Underlying influences on health and mortality trends in post-industrial regions of Europe by Daniels, Gordon A.
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniels, Gordon A. (2014) Underlying influences on health and mortality 
trends in post-industrial regions of Europe. PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5697/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
  
Underlying influences on health and mortality 
trends in post-industrial regions of Europe 
 
Gordon A Daniels: BA, MSc 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD 
 
 
University of Glasgow College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, Institute 
of Health and Wellbeing, Public Health research group 
 
 
 
 
2014 
 
 
 
 
2 
Abstract 
 
This Thesis is part of a wider programme of work being pursued by the Glasgow 
Centre for Population Health (GCPH) which is examining health outcomes in 
West Central Scotland and other post-industrial regions throughout Europe.  
 
Background 
Scotland‘s health has been improving since the industrial revolution but its 
position relative to improving trends within Europe has been deteriorating. This 
is recent, dating from the period since the Second World War and becoming 
more problematical over the past three decades. While deprivation is a 
fundamental determinant of health, in the case of Scotland (and particularly 
West Central Scotland (WCS)) it does not explain the entire extent of the higher 
levels of mortality. There is, of course, a well established link between 
deindustrialisation, deprivation and poor health. However, the unexplained 
additional mortality in Scotland and WCS (the Scottish Effect) compared to other 
similar post-industrial regions and the time scale of Scotland‘s worsening 
relative health status, require further investigation. Other research has 
examined this question using a range of well established public health principles 
and methods. This thesis adds to this understanding by providing a comparative 
analysis of the political and socioeconomic contexts for the observed mortality 
trends.  
 
Setting 
Post-industrial change is discussed at three levels. These are (i) International 
regions – Eastern Europe and Western Europe (ii) Countries – Scotland within the 
UK is compared with two Eastern European (Poland and the Czech Republic) and 
two Western European (France and Germany) countries. (iii) Regions within 
countries that have been subject to deindustrialisation. Five post-industrial 
regions are investigated (West Central Scotland, The Ruhr, Germany, Nord Pas-
de-Calais, France, Katowice, Poland and Northern Moravia, Czech Republic). 
These regions were selected because they are analogous in their experience of 
deindustrialisation but diverse in their political and socioeconomic histories. 
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Methods 
 
The main aim of the thesis is to determine what aspects of the political and 
socioeconomic context in WCS have diverged from comparable post-industrial 
regions of Europe and whether these might form the basis of potential 
explanations for the region‘s poor health record. Two methods were employed.  
First, a detailed narrative literature review was undertaken to examine political 
and socioeconomic change in the post-war period at the national level with a 
particular focus on policy responses to deindustrialisation. Second, case studies 
were conducted on the five regions listed above. These examined political and 
socioeconomic changes in each of the five regions in some detail using published 
data and a variety of literatures as source materials. In this way a rich but 
diverse picture of economic restructuring as a response to deindustrialisation 
emerged. Insights from the literature review and case studies were then brought 
together to formulate some conclusions about why health in WCS has suffered 
more adverse effects than in the other four regions. 
Findings  
This thesis has shown that there was a broad correspondence between life 
expectancy and the socioeconomic/political success of states in Central East 
Europe and Western Europe during the 20th Century. When states prosper and 
their governments enjoy the confidence of the population, health improves. In 
all the countries covered in this analysis, deindustrialisation damaged health and 
slowed improvements in life expectancy (in some cases putting it into reverse). 
The institutional path dependencies and country-specific factors outlined in this 
thesis help to explain the divergence in policy responses and subsequent 
economic development that can be observed in each of the five regions and their 
parent countries. The five countries and regions have each taken a different 
approach to deindustrialisation, have varied in the levels of social protection 
provided and each manifests a very different context. In response to economic 
restructuring (and associated social costs), policy in WCS (and the UK) has 
focused primarily on narrow economic growth policies, emphasising employment 
and physical regeneration, but not social outcomes such as community cohesion 
and sustainability. 
4 
Conclusions 
Detailed comparisons suggest that WCS negotiated deindustrialisation less 
successfully than the other regions. However, it is important to note that the 
other regions are not ‗better‘ than WCS on all factors: there is a complex picture 
to be understood in each region. Rather, what seems to emerge is that there are 
a series of national and regional factors at work in WCS which have made the 
aftershock of deindustrialisation particularly severe and may have contributed to 
poorer health outcomes. 
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Underlying influences on health trends in post-
industrial regions of Europe.   
1. Introduction  
This thesis seeks to better understand the health status of the people of West 
Central Scotland (WCS) in the period following deindustrialisation. It will do so 
by reviewing the political and socioeconomic history of WCS and comparable 
regions of both Western and Eastern Europe, examining some key data trends for 
these areas in more detail and setting these observations in the context of 
theories which consider links between social and economic systems and health 
outcomes. 
The rationale for the selection of the specific regions is set out in methods 
section 2.4.1. The four comparator regions selected are: Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
(France); the Ruhr area (Germany); Katowice/Silesia (Poland); Northern Moravia 
(Czech Republic). These regions all share an industrial legacy and generally have 
experienced the most comparable levels of deindustrialisation (measured as the 
decrease in industrial employment) as WCS in recent decades. In addition, each 
operated within a distinct geopolitical region and (now) 
capitalist/socioeconomic system and has been subject to neoliberal change – 
acknowledged as an uneven process and experienced differently according to 
national and regional contexts. An understanding of this process and the 
divergence between these regions should provide explanatory potential for the 
divergence in life expectancy between WCS and similar post-industrial regions.  
 
Before outlining the main aim and objectives of this thesis and specific research 
questions to be addressed, this chapter will first introduce the region of WCS 
and the significance of post-industrial change and will set out some ideas on the 
determinants of health.  
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The region of WCS1 is home to 2.2 million people who form approximately 43 per 
cent of the total Scottish population (NRS 2011). It comprises the eleven local 
authority areas shown in Figure 1.1. The centre of the region (historically, 
economically and culturally) is the city of Glasgow and the adjoining Clydeside 
conurbation which includes the towns along the lower course of the River Clyde 
such as Paisley, Renfrew, Clydebank, Dumbarton, Port Glasgow, and Greenock. 
Historically, the fortunes of WCS were very much aligned to those of the British 
Empire with much of the region‘s wealth derived from trading imported goods 
and processing raw materials such as sugar, cotton, and tobacco (Gibb 1983). 
The development of heavy engineering in the 19th century, particularly of 
locomotives and ships destined for markets in the Empire and beyond, led to the 
formation of an industrial nexus around Clydeside supported by the steel and 
coal producing industries of the wider region (Hume & Moss 1977).  
 
Figure 1.1: West Central Scotland Region 
 
 
                                         
1
 WCS comprises the same eleven local authority areas used in the first Aftershock report 
discussed later in this chapter: East Ayrshire, East Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, 
Glasgow City, Inverclyde, North Ayrshire, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, South Ayrshire, 
South Lanarkshire, and West Dunbartonshire.  
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During this period, the pace of industrialisation was rapid and by the beginning 
of the twentieth century, WCS had ―the biggest concentration of heavy industry 
in Britain‖ (Foster 2001:417). The region‘s burgeoning industrial workforce was 
augmented by the rural population of the Scottish highlands who were forced by 
changes in land ownership and agricultural practices to settle elsewhere (Devine 
1994). The second major source of migrant labour came from Irish immigrants 
fleeing the Irish potato famine in particular, and rural poverty more generally 
(Foster et al. 2011). These developments caused the city of Glasgow and its 
hinterland to experience rapid population growth until around 1919. Thereafter, 
the rate of growth slowed, peaking around the middle of the century before 
moving into a decline that stabilised during the 1990s (Lever 1991:985).  
 
During the period of population expansion in the second half of the 19th century, 
industry in WCS enjoyed a competitive advantage and grew rapidly. However, by 
as early as the 1920s, heavy industry in the region was in decline, mainly 
because it was unable or unwilling to adapt to changing circumstances or 
implement new technologies and practices (Kurth 1979; MacInnes 1995). To 
some extent, the onset of the Second World War masked this decline as the 
industries around the Clyde responded to the wartime imperative for increased 
production. The result was that in the immediate post-war period Clydeside was 
producing 20 per cent of the world‘s output in ships and this prominence was not 
solely due to the interim dislocation of other suppliers. Steel production in the 
region was also booming, largely due to the demand from shipbuilders (Foster 
2003:58).   
 
The demand created by World War II and subsequent post-war reconstruction led 
to higher levels of industrial employment, reaching a peak in 1961 (when 51 per 
cent of the total working population were employed in industry) (Census 1961). 
However, the truth was more complex: the industrial decline evident in the 
inter-war period had not been rectified. By the 1950s, WCS‘s competitive 
advantage was effectively lost. This was due to a significant lack of 
technological investment and modernisation, in part by the state but also 
inherited from the large but indebted family firms that owned the most 
important industries (Payne 1996).  This was exacerbated by the renewal of 
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heavy industries in the countries that had experienced damage to their industrial 
infrastructure during the war.   
 
The shipbuilding industry was particularly affected as it was still using 
technology from the 1800s which was in the hands of a workforce characterised 
by multiple, fractious unions (Strath 1987; Lorenz 1991; Bristow 2009). In short, 
industry in WCS was becoming difficult to manage and extremely costly to 
sustain: the result was a continuing reduction in its share of world markets 
(Devine 2000).  
By the 1990s, WCS had lost its historical specialisation in engineering and service 
industries had begun to comprise the majority of the economic base (Foster 
2003:60). However, services without a secure and innovative production base 
tend to be technologically limited. Moreover, a solid manufacturing base is a 
critical component in the sustained development of service activities (Capron & 
Debande 1997).  Only in the 1990s did employment begin to recover. However, 
the recovery has not been without its problems and the region continues to face 
a number of social and economic challenges (Paddison 1993; Dorling et al. 2008).  
1.1 The Aftershock of Deindustrialisation  
It is within this context of industrial change that Scotland came to be labelled by 
the media the ‗sick man of Europe‘ (Leon et al. 2003; NY Times 2004). This label 
is not without justification, as recent analyses have demonstrated that Scotland 
has the highest levels of premature and working age mortality of any western 
European country for both males and females (ScotPHO 2007; Whyte 2007). Post-
industrial decline and its many associated factors (in particular multiple 
deprivation) are commonly referred to as the major underlying influences 
contributing to Scotland‘s poor health profile (Carstairs & Morris 1989; Scottish 
Council Foundation 1998; Scottish Office 1999). This is particularly true in 
relation to WCS where Scotland‘s post-industrial decline has been most severe.  
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It is this situation that contributed to the establishment of The Glasgow Centre 
for Population Health2 (GCPH) which has sought to develop a better 
understanding of health and health inequalities with a particular focus on 
Glasgow and WCS. Two recently published findings from the researchers linked 
to GCPH have led to deeper debate about the role of deprivation as a single and 
unproblematic explanation for the poor health profile in WCS. The first was a 
paper by Hanlon et al. in 2005 entitled: ―Why is mortality higher in Scotland 
than in England and Wales? Decreasing influence of socioeconomic deprivation 
between 1981 and 2001 supports the existence of a ‗Scottish Effect‘‖. This 
paper reinforced the centrality of deprivation as the single most important cause 
of ill health in WCS. However, it also established that Scotland had an excess 
mortality above that which could be accounted for by standard measures of 
deprivation, such as the Carstairs Index3.  Deprivation accounted for much of 
Scotland‘s excess mortality but the proportion of excess deaths that could be 
attributed to deprivation was much less than had been the case in the 1980s. 
The additional mortality beyond that which could be explained by deprivation 
was called the ‗Scottish Effect‘. It is important to note the ‗Scottish Effect‘ has 
an impact across all social strata and throughout Scotland. However, it is most 
evident in Glasgow and WCS (Hanlon et al. 2005).  
 
A second paper The Aftershock of Deindustrialisation: Trends in mortality in 
Scotland and other parts of post-industrial Europe (Walsh et al. 2008, 20094) 
examined the same issue (Scotland‘s high levels of mortality and the role of 
deprivation linked to deindustrialisation) from a different perspective. It 
identified other European regions that had experienced collapses of industrial 
employment and explored what impacts these had on their health trends.  
 
                                         
2
 The Glasgow Centre for Population Health (GCPH) was established in 2004 as a resource to 
generate insights and evidence, to create new solutions and provide leadership for action to 
improve health and tackle inequality. 
3
 Developed by Carstairs and Morris (1991), the Index of Deprivation is applied in spatial 
epidemiology to identify socioeconomic confounding. Developed for Scotland it was an 
alternative to the Townsend Index of Deprivation to avoid the use of households as denominators 
(Elliot, 1997). The Index is based on four census indicators: low social class, lack of car 
ownership, overcrowding and male unemployment. Areas are then split by postcode using these 
variables.  
4
 Regarding The Aftershock of Deindustrialisation, there is both a detailed report (Walsh et al. 
2008) and academic paper (Walsh et al. 2009). 
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The Aftershock report presented three types of trends for a set of 
deindustrialised European and UK regions: overall mortality trends, age and sex-
specific mortality trends and cause specific mortality trends. In terms of overall 
mortality, the report found that male (see Figure 1.2) and female life 
expectancy for WCS was improving more slowly than in almost every other 
selected European region. As Figure 1.2 illustrates, WCS males at the end of the 
period analysed (2003/05) had lower life expectancy than those from each of the 
other regions except Katowice in Poland and Northern Moravia in the Czech 
Republic. However, the rates of improvement in life expectancy in these two 
regions compared to WCS suggested that these regions will overtake WCS if those 
trends continued. WCS females (data not shown) also had lower life expectancy 
than the other selected regions and improvement rates were also faster in the 
comparator regions (Walsh et al. 2009).  
 
It should be noted that infant and childhood mortality rates in WCS compared 
reasonably well with rates recorded in the other regions. However, this was not 
the case for the working aged populations.   
 
Figure 1.2: Male life expectancy for WSC and ten post-industrial regions 
 
Source: Taulbut et al. 2011 
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In terms of age and sex-specific mortality, Figure 1.3 illustrates all-cause 
standardised mortality rates for WCS males aged between 15 and 44 years 
compared to the maximum, minimum and mean rates recorded in other regions 
(including WCS itself). The findings here are as important as they are surprising. 
In most cases WCS death rates were improving but at a lower rate than much of 
the rest of the UK and Europe (that is, a relative decline). However, in younger 
working-aged men, death rates in WCS had been increasing since the 1990s while 
death rates in this age group in the other regions that have experienced a similar 
industrial decline were decreasing5 (Walsh et al. 2009). In short, for this age 
group, WCS experienced an absolute as well as relative worsening relative to the 
other regions. 
 
Figure 1.3
6
: Mortality of working aged men in WCS with European comparators  
 
Source: Walsh et al. 2009 
 
 
 
                                         
5
 The pattern for females, although less marked, is similar to the trend for males, with an 
increase in rates from the mid-1990s onwards. 
6
 Selected European regions are: the Ruhr, Saxony, Katowice, Northern Moravia, Nord-Pas-de-
Calais, Wallonia, Limburg, Northern Ireland, Swansea and South Wales Coalfields and 
Merseyside.  
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Figure 1.4
7
: Impact of alcohol in WCS among 15 to 44 years old males 
 
Source: Walsh et al. 2009 
 
In terms of cause-specific mortality, there appeared to be a number of key 
causes driving the increase in total WCS mortality rates in the 15 to 44 year age 
group. Deaths from circulatory system diseases or all cancers were not higher in 
WCS than in other regions for this younger working age group.  These conditions 
become important for older age groups.  
 
Scotland‘s excess mortality in younger working aged males was primarily due to 
deaths from suicide, violence, drug use and chronic liver disease due to alcohol.  
Figure 1.4 illustrates dramatically the impact of alcohol in WCS among 15 to 44 
years old males where, over the past 25 years, there has been a marked increase 
in mortality from chronic liver disease due to alcoholic cirrhosis.  The trend for 
females was similar but less dramatic and in both instances WCS‘s relative 
position had shifted from being significantly below the regional average in the 
earlier years of the analysis to being the highest of all the post-industrial regions 
analysed (Walsh et al. 2009).  
 
                                         
7
 See above.  
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Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, highlight life expectancy and health trends since the 
1980s. This is the period during which the relatively poor improvement in life 
expectancy in WCS became evident. However, the narrative of the thesis covers 
a longer time-frame because it is important to understand longer term political 
and socioeconomic forces that may have contributed to these trends (the time 
relationship between social and economic determinants of health and 
subsequent health outcomes is complex and is discussed in relevant sections 
later in this Thesis). 
 
Since the publication of the original Aftershock Report, two further pieces of 
work have from the perspective of WCS added to the understanding of this 
phenomenon.  
 
First, quantitative analyses were carried out to examine a range of important 
health determinants (socioeconomic factors, environmental factors, health 
behaviours etc.) in WCS and a subset of the post-industrial regions included in 
the Aftershock Report (Taulbut et al. 2011). While this work added greatly to the 
texture and detail of the regional comparisons, its most striking finding was that 
the most marked differences that could be observed were between continental 
Europe and all the UK regions considered. One example is economic inequality. 
The continental European Regions demonstrated less economic inequality than 
the UK regions but there were no important differences between WCS and the 
other UK regions in this regard (Taulbut et al. 2011).  
 
This challenge was addressed by a second piece of work: the Three Cities study 
which focused on Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester (Walsh et al. 2010). This 
showed the current deprivation profiles of these three cities to be almost 
identical. If deprivation was the primary determinant of mortality, very similar 
mortality rates would therefore be expected in all three cities. However, 
premature deaths in Glasgow were shown to be more than 30 per cent higher 
and all deaths around 15 per cent higher than in Liverpool or Manchester (Walsh 
et al. 2010). This ‗excess‘ mortality was seen across virtually all ages of the 
population (except the very young), in both males and females, and in deprived 
and non-deprived neighbourhoods.  
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What these results demonstrate is that while deprivation resulting from post-
industrial change adversely affects health in all the post-industrial regions 
examined, we cannot conclude that the health trends observed in WCS over 
recent decades can be entirely explained by the aftershock of 
deindustrialisation. While never losing sight of the centrality of deprivation as a 
key influence on health, the higher levels of mortality in WCS require other 
explanations. A number of potential explanations for the ‗Scottish Effect‘ have 
been identified and summarised in a report published by GCPH in which a total 
of seventeen candidate ‗hypotheses‘ were identified ranging from ‗downstream‘ 
health determinants to ‗upstream‘ societal phenomena (for further discussion 
see McCartney et al. 2012). GCPH is currently engaged in a variety of qualitative 
and quantitative studies to further investigate the ‗Glasgow/Scottish Effects‘.  
 
In summary, it is now clear that the Aftershock report challenged a consensus. It 
called into question the idea that the only important explanation for WCS‘s poor 
health compared to the rest of Western Europe (and increasingly Central Eastern 
Europe) is the nature and severity of deprivation linked to deindustrialisation in 
this part of Scotland. To be clear, there is no debate that deindustrialisation, 
associated as it has been with material deprivation and high rates of health 
damaging behaviours (Carstairs & Morris 1989; Scottish Office 1999; Scottish 
Executive 2000; Scottish Council Foundation 1998), is responsible for much of 
Scotland‘s and WCS‘s poor health. What is being questioned is the perception 
that all of the health outcomes in WCS in recent decades can be explained in 
terms of the region having suffered more and greater industrial shocks than most 
other parts of Europe (Devine 2005; Payne 1996) and that this provides a 
sufficient explanation for observed health and social trends.  
 
One important piece of evidence is that Scotland‘s poor health status within a 
European context is relatively recent, dating from the period since WWII and 
becoming more problematical over the past three decades (Leon et al. 2003). 
 
In light of these findings, questions emerge about whether there are aspects of 
the political and socioeconomic context in WCS that differ from comparable 
post-industrial regions of Europe and which might form the basis of potential 
explanations for the region‘s poor health record. It is against this background 
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that the more specific research questions addressed in this thesis were 
developed.  
 
1.1.1 How this work differs and what it adds to GCPH? 
In researching the Glasgow Effect, the GCPH has recognised that its own 
strengths lie in epidemiology, data collection, public health information and 
awareness of the determinants of health. A large programme of that research 
relates to increasing understanding regards why WCS‘s health differs from other 
post-industrial regions. GCPH's approach has majored on data-driven 
epidemiological analyses. However, the findings of those analyses show a clear 
need for the evidence to be viewed in the context of historical, socioeconomic 
and political circumstances, all issues that are known to be profoundly important 
for population health but are outside the GCPH‘s core area of expertise.  
 
Consequently, they funded this PhD research. The contribution of this thesis, 
therefore, has been to conduct a deeper exploration of these important factors 
in order to increase understanding regarding the underlying influence on the 
divergence in life expectancy between WCS and other post-industrial regions. It 
provides a complementary analysis which uses epidemiological data (largely) 
collected in other studies the aim of which is to increase understanding and 
account for divergence, by providing a detailed analysis of themes such as 
economic and institutional development, deindustrialisation, economic 
restructuring and social protection.  
 
What will become evident is that these analyses provide the distinctive 
contribution of this thesis to the wider body of work still being pursued by the 
GCPH to better understand WCS‘s poor health. They also contribute to the wider 
body of academic literature concerning comparative political economy, 
economic development, economic/regional geography, new social risks and the 
wider socioeconomic determinants of health.  
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1.2 The determinants of health in populations 
The social and economic changes associated with the structural developments 
that characterise post-industrialism appear to have an adverse influence on 
health and wellbeing as a consequence of: 
―abrupt changes in ways of life, cultural patterns, migration patterns 
and losses of income and security especially among the least 
occupationally-skilled segments of society‖ (Harvey-Brenner et al. 
2011:3).  
As Harvey-Brenner et al. note: 
―economic growth (or development) may well benefit the ‗average‘ 
population, it may also cause net harm to many distinctive and large 
population groups who experience loss as a result of skill obsolescence 
and sweeping change in the international division of labour‖ (2011:4) 
It is clear, even from these short descriptions, that the relationship between 
deindustrialisation and health is complex. As such, it is important to set an 
analysis of this relationship in the context of what the public health world refers 
to as ‗the determinants of health‘ (Marmot & Wilkinson 1999). 
The historical view from a public health perspective has always been that 
genetic endowment, expressed through biology, interacts with the environment 
(physical, biological and social) over the whole life course to determine health 
outcomes (Evans & Stoddart 1994). The so-called Biomedical Model has been 
contrasted with this broader public health perspective and has been criticised 
for being too narrow because it is only concerned with biological and 
behavioural precursors of disease. For example, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (2008) concluded that 
divergence in health service access alone could not account for health 
inequalities and that wider social determinants play a central role. So, while the 
Biomedical Model has its place in medical care, an understanding of population 
health requires analyses of what are increasingly being called ‗the social 
determinants of health‘ (e.g. Marmot & Wilkinson 1999).  
The WHO asserts that political and socioeconomic contexts generate structural 
determinants of health, defined as including: governance, macroeconomic 
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policies, social policies (labour, social welfare, housing), public policies 
(education, medical care) and cultural and societal values (2007:22). These 
structural determinants are considered, along with socioeconomic position 
(relating to education income, class, access to resources, status etc.), gender 
and ethnicity (race), to have an underlying influence on intermediary 
determinants (material circumstances, behaviours and biological factors, 
psychosocial factors) which ―impact on equity in health and well-being‖ 
(2007:48). 
 
The inequalities that exist in the distribution of income, employment, skills, 
education, housing and so on are determinants of health inequalities (Graham 
2000). As such, these determinants are systematically associated with social 
disadvantage and marginalisation (Braveman & Gruskin 2003). The list above 
might be considered the ‗material‘ determinants of health and health 
inequalities. Other writers have added to these by suggesting that one‘s position 
in the socioeconomic hierarchy can also have psychosocial influences on health 
(Wilkinson 1996; Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). The argument here is that the ill 
health effects of being relatively poor in a rich society are not only mediated 
through material influences but also impact through the lived experience of 
being relatively poor (for example, this may give rise to higher levels of chronic 
stress) (Marmot et al. 1978). 
 
The point that needs to be made in the context of this thesis is that, while the 
broad association between social factors and health is well established (Marmot 
& Wilkinson 1999; Solar & Irwin 2007), direct causal relationships are not so well 
understood or established (Shaw et al. 1999). The pathways are likely to be 
many, complex and interacting.  
Consider some reasonably direct pathways of causation: socioeconomic status 
can influence health directly through the influence of material deprivation in 
terms of an individuals or populations health status, or via access to services like 
health care and education. The reverse is also true to a small extent: health can 
influence socioeconomic status due to the effect of health on labour market 
outcomes, such as unemployment and early retirement (Bartley & Owen 1996; 
Bartley, Ferrie & Montgomery 2006) and earnings (Contoyannis & Rice 2001; 
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Gambin 2005). However, as far back as the Black Report (DHSS 1980) it has been 
clear that these more direct relationships (while important) only explain a small 
part of the variability in health outcomes across the socioeconomic gradient.  
It is such complexities that led to the development of models of determinants of 
health. One of the most recognised is the Evans and Stoddart (1990) model of 
the determinants of health (see Figure 1.5) which provides a broad conceptual 
framework for considering the factors that influence health in a community. The 
model was informed by the ‗McKeown Thesis‘ (McKeown 1979) which posited 
that the health of populations is determined by many factors in the social and 
economic environment outwith the formal health care system. Identification and 
understanding of the pathways by which socioeconomic factors impact health 
can inform and shape policies designed to mitigate the effects of societal change 
on population health and health inequalities (Evans & Stoddart 1990; Adler et 
al., 1993). 
What models of the determinants of health like that of Evans and Stoddart (E & 
S) emphasise is that the determinants are interactive and, although not easily 
shown diagrammatically, these interactions take place over time and over the 
life course. As such, levels of prosperity and inequality interact with the physical 
and social environment to determine emergent health behaviours and outcomes 
(that are also influenced by genetics and biology - also subject to environmental 
factors). 
Moreover, they illustrate the societal processes and influences underlying the 
inequalities which determine health (living and working conditions and the 
broader social structures in which they are embedded) and individual-level risk 
factors (like health behaviours).  There is no simple determinism here but, as 
the country/regional analysis that will be reported in this thesis demonstrates, 
broad patterns can be discerned.  
The E & S model has been used previously by the GCPH for its work on both 
community and regional health profiles. Therefore, it seemed consistent to use 
it in this context. E & S provided an agenda for the initial literature search and 
review. It was particularly relevant to the work done on CEE. For example, can 
the deterioration in life expectancy, experienced from the 1980s and 
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exacerbated by the collapse of communism,  be explained in terms of any single 
health field – that is via specific changes in physical environment, health 
services, health related behaviours and so on. The same rationale was then 
applied to other broad issues investigated by this thesis – namely, the post-war 
improvement in life expectancy in Europe and the relative decline in life 
expectancy or increase in health inequalities in post-industrial regions. This 
work, led to the synthesis of thinking about causal pathways that is outlined 
below. 
Figure 1.5: Evans & Stoddart (1990) Model of the Determinants of Health 
 
In terms of why health improves or deteriorates, it is useful to consider four 
mechanisms: 
1. Direct causation – for example industrial pollution leading to lung disease. 
2. Complex causation – for example, increased prosperity in Western Europe 
led to diets richer in fats and sugars and an increase in smoking both of 
which contributed to the increases in heart disease reported in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Similarly, the collapse of communism in Central East Europe 
affected cultural and behavioural pathways that had adverse impacts on 
health behaviours, particularly in those parts of the region and sections of 
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society most affected by the associated political and socioeconomic 
change. 
3. Emergent – this refers to circumstances where a complex, interacting 
system of causation causes the emergence of health outcomes without a 
clear pathway to explain causation. For example significant political and 
socioeconomic change influences the economy, the physical and social 
environment, personal behaviour and the provision of services – the result 
is emergent changes in health. The rise in life expectancy in the 
prosperous economies of Western Europe after WWII is an example of this 
type of emergence.   
4. Emergent but with a clearer final pathway – for example the alcohol-
related harm experienced in Russia arising out of a historical drinking 
culture in a country that was then subjected to the social, economic and 
cultural changes that accompanied the fall of communism. Alcohol-
related deaths were responsible for much of the increase in mortality but 
it would be simplistic to say that alcohol ‗caused‘ the rise in mortality. 
All four pathways are relevant to this analysis. However, it will be shown that 
simple direct pathways like the effects of pollution on respiratory health are 
considered to be of lesser importance by most analysts. Instead, although 
cardiovascular and other non-communicable diseases associated with damaging 
health behaviours are the main, proximal causes of excess mortality in some 
regions of Europe (in other words, these have been the primary causes of death 
in the post-industrial era), the progressive consensus is that the ‗causes behind 
the causes‘ (Marmot 2004) have better explanatory potential. As such, 
mechanisms three and four are critical. What we are dealing with here is the 
lifecourse and lifeworlds of individuals and the interaction between them - 
scaled up to the population level where death rates are measured (Kelly et al. 
2006). This is a complex argument. When we say, for example, that rates of 
heart disease increased, this can often be ‗explained‘ in terms of a well known 
set of coronary heart disease risk factors. However, what will be understood in 
this thesis is that health-related behaviours and classical risk factors in and of 
themselves do not provide a sufficient explanation for the excess rates of 
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cardiovascular illness and mortality at a population level: other factors are at 
play.  
Those who support the ‗Psychosocial Hypothesis‘ (Bobak & Marmot 1996, 2006; 
Hertzman et al. 1996; Cornia & Paniccià  2000; Lachman & Weaver  1998; van 
Oort 2005) maintain that the impact on health of a poor socioeconomic situation 
is mediated by psychosocial factors. According to this hypothesis, socioeconomic 
dissatisfaction and people‘s inability, perceived or real, to influence their own 
circumstances by engaging in political and civic life results in a situation of 
relative or perceived deprivation. According to this view, psychosocial 
wellbeing, mediated by limitations on personal freedom and control, insecurity, 
social relationships, support and participation, is considered particularly 
important in terms of health inequalities.   
It is important to note that models of determinants of health, such as that of E & 
S, are about health and not just disease. Protective and health enhancing factors 
matter: for example, maintenance of prosperity and social protection. Moreover, 
an individual‘s or group‘s situation vis-à-vis society and the economy or political 
system may, therefore, be particularly germane to developing understanding of 
the impacts of large-scale processes of economic change on health. This is 
perhaps best understood in terms of people‘s position relative to the labour 
market, for example: security, inequalities in income, skills and knowledge, 
status and control in the work place, society and family and anomie.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with the social and economic context of 
deindustrialisation and consequential post-industrial change. If it were a work of 
more orthodox public health analysis, it could be argued that equal weight 
should be given to each of the fields in the E & S model. However, while this 
thesis aims to identify possible explanations for patterns of health in Europe‘s 
post-industrial regions, in terms of a broad conception of the determinants of 
health, it will do so from the starting point of post-war economic development 
onto the period of ‗deindustrialisation‘ and the policy responses that emerged 
thereafter. As the analysis unfolds it will become evident that the thesis uses an 
awareness of the broader determinants of health (as expressed in the E & S 
model) to account for the divergence in life expectancy with a particular focus 
on 2 aspects of deindustrialisation. First, how severe was the nature and pace of 
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deindustrialisation and, second, what efforts were made to provide social 
protection to the populations that were experiencing deindustrialisation? The 
questions are addressed for each of the countries and regions that are studied. 
To ensure that differences in the broader determinants of health are not 
neglected, a third question is asked – what differences in context (determinants 
of health, political economy, economic restructuring) can be observed in each of 
the regions studied?  
What will become clear is that the E & S model provided the theoretical 
framework which determined the variables that were examined to understand 
variation between countries and regions in health outcomes. However, the 
research aims of the thesis led logically to the selection of variables that 
answered the three questions set out above: namely what were the differences 
in (i) speed and nature of deindustrialisation (ii) levels and nature of social 
support (iii) context between the regions and countries studied? 
1.3 Aim and objectives  
The main aim of the thesis is to determine what aspects of the political and 
socioeconomic context in WCS diverge from comparable post-industrial regions 
of Europe and whether these might form the basis of potential explanations for 
the region‘s poor health record. The anticipated outcomes of the thesis are (i) a 
rich narrative review of the countries and regions, designed to complement the 
data driven analysis carried out in both the Aftershock Report and subsequent 
second stage research (ii) enhanced learning among those investigating the 
Aftershock phenomenon (iii) emergence of hypotheses, for testing in other ways. 
Although the findings may add to, or detract from, evidence to support any one 
of the hypotheses under consideration by the GCPH, the research described here 
is not designed to test hypotheses. Rather, it may help to generate further 
hypotheses or refine our understanding of existing hypothesis.  
To assist in achieving this aim, the GCPH defined a number of objectives. The 
objectives are listed below and as described in the methods chapter provided 
and important initial focus, useful in reviewing a wide range of literatures.  
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1. Describe in broad terms the political and socioeconomic changes that 
affected them since WWII. 
2. Describe what happened to life expectancy in this period and 
identify/assess hypotheses that explain links between political and 
socioeconomic change and life expectancy.  
3. Describe the pattern (timing, rate and nature) of 
deindustrialisation/privatisation and identify variations to the general 
pattern.  
4. Define the typologies of policy response to 
deindustrialisation/privatisation.  
5. Define the level of social protection, including welfare provision and 
broader social protection, available to those affected by 
deindustrialisation/privatisation. 
6. Summarise the factors that emerge as being most important in alleviating 
the health and social impacts of deindustrialisation/privatisation.  
The objectives provided guidelines without a tight enough focus. As such, the 
results could be unyielding.  A framework was required to present the findings in 
a manner which was coherent yet still reflected the interrelatedness and 
complexity of the areas discussed. Therefore, as awareness developed, more 
specific and relevant research questions were formulated. Although informed by 
the aim and objectives, the research questions were established in order to 
account for the divergence in life expectancy between these regions as a 
consequence of the underlying influence of post-industrial change both at the 
national and regional level. 
Those research questions were as follows: 
 Why, and to what extent, are there different socioeconomic models 
(approaches to economic development) in each country/region? 
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 Why, and to what extent, were the responses to post-industrial change 
different (in terms of economic restructuring and social protection) in 
each country/region? 
 Why, and to what extent, did policies at the national level help/hinder 
their respective regions? 
 Why might these differences account for the divergence in life expectancy 
between these countries/regions?  
1.4 The structure of the thesis  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2, provides a rationale and 
defence of the methods adopted namely the narrative literature review and case 
studies. In addition, it provides a rationale for the choice of selected post-
industrial regions.  
 
Chapter 3 aims to provide some important context, regarding post-industrial 
change at the national level, for the selected regions. It provides a synthesis of 
the detailed narrative literature review included in Appendix A which covers the 
objectives and research questions outlined previously in section 1.3 at the 
national level.  
 
Chapters 4-8, constitute the main body of the thesis and provide a case study for 
each of the selected regions. The structure of the case studies is shaped by the 
research questions and structured as follows: historical development; 
deindustrialisation; national response; regional response; changing 
socioeconomic context and social protection.  
 
Chapter 9 contains 2 main sections. The first, deals explicitly with the research 
questions. It includes a set of tables that outline the key facts and judgements, 
in accounting for the divergence between the selected regions. The second 
reflects a more classical discussion chapter. It expands critically on the 
judgements made, reflects critically on the strengths and weaknesses and 
provides a final set of conclusions and recommendations.  
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2. Methods 
As described in the previous chapter, descriptions of the influences on health in 
post-industrial nations are well established in the public health literature.  
Moreover, although there is no clear consensus as to the relative importance of 
specific influences or the pathways through which they act, there is a common 
acceptance that a range of factors impact on health and that social, political 
and economic processes are key. The broad question, in the context of this 
thesis therefore, is to explore for each country/region of interest the degree to 
which these influences are more or less prevalent, why that is, and why these 
areas might therefore be more resilient than WCS. As this is essentially a 
comparative piece of research the choice of methods available to meet this 
purpose is not extensive. A data driven approach could be part of the answer but 
this was an approach already being conducted by the GCPH.  
2.1 Overview of methods  
This thesis revises a previous submission of work. The first submission adopted 
what was ostensibly a narrative review, which resulted in a large amount of 
descriptive and narrative material. In light of the stated aims and objectives for 
the research, the lack of analysis and evidence of a unique contribution in that 
initial submission were cited as weaknesses. To rectify this and to facilitate a 
more focused approach the aims and objectives were developed into research 
questions that could more adequately account for and explain the divergence 
between these regions. In addition, different methods have now been used to 
address the different facets of the research. 
The 2008 Report The Aftershock of Deindustrialisation (trends in mortality in 
Scotland and other parts of post-industrial Europe) was a quantitative data 
driven exercise based on a set of ecological studies.  The methods outlined here 
are appropriate to a complementary approach, drawing upon the data and 
insights provided by the Aftershock Report but addressing a different set of 
research questions. When embarking on the work described in this thesis, it was 
recognised that the research needed to reflect the complexity and inter-
relatedness of the issues discussed and compare the regions' political and 
socioeconomic development in some depth.  
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Therefore, went back to first principle – asked does this require a quantitative or 
qualitative methodology – the simple answer was both. Although, quantitative 
methods were not the author‘s strength, or, necessarily, the means to answer 
the questions being researched, they were critically important. The quantitative 
methods had been the foundation of the ‗aftershock‘ work and as such they 
were critical in the genesis of this research. Moreover, data included here was 
identified from a number of sources including data collected for the ‗Aftershock‘ 
work and associated post-industrial regional comparisons (see Taulbet et al. 
2011). Qualitative work was therefore required to interpret the data presented 
and, more importantly, explain and account for the divergence between the 
selected regions. In addition, the qualitative work provided a logical framework 
to decide and present data, see section 3.4, which lent itself to the case study 
approach used for the regional level and discussed later in this chapter.  
 
The dual-method research design adopted facilitated the thesis aims of going 
beyond describing post-industrial change in specific countries and regions, to 
identifying the dominant causal structures shaping post-industrial change and 
possibly influencing health. While the qualitative methods sought to address 
‗why‘ and ‗how‘ post-industrial change and the associated outcomes vary, the 
quantitative methods mainly describe ‗to what extent‘.  
First, a narrative-literature review was undertaken to examine political and 
socioeconomic change in the post-war period at the national level with a 
particular focus on policy responses to deindustrialisation and any link with 
health inequalities, in particular life expectancy.  To varying degrees this 
contributed to answering the stated objectives and research questions albeit at 
the national level.  Second, case studies were used to examine political and 
socioeconomic change at the regional level, particularly looking at economic 
restructuring as a response to deindustrialisation and privatisation and the 
impact that might have had on health inequalities, in particular life expectancy. 
This approach addressed the stated objectives and research questions at the 
regional level. Together these methods provided findings that contributed to an 
understanding of the divergence between these regions and could be synthesised 
to yield new understandings concerning the experience of WCS relative to 
comparable post-industrial regions.  
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2.2 Rationale for methods  
Analyses in comparative political and regional economy can contribute to the 
understanding of health inequalities between societies. Given the evidence of 
the determinants of health – it is likely that divergent approaches to economic 
development, economic restructuring and social protection will mediate health 
inequalities. A comparison between the countries/regions selected here, can 
further add credibility and contribute to that evidence base. The social gradient 
in health and cross-regional variation (illustrated by the Aftershock report) 
suggests these inequalities are not a consequence, solely, of health selection but 
are in fact socially produced. As such, health inequalities are considered to some 
extent avoidable and therefore modifiable (Dahlgren & Whitehead 2007).   
 
Research has been done to identify features of societal context that affects 
health outcomes. Macro comparative design has been utilised by researchers in 
public health as it offers an efficient way to reveal underlying political 
determinants, typically homogeneous within nations and thus only identified 
through studies examining multiple countries (Rose 2001). Such studies compare 
clusters of nations with common political traditions, democratic systems, or 
welfare regimes providing an understanding of why some countries exhibit 
improvements in population health or reduced health inequalities (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Huber & Stephens 2001; Navarro & Shi 2001; Bambra 2007). In 
addition, as discussed, there is a body of research that, for example, has 
established an association between health and the features of labour regimes 
(Scott 2004), the availability of work or prevalence of unemployment (Bartley & 
Owen 1996), job security (Ferrie et al. 2002), and occupational hierarchies 
(Wilkinson 1999) and so on – many of which will be cited here. However, the 
wider historic and socioeconomic context has received less attention.  
 
The work and methods employed here are complementary and provide a strong 
alternative - through an understanding of societal context in reference to the 
character of the national (or regional) political economy. In particular, this 
research will identify systematic forms of variation (see Tables 9.1 – 9.8, for 
summary) and analyse the associated processes of economic development, 
deindustrialisation and consequent post-industrial change that mediate health 
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outcomes and assess the relationship between national/regional variations and 
health. Although common in the comparative political and regional economy 
literature, the typologies and findings this thesis produces lack coverage in the 
sphere of public health despite providing explanatory potential about how 
societal contexts and economic development mediate and help account for 
inequalities in health.  
 
2.3 Literature review 
Initially, the feasibility and value of undertaking a systematic review of the 
literature was considered and discussed. The systematic review has been defined 
as: 
―a replicable, scientific and transparent process . . . that aims to 
minimize bias through exhaustive literature searches of published and 
unpublished studies and by providing an audit trail of the reviewer‘s 
decisions, procedures and conclusions‘ (Tranfield et al. 2003:209). 
Systematic reviews, particularly in medical/clinical research, have increasingly 
replaced traditional literature and narrative reviews as a means to précis 
research evidence. They were devised to eliminate the bias often perceived as a 
weakness in less structured approaches (Collins & Fauser 2004). The key 
strengths and limitations are summarised in Table 2.1.  
 
As a method, the systematic review identifies, evaluates and synthesises 
research evidence from individual studies according to a defined protocol (Oliver 
et al. 2005). Thus, the systematic review involves explicit, transparent methods 
which are clearly stated and reproducible by others. It is argued that this 
approach ensures that all potential and germane research sources have been 
considered and critically reviewed (CRD 2007), thereby removing the dangers of 
selectivity and reviewer bias. It also permits the reader to derive equivalent 
conclusions and provide feedback concerning methodological practice (Davies & 
Crombie 2003). The rationale is that a systematic review is more likely to 
generate comprehensive accounts of literature and minimise reviewer bias, 
particularly in fields in which the principal aim is to determine whether a 
specific intervention has particular benefits. In summary, the strengths of the 
systematic review are said to include: a ‗tight‘ (precise and explicit) focus of the 
question; a comprehensive search for evidence; criterion-based selection of 
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relevant evidence; a rigorous appraisal of validity; an objective or quantitative 
summary; and the production of evidence-based inferences (Cook et al. 1997). 
 
Table 2.1 Strengths and Limitations of Systematic and Narrative-Literature review  
 
Feature 
 
Systematic Review 
 
Narrative-literature Review 
 
Question  
 
Typically a focused clinical question 
 
 
Typically broad in scope 
 
Sources and Search 
Comprehensive sources and an 
explicit search strategy 
 
Not typically specified and 
potentially subject to bias 
 
Selection 
Criterion based selection which is 
uniformly applied 
Not usually specified and 
potentially biased 
 
Appraisal 
Rigorous critical appraisal  Variable  
 
Synthesis 
Quantitative summary or meta-
analysis  
Typically qualitative summary  
 
Inferences 
Typically evidence based  Sometimes evidence based  
 
However, the systematic review can also be criticised for inherent bias. 
Although the methodology is made explicit, the criteria used to select evidence 
for inclusion and the conclusions derived are also subject to bias (Cooper 1982; 
Jackson 1980). For example, in setting criteria, pre-existing knowledge, 
ideological or political outlook and/or an individuals (or institution‘s) value 
system and beliefs may have an influence or create bias. Moreover, once that 
criterion is established, it is very difficult to change course if new information, 
terminology etc. becomes available. If the search is restricted to electronic 
databases, comprised mainly of references to published journal articles, the 
review risks publication bias as this method is unlikely to detect literature not 
published in peer reviewed journals. Wider searching is required to identify 
research results circulated as reports or discussion papers. 
 
There are other limitations of the systematic review that should also be 
considered. For example, there are significant methodological and theoretical 
challenges facing public health systematic reviewers particularly relating to the 
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under-populated and heterogeneous nature of the public health evidence base 
(Millward et al., 2003). Moreover, the evidence that does exist is more widely 
dispersed than evidence of the effectiveness of clinical interventions (Petticrew 
& Roberts 2006). Often, in the case of health-care interventions, the 
interventions can be easily specified, enabling their use as search terms. This is 
not often the case with public health interventions, which are often complex 
and long-term. As Petticrew and Roberts conclude: 
 
―If we accept that the main determinants of public health and health 
inequalities are social, then the interventions of most interest to 
public health reviewers are social interventions: social projects, 
programmes, and policies. Everything outside the health sector (as 
well as some things within it) are potential public health 
interventions. Interventions within the housing, transport, 
environment, employment, justice and many other sectors are thus 
potentially eligible for inclusion in such reviews‖ (2008:199). 
Evaluations of the outcomes of such interventions are, however, uncommon, and 
studies of their health outcomes even more so. Assessments of the distributive 
effects of such policies are even rarer. Even sourcing pertinent evidence by 
utilising electronic searches is difficult. For example, studies of labour market 
policies may report on the health or social outcomes of such interventions, but 
this may not always be evident in the titles and abstracts of journal articles. 
Important studies may thus be easily missed. Often, in databases, older studies 
are without abstracts entirely and this further increases the chance of 
overlooking relevant evidence. For this reason, hand searching of journals and 
books is perhaps even more important when conducting reviews in public health 
than in other fields (Petticrew & Roberts 2008). Clearly, the systematic review 
should not be seen as the gold standard for the sorts of issues and evidence 
covered in this thesis. 
 
The fact is that not all areas of public health and social policy research are 
concerned with research questions that explore whether a certain independent 
variable has particular types of effects.  They are, therefore, not as amenable to 
the systematic review approach. Often the subject boundaries are more fluid 
and subject to change (Bryman 2012) and the questions of interest include 
matters of process as well as impact (Downie, Tannahill & Tannahill 1996:92). 
Researchers in medical science acknowledge that the process of identifying 
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relevant qualitative studies is time consuming and cannot be done on the basis 
of the abstract or summary in the way that quantitative research studies can 
(Jones 2004). In addition, systematic reviews frequently but not exclusively 
employ databases (Petticrew & Roberts 2008), for example PubMed, which are 
populated primarily from peer-reviewed journals, risking exclusion of what is 
typically characterised as ‗grey literature‘ (for example, conference papers and 
reports by various bodies). 
 
Advocates of the systematic review acknowledge that social scientific fields are, 
because of different theoretical approaches, often characterised by low levels of 
consensus concerning key research questions (Tranfield et al. 2003; Bryman 
2012) whereas medical science (from which the method of systematic review 
emerged) often addresses research questions established to answer the question 
‗what works‘? This does not preclude systematic reviews from social science 
fields such as social policy, but emphasises the point that the ‗what works‘ 
question is not always applicable or addressed, and the experimental design 
(exemplified by the randomised controlled trial) is often not appropriate.   
 
It is not being suggested here that a systematic review method could not be 
applied to the research questions in this thesis. Systematic reviews can have 
flexibility and comprise a broad range of research designs and questions. As 
Petticrew attests:  
 
―there are far too many examples of systematic reviews of non-
clinical interventions (including government policies), which include 
non-randomized studies... Systematic reviews of qualitative research 
are also becoming more common‖ (2009:163). 
For some review topics, however, the strengths of the systematic review may 
turn into weaknesses. The primary problem is that the narrow focus and 
prescribed methods of the systematic review do not always allow for 
comprehensive coverage. Moreover, there is still a place for review papers that 
provide a broad overview, discuss a range of evidence and make a contribution 
to wider debates about what works and why in particular settings.   
 
The breadth of the subject matter in the current investigation and its cross-
disciplinary nature meant that inclusion and exclusion criteria were not apparent 
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at the outset of the project. A research approach that allowed for a wide 
overview (rather than a specific focus) was needed. Despite its strengths, the 
tight systematic review method seemed to have little to offer to the task in 
hand.  For example, a formal tabulation of selected, critically reviewed papers 
is not the best way to determine broad themes or to identify previously 
unrealised insights. Moreover, as recognised by Bryman (2012), the systematic 
review emphasises the technical aspects of the approach rather than the 
analytical interpretations generated.  
 
This research is not assessing direct interventions per se; it is looking at political 
and socioeconomic systems of deindustrialisation and post-industrial change in 
light of what is known about underlying influences on health. The methods 
adopted and coverage of research question here will, like the systematic review, 
provide information on whether policies/interventions work, but also on the 
factors that influence how they work, whether they can be adapted, the 
distribution of benefits and costs, and the underlying influence on health.   
 
In contrast to the systematic review, the narrative literature review provides a 
means to facilitate a synthesis of disparate literature and generate 
understanding. It allows for the evaluation and synthesis of information in line 
with the aim and objectives that have been set for the research. It also 
facilitates an interpretive or inductive approach allowing flexibility so that the 
parameters of the research can be modified in light of certain theories, 
literature or data. The narrative review is considered suitable for wide-ranging 
topics as they précis different primary studies from which conclusions may be 
synthesised into a comprehensive analysis supplemented by the researcher‘s own 
experience, existing theories and models (Campbell collaboration 2001; Collins & 
Fauser 2004). A particular advantage of a narrative review is its aim, that is:  
 
―to comprehend the diversities and pluralities of understanding 
around scholarly research topics and the opportunity to speak with 
self-knowledge, (and) reflective practice‖ (Jones 2004:11).  
However, with this strength comes a fundamental weakness. While narrative 
reviews are typically comprehensive and can span a broad range of themes, they 
are criticised for lacking the rigour of the systematic review (see Table 2.1). 
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First, they often fail to adhere to search criteria or to reveal the decision-
making process regarding the relevance and validity of preferred studies.  
Second, although there is clearly a selection and assessment procedure at work, 
the reader is unlikely to be privy to that process, thereby precluding any 
assessment of the authors‘ choices (Collins & Fauser 2004).   
 
However, as Collins & Fauser (2004) assert, less explicit methods are the trade-
off for broader coverage. Moreover, while such discussions help place evidence 
in context, they should not as Petticrew states: 
 
―be confused with the evidence-based conclusions of a transparent, 
scientific review, which systematically attempts to find all the 
relevant evidence, appraises its strengths and limitations in a 
transparent fashion, and draws that evidence together in such a way 
that the more robust studies are given greater weight‖ (2009:163). 
The literature included in the current study mainly comprises historical accounts 
and commentary on political and socioeconomic change in specific countries and 
regions. Competing theories, data and case studies were utilised to evaluate 
conclusions and triangulate across different data sources.  
 
The adaptability of a narrative literature review, which allows for coverage of 
broad themes and situational choices with regard to the inclusion of evidence, 
facilitates a full description and deep understanding of evolving political and 
economic systems and social milieu. Often, contextual factors (such as the 
institutional structures and arrangements policy makers work within and the sort 
of factors that inform their decision making) are overlooked when analysing and 
presenting results in a systematic review. The methods here address those 
concerns.  
 
2.3.1 Application of method 
As stated, the key weakness of the narrative review is the lack of transparency 
regarding the decision making process. To mitigate that weakness and highlight 
a key strength of the narrative review – namely, to facilitate synthesis of 
disparate literature - the application of the method will be described.  
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The prior knowledge and experience of the author, a key consideration in being 
awarded this studentship, meant many key texts and authors, relating to the 
broad political and socioeconomic changes that have taken place in Europe, 
were already familiar. This, in combination with the aim and objectives outlined 
by the GCPH, informed the initial reading strategy. In addition, as the primary 
motivation of this research was to contribute to the field of public health, any 
understanding of the political and socioeconomic contexts had to be informed by 
the health and mortality trends that characterised the selected regions and the 
literature on the determinants of health. An understanding of the health context 
(and determinants of health) would facilitate a more focused and nuanced 
enquiry.  
A wide range of ‗high level‘ analyses, primarily regarding political and 
socioeconomic transformation and deindustrialisation/privatisation in each 
country, were reviewed. Where relevant literature and systematic reviews had 
been conducted, these were consulted: for example, for health and inequality in 
CEE (see Bobak & Powles; Walters & Surcke 2005). Key texts were identified and 
manual searches of their references and citations were then conducted and 
followed up.  To try and reduce any inherent bias, the reading was as extensive 
as possible. In addition, there was cross checking of reference materials and 
additional searches in order to corroborate findings and conclusions, support any 
analysis, and to preclude any significant omissions. 
This was supplemented by recommended reading in pertinent course modules 
and textbooks. From this, further relevant references and authors were followed 
up. In addition, key words emerged that facilitated the use of electronic 
databases and the internet, for example Google Scholar, in searching for 
pertinent research and literature. The primary databases used were the Social 
Science Citation Index (SSCI) and the Central East European Online Library 
(CEEOL). These databases provide a citation link which identifies further 
literature.  In addition, it indicates how research has been utilised by other 
researchers and whether or not it has been supported, challenged or 
undermined. 
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Informing this process were further parameters provided by geographical 
considerations namely, the specific countries and regions and important time 
frames, notably the initial post-war period, the 1970s and 1980s period of 
deindustrialisation, the 1989 collapse of communism and so on. Searches 
regarding the industrial regions covered inevitably lead to the literature 
concerning regional geography and development. The established themes, key 
words, authors, geography and time frames enabled the creation of Zetoc and 
Google alerts (email alerts) regarding new literature as it was published.   
To summarise, the core method for the national level and each region was as 
follows: 
1. Conduct background reading and research as indicated above. 
2. Produce an extended piece of writing that described findings. 
3. Share this writing with supervisors: primary supervisor Phil Hanlon 
Professor of Public Health at University of Glasgow; second supervisor 
Professor Carol Tannahill of Glasgow Centre for Population Health (GCPH); 
and David Walsh a public health programme manager at GCPH and lead 
author of the ‗Aftershock of Deindustrialisation‘ report. 
4. Findings were then discussed in detail and writing was refined and 
focused in light of this discussion and associated feedback. With the 
supervisors coming from a public health background and the author from a 
more traditional social science background this part of the process was 
critical. As an exercise in collective learning, it was essential to assist the 
supervisors‘ understanding of political and socioeconomic themes and for 
them to aid the author‘s understanding of the relevance of these themes 
to public health.  
5. It is important to note that the extended pieces of writing formed the raw 
material used to determine the structure of the thesis and content. They 
did not form any part of the final thesis. 
6. From this, the research questions began to develop. These would provide 
the focus needed to draft the chapters in a way that would best account 
for the divergence that exists between these countries/regions. Once this 
process was well advanced, the final structure of the thesis began to 
emerge (see section 1.4).  
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7. Data from the Aftershock report (and subsequent works) along with the 
data mined from the author‘s own research was then collected and 
appraised.  This was used to illustrate the comparative elements of the 
thesis, support any analysis, and demonstrate emerging conclusions.  
8. This process was modified and augmented in order to conduct a synthesis 
of the thesis‘ findings articulated in chapter 9. This entailed reviewing all 
writing and data for chapters 3-8 (and Appendix A). Key differences were 
then noted for discussions with supervisors to note what particular ideas 
or hypotheses emerged and if there was anything distinctive that might 
contribute to an understanding of WCS poor health profile in relation to 
the other regions and in light of the social determinants of health widely 
recognised in the field of public health.  
 
2.4 Case studies 
The findings for each region are presented in a case study. The case study offers 
a means of investigating complex social units consisting of multiple variables of 
potential importance in understanding a process or phenomenon. Typically 
secured in real-life situations, the case study can produce a rich and holistic 
account of a phenomenon or process. It offers insights and provides 
understanding that can expand its readers' experiences. This understanding can 
then be interpreted into tentative hypotheses that facilitate and structure 
future research; hence, case studies play an important role in advancing a field's 
knowledge or research base. For this reason the case study method retains 
considerable appeal, even among researchers in communities not traditionally 
associated with this method of research e.g. among political economists and 
quantitatively inclined political scientists (Bates et al. 1998; Acemoglu, Johnson, 
& Robinson 2003; Rodrik 2003). 
 
As the discussion above suggests, all research methods can be discussed in terms 
of their relative strengths and limitations. Shields argues for qualitative case 
studies:  
"The strength of qualitative approaches is that they account for and 
include difference ideologically, epistemologically, methodologically 
and most importantly, humanly. They do not attempt to eliminate 
what cannot be discounted. They do not attempt to simplify what 
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cannot be simplified. Thus, it is precisely because case study includes 
paradoxes and acknowledges that there are no simple answers, that it 
can and should qualify as the gold standard" (2007:12). 
It should be noted that there is no greater bias in case studies toward confirming 
preconceived notions than in other forms of research. Typically the difficulty in 
summarising case studies is due to properties of the reality studied, not the 
research method. Its key strengths are its suitability for describing complex 
phenomena whilst also providing individual case information. It allows the 
researcher to describe in detail phenomena as they are situated and embedded 
in local contexts, for the researcher almost always identifies contextual and 
setting factors as they relate to the phenomenon of interest. Moreover, and 
particularly useful in this instance, it allows for cross-case comparisons and 
analysis (Azarian 2011).  
 
At their best, case studies can provide accounts of innovative or good practice, 
identifying specific problems or issues experienced by a location, group or 
individual and the actions taken to overcome the problems. Their aim is to 
promote or provide understanding of these actions to others. They are typically 
used where there have been limited solutions found to a problem or little 
understanding of a particular process or phenomenon. Case studies contain a 
strong narrative element, which often entails a sequence of events and their 
relationship to each other and to context. They generally report factual 
information as well as opinions (good and bad) (Yin 1984; Soy 2003), and 
typically they are based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
(Gerring 2004; Flyvbjerg 2011).   
 
In this thesis, case studies have been utilised to provide a detailed summary of 
each of the regions of interest, structured according to a standard framework 
which allows comparisons to be made.  Deployed in this way, the case study 
method enables the different adjustment processes in the study regions to be 
examined.  Local (regional) trends are influenced not only by local policies and 
regional characteristics, but also by wider influences such as national 
government policy, regional and local intervention, social and cultural attitudes, 
and so on.  The case studies recognise this, and incorporate information on these 
wider influences alongside regional evidence to offer a rich examination of post-
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industrial change at the regional level and the impact that has on health and 
mortality.   
 
2.4.1 Application of method 
 
As previously stated, the five regions (including WCS) of interest were already 
established by GCPH as part of the wider programme of research into the health 
of post-industrial European regions. A decision was made to collect evidence 
concerning social, political and economic history at three levels. These were: 
 
 International regions – Eastern Europe and Western Europe. 
 Countries – Scotland was to be compared with two Eastern European and 
two Western European Countries. 
 Regions within countries that have been subject to deindustrialisation and 
were included in the Aftershock Report. 
 
There was a desire to choose regions that represent a spectrum of European 
circumstances and would provide the most useful comparisons to WCS. After 
investigation and discussions, the following choice of deindustrialised regions 
and countries was made: 
 
 Ruhrgebiet, Germany 
 Nord Pas-de-Calais, France 
 Katowice (Upper Silesia), Poland 
 Northern Moravia (Moravia-Silesia) , Czech Republic  
 
The first Aftershock Report identified 20 regions with a history of 
deindustrialisation comparable to WCS. The regions which are the primary focus 
of this thesis and the 2nd Aftershock Report were chosen by GCPH due to the 
opportunities for collaborative research with colleagues in the regions‘ 
respective countries.  
 
In addition, for the thesis, the selected regions: (a) provided coverage across 
mainland Europe (two in western European countries (Germany and France), and 
two in eastern European countries (Poland and Czech Republic)); and (b) had 
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experienced the most comparable levels of deindustrialisation (measured as the 
decrease in industrial employment levels) in recent decades, see Figure 2.1 
which indicates the amount of industrial employment loss due to 
deindustrialisation.  
 
Figure 2.1 Loss of industrial employment in the five selected regions 
 
 Source: adapted from Walsh et al. (2008) 
 
As this figure 2.1 shows, the mainland West European regions that experienced 
the most similar levels of deindustrialisation were the Ruhr (54%) and Nord-Pas-
de-Calais (NPdC). In Central Eastern Europe (CEE) the comparable regions were 
Katowice (55%) and Saxony (48%) not shown. However, due to a lack of regional 
co-contributors and contacts for the second phase research conducted by GCPH, 
Saxony was not chosen and Northern Moravia selected instead. It should be 
noted that the author of this thesis and the Aftershock report acknowledge that 
Northern Moravian levels of deindustrialisation appear considerably less than 
those experienced in the WCS, Nord Pas-de-Calais (NPdC), Ruhr, and Katowice. 
However, this primarily due to the more recent base year.  
 
The case study method applied to each of these regions sought to: 
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1. Describe the narrative of each region both in terms of the political 
economy and socioeconomic change. 
2. Describe and chart the process of, and responses to, 
deindustrialisation/privatisation.  
3. Describe the degree of social protection, including welfare provision and 
broader civic support.  
4. Describe the post-industrial context both politically and 
socioeconomically.  
5. Synthesise the above into a set of conclusions about the most likely 
factors to have influenced life expectancy.  
In terms of applying an organisational framework to the case studies, from the 
literature review it became evident that deindustrialisation had the potential to 
damage health and slow life expectancy. However, that effect was mediated by 
(i) characteristics of deindustrialisation (speed, intensity, response) (ii) the 
broader socioeconomic context (and change to that context) and (iii) the level 
and type of social protection. From this review-based evidence a rudimentary 
version of the model of determinants of health discussed in the introduction was 
developed. This model has life expectancy/health in the centre (as the outcome 
of interest) and these three categories of influence impacting upon it.  This 
became the organising framework for the regional case studies: both in terms of 
the narrative and in relation to the data presented. 
 
In terms of the narrative for the case studies the approach used was broadly 
similar to the literature review (particularly as much of the narrative material 
was so-called ‗grey literature). Although the original research components were 
used as search criteria (in both topic and title) for each specific region, the 
results returned lacked specificity and often only referred to the region 
indirectly. However, the establishment of the themes relating to the organising 
framework (i.e. deindustrialisation, context, social protection) provided 
additional search criteria which were then applied. Additional searches which 
focussed on the issues of Old Industrial Regions (OIRs), regional development, 
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local government and restructuring were also productive and revealed a vein of 
location-specific research and authors. Google books proved particularly useful 
as much of the literature was to be found in area-specific chapters and case 
studies in books that were not revealed via the more orthodox search 
approaches, particularly in the case of Nord Pas-de-Calais where less literature 
was available. In addition, the above processes led to the identification of a 
number of web or institutional resources. 
The quantitative analyses used in the case studies build on extant analyses from 
the Aftershock Reports, supplementing them with additional data. Much of the 
additional data relates to the comparative data contained in Chapter 3, and 
discussed within the case-studies, and is included as it allowed comparisons 
across five regions (rather than region v WCS). In addition and where possible, 
extant analysis from the Aftershock research was brought up to date, although 
the periodicity of the data (e.g. census and surveys) prevented this in some 
cases. Data sources included: OECD, Eurostat, Euro-Barometer, Government 
statistical offices, Electoral Commissions, Luxembourg income studies, and 
various social and household surveys. Information on the data sources and details 
of the variables used are provided in Appendix B.  
 
It should be noted that comparisons are made using multiple indicators drawn 
from a large number of geographical areas. Such an approach has recognised 
limitations: it relies on routinely available data (which do not cover all the issues 
of interest) and the use of information derived from such a variety of sources 
leads to issues of data comparability as the meaning and quality of data are 
affected by cultural and social contexts (Taulbut et al. 2011).  
 
However, these acknowledged weaknesses should not detract from the strength 
of the methods employed. Quantitative comparative analysis combined with 
qualitative research should provide insights into the questions raised by the 
Aftershock Reports and allow for a ‗bigger picture‘ to emerge concerning the 
comparative paths and fortunes of each region. Therefore, rather than focusing 
on comparisons of specific individual indicators across a number of regions, the 
method adopted seeks to highlight what the data, taken in their entirety, 
indicate and what they tell us about the relationship between 
deindustrialisation, post-industrial change and life expectancy.  
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2.5 Final synthesis 
Once the literature review and case studies were complete, the challenge of 
synthesising the findings from the different methods remained. The degree of 
immersion in the literature and data during the process of undertaking this 
thesis meant that key themes and research questions became apparent, and 
these were highlighted for discussion with supervisors.  The focus of this 
synthesis and discussion process was on the extent to which anything distinctive 
was evident and might contribute to an understanding of WCS poor health profile 
in relation to the other regions and in light of the social determinants of health.  
 
The Aftershock work and WCS‘s poor health profile generally are of concern and 
interest to both policy makers and researchers. As such, forums have presented 
themselves within which this research and its emergent findings have been 
tested and discussed. These have included a GCPH/Scottish Government 
Discussion seminar: Health in post-industrial regions of Europe8,  and the 
Public Health Information Network for Scotland Seminar (PHINS)9 2012. In these 
and other instances key messages, in particular around the nature of economic 
development, deindustrialisation/economic restructuring, post-industrial 
context and levels of social protection, were presented and discussed. This 
enabled the key differences/similarities between the regions to be considered 
and deeper understandings to be developed of the path each had taken in terms 
of economic restructuring, as well as the possible impact this might have had on 
life expectancy and health.   
 
The synthesis would be an opportunity to highlight the strengths and limitations 
of the research and research methods, theoretical considerations and any 
conclusions and recommendations that emerged from the thesis. More 
                                         
8
 This was a small, invitation-only, 'round-table' event hosted by GCPH and the Scottish 
Government to discuss the 2nd Aftershock Report comparing health and its determinants in 
West Central Scotland and other post-industrial regions in the UK and mainland Europe. It 
involved senior civil servants and public health officials and academics experienced in 
working in a European context. 
9 PHINS is an annual event where research on the Public Health of Scotland is presented and 
discussed amongst various stake holders. In the context of exploring health at the national, 
regional and city level-findings from this thesis concerning the underlying influences on 
health in post-industrial regions were presented and discussed.  
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importantly, it provided an opportunity to address the underlying weaknesses of 
the narrative approach and demonstrate that the research questions had been 
answered.  The narrative review and case studies were chosen as they allowed 
situational choices to be made that reflected the complexity and inter-
relatedness of the issues discussed.  To account for those weaknesses, the 
methods employed have sought to be: relevant in terms of facts, details and 
findings; consistent in terms of research questions and the organising 
framework10; and transparent in presenting both the findings and conclusions.   
 
In discussion with supervisors it became apparent that the complexity and inter-
relatedness of the findings should not deter from the research questions being 
addressed directly. Particularly considering the original research objectives 
have, as required, been incorporated into a broader narrative structure of the 
thesis. Therefore, the summary tables and accompanying text were developed 
(Chapter 9 pg.250-258). These tables highlight the relevance, consistency and 
transparency of the findings whilst making explicit the divergence between the 
selected regions. Moreover, they organise the findings in line with the research 
questions and link them to the relevant sections of the thesis and critical texts 
cited.  
 
Finally, the synthesis also provided the opportunity to reflect on the main 
messages emerging from the thesis and the impact this has for WCS. Specifically, 
to discuss in more detail and in the context of the determinants of health how 
post-industrial change has had an underlying influence on the health and 
mortality of WCS.  The development and use of an organising framework 
facilitated the synthesis of the findings (supported with data across the regions) 
into a set of conclusions that supports current understanding of the social 
determinants of health and supports an emerging picture of the impact of a 
state‘s socioeconomic model on health. Consequently it confirms that health 
outcomes are a good indicator of the success of a state‘s institutional 
arrangements and policies.   
                                         
10
 See section 3.4 
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3. Synthesis of the narrative literature review  
The following sections are a synthesis of the narrative literature review 
contained in Appendix A. It will discuss those factors that emerge as important 
in limiting the adverse health and social impacts of economic development, 
deindustrialisation/ privatisation and subsequent post-industrial change. As 
such, it will provide important context for the regional case studies that follow, 
helping explain the divergence in terms of policy and socioeconomic and health 
outcomes.   
3.1 CEE 
In the post war period, significant political and socioeconomic changes led to the 
establishment of communism in CEE. The patterns of health, certainly in terms 
of life expectancy, effectively mirrored the fortunes of state-socialism in CEE 
(and FSU). As communism established itself, life expectancy improved: as 
communism stagnated and deteriorated so did life expectancy. Moreover, these 
trends reflected the individual experiences of countries in CEE. For example, 
Hungary, one of the first countries to react to Soviet hegemony, was one of the 
first to experience a deterioration in mortality trends. Similarly, the Czech 
Republic and Poland, perhaps the two countries which in relative terms are 
considered to have coped most successfully with the post-communist transition 
of 1989, were the first to exhibit (after a period of stagnation during the 1970s 
and 1980s) improvements in life expectancy. Countries that did not adjust to 
transition as successfully, such as Russia, Romania and Bulgaria, experienced a 
further reduction in life expectancy during the transition - a trend that 
continued well into the 1990s (Hertzman et al. 1996; Cockerham 1999; Cornia & 
Paniccià 2000).  
By the time Communism came to be established in CEE it had already produced a 
marked effect on the Soviet Union. Although the costs of transformation under 
Stalin were great and millions died due to conflict, famine, mass purges and 
executions, society developed significantly. Developments in society such as 
rapid industrialisation, increased social provision, increasing prosperity and the 
massive expansion in the number of health professionals and facilities, meant 
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that life expectancy increased and health improved for many (Field 1991; 
Cockerham 1999). 
A modern understanding of the demographic and epidemiological transitions 
experienced by Russia under the early years of communism would point to the 
interacting impact of changing physical and social environments, rising levels of 
prosperity, enhanced services (health, education, etc.) and specific public 
health interventions. The literature of the time and some of the more politically 
orientated modern commentaries give more credit to health service 
developments which were clearly important but need to be seen in the context 
of the wider determinants of health (Sigerist 1947).  
These gains were not exclusive to the then relatively undeveloped Soviet Union. 
Even in the relatively industrialised and developed countries of CEE, state-
socialism had a discernable and immediate impact on health. As the evidence 
outlined demonstrates, even in the CEE, where life expectancy was much closer 
to western norms, health improvement was quick and widespread (Mezentseva & 
Rimachevskya 1990; Eberstadt 1994). These improvements in life expectancy 
were not exclusive to any one cultural or social group and it is worth reasserting 
that similar improvements were experienced in communist states in the 
developing world (Guo 1993).  
In accounting for the improvements in life expectancy (and health more 
generally), one must acknowledge the relative achievements of state-socialism, 
the source of which was the concentration of power and, with it, the state‘s 
ability to mobilise resources and populations. Initial improvements in the Soviet 
Union, at least, were certainly a consequence of this. The state succeeded in 
controlling communicable diseases (typhus, cholera, and syphilis), reducing 
infant mortality and meeting basic needs. Western nations often face problems 
filling posts in remote and unpopular destinations, whereas, under state-
socialism medical professionals were required to carry out compulsory service. 
However, this is not to say inequalities did not exist according to location (Field 
1991, 1994; Eberstadt 1994). 
 
The imperative of industrialisation had a significant impact on political, social 
and economic change all of which influenced the wider determinants of health. 
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As society became increasingly urban and industrial, standards of living 
improved. Benefits, including housing, utilities, nutrition, sanitation, health 
care, and general welfare services, were used as a form of material incentive 
and helped to promote acquiescence. This provision impacted on health by 
reducing deprivation and increasing security among many who had hitherto been 
economically and socially marginalised (Wnuk-Lipinski 1990; Eberstadt 1994; 
Cockerham 1999). Basic needs were being met and general levels of education 
and literacy improved significantly. In comparison with the West, income 
inequality was minimal due to state controlled salaries. There was ‗full‘ 
employment and subsidised housing, amenities and food. As society became 
increasingly urban and industrial, standards of living improved.  
This initial transformation, rather than alienating a population under state-
socialism, served to ferment an ―ethic of comradeship‖ (Vogel 1965). This, 
shared with the communist determination to achieve social equality and justice, 
had a profound effect on attitudes and perceptions. This is particularly the case 
amongst the growing proletariat and enfranchised ‗new class‘, (Djilas 1957, 
1998; Szelenyi 1978, 1983, 2009)11 two groups that helped to constitute the 
political base for the state-socialist regimes of CEE (and FSU). This perception 
was augmented by the further achievements of state-socialism that included 
rapid industrialisation and development, the defeat of Nazism and an emerging 
superpower status. 
If we judge the 1917 – 1960s period of state-socialism in terms of health it was a 
significant success. As noted previously, by the mid-1960s, life expectancy in 
communist Europe equalled and in some cases exceeded what could be found in 
the West (Sen 1981; Wilkinson 1996; Cockerham 1999). This period was the 
apogee of European communism, putting the Soviet bloc on a par industrially 
and militarily with the West. It was also a period where many advanced their 
status and material position as indicated by the substantial improvements in 
both intra and inter-generational social mobility (Lovenduski & Woodall 1987). 
                                         
11
 The ‗new class‘ were essentially beneficiaries of the new system: communism. Members of this 
class, frequently of working class and peasant origin, were advanced by the party into positions 
of power due to their class pedigree. This group soon became accustomed to the power and 
privileges that went with their elevated status. See (Djilas 1957, 1998; Szelenyi 1978, 1983, 
2009). 
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From the late 1960s, a mounting polarisation of the socioeconomic situation 
began in CEE. Social mobility slowed and downward mobility became a feature 
of CEE (Lane 1982). State provision in ―education, housing, consumption and 
control of life became increasingly important‖ (Lovenduski & Woodall 1987:138). 
Moreover, it was clear that ―new patterns of social mobility did not break down 
traditional patterns of internal recruitment to privileged positions‖ (Lovenduski 
& Woodall 1987:137). As a result, ―increasing disparities in socioeconomic 
conditions were accompanied by a widening socioeconomic gradient in 
mortality, especially amongst men‖ (Kopp et al. 2007:3). Evidently, some factors 
in CEE were either changing or becoming increasingly marked. The failure to 
realise ideological objectives and the increasing apathy and hostility towards 
official ideology contributed significantly to popular discord with the system of 
state-socialism. 
 
The dynamics of state-socialism changed society at every level. Rather than 
realising a classless society, society became even more fragmented: 
administrative position, party membership, social cleavages, sectoral 
employment, factory size, and geographical location replaced the boundaries of 
white/blue collar, urban/rural, and indicators such as age, sex, and location.  
 
This societal shift defined the attitudes and agency of the CEE populations, 
shaped the division of life into the public and private spheres, determined 
opportunities for formal work and informal activity and led to an increasing 
passivity in state sponsored spheres. As Kolankiewicz & Lewis conclude: 
 ―The apparent schizophrenic nature of life can only be understood in 
the context of imposed modernisation, an artificial political 
hegemony, the forced social decomposition and its ad hoc 
reconstitution of the social order and the overarching rhetoric of 
transvaluation contained within an official ideology having little or no 
basis in the cultural signifiers of society.‖ (1988:25) 
Rather than abolish class divisions, the economic policy and ideology of the 
party-state created a new and complex social order.  Failure to meet and 
reconcile the needs and expectations of the new social order led to the political 
crises that came to define state-socialism and ultimately led to its demise. Such 
a pattern of events was always likely to have a profound effect on the physical 
and mental well-being of the population.  
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By the 1980s, thanks to the work initially of Davis and Feshback (1980), it was 
becoming increasingly clear that health trends, particularly life expectancy, 
since the 1960s had begun to diverge significantly from those observed in the 
advanced industrial states of the West. The events of the 1960s and 1970s had 
been devastating to societies under state-socialism and had a profound impact 
on health. Between 1970 and 1991 no CEE country experienced an increase in 
male life expectancy and, even at age 45, the difference in male life expectancy 
between the best and worst European countries in this respect was almost eight 
years (Shkolnikov et al. 1996). 
Evidence previously outlined (Appendix A), demonstrates that the increase in 
mortality and stagnation and deterioration in life expectancy was not the result 
of specific pathways like infectious diseases, genetics, medical care, or 
environmental pollution. Although, they clearly impacted on individual lives they 
are not regarded as the primary determinant of increased mortality and 
declining life expectancy in whole populations. Rather, the change from 
improving to stagnating or declining health in the communist states seems to 
mirror the more general stagnation and decline of the whole communist 
experiment and its ability to meet material, social and psychological needs. Of 
course, these high level determinants of health found various pathways to 
become manifested as morbidity and mortality (for example, alcohol abuse and 
stress). 
It should be noted, however, that the whole population health outcomes 
experienced in this period were not uniform: there was divergence in terms of 
status/occupation, gender, age, locale, education and region. Middle aged males 
were the worst affected and, of that group, those engaged in manual 
occupations were most vulnerable (Haub 1994; Mezentseva & Rimachevskaya 
1992). This was true for the Czech Republic (Janeckova & Hnilicova 1992), 
Poland (Okolski 1993; Wnuk-Lipinski 1990), and the former Soviet bloc generally 
(Eberstadt 1994; Okolski 1993). This affect was often mediated by family status, 
both in terms of marital status and network (Watson 1995, 1998) and form of 
state employment (Szelenyi 2009). During state-socialism, much of the labour 
force in regions such as Katowice and Moravia-Silesia were afforded many 
privileges. Although the workers in heavy industry were expected to work in 
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demanding and dangerous conditions, they were also relatively well 
remunerated and provided with well-regarded employment and job security.  
Ultimately, the failure to realise ideological objectives and the increasing 
apathy and hostility towards official ideology contributed significantly to popular 
discord with the system of state-socialism. The ideology of state-socialism failed 
to maintain or guarantee the legitimacy of communist rule at the popular, and 
increasingly, elite levels. Between 1989 and 1991 the Soviet empire collapsed.  
Considering the monolith that was state-socialism and the degree of 
homogeneity that existed in CEE regardless of national differences, there was a 
marked divergence displayed in post-communist transitions. This was due to a 
number of factors. First, due to the reform tendencies of the 1970s and 1980s, 
the countries of CEE had different starting points when the transition period 
began. Poland had market elements in their economy prior to 1989. Second, the 
package of policies and path pursued shaped future developments. Broadly 
speaking, both the Czech Republic and Poland had the advantage of acceptable 
living standards and a long legacy of industrial capitalist development. The 
Czech Republic also enjoyed macroeconomic stability and low foreign debt. 
Finally, geography was critical: Poland and the Czech Republic benefited greatly 
from their proximity to the E.U.‘s economic powerhouse - Germany.   
Both Poland and the Czech Republic were relatively successful in their transition 
paths. Moreover, they significantly increased social provision during the initial 
transition phase. Both were able to recover their 1989 output by the end of the 
1990s. The situation elsewhere was quite different. For example, in Russia, GDP 
was still 36 per cent below 1989 levels. As Blaczyca concludes: 
―The difference in performance between leaders and laggards reflects 
a situation in which a market mechanism (of some type) is being fairly 
successfully installed in the first group but sheer hopelessness appears 
to prevail in the second, where whatever policies are adopted seem to 
be incapable of restoring economic dynamism‖ (2003:221). 
What is clear is that the market-based recovery was not immediate and took 
longer than expected. This was not the predicted outcome. The longer 
economies struggled and social costs mounted the more flawed the approach 
favoured by western advisors (the so-called Washington Consensus) appeared.  
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Orenstein (2009) notes how liberal economists have pointed out that those CEE 
countries that went farthest with neoliberal policy reforms did better 
economically than their neighbours. Poland, considered one of the most radically 
reformed countries, reached 127 per cent of its 1989 GDP by 2000, whilst non-
reformers like Belarus had still to recover their 1989 levels. Examples such as 
this provided evidence to support the view of those for those who advocated 
neoliberal transition as ‗inevitable‘ and ‗necessary‘: although there would be 
some tribulations, the alternative was worse (2009:6). 
However, many CEE countries also employed more social spending than typically 
advised by neoliberal reformers. Poland, the exemplar for neoliberal reform in 
CEE, spent up to 16 per cent of its GDP on pensions in the mid-1990s, before 
reducing back to 15.5 per cent in 2007 (Orenstein 2009:7). Even at this reduced 
level it is still one of the highest in Europe. Moreover, the rapid growth 
experienced in the region post 2000 undermined the assumed association 
between neoliberal reforms and economic growth. Most CEE countries 
experienced rapid economic growth after 1998–2000, even those that had not 
imposed radical reforms. As Orenstein notes:  
―this suggests that while neoliberal reforms cannot be burdened with 
all the responsibility for the collapse, neither can they claim credit 
for the return to growth. (2009:7) 
The transition to market economies created significant inequalities within post-
communist societies. There is some consensus regarding the correlation between 
transition and its social impact, however, different conclusions are reached as to 
whether it was failures in the procedures of reforms or their inadequacies or 
incorrect application that caused the social costs (Ionita, Mandruta & Pippidi 
2000:2). What is more clear is that the socioeconomic vulnerability of various 
social groups increased significantly during and post transition period. In 
addition, a great number of people were exposed to processes of social exclusion 
including the intensification of social borders based on ethnic, cultural and 
religious differences and discrimination due to age, sex and wealth (Musiolek 
2002). As with the establishment of state-socialism, winners and losers emerged. 
Generally, inequality increased throughout the former Soviet Bloc. The CEE 
countries recorded lower levels and smaller increases of income inequality while 
those in the south and further east (as represented by Bulgaria and Russia), 
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experienced greater levels and higher increases in inequality. Currently, income 
inequality is greater in the UK than either Poland or the Czech Republic which 
has the lowest income inequality in Europe (Taulbut et al. 2011). 
The economic contraction (and social change) that followed the collapse of 
communism had a dramatic human consequence. In this regard, the Stuckler, 
King  & McKee (2009) Lancet article ―Mass Privatisation and the Post-Communist 
Mortality Crisis‖ is strongly critical of the neoliberal inspired, rapid and mass 
privatisation that occurred in the region. This article argues that the model of 
privatisation is strongly related to the increased mortality rates post-communist 
countries experienced between 1989 and 200212. Within this period mass 
privatisation and the rapid economic transformation are associated with a 12.8 
per cent increase in adult male mortality rates in the post-communist countries 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Stuckler, King  & McKee 
2009:399).  
The relationship between mass privatisation and unemployment was also clear. 
With the implementation of mass privatisation, unemployment increased by 61 
per cent compared with countries in which privatisation was more gradual. In 
the majority of former Soviet countries, unemployment was strongly associated 
with the increase in mortality. Stuckler et al concluded: 
―Four of the five worst countries, in terms of life expectancy, had 
implemented mass privatisation, whereas only one of the five best 
performers had done so‖ (2009:404). 
They conclude that social capital, as measured by membership in social 
organisations, mitigates the effect of mass privatisation, stating: 
―This analysis shows how the estimated effect of rapid mass 
privatisation on adult male mortality rates linearly decreases with 
increasing social capital. In countries in which more than 45% of the 
population was a member of a social organisation, mass privatisation 
had no significant adverse association with mortality rates‖ (2009:403-
04). 
                                         
12
 A similar analysis is outlined in Lawrence King and  David Stuckler ―Mass privatisation and the 
Post-Communist Mortality Crisis‖ in Lane, David (ed) Transformation of State Socialism (2007) 
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The controversy that followed is indicative of the emotions provoked by debates 
around neoliberal reform. The report made the front page of the Financial Times 
(15 January 2009) prompting economist and so-called shock therapy advisor 
Jeffery Sachs to write a letter to the editor of the Financial Times (19 January 
2009) calling the Lancet article a ―confused polemic that will not withstand 
serious epidemiological scrutiny‖. His line of defence was confused, noting, in 
reference to Poland‘s radical shock therapy, that ―Poland did not experience a 
surge in mortality or decline in life expectancy‖. Stuckler et al. note that 
Poland‘s mass privatisation was, as has been noted here, gradual, often 
hindered, and not on the scale implemented in other countries. 
The debate concerning the effects of mass privatisation and more generally 
neoliberal reforms is ardent because vested interests are at stake. As Orenstein 
notes: 
―it concerns not only whether the neoliberal  economic reforms work 
in post-communist countries, but whether the free market policies 
will continue to be adopted in other parts of the world and whether 
such reforms are compatible with democracy‖ (2009:2).  
Henryk Domanski's examination of social stratification in post-Communist CEE On 
the verge of convergence: social stratification in Eastern Europe concludes: 
―intergenerational movements in East Central Europe strongly resemble the 
shape of basic distances and rigidities in the West‖ (2000:62). His findings chime 
with much of the analysis outlined here in reference to economic reform. That is 
that Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have come closest to Western 
patterns (of stratification), while Bulgaria and Russia are the farthest from them 
(Slovakia falls somewhere in the middle). 
Although patterns of social mobility in CEE are converging towards those we 
would expect in the West, there may be, as Cox explains, an important 
distinction emerging: 
―between classes and social groups defined in terms of competing 
economic interests, power relations and social outlooks. While some 
aspects are clearly influenced by long-term modernising trends (as in 
the West), competing social interests and political cleavages in CEE 
may be more influenced by post-communist economic and political 
transformations‖ (2003:238).  
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The marginality evident in CEE (and FSU) certainly advanced and became more 
widespread post-transition as the exposure to social risks and processes of social 
exclusion for many groups increased significantly.  
So, in conclusion, health improved in communist countries during the earlier 
period because material living standards, equity, social mobility and access to 
services all improved. This supported and coincided with a sense of social 
cohesion and a psychological and social identification with the communist 
project. As communism stagnated, all these favourable features moved into 
reverse. When communism collapsed, health suffered profoundly. This, 
basically, is an argument about the links between macro social and economic 
determinants of health and whole population health outcomes (like life 
expectancy). Of course, individual and groups will manifest their own particular 
pathways linking determinants and outcomes. However, the detail of the 
pathways is not the important part of this analysis. 
The other part of this analysis that is important is to make distinction between 
what happened in the FSU and the two countries that are of primary interest to 
this Thesis the Czech Republic and Poland. What has been demonstrated is both 
countries experienced different pathways from each other and profoundly 
different circumstances from the FSU and their respective health outcomes 
reflect these differences. 
3.2 Western Europe 
By the end of WW II a political consensus had established in Western Europe that 
poverty and unemployment was not solely the product of individual 
inadequacies.  Rather, they were structural and systemic. The political 
imperative became full employment. Governments, to varying degrees, 
increased intervention in the distribution of resources, implemented activist 
industrial policies and on the back of economic growth legislated for 
progressively munificent social benefits (Beer 1969; Foley 1998; Pierson 2006). 
During this period in Western Europe there was a steady increase in life 
expectancy. However, since the 1970s mortality differentials by socioeconomic 
status have increased significantly for both men and women. As such, widening 
inequalities are seen in many European countries, including Scotland.  
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Although all experienced economic growth and increases in productivity, the UK 
economy was in decline relative to France and Germany who experienced the 
trente glorieuses and wirtschaftswunder respectively. The UK, relative to 
France and Germany, suffered from proximate disadvantages. These included: 
level of reconstruction; structural capacity for ‗catch up‘ (i.e. increases in 
productivity due to shift from agriculture to industry); and elastic supply of 
labour. The UK was also at a comparative disadvantage particularly in terms of 
management, labour relations and training (Flanders 1975; Crouch 1993; Crafts 
1998).  
Within this period the UK, France and Germany developed post-war varieties of 
capitalism (Schonfield 1965; Hall 2007). Economic decline and distributive 
conflict experienced from the 1960s to 1980s provided a challenge for each 
country. In order to encourage economic growth and competitiveness, each 
country, to varying degrees and intensity, pursued: deindustrialisation, 
liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation. In this regard the 
UK went furthest, pursuing a strident neoliberal strategy. France and Germany, 
broadly speaking, pursued solutions within the established structures of local 
governance and economic relations. 
The models of capitalism adopted by France and Germany softened the adverse 
effects of economic development, deindustrialisation and subsequent post-
industrial change compared to what happened in the UK. Stated in this way, 
such a statement is, of course, an over simplification. Nonetheless, there is a 
core truth that needs to be explored.  
The structural changes in the economy and in modes of production typically 
characterised as post-industrial, have affected a gamut of political and 
socioeconomic outcomes, including occupational and class structures (Bell 1999), 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1999; Iversen & Cusak 2000; Wren 2001), wage 
equality (Iversen & Wren 1998) trade union density (Lee 2005) education 
spending (Jensen 2009) and, significantly, health and wellbeing (Ostry et al. 
2002; Walsh et al. 2010; Collins & McCartney 2011). Although life expectancy in 
Western Europe has steadily been increasing in the post-war period, since the 
1970s, health inequalities have become increasingly prevalent.   
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Noting the post-industrial shift, Eley concludes: 
―As the post-war boom came to its end, so too, did the promises of 
permanent growth and continuously rising prosperity, receding 
alarmingly before the new norm of high inflation, rising 
unemployment and low growth. This magnified the consequences of 
underlying changes in the economy-the reorganising of labour 
markets, manufacturing decline and deindustrialisation, the 
reconfiguring of class and general capitalist restructuring‖ (2011:13).  
The liberalisation and deregulation of capital markets and commercial relations 
has had a significant impact on traditional manufacturing and industrial 
enterprises and facilitated the shift towards a post-industrial service society. 
This has transformed both the forms of employment and the labour market, both 
of which are liable to impact wellbeing.  
These changes have occurred to varying degrees and intensity. For, despite 
similar levels of economic development there is, as has been described, 
substantial institutional variation in the Western capitalist political economies, 
in terms of the means of linking production systems, labour markets, and 
welfare state institutions. Moreover, this divergence continues even in the post-
industrial highly de-regulated and globalised environment (Kitschelt et al. 1999; 
Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2001). As Gallie notes: 
―systems differ in a relatively systematic way in terms of the extent 
of involvement of organised labour in decision-making, the principles 
underlying employment policy, the role attributed to the public 
sector, the salience of quality of working life programmes, the 
institutional provision to support the combination of paid work and 
family and the level of welfare protection offered to the unemployed‖ 
(2007:17). 
These institutional arrangements are primarily conceptualised as ‗welfare 
regimes‘ ‗varieties of capitalism‘ (VoC) and ‗production regimes‘. The leading 
approach to the study of welfare regimes is based upon Esping-Andersens Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), and the lens of a typology using three 
(sometimes four) types of regime. In the varieties of capitalism and production 
regime literature, Soskice‘s (1994) distinction between flexibly coordinated and 
deregulated market economies directed researchers towards the degree of 
convergence or divergence between capitalist societies as determined by their 
approach to reconciling coordination problems in areas such as industrial 
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relations, inter-firm cooperation, investment or vocational training 
(Hollingsworth, Schmitter & Streeck 1993; Soskice 1994, 1999; Hall & Soskice 
2001; Hancké, Rhodes & Thatcher 2007; Lane & Myant 2007). As such, it added 
to the discourse on corporatism and industrial relations that had focused 
primarily on the institutionalised arrangements between the state, labour and 
employers. A  Gallie notes, they: ―provide an account of the inter-linkages of 
many different institutional characteristics, affecting diverse spheres of social 
interaction‖ (2007:13).  
Although, each looks through a different lens, the analysis is broadly similar. As 
Esping-Andersen (1990) and Kolberg (1992) argue, welfare state regimes are 
interrelated with different labour market institutions and policies. Although the 
VoC analysis focuses primarily on factors sustaining competiveness in 
manufacturing and on the organisation of capital and labour, these institutional 
arrangements, as observed here, can be seen as national and/or economy-wide 
and are divergent in the extent and nature of state involvement in capital and 
labour markets (see Kitschelt et al. 1998; Schmidt 2002, 2003).  
The first indicates the divergent types of institutional arrangements broadly 
related to a state‘s welfare policies (Esping-Andersen 1990). The second 
indicates a country‘s ―organization of production through markets and market-
related institutions‖ (Soskice 1999:101).  A marked and important divergence in 
these arrangements is between ‗liberal (uncoordinated) market economies‘ and 
‗coordinated market economies‘ (Soskice 1999).The liberal production regime is 
characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. the UK) and combines deregulated 
labour markets, short-term time horizons of financial systems and companies, a 
highly competitive enterprise environment, and an emphasis on general 
education to provide and maintain skills (Soskice 1999). The coordinated 
production regime is characteristic of continental and northern European 
countries and combines, instead, regulated labour markets, a financial system 
which accommodates long-term financing of companies, more cooperative 
industrial and inter-company relations, and an emphasis on serious and 
coordinated vocational training to provide skills (Soskice 1999). 
Huber and Stephens state that ―the same welfare regime is compatible with 
different - but not any - labour market institutions and policies‖ (Huber & 
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Stephens 2001:109). The liberal or uncoordinated market economies, ―due to 
the imperative to keep labour costs low and maintain managerial prerogatives‖ 
(Hult & Svallfors 2002:316), typically have less extensive welfare policies. The 
UK is a leading example and, as such, spends less on social provision: this is 
facilitated by means testing and targeted benefits while allowing market forces 
to influence policy outcomes. Safeguarding against labour-market and life course 
risks beyond a rudimentary level is left to private insurance and savings schemes 
sometimes supported by complementary state policies e.g. tax credits (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Huber & Stephens 2001).  
The coordinated market economies are more dependent on welfare state 
arrangements where higher levels of social spending are maintained whilst 
pursuing policies that bolster the prevailing status quo and allow for the 
reproduction of a skilled workforce. Germany, and to a lesser extent France, 
where the state played the leading role in this regard, are examples of such a 
regime where the welfare state is extensive and aims to protect (at least) the 
working population from the social risks connected to market dependency and 
the life course (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber & Stephens 1999, 2001). Both 
Germany and France have exhibited a tendency towards ‗early exit‘ from the 
labour market, with much lower participation among the elderly (Ebbinghaus 
2000). Also, at the height of deindustrialisation, both Germany and France 
pursued a process of labour shredding to reduce the social costs of 
unemployment both short-term and long-term. The state, utilised early 
retirement (and even definitions of disability) and funded many of the social 
plans designed to mitigate the increase in unemployment. Time spent in 
education for the younger population was also increased.  
In addition, traditionally, they have also limited the entry of women to the 
labour force via the breadwinner model (Lewis 1992; Ostner 1995). In the initial 
post-industrial period when there was a demand for labour, foreign labour was 
imported in large numbers. Moreover, a large percentage of the domestic labour 
force was covered by union contracts. This prohibited the rapid expansion of a 
low wage service sector which has been a primary source of employment for 
women in an uncoordinated economy such as the UK. This limited the extent to 
which a dualist labour market could exist with low wage sectors based 
predominantly around routine service jobs (as is the case in the UK). Despite the 
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early entry of women into the labour market in the UK, social policy was and 
remains more working mother friendly in coordinated economies like France and 
Germany (Hubert & Stephens 1999).  
The success of the coordinated market economies depends heavily on the 
continuous reproduction of a highly skilled and highly motivated workforce. Only 
in this way can they compensate for the comparatively high wages and other 
labour costs, by competing through quality rather than lower costs. To facilitate 
this, employers are able to organise collectively in training their labour force. 
Skills are often specific and linked to a particular occupation or sector. This 
coordination extends to technology sharing, providing export marketing services 
and advice for R&D and for product innovation, setting product standards, and 
bargaining with employees (Soskice 1999; Hall & Soskice 2001). This institutional 
capacity and culture for a cooperative approach allows for long-term strategising 
and as Huber and Stephens conclude: ―shapes stable patterns of economic 
governance encompassing a country‘s financial system, its vocational training, 
and its system of industrial relations‖ (1999:4-5).  
There is, broadly, a consensus in the coordinated economies regarding successful 
competition in the globalised world. That is, where possible, to maintain existing 
social and economic relations. This necessitates the highly skilled labour force 
and an ability on the part of unions to maintain a level of wage restraint and 
flexibility required to maintain global competitiveness. Unions are typically 
founded along industrial lines and play, particularly in Germany, an effective 
role in negotiating working conditions within enterprises and in setting wage 
levels for the economy as a whole. Banks and industries, and in the case of 
France, the state, are strongly aligned, providing enterprises with stable and 
preferential sources of long term credit (Hubert & Stephens 1999; Soskice 1999; 
Hall & Soskice 2001).  
In the coordinated economies, the combination of strong unions and dependence 
on competitive exports necessitated a policy of wage restraint and the 
institutional capacity of unions, employer‘s organisations, and the bargaining 
process secured such a policy. This has allowed enterprises to remain 
competitive with skilled and committed workforces, and afforded the labour a 
high level of social protection.  
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In the liberal market economies, particularly the UK, relations between 
management and the labour force are more of a short- term character and based 
on unilateral control by management.  They are dependent on the combination 
of a highly motivated and dedicated management, and a low-skill, low-wage, 
mass of workers whose commitment is induced more by external control than by 
commitment to occupation or enterprise. Training for basic level workers, which 
in these economies is a sizeable proportion of the labour force, is not 
undertaken by private business and is generally ineffective. The UK has pursued 
a voluntarist approach to training, leaving it to the market or firms to organise 
independently of the education system. Moreover, there are negative attitudes 
socially regarding vocational education and training, the standard of which is low 
(Rubery 1994). 
Unlike the coordinated economies, trade unions are regarded as impediments to 
enterprises and, as such, have a marginalised role in employer decision making 
and coordinating activities. Due to the nature of industrialisation, the state has 
an arm‘s length role and bank-industry ties are weak. This puts enterprises at 
risk from merger and acquisition and forces them to rely on competitive markets 
to raise capital for investment (Hubert & Stephens 1999; Soskice 1999; Hall & 
Soskice 2001). Therefore, for large sections of the labour force, job security 
and, as a consequence, commitment is low. State action in order to augment 
commitment to employment and work has been meagre and more focused upon 
various ‗workfare‘ arrangements than towards creating or encouraging 
conditions for work and employment as a positive choice (King 1999).  
An additional concern, is that capital accumulation is no longer dependent on 
the development of a strong manufacturing and service base. Increasingly, UK 
policy has encouraged a profit based strategy rather than focusing on the 
development of what might be called the real economy. As Rubery explains:  
―British firms do not see themselves as producers but asset managers; 
issues such as developing new products and technologies to enhance 
Britain‘s long-term competitiveness are treated very much as of 
second-or third-order importance to ensuring a decent return on 
capital even if this means divesting all direct manufacturing 
activities‖ (1994:342). 
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This ‗hollowing out‘ of the economy, is the reason many individual enterprises in 
the UK will not commit to or develop a high-value-added skilled production 
system.  
The typologies outlined are idealised types, but are useful in explaining the 
paths taken by the countries and regions analysed in this thesis. Moreover, 
despite the different lens of analysis, many aspects of the VoC, production 
regime and welfare state exist together and complement one another. As Huber 
and Stephens observe:  
―wage levels and benefit levels have to fit, and labour market and 
social policies have to be in accord such as not to create perverse 
incentives. In addition, the type of production for the world market 
has to fit with the qualification of the labour force and with wage and 
benefit levels. Business, labour, and government coordination in R&D, 
training, and wage setting makes it possible to engage in high quality 
production and thus to sustain high wages and a high social wage‖ 
The combined welfare state regimes and production regimes, particularly their 
labour market aspects, result in very large differences in the distributive 
outcomes. As is widely reported, relative to France and Germany, the UK has 
been unsuccessful in combating poverty (as defined as less than 50 per cent of 
the median income in the country in question). Income inequality is also more 
prevalent in the UK (Wilkinson 1996; 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). 
Huber and Stephens, note two policies that have been particularly effective in 
combating poverty: pensions and family policies (1999:8). The aged and single 
mothers are traditionally two groups most at risk from poverty. Replacement 
rates in unemployment and retirement are typically greater in France and 
Germany - particularly during the period of deindustrialisation (Seeleib-Kaiser et 
al. 2010). However, as Palme‘s (1990) demonstrates, the level of minimum 
pensions, that is those not earning related, were the main factor in accounting 
for the international differences in at risk of poverty rates amongst the aged.  
As for single mothers, the two factors which appear to explain the most 
variation in poverty rates are child allowances and high levels of labour force 
participation among young women (which is in turn a product of policies 
supporting mother‘s employment) (Gornick et al. 1998). 
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As to redistribution via taxes and social transfers, Korpi and Palme‘s (1998) 
analysis establishes that systems which combine basic security, a term that 
usually refers to transfers with flat rate benefits, and income security, transfers 
with earnings related benefits, have the greatest redistributive impact. In 
coordinated economies the welfare states were employment based and earnings 
related. The basic needs of those without employment based benefits were 
mean tested. However, coordinated economies are still more egalitarian in their 
impact than the liberal welfare states like the UK with their greater dependence 
on programs that directly target those in need. Korpi and Palme termed this the 
‗paradox of redistribution‘. The coordinated economies were greater in scale. 
Alhough those with employment related benefits were better off, a greater 
expenditure on welfare generally assured a basic security for those without 
employment benefits at least as good as the uncoordinated economies like the 
UK. In addition, where benefits are generous, they work to marginalise private 
(typically inegalitarian) alternatives. 
The neoliberal shift in the UK, although ideological, was advocated as a way to 
facilitate post-industrial change with a view to sustaining economic growth and 
stimulating employment. The generous welfare states of the coordinated 
economies, it was suggested, were limiting economic growth and contributing to 
unemployment. However, UK growth (i.e. annual per cent increase in GDP) 
which had been significantly lower in the 1960s and 1970s only marginally 
exceeded France and Germany in the 1979-1989 period, 2.2, 1.6 and 1.7 per 
cent respectively. By the 1990-1993 period, UK growth was -0.3 compared with 
0.2 and 2.1 respectively. UK unemployment (as a percentage of total workforce) 
was greater than both France and Germany in the 1980-1989 period and in the 
1990-1994 period was still greater than Germany and only marginally better than 
France (OECD database; Huber & Stephens 1999). Moreover, it is important to 
note that increases in UK productivity were secured via the expansion of 
employment rather than technological upgrading, both of which have, in turn, 
fostered growing consumer expenditure and debt (Wilkinson 2007). 
Both France and Germany, had developed their welfare states in economies 
open to trade. They were also built around the interest of the export sector 
workers who, along with their unions, had a vested interest in the 
competitiveness of the export economies. As Huber & Stephens conclude: 
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―These countries chose a high quality production niche in the global 
economy based on highly skilled and educated labour, cooperative 
production, and capital intensive production techniques, which is 
compatible with both high wages and generous social benefits‖ 
(1999:8). 
However, as each state attempts to adapt to the New social Risks (NSR‘s) 
associated with post-industrialism they are all, to varying degrees and intensity, 
subject to a prevailing consensus of neoliberal austerity and retrenchment. In 
the case of these countries, the dynamic for retrenchment appears to be driven 
by ideology or unemployment. In the 1970s the governments sought to counter 
the deteriorating economy with traditional Keynesian counter cyclical policies. 
However, by the 1980s they came to realise that the global economy had 
changed fundamentally. Moreover, rising unemployment increased public 
expenditures. As Pierson (1996) argues, the politics of retrenchment were 
different from those of welfare state expansion.  
In France and Germany electoral constraints worked against major departures 
from the established welfare state models. Despite rhetoric on both sides, the 
right was limited in its capacity for retrenchment due to the popularity of the 
welfare settlement while the economic deterioration limited the left‘s capacity 
to raise taxes in order to maintain the status quo. In the UK, the cuts were 
ideological. The majority rule system of the UK meant the conservative 
government was able to pass legislation which was deeply unpopular with large 
groups within the population. In the UK the welfare state regime went from one 
that provided basic income security to one that was residualist and relied greatly 
on means testing. Although provision is in some ways universal, accounting for 
means-testing, in terms of the proportion of GDP allocated to the welfare state 
and the munificence of benefits, the UK lives up to its ideal type: liberal market 
economy.  
The path set out by the Conservatives under Thatcher has endured and both New 
Labour and the current coalition government have augmented that trajectory. 
The processes commonly characterised as neoliberalism, which were considered 
in the UK context to facilitate deindustrialisation and provide a foundation for 
future socioeconomic development, have impacted adversely on many in the UK. 
Rather than stimulating economic development and encouraging innovation, an 
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increased role for the market has to a greater extent increased inequalities; led 
to skill polarisation; made many jobs less secure; and disadvantaged many in 
precarious labour market positions.  The relative success of the other 
deindustrialised countries studied here cannot be attributed to one common 
factor or set of factors but reflects, in each case, a different institutional 
arrangements and approach to economic development. 
The coordinated economies have, despite some periods of high unemployment 
and inactivity, been better at keeping people out of poverty and protecting 
against the social costs associated with post-industrial change. This is due to the 
fact they are embedded in production regimes with greater contract coverage, 
worker protection and thus less inequality in income distribution.  Importantly, 
the uncoordinated approach to slow economic growth, lack of competitiveness 
and high unemployment (namely, the deregulation of the production regime and 
retrenchment of the welfare state into a residual one), is unlikely to be pursued. 
The reason for this is that the social costs endured as a result of a low-wage and 
low-skill economy would be politically unpopular. Hence, Germany and France, 
broadly speaking and relative to the UK, eschewed neoliberalism and pursued a 
more gradual and socially inclusive path toward economic restructuring and 
future economic development (Couch 2011).  
3.3 Conclusion 
As already outlined, there is consensus within the field of public health 
regarding the effect of socioeconomic determinants upon health outcomes. 
Social, material and psychosocial factors mediate health. For example work, 
unemployment, stress, social exclusion, social support and the social gradient 
(see Marmot & Wilkinson 2003). Divergence in life expectancy between 
population groups is a product of the characteristics of a society, not differences 
in health care/systems. Environment determines the risk of disease, when a 
person‘s social and cultural environment changes, their disease risk changes. 
Health inequalities are not solely determined by poverty. There is a 
socioeconomic gradient, as one moves down that gradient life expectancy gets 
shorter and the burden of disease gets higher. The experiences outlined in CEE 
illustrate this acutely and in the advanced industrial states of Western Europe 
major determinants of health or ill-health are inextricably linked to social and 
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economic context (Doyal & Pennell, 1979; Townsend & Davidson 1992; Acheson, 
1998). 
 
The coordinated economies of Germany and France managed better in terms of 
employee wellbeing and, ultimately, life expectancy. Their production regimes 
encouraged market strategies founded upon high quality and niche production 
(Streeck 1992) that depended on highly skilled employees. This was facilitated 
by strong initial vocational training systems and specialised skills across the 
broad spectrum of the workforce (skilled manual workers, technicians, and 
engineers). This mode of production demanded more cooperative industrial 
relations to safeguard cooperation from highly skilled and hence powerful 
employees‘, with employee elected bodies affiliated with industrial unions 
playing a substantive role in company decision-making (Soskice 2000; Gallie 
2007).  
 
This high skill ‗equilibrium‘ contributed to security and wellbeing as employers 
were, due the training costs and market power of transferable skills, less 
inclined to casually hire and fire employees. This situation was augmented by 
the nature of industrial relations which required long-term and cooperative 
associations with employees. It also had implications for the welfare systems: 
where there is investment in skills, employers and employees ―prefer welfare 
programmes and policies that reward and protect these investments for the 
future‖ (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001:160).  
 
In contrast the UK production regime was commonly categorised as a low-skill, 
low-value added system of production, whose competitive edge was often 
founded upon low wages and lack of restrictions on the employment of labour 
(Lane 1992; Finegold & Soskice 1998). Out of this developed a low-skill 
‗equilibrium‘ considered beneficial by employers who had adjusted their systems 
of organisation and production to make few demands on the workforce, other 
than to accept low wages and atypical employment: a consequence of a long-
term attitude towards training and education reinforced by cultural attitudes 
and practices (Rubery 1994). This has certainly impacted upon industrial 
relations and contributed to the adversarial relations that have been typical of 
the UK.  
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More recently, the UK has been characterised in terms of its highly polarised skill 
structure. The inadequacies of the vocational training system at post-compulsory 
secondary education level has left many with no or weakly developed skills. 
However, the UK liberal economy is heavily orientated toward the provision of 
internationally competitive services and systems for example finance, defence, 
telecommunications, which require significant numbers of ‗highly trained and 
mobile‘ professionals. As Gallie notes: 
 
―The emphasis on rapid technological innovation encourages 
organizational structures that allow high levels of unilateral 
managerial control, and the consequent marginalization of unions, 
while the need to take advantage at short notice of new skills on the 
labour market requires a regulative system that allows employers to 
hire and fire employees at low cost‖ (2007:15). 
The path of the CEE countries is still to be determined. Currently, they share 
characteristics of both the coordinated and liberal economies which, as 
discussed, in the VoC/production regime literature are described as dependent 
market economies. They have comparative advantages in the assembly and 
production of relatively complex and durable consumer goods: based on 
institutional complementarities between skilled, but cheap, labour; the transfer 
of technological innovations within transnational enterprises; and the provision 
of capital via foreign direct investment.  At least in terms of social protection, 
the Czech Republic, due to the levels of social solidarity, is considered closer to 
the coordinated model. Poland, due relatively low coverage and high 
vulnerability rates, is considered closer to the UK. 
 
3.4 A simple framework for further analysis 
Thus, we see that life expectancy follows successful socioeconomic development 
within a state that enjoys support from the population. Again, 
individual determinants of health matter but their importance is subordinated 
within large economic, social and political processes.  
 
In all the countries covered in this analysis, deindustrialisation damages health 
and slows improvements in life expectancy and in some cases puts them in 
reverse. However, the amount of harm to health caused by deindustrialisation 
and subsequent post-industrial change can be softened by (i) slowing the rate of 
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deindustrialisation (ii) the broader socioeconomic context specific to individual 
countries or regions (iii) providing effective social protection. 
  
What emerge here, therefore, are three headings under which we can examine 
the link between life expectancy trends and the economic, political and social 
context of regions that have undergone deindustrialisation.  These are: 
 
(i) the speed and nature of deindustrialisation  
(ii) the broader socioeconomic context specific to individual countries or 
regions 
(iii) provision of effective social protection. 
  
This simple framework will be used to investigate West Central Scotland and the 
four European regions following this chapter.   
 
3.5 Comparable data for the five post-industrial regions 
This section is intended to complement the case studies presented in the 
chapters that follow this.  Presented are a table and series of figures (1-22) 
comparing data for the five selected regions. The table and figures are referred 
to in each of the individual case studies that follow. Most of the data has been 
collected in the context of the previously discussed Aftershock work. Where 
possible these data have been updated. However, due to the use of census and 
social surveys etc. that has not always been possible. Information on the data 
sources and details of the variables are provided in Appendix B.  As discussed in 
the methods chapter such an approach has recognised limitations. For example, 
in some instances, where indicated, proxy geographies have had to be used. 
Although, the use of proxy geographies highlights the difficulties of obtaining 
comparable data sets, it also further emphasises the suitability of these regions 
in the context of this thesis, given the comparable data which is available.  
 
3.6 Proxy geographies  
The area defined as WCS is shown in Figure 1.1 (pg.18). However, a number of 
other geographies have been used to represent WCS. These are: Greater Glasgow 
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(the boundaries of the old NHS board area before expansion in 200613); and 
Strathclyde (as defined by the boundaries of the old local government region14). 
In addition, the area of ‗South West Scotland‘ has been used. This is defined as 
the ‗NUTS‘15 region used, for example, by Eurostat. This region includes WCS, 
but also integrates the more affluent (but less economically productive) 
Dumfries & Galloway area, and this is likely to impact to a degree on the data 
presented.  
 
Similar data limitations meant that for the presentation of some indicators for 
some regions it was necessary to use other proxy geographies. These include, 
North-Rhine Westphalia occasionally used in place of the Ruhr and South Poland 
(encompassing Silesia and its neighbouring province, Malopolskie) for Silesia. 
Note that where a proxy geography has been used, it is indicated below the 
relevant Figure, and will often be also referred to in the text and Appendix B. 
 
3.6.1 Silesia/Katowice 
In the first ‗Aftershock‘ report, the post-industrial region in Poland was referred 
to as ‗Katowice‘. This was one of the old provinces (voivodeships) of Poland. In 
1999 it became part of the slightly larger province of Silesia (Slaskie in Polish). 
With one or two minor exceptions, the data presented in this report relate to 
Silesia, and this name is therefore used in preference to ‗Katowice‘. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
13 The former Greater Glasgow Health Board, which existed before 2006, covered Glasgow City, 
East Dunbartonshire and parts of West Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, North and South 
Lanarkshire. 
14 The old Strathclyde region approximates to the definition of WCS shown in Figure 1.1, but 
additionally includes Argyll & Bute. 
15 Nomenclatures of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) are the standard geographies used by 
the European Union to divide countries into regions and sub-regions. NUTS II regions have 
populations between 800,000 and 3m. 
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3.7 Case study structure 
Each of the case studies is similarly structured and in each section the 
comparative data contained in this chapter will be referred to – providing a 
comparison across the regions. Within each case study there is additional data 
providing a direct comparison between the region discussed and WCS. The 
indicators have been selected on the basis of the three previously established 
headings and highlight the degree of divergence in terms of deindustrialisation, 
changing socioeconomic context, and effectiveness of social protection.  
 
As discussed, the case studies consider research objectives and questions for 
each selected region, in light of the national contexts outlined in this chapter 
and appendix A. The structure of the case studies contained in chapter 4-8 is as 
follows. First, deindustrialisation is considered with a focus on national and 
regional responses, the path of economic restructuring and the effect on 
employment. Second, the changing regional context is described and discussed 
and the impact of that change in terms of skills and education, social capital and 
income inequality is considered. Finally, the nature of the change to social 
protection is discussed. 
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Table 3.1:  Post-industrial European regions: country, size, industrial specialisation and 
employment loss. 
 
Region Country Population16 
 
 
 
Year of 
Industrial 
Employment 
Peak17  
Principal 
Historical 
Industries 
Total 
Industrial 
Employment 
Loss18 
 Percentage 
of industrial 
employment. 
Year 2005 
Katowice 
(Silesia) 
Poland 4.1m 1977 Coal, steel, 
automobiles, 
zinc 
-55% 
(1980-2005) 
42.8 
Northern 
Moravia 
Czech 
Republic 
1.9m 1986 Coal, steel -19% 
(1993-2005) 
 
42 
Nord-
Pas-de-
Calais 
France 4.0m 1974 Coal, 
textiles, 
steel 
-43% 
(1970-2005) 
 
26.4 
Ruhr 
area 
Germany 5.3m 1970 (West 
Germany) 
Coal, iron 
steel 
-54% 
(1970-2005) 
 
28.1 
West 
Central 
Scotland 
Scotland 2.1m 1965 Shipbuilding 
& support 
industries 
(iron, coal, 
engineering) 
-62% 
(1971-2005) 
19.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
16 Population at 2005 for all regions except NPdC, for which the year is 2003. 
17 Employment peak of the parent country, rather than the region. 
18 This column shows the percentage decrease in the number of industrial jobs in each region 
over the time period shown in parentheses. The time period is between a ‗base‘ year and 
2005. For Western European areas, the base year is the year closest to 1970 (the peak year of 
industrial employment in Western Europe) for which industrial employment data were 
available at the time of undertaking the analysis. For the Central and Eastern European 
regions, data availability largely determined the base year: 1980 for Katowice/Silesia and 
1993 for Northern Moravia. 
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Figure 3.1: Industrial employment as percentage of civilian labour force for five host 
countries: 1956-2010.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Unemployment as a percentage of civilian labour force for five host countries: 
1956-2010. 
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Figure 3.3: Unemployed as a percentage of economically active population in host countries 
for years: 2008 and 2011.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Percentage of men aged 25-49 not in employment in selected regions: 2001. 
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Figure 3.5: At risk of poverty rates for working age adults not in employment in host 
countries: 1995-210. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Income inequality over time in Scotland and host countries: 1984-2004. 
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of adults aged 25-64 with tertiary level qualifications in selected 
regions: 2008. 
 
NB: S.W. Scotland used as proxy for WCS. N. Moravia (pt.) figure based on Moravskoslezsko 
region. North-Rhine Westphalia used as proxy for The Ruhr.  
 
Figure 3.8: Percentage of adults aged 25-64 with no or low-level qualifications in selected 
regions: 2008. 
 
NB: S.W. Scotland used as proxy for WCS. N. Moravia (pt.) figure based on Moravskoslezsko 
region. North-Rhine Westphalia used as proxy for The Ruhr. 
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of households with children headed by a lone parent in the selected 
regions: 1999-2002. 
 
 
NB: Ruhr data is an estimate, based on adjusted Urban Audit data. 
 
Figure 3.10: Change over-time in percentage of households with dependent children in 
selected regions: 1990-2001. 
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of households that are single person households in selected 
regions: 1999-2002. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Change over-time in percentage of single person households in selected 
regions: 1990-2001. 
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Figure 3.13: Percentage of adults aged between the ages of 25 and 64 who were married in 
selected regions: 2001. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Percentage of adults in selected regions who never attend religious ceremonies 
except on special occasions: 2002-2008. 
 
 
NB: North-Rhine Westphalia used as proxy for The Ruhr. 
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Figure 3.15: Voter turnout percentage for national parliamentary elections in selected 
regions: 2005-2007. 
 
 
NB: North-Rhine Westphalia used as proxy for The Ruhr. 
 
Figure 3.16: Change over-time for percentage voter turnout in national parliamentary 
elections in selected regions: 1990-2007. 
 
 
NB: North-Rhine Westphalia used as proxy for The Ruhr. 
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Figure 3.17: Percentage of adult male daily smokers in selected regions: 2002-2010.  
 
 
NB: North-Rhine-Westphalia is used as a proxy for The Ruhr. S. Poland used as proxy for Silesia. 
 
Figure 3.18: Percentage of adult female daily smokers in selected regions: 2002-2010.  
 
 
NB: North-Rhine-Westphalia is used as a proxy for The Ruhr. S. Poland used as proxy for Silesia. 
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Figure 3.19: Percentage of adult population not drinking during last year in host countries 
between 2003 and 2007.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Percentage of adult population drinking daily in selected host countries 
between 2003 and 2007.  
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Figure 3.21: Percentage of births to mothers under the age of 20 in selected host countries: 
2005-6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.22: Occupations of employed population for selected host countries: 2007.  
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4. The Ruhrgebiet (Ruhr region)19,20 
Figure 4.1 The Ruhr Region 
The Ruhr is not an historical or political entity it is an area defined by its 
economic specialisation: coal and steel. Situated in the Federal Länd (State) of 
North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), the Ruhr has an area of 4,400 square kilometres 
and is home to 5.4 million inhabitants. It is still one of the world‘s largest 
industrial agglomerations and one of Europe‘s most densely populated 
conurbations. The Rhine marks the western border and its tributaries effectively 
demarcate three of its four zones. These three zones of the Ruhrgebiet are the 
Ruhr Zone, the Emscher Zone and the Lippe Zone. It is between the Emscher and 
Lippe Zones that we find the Hellweg Zone, the industrial heartland of the area. 
It was here during industrialisation that the medieval towns of Duisburg, Essen, 
Bochum, Dortmund and Unna transformed into large industrial cities (Bross & 
Walter 2000; Hospers 2004). 
                                         
19 All but three of the Ruhr districts (Wesel, Unna and Recklinghausen) are kreisfreie stadt. 
Wesel, Unna and Recklinghausen cover both the urban districts of the same name and their 
surrounding rural municipalities. 
 
20
 Note: map is not to scale. 
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Extensive urbanisation of the region was a direct consequence of rapid 
industrialisation due to (i) technological innovations imported predominantly 
from Great Britain (ii) political and economic liberalisation afforded by 
progressive Prussian policies (iii) investment capital funding secured from 
Belgium and France and finally (iv) burgeoning transport connections (Schrader 
1998; Van Dijk 2002). As a consequence, between 1850 and 1925, the population 
increased from approximately 400,000 to 3,800,000 (Hospers 148:2004).  Over 
time other industries, such as power generation and chemicals, integrated into 
the coal and steel complex (Heinze et al. 1998) and the population continued to 
grow, peaking in 1961 at 5.7 million and declining modestly thereafter to its 
present 5.4 million. Second generation immigrants comprise 12 per cent of the 
population which is a relatively large proportion compared to the rest of 
Germany (Hospers 149:2004). The Ruhr has experienced two significant waves of 
immigration. First, from 1890-1918, Poles who had been afforded German rights 
as part of Prussia came to the Ruhr to work in the coal and steel industries. 
Second, from the 1960s, many Turks, Yugoslavians and Italians came to fill the 
low-paid and unskilled jobs unpopular amongst Germans.  
4.1 Deindustrialisation 
Figure 3.1 (pg.81), indicates the level of industrial employment as a percentage 
of civilian labour force in the five host countries. From these data it is clear that 
while deindustrialisation was well under way by the 1970s in the UK, in West 
Germany it was a phenomenon of the 1980s and 90s. Moreover, once 
deindustrialisation started it was more gradual than in the UK. The same truth is 
apparent when one compares the levels of unemployment in Figure 3.2 (pg.82) 
(Singh 1989; Iversen & Cusack 2000; Fleckenstein et al. 2011).  
The peak of coal production occurred in 1956 when 124,600 tons of coal was 
produced and approximately half a million workers were employed in coal 
mining) (also see Table 3.1 (pg.81). However, by 1958 the coal mining industry 
was in crisis due to cheaper imported coal and coal substitutes (Hospers 
2004:148).  
The economic crises of the 1970s sent a shock to the steel industry. Increased 
competition from low-wage countries and a fall in demand for cars and ships led 
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to the closure of many firms. Between 1974 and 1988 Duisburg and Rheinhausen, 
the location for approximately 70 per cent of German steel production, lost 
87,000 of its 210,000 steel related jobs (Van Dijk 2002:5). Since the 1960s more 
than 750,000 jobs in the coal and steel industries, some 10 per cent of the total 
of NRW‘s jobs, were lost. At the same time, the Ruhr‘s share of German GDP 
declined from 12.2 per cent in 1957 to 8.2  per cent in 1987 (Maggi 2004:49).  
Despite this, the region (and country more broadly) sought to maintain industrial 
capacity by building on existing regional assets and competences and promoting 
diversification into new and related technologies and the technological 
upgrading of existing industries (Martin & Sunley 2006; Boschma 2007). In direct 
contrast to WCS the speed of deindustrialisation in the Ruhr was significantly 
slower and the process was and continues to be socially managed (Goch 2002; De 
Spiegel 2007).  
 
Contemporary accounts (Birch & Mykhnenko 2009; Birch et al. 2010) indicate 
that, between 1996 and 2005, deindustrialisation, as indicated by manufacturing 
employment, continued in the Ruhr. Broadly speaking, the losses in low tech 
industries exceeded those in high-tech. Like WCS, there was some increase in 
service employment. However, the growth was not limited to routine services 
with areas of the Ruhr recording increases in high-tech knowledge intensive 
service industries.  
 
Comparing the speed and intensity of deindustrialisation between regions is 
difficult as the data series are not complete and starting points could be 
contested. Nonetheless, Table 3.1 (pg.81) shows that, by 2005, the share of 
industrial employment (as a percentage of total employment) had fallen in the 
Ruhr but that it still maintained more than a quarter of its workforce in these 
industries. By contrast, WCS had a lower proportion of its workforce in industry. 
Also, during the period 1970 – 2005, the Ruhr lost just over half (52%) of its 
industrial employment while WCS lost roughly two-thirds (62%). 
 
To be more accurate comparing the speed and intensity of deindustrialisation in 
each region is difficult. Data is unavailable for WCS for the 1970s and 1980s; 
therefore any estimates would be based upon assumptions about individual 
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years. Additional data for West Europe in the 1970s and CEE in the 1980s may be 
available in printed sources and that could be a potential source for further 
inquiry. Finally, due to the different (and debatable/contested) start points for 
deindustrialisation there is no established way to accurately measure speed and 
intensity of deindustrialisation. However, as established, deindustrialisation is 
regarded as being less intense in Germany than the UK.  
 
The next section will look at the policy responses, both national and regional, to 
deindustrialisation in the Ruhr.  
 
4.1.1 Federal role 
In Germany, regional policy is principally the responsibility of the Länder or city 
states. With the exception of sector and macro-economic policy, the role of the 
federal government is limited to setting guidelines and delivering some 
investment for regional policies. The ‗Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der 
Regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur‘ (Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional 
Economic Structures) is an important regional policy tool of the federal and Länd 
governments as it supports industrial investments and infrastructure 
developments for those regions most in need of assistance. Due to the federal 
system and the relative autonomy and power of local governments, economic 
development is reliant upon: 
 
―Indigenous economic potential, the qualifications of the local labour 
force and the variety of local conditions, including image, cultural 
identity, and appropriateness for corporate headquarters‖ (Rodwin & 
Sazanami 1991:100).  
In contrast to the UK and WCS, decentralisation and autonomy at both the 
regional and local level have facilitated a strong tradition of planning and policy 
cooperation. This cooperation is augmented by a constitution, which codifies a 
commitment to equal living standards across all Länder. However, as the costs of 
reunification have demonstrated, this commitment can limit the capital 
available for regeneration.  
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4.1.2 Regional role 
Regional policy was focused on mitigating the impact of industrial decline by 
facilitating the restructuring of the vulnerable coal and steel sectors through 
subsidies designed to avoid mass unemployment. These efforts to maintain the 
economic base, the policies of ‗reindustrialisation‘, were summed up in the 
motto of the local parties: ―defence is the best form of attack‖ (Hospers 2004). 
The belief was that if prior prosperity had been driven by a vital industrial 
sector, and if the economic crises were due to the failure of that sector to 
maintain its impetus, then a return to prosperity should be facilitated via an 
industrial revival. 
 
Such policies were pursued during the 1960s and 1970s (Hassink 1993). The large 
industrial enterprises such as Thyssen, Manesmann and Krupp, faced with 
exogenous pressures, tried to remain competitive within the coal and steel 
industries by attracting investment in order to increase their scale and 
productivity. Cooperation between the major players increased and evolved into 
a trend for consolidation. Mergers were facilitated between former competitors 
and closer relationships with customers and suppliers were cultivated. Moreover, 
from the 1970s onwards these same enterprises began to acquire firms in 
associated areas such as processing and industrial technologies. The problem was 
that these new acquisitions were often based outside the Ruhr and, as such, this 
strategy of ‗external diversification‘ and consolidation transformed major 
regional players into multinational enterprises but did little to redevelop the 
Ruhr (Hassink 1993).   
 
Initially, during the 1966/1967 recession, political protests and industrial action 
took place in reaction to the closures. However the Federal Republic and Länd of 
NRW responded by implementing Keynesian economic measures. In addition the 
federal state, industry and trade unions worked together to ensure the 
contraction of the mining industry was ‗socially carried out‘ (Danielzyk & Wood 
1993:131). This led to the consolidation of the collieries into the new enterprise 
Ruhrkohle AG (RAG), the creation of which allowed trade union representatives 
to put in place a safety net protecting miners against long-term economic 
insecurity. In the iron and steel industry, the employee councils negotiated a 
socially acceptable plan for coping with deindustrialisation. Generally, a regional 
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model of cooperation between management and labour, assisted by the 
government, was able to secure a safety net against the costs of structural 
change (Goch 2002).  
 
In these earlier stages of deindustrialisation, local government continued to 
subsidise the education of a new generation of miners and steel workers. These 
strategies were designed to maintain the status quo rather than facilitate 
restructuring. Local stakeholders still believed that the region‘s fortunes 
depended on the coal and steel industries (Hassink 1993; Hospers 2004). By the 
mid-1980s however, Germany was suffering from eurosclerosis - high 
unemployment and slow job creation in spite of overall economic growth. The 
Ruhr was typical of a sclerotic milieu and local stakeholders realised that their 
defensive policies of reindustrialisation were no longer suitable and needed to 
be replaced by a more offensive strategy.  
 
Although the immediate policy responses to deindustrialisation (the 
reindustrialisation) were defensive, local authorities at the time did look beyond 
the immediate concerns of heavy industry to consider long-term regional growth. 
To facilitate a diversification of the regions knowledge base, the first university 
was introduced in the Ruhr Area in 1961 and was soon followed by other 
universities and polytechnics throughout the region. Programmes such as the 
1975 NRW programme (Nordrheine-Westfalen-Programm) sought to revitalise the 
region through modernising the mining industry and attracting inward 
investment. The nascent educational institutions would aid this process. In 1979 
the Ruhr Area Action Programme (Aktionsprogramm Ruhr) was established to 
facilitate urban renewal, environmental protection and technology transfer. 
However, as Percy notes: ―The programme helped to soften the impact of job 
losses, but it also held back the process of restructuring and creating a new 
economic basis‖ (2003:154).  
 
Despite these efforts, the Ruhr in the 1980s still suffered from high 
unemployment and industrial decline: ongoing initiatives were not adequately 
resolving the region‘s economic and structural problems. In a direct attempt to 
broaden the economic base, the local government encouraged inward 
investment from industries such as micro-electronics, cars and chemicals. 
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However, with the exception of the Opel car manufacturing plant in Bochum, 
the policy was largely unsuccessful (Percy 2003).   
 
The established industrial giants were dismissive of attempts to broaden the 
region‘s economic base. In reaction to the establishment of the Ruhr University, 
industrialist Gustav Krupp, perhaps illustrating the problems of a well 
established industrial mono-structure, remarked to his colleagues: ―what we 
need in the Ruhr are muscles not brains‖ (Hospers 2004:151). Moreover, they 
directly thwarted attempts to attract inward investments by refusing to give up 
sites and by highlighting unappealing conditions in order to deter potential 
investors. The local authorities were weak in response. With regard to the 
refusal to sell land, the government satisfied itself in the knowledge that the 
established old industries paid higher income taxes. Similarly, calls by lobbyists 
for state intervention in established sectors were viewed sympathetically, as ties 
between managers and politicians in the Ruhr were traditionally close. Rather 
than facilitate structural change in order to drive long-term economic 
development, the self-sustaining coalition of local interests instead served to 
undermine it (Grabher 1993; Hospers 2004).  
 
The Ruhr was in the grip of a so-called ‗lock-in‘. Grabher (1993) identified three 
forms of lock-in prevalent in this period: economic, institutional, and cognitive.   
‗Economic lock-in‘ manifested itself as an industrial mono-structure which 
inhibited enterprise, innovation and flexibility. (Grabher 1993; Hospers 2004).  
‗Institutional lock-in‘, refers to the highly accommodating relations that existed 
between industry and the politico-administrative system (Grabher 1993:264) that 
impeded the process of innovation and restructuring. The Ruhr also had to 
manage a ‗cognitive lock-in‘ both within and outside the region. The regional 
parties were convinced that the crises were cyclical in nature rather than being 
due to permanent structural forces. In addition, the outside world perceived the 
Ruhr to have an industrial mono-structure and be an unattractive and polluted 
industrial region, although in fact the Ruhr was, and continues to be, one of 
Germany‘s greenest regions.  As Hospers concludes: ―this cognitive distance 
between the region‘s identity and its image‖ may be a factor in understanding 
why the Ruhrgebiet struggled to attract the inward investment required for its 
restructuring and renewal (2004:152).  
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4.1.2.1 Neo-industrialisation 
From the mid-1980s, the policy emphasis shifted from one of reindustrialisation 
to neo-industrialisation (Hospers 2004, 2010). Neo-industrialisation was a bottom 
up approach concerned with developing new forms of economic activity around 
the old industries in the region in order to facilitate a structural conversion of 
the economic base. The larger coal and steel concerns, having realised that 
industrial decline was a structural concern and not a cyclical event, were 
proactive in this regard. Firms such as RAG, Thyssen and Krupp diversified from 
coal and steel into related growth areas such as plant engineering, 
environmental technology and control services. In 2004, Hospers estimated that 
these new enterprises accounted for two thirds of the former coal and steel 
giants‘ revenue (2004:52).  
 
The major achievement of neo-industrialisation in the Ruhr is the coal and steel 
industries‘ diversification into the area of environmental technology (Kilper & 
Wood 1995; Hilbert et al. 2004). Both industries had a legacy of innovation they 
could draw upon and, from the early 1970s, environmental concerns formed part 
of the political agenda in the region. The subsequent introduction of political 
measures designed to limit pollution and contamination can be considered a 
critical juncture, facilitating the rise of the Environmental Protection Agency in 
the Ruhr. The legislation for strict environmental rules and the associated 
demand for clean technologies amongst local firms since the 1980s encouraged 
the accumulation of knowledge and expertise in environmental protection. The 
cluster of enterprises in the Ruhr forms the centre of environmental technology 
research in Germany (Hilbert et al. 2004).   
 
Regional cooperation between local enterprises, universities, research institutes 
(Soil Protection Centre, Environmental and Packaging R&D Centre), and 
environmental agencies led to the development of many pioneering applications. 
The success of these developments has allowed the Ruhr environmental cluster 
to increasingly develop markets outside of the region. Similar successful areas of 
old industrial diversification are energy supplies and waste management. Owing 
to the considerable quantity of energy resources required and waste emitted by 
coal and steel plants, R&D in the area of renewable energies, recycling and 
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waste management was developed in the Ruhrgebiet comparatively early on, as 
Hospers explains:  
 
―Just as in the case of environmental technology, these branches are 
future-orientated while they paradoxically emerged from the region‘s 
industrial tradition‖ (Hospers 2004:152).   
They managed to transfer the old competencies and skills situated within the old 
cluster into new markets, giving rise to the new environment protection 
industry. New firm formation would prove a critical element for the emergence 
of high-technology industries (Feldman et al. 2005). 
 
From the 1980s, local authorities began to acknowledge the consequences of 
technological-economic structural change and to develop new efforts centred 
upon a tertiary sector with more flexible modes of production (Blotevogel 
1998:408).  
 
Although these approaches diverged significantly from their antecedents, 
focussing as they did on processes of networking at the regional and local levels, 
and the breaking up of established milieus, they remained within the corporatist 
tradition of the West German social democratic model.  
In 1984, the Land of NRW called for a concerted action approach to economic 
restructuring to encourage ‗sunrise technologies‘ (Deeg 1999:148). Around the 
same time, the majority of municipalities in the Ruhr rolled back their efforts to 
secure inward investment in order to preserve the status quo. Instead, in 
accordance with the policy objective of the State, innovation was encouraged 
and local technology centres were established to provide advice and service to 
start-ups. By the early 1990s the Ruhr was host to 29 such centres (Hospers 
2004:152).   
The neo-industrial approach not only signalled a break from the past in its 
objective of renewing the economic structure of the region, it also sought to 
stimulate the region‘s endogenous potential from the bottom up rather than the 
top down, by decentralising responsibilities for structural change in the region. 
For example, the city of Gelsenkirchen sought to exploit its industrial legacy in 
which energy supply for steel production formed the mainstay of the local 
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economy. The new niche is now solar technology, a modern field in which the 
endogenous capacity of traditional sectors could combine with state of the art 
technology (Hospers 2004:153). 
 
The IBA Emscher-park exemplifies this shift. This public-private project 
established in May 1988 by the Land of NRW was central to the economic, 
ecological and social renewal of an 800 square kilometre area. The Emscher 
district is the conurbation between Dortmund and Duisburg, covering an area of 
approximately 800 km2. It encompasses 17 cities and towns and is home to 
approximately two million inhabitants in the heart of the Ruhr, adjacent to the 
river Emscher. The concentration of heavy industry in the area has meant it has 
endured structurally induced social and economic deterioration (Kilper & Wood 
1995; Knapp 1998; Hospers 2004; also for detailed overview see IBA 1989).  
 
The project proved popular and successful. Funding for the IBA came mainly 
from the Land and federal governments, with some EU funds and very little 
private investment. By 1994 approximately 83 projects were either planned or 
implemented, and around DM 1.4 billion (£461 million) of public money had been 
directed into the area21. Within ten years 123 cooperative projects had been 
carried out, ranging from the establishment of technology centres to the 
renovation of apartments and the restoration of industrial sites for heritage 
tourism.   
 
4.1.2.2 The current situation 
More recently in the Ruhr, service sector growth, a contracting male-dominated 
industrial workforce, and the growing number of women in the labour market 
have transformed the post-war configurations of work and welfare.  
 
The current economic structure and labour market in the Ruhr is the product of 
the region‘s industrial development legacy and global economic developments. 
It is the service or tertiary sector that, as in WCS and NPdC, now dominates the 
                                         
21
 This was despite the dire financial situation of the Länder in the aftermath of unification. To 
ensure the project worked, IBA initiatives are given funding priority within the State 
programme so that different actors are stimulated to cooperate and also accept the State‘s 
role of organising the restructuring processes and securing certain ecological, social and other 
standards (Kilper & Wood 1995:213). 
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Ruhr economy. The share of the labour force working in services increased from 
36.3 per cent in 1961 to 65.4 per cent in 2000 (Hospers 2004). Business oriented 
services, household services, and banking and insurance services have all 
developed. Most recent growth areas are in the knowledge and creative 
industries. However, in comparison with the growth of services in the EU in 
general, and in Germany in particular, the rate of growth in the Ruhr is limited 
(as it is in WCS) particularly within business oriented services (Van Dijk 2002:6). 
Bade and Niebuhr (1999) discern in the German economy a correlation between 
the number of business services and the creation of jobs in the manufacturing 
sector. This ‗parallel thesis‘ concludes that future or ongoing tertiarisation is 
dependent on developments simultaneously occurring in the region‘s 
manufacturing sector. For  example, the successful growth of information and 
communication services in  Dortmund and logistic services in Duisburg can both 
be traced to the cities‘ respectively strong electronic and transport industries 
(Bömer 2005; Hospers 2004). 
 
Some of the developments have been controversial. For example, in Oberhausen 
a large area of derelict land has been regenerated as Centro, a regional shopping 
and leisure complex. The development is well designed and of high quality, is 
well served by transport infrastructure and has generated service employment. 
However, in contrast to similar developments in WCS, the development has 
received criticism for it has generated large volumes of additional road traffic 
and has had a significant impact on the fortunes of nearby town centres (Percy 
2003).   
 
The remaining mines in the Ruhr are due to be phased out in 2018. Currently, 
the federal and land governments subsidise coal mining by approximately €2.5 
billion a year this is set to continue until the last mine is closed. The subsidies 
are part of an agreement that led to the stock market flotation of the mining 
corporation: RAG. Their plans for the future are to focus on profitable "white 
activities" consisting of real estate, power stations and chemicals production. 
Proceeds from the flotation will be used to pay for miners' pensions and for 
repairing some of the damage mining has done to the environment. Since the IBA 
the region‘s industrial heritage continues to be transformed into leisure parks, 
exhibition halls and museums (de Spiegel 2007).  
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Declining employment in the manufacturing sector as a percentage of the 
national labour force relative to rising employment in the service sector, a 
feature of the UK since the 1970s, has increasingly been a feature in Germany 
since the mid-1990s (Figure 3.1 pg.82). As Figure 3.22 (pg.92) indicates, even in 
2007 at the national level, relative to the UK, Germany, despite the degree of 
tertiarisation, still has a significant proportion of its workforce engaged as 
technicians and in crafts and related trades. As a consequence, the degree of 
deskilling has been less severe than the UK. That said the skill profile of 
Germany, like a number of continental European economies, is shifting (see, e.g. 
Culpepper 2007). It should be noted, particularly in the context of the Ruhr that 
employment growth in the service sector, as in WCS, could not adequately 
compensate for the extreme employment losses attributed to 
deindustrialisation. In fact, the negative economic trend led to the out-
migration of 90,000 persons between 1989 and 2006 (Kahl 2012:8). 
 
4.1.3 Unemployment  
Figure 4.2: Unemployment in SW Scotland and the Ruhr. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the change in unemployment between 1985 and 2008 for the 
Ruhr and South West Scotland (SWS) – a proxy for WCS. From the mid-1980s, 
unemployment was greater in SWS as the Ruhr benefitted from early retirement 
schemes and limited female entry to the workforce. However, rising 
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unemployment in the Ruhr and falling unemployment in the Scottish region 
meant that rates converged in the early 1990s. These trends continued such 
that, by 2005, unemployment in the Ruhr was nine percentage points higher 
than in SWS. 
 
Figure 3.3 (pg.83) presents regional unemployment rates in 2008 and 2011 for 
the five regions (The measure of unemployment uses the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) definition (ONS 2010). The rate calculated is the number of 
unemployed people divided by the economically active population (employed 
plus unemployed). In 2008, at 5.8 per cent, the unemployment rate in WCS was 
lower than the other regions. The situation in the Ruhr was more severe with 
unemployment at 11.1 per cent. However, as the figures for 2011 show, this is a 
fluid picture. Rates in WCS are now comparable with the Ruhr. This is a concern 
for WCS and the UK as historically, the Ruhr and Germany have experienced 
higher structural unemployment typically attributed to ‗Eurosclerosis‘ or lack of 
labour market flexibility and generous welfare arrangements (Nickell & Layard 
1999). This is a picture that, as shall be discussed, has been changing since the 
1990s.  
4.1.4 Employment rates  
A problem with utilising unemployment rates as an indicator of labour market 
disadvantage is the degree of hidden unemployment. In the Ruhr, labour was 
shed via early retirement and a widening of the definitions of disability. Such 
individuals would not be measured as unemployed, even though many are likely 
to be in employment or looking for work. In the UK, many former industrial 
workers found themselves on incapacity benefits (Beatty et al. 2000). As such, 
regional comparisons of unemployment have the potential to be misleading. If 
‗hidden unemployment‘ is worse in WCS, as has been suggested (Beatty et al. 
2002; Webster 2002; Beatty et al. 2012), then unemployment rates alone may 
not provide an accurate account of labour market change in the regions over 
time.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4  106 
Figure 4.3: Male employment in WCS and the Ruhr. 
 
Figure 4.4: Female employment in WCS and the Ruhr. 
 
To attempt to accommodate this, crude employment rates were calculated for 
men and women aged 15-64 for both regions for the period 1981-2005 (note 
again the proxy of South Western Scotland). As historically Germany has 
operated a bread-winner model of welfare, gender division is important as 
female labour market participation has historically been higher in the UK than in 
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Germany. As Figure 4.3 indicates, employment rates for men aged 15-64 were 
marginally higher in the Ruhr in the 1980s and similar in both regions until the 
late 1990s, when they diverged as rates rose in WCS but fell in the Ruhr. For 
females, employment rates (Figure 4.4) in both regions increased steadily but 
were, as one would expect, consistently greater in WCS than the Ruhr.  
 
Taulbut et al. (2011) have noted that, at the regional level, direct comparisons 
have their limitations. For example, employment rates are presented at the 
individual level. Comparisons of employment (and non-employment) levels at 
the household level could potentially provide better information but these data 
are not available. The employment data presented here are also limited due to 
the absence of WCS employment data for the period 1982-85.  
 
4.1.5 Worklessness 
Due to international and regional variances in pension provision (the potential to 
affect those aged 50+) and participation in full-time education (greater impact 
on younger adults under the age of 25) crude employment rates may not fully 
indicate the level of labour market opportunity. As we have seen in the Ruhr, 
relative to WCS particularly, historically there have been high levels of 
retirement and limited levels of female labour market participation. To 
accommodate this Figure 3.4 (pg.83) shows the percentage of men aged 25-49 
not in employment in 2001. Of all the selected regions the Ruhr has the highest 
proportion 35.1 per cent compared with 21.7 per cent in WCS. This is 
significantly higher. As we have seen, employment levels are increasing in the 
Ruhr and unemployment levels are falling.  
Unfortunately, as the figures for WCS are based on census data, a more 
contemporary picture is unavailable. In the Ruhr, the levels high of inactivity in 
this age group may be a consequence, for some individuals at least, of the 
relative generosity of unemployment protection and lack of compulsion to return 
to a job that was beneath their former occupational status. However, due to 
changes in unemployment insurance and activation policies, this is increasingly 
unlikely.  
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4.2 Context 
This section will explore contextual factors that were influential in the Ruhr.  
4.2.1 Skills and Education 
4.2.1.1 Skills 
In Germany and the Ruhr, high labour costs continue to encourage technological 
(labour-saving) investment rather than increases in labour. This is facilitated by 
strong initial vocational training systems and specialised skills across the broad 
spectrum of the workforce (skilled manual workers, technicians, and engineers). 
This mode of production demands more cooperative industrial relations to 
safeguard cooperation from highly skilled and hence powerful employees 
(Soskice 1999; Gallie 2007). 
 
However, the skills profile is in flux nationally and regionally. In Germany and 
the Ruhr, like WCS, a majority of workers are employed in jobs requiring general 
skills. However, as Figure 3.22 (pg.92) suggests and research (Birch & Mykhnenko 
2009; Birch et al. 2010) indicates, in a UK context, deindustrialisation and 
deskilling has continued while in Germany, employment requiring high-general 
skills has increased significantly. Moreover, specific skills continue to be more 
prominent in the German labour market, although they declined between 1992 
and 2007 by nearly a quarter to only 22 per cent of the German workforce 
(Fleckenstein et al. 2011:1637).   
 
In Germany, as in the UK, the number of females requiring specific skills is 
marginal (Estévez-Abe, 2006). However, this is a figure that is increasing in both 
countries (Fleckenstein et al. 2011:1639). It should be noted that women in 
Britain are still more likely to be employed in low-skilled work. The German 
labour market, perhaps in contradiction to much of the literature (Estévez-Abe 
et al. 2001; Iversen 2005; Iversen & Soskice 2001) is becoming increasingly 
dependent on jobs that require general skills. However, in contrast to the UK 
and particularly WCS, employment growth in jobs requiring high-general skills 
has been faster than in the area of low-general skills (Fleckenstein et al. 2011). 
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This is reflected in the increasing employment levels shown in Figures 4.2 and 
4.3.  
 
4.2.1.2 Education  
International comparisons in this field are difficult. To overcome this obstacle 
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), a statistical 
framework for organizing information on education, was developed. Figures 3.7 
and 3.8 (pg.85) show the percentage of adults (25-64) with tertiary (post-
secondary) qualifications and the percentage of adults with no or low level 
qualification (ISCED Level 0-2) in 2008 for all the regions. Again NRW and SWC 
are used as proxies. It shows that NRW had a smaller proportion of adults with 
tertiary qualifications22 than SWS (22 per cent and 33.3 per cent respectively) 
and that SWS had a significantly higher proportion of adults with low or no 
qualifications relative to NRW (27.3 per cent and 18.7 per cent respectively).  
Figure 4.5: Educational attainment in adults in WCS and The Ruhr. 
 
Figure 4.5 provides a more exact comparison of the Ruhr and WCS. It shows the 
distribution of working-age adults in the Ruhr area and WCS by the highest level 
                                         
22
 These include university degree or NVQ level 4/5 level qualifications and above. 
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of ISCED qualification attained23. In both regions, the levels of working-age 
adults with the lowest level of attainment are similar. In terms of intermediate 
qualifications, the Ruhr had significantly better attainment, 56 per cent 
compared to 35 per cent in WCS. At the highest level, WCS had significantly 
better attainment, 35 per cent compared to 13 per cent.  
 
HE and FE institutions did not develop until the late 1960s and this might 
account for some of the differences in higher levels of attainment. In terms of 
intermediate qualification‘s, relative to the UK and WCS, the continued 
widespread use in Germany and the Ruhr of apprenticeships as a means of entry 
into intermediate and high level jobs provides an incentive, even when 
employment prospects are limited. For the training they complete combined 
with general education that goes with an apprenticeship, equips them with 
transferable skills useful in many occupations. 
 
4.2.2 Social exclusion  
In the Ruhr it was acknowledged, ex ante, that as a consequence of 
deindustrialisation, certain groups would become vulnerable to exclusion from 
the formal labour market and social and cultural opportunities. To combat this 
exclusion a number of initiatives were introduced. For example, housing stock 
was improved, living conditions enhanced and opportunities to achieve home 
ownership provided (Madanipour et al. 1998).  Moreover, in the Ruhr, due to the 
decline in heavy industry and erosion of traditional social networks and milieus, 
the enhancement of the social fabric of the region is regarded as important. This 
is exemplified by the IBA and subsequent similar developments such as the 
former Zollverein mine and industrial complex24 now a UNESCO world heritage 
site. 
Relative to the UK and France, the level of social housing in Germany is small. 
German social housing is market-based. Traditionally, the public sector has 
                                         
23 Three levels of qualification were scrutinised: low or no qualifications (ISCED 0-2), 
intermediate (upper secondary school qualifications, ISCED 3-4) and higher-level (tertiary level 
qualifications, ISCED 5-6). UK qualifications were mapped to ISCED levels as follows: no 
qualifications & NVQ Level 1=ISCED 0-2; NVQ Level 2, 3 and Trade apprenticeships=ISCED 3-4; 
and NVQ 4+ and other qualifications=ISCED Level 5-6. 
24
 See http://www.zollverein.de/# and http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/975 . 
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subsidised private developers to build new social housing, or regenerate existing 
housing. These homes were never specifically for the poor. Rather, key workers 
and lower middle class families were the main beneficiaries with the result that 
these houses were never stigmatised as lower-class homes. Since the late 1980s, 
special consideration has been given to at risk groups - providing for the aged, 
single parents and large families (Whitehead & Scanlon 2007). 
Access to social housing is managed via a criterion that takes into consideration 
individual household needs. Public and private landlords can then select tenants 
from this group and allocate housing according to their judgement. Generally, 
this facilitates an adequate social mix. However, there are concerns over 
segregation and marginalisation, particularly in those estates with poor 
reputations (Droste & Knorr-Siedow 2007). 
In (West) German inner urban areas, the degree of social and economic diversity 
tends to be greater than in the UK. Whilst there are some social problems in the 
social housing estates of cities, such estates tend to be fewer than in the UK (or 
France), better built and better maintained (Whitehead & Scanlon 2007). In 
terms of city development, the function of a city is considered to extend beyond 
just being a place of intense employment and retail activity. As such, retail 
hours are tightly controlled and shops are shut on Sundays (Couch 1997). 
 
4.2.2.1 Lone parent households  
Research shows that ‗vulnerable‘ household‘s often lone parent households are 
more vulnerable to the more adverse determinants of health (Spencer 2005; 
Suhrcke et al. 2009). Figure 3.9 (pg.86) shows the percentage of households with 
children headed by a lone parent in the five regions. In 2001, almost a third 
(32.3%) of households with children in the Ruhr were headed by a lone parent. 
Although this is higher than the other regions, it is similar to WCS with 31.1 per 
cent. Figure 3.10 (pg.86) shows the rate of change in lone parent household with 
dependent children between 1990 and 2001. Although historically the Ruhr had a 
higher proportion, WCS, with the fastest rate of change of all the regions, 
overtook the Ruhr in 2001.  
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4.2.2.2 Single person households 
Single person households are known to be vulnerable to a number of adverse 
health and social outcomes. Figure 3.11 (pg.87) shows the percentages of 
households that are single person households in each region. In the Ruhr, over a 
third (36.8%) of adults live alone. This is relatively high compared to the other 
regions but comparable to WCS with 33.8 per cent. Figure 3.12 (pg.87) shows the 
change in single person households over time: between 1990 and 2001. As with 
lone parent households, the number of single person households increased in the 
Ruhr and WCS over time.  
4.2.2.3 Marital Status  
In the context of CEE, marriage was a factor contributing to premature 
mortality, particularly amongst men (Watson 1995). A similar correlation has 
been discerned in the West (Koskenvuo et al. 1980; Helsing et al. 1982). Figure 
3.13 (pg.88) shows the percentage of adults aged 25-64 reporting that they were 
married25. Results are shown for adults aged 25-64. This accounts for different 
population structures across the regions and the fact that adults in these regions 
tend not marry until their mid-20s (Eurostat 2006). In the Ruhr it was 66.4 per 
cent compared with 63 per cent in WCS. 
4.2.2.4 Births to teenage mothers 
Teenage mothers have a greater risk of giving birth to pre-term and low birth 
weight babies and being more vulnerable to associated health risks (Poverty Site 
2011). Younger parents are also considered more vulnerable to other adverse 
health-related outcomes (Graham et al. 2006; Riordan et al. 2006). Figure 3.21 
(pg.92) compares the percentage of births to mothers aged below 20 in the five 
selected regions. It shows that the rate for WCS is almost double that for the 
Ruhr: 8.5 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively. Note, the figure for the Ruhr is 
an average for the regions of Dusseldorf, Munster and Arnsberg and therefore 
includes more rural areas of NRW.  
                                         
25 Including those separated from their partners but still legally married or in a civil partnership 
across the regions in 2001. 
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4.2.2.5 Health behaviours  
Health behaviours - particularly smoking, alcohol consumption (also physical 
activity and diet) - are known to have a significant impact on the health of 
individuals and populations (WHO 2009). However, health behaviours are 
strongly mediated by the choices available to people: choices affected by age, 
gender, socioeconomic position and other structural constraints that influence 
behaviour choice (for example, patterns of socialisation and normative 
behaviours in the home, workplace and community).  Although systematic 
comparisons are hard to establish due to limited data (Leon et al. 2003), 
comparisons will be made for smoking and drinking, health behaviours in WCS 
and European regions for which evidence is available.  
4.2.2.5.1 Smoking  
 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 (pg.90) show the percentage of adult daily smokers, 
defined as those who smoked at least one cigarette a day, for males and females 
respectively. Although, male smoking rates were almost identical in WCS and 
NRW (29.9% and 29.8%), female smoking rates were significantly higher in WCS 
than in the German region (28.4% and 21.6%).  
4.2.2.5.2 Alcohol  
 
Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of adults aged 45-74 exceeding 21/14 units of 
alcohol a week, c. 2003. As data for direct regional comparisons are not 
available, a comparison has been made, using data from the Heinz-Nixdorf 
Recall Study26, between Glasgow and three cities in the Ruhr area. 
 
It shows that older working-age adults (45-74) in Greater Glasgow are 
significantly more likely to report that they exceeded the recommended weekly 
limits for alcohol consumption (21 units for men, 14 units for women) than those 
in the Ruhr cities. 
                                         
26 The Heinz Nixdorf Recall (Risk Factors, Evaluation of Coronary Calcification, and Lifestyle) 
Study was initiated in 2000 with a particular remit to investigate risk and protective factors 
related to cardiovascular disease in the urban populations of Bochum, Essen and Mülheim and 
the Ruhr. More information at: http://www.uk-essen.de/recall-studie/?L=1. 
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Figure 4.6: Excess alcohol consumption in Greater Glasgow and selected cities in The Ruhr. 
 
This mirrors international comparisons Figures 3.19 and 3.20 (pg.91) which 
indicate that Germany has a lower proportion of daily drinkers than Scotland 
(9%- 12%), it also has higher proportion of abstainers (19% - 12%). Note, the 
Scottish data is based on consumption over a week as opposed to a month; this 
may impact the results (Walsh et al. 2008).  
 
4.2.3 Social capital  
Social capital is increasingly acknowledged as having a positive effect on 
individual health (Putnam 1995; Wilkinson 1996; Kawachi, Kennedy & Lochner 
1997; Kawachi, Kennedy & Glass 1999; Kawachi, Subramanian & Kim 2008). 
However, measuring and even conceptualising social capital is difficult. 
Nonetheless, it is identified as a factor contributing to health outcomes. As has 
been discussed in relation to CEE, Stuckler et al. (2009) when looking at the 
impact of mass privatisation on the former communist states concluded that 
social capital, in this case membership of social organisation (including 
religious), mitigated against the associated adverse health effects i.e. mortality.  
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4.2.3.1 Religious participation 
A couple of indicators will be used here as proxies for social capital: religious 
and political participation. Religion is regarded as potentially protective against 
suicide (McLean et al. 2008). Moreover, participation socialises individuals. 
Figure 3.14 (pg.88) employs survey-based measurement and indicates the 
percentage of adults who never attend religious ceremonies except on special 
occasions in each region. The results indicate that religious affiliation appears to 
be significantly higher in NRW (again used as a proxy) than WCS (30.6% - 50.7%). 
Survey data show that half the adult population of WCS reported that they never 
attended religious ceremonies except on special occasions.  
 
4.2.3.2 Voter turnout 
Figure 3.15 (pg.89) shows turnout rates at national parliamentary elections, 
across each region. In 2005, election turnout in NRW (again used as a proxy) was 
significantly greater than WCS, 78.3 per cent vs. 58.3 per cent respectively. In 
addition as Figure 3.16 (pg.89) indicates, voter turnout in WCS has fallen 
significantly over time while rates in NRW have remained more consistent. As 
such, the divergence has increased over time. Voter turnout in Scotland is 
calculated by dividing the number of people who voted in an UK election by the 
electorate (i.e. those registered and entitled to vote). The Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany calculates voter turnout by dividing the number of people 
who voted by the total population over 18 years. In addition, voter turnout in 
Scotland is measured by constituency, rather than local authority. Taulbut et al. 
(2011) note that this may underestimate the difference between the regions as 
the registered electorate will be smaller than the population aged 18 years and 
over.   
 
4.2.4 Relative poverty  
Most OECD countries and Eurostat measure poverty in relative terms, setting the 
poverty line as a share of the average or median standard of living in a country. 
Typically, the indicator used is the percentage of the population living in 
households with an income below 60% of the median income. Figure 3.6 (pg.84) 
shows risk of poverty in selected countries across time. Note, although all 
countries exhibit fluctuations, levels of poverty are consistently higher in the 
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UK. However, Germany is starting to converge on UK levels and has overtaken 
Poland.  
 
In terms of the level of regional inequality, Lemmi et al. (2003) have published 
methods and data that can be used to estimate relative poverty rates for a large 
number of NUTS II regions, averaged for the period 1994-2001. These were used 
to estimate poverty rates for NRW (used here as a proxy for the Ruhr area) and 
SWS (used as a proxy for WCS). 
 
Figure 4.7: Relative poverty in South Western Scotland and North-Rhine-Westphalia. 
 
 
 
Poverty rates at the national level, until recently at least, have been historically 
higher in the UK. At the regional level, as Figure 4.7 indicates, the difference is 
more marked, with relative poverty significantly lower in NRW than in SWS 
(11.0%vs.18.9%). However, in interpreting these results one should acknowledge, 
as is widely reported, that poverty rates (particularly among children and 
pensioners) are significantly higher in the UK and Scotland (HM Government 
2011; Scottish Government 2010). Moreover, neither proxy is entirely 
representative of the OIRs given the greater levels of affluence that exist in 
each.  
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4.2.5 Income inequality  
Within the field of public health it is widely acknowledged that income 
inequality mediates health outcomes at the national level (Wilkinson 2005; 
Dorling et al. 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett 2009).  As such, it is entirely reasonable 
to suggest this is also the case for regions. Figure 3.6 (pg.84), tracks income 
inequality in the selected host countries from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. It 
indicates that income inequality in Scotland, broadly speaking, has been high 
relative to other selected countries since the 1980s.  
Figure 4.8: Income inequality in WCS and North-Rhine-Westphalia. 
 
With the exception of France, there has been some increase in income inequality 
in each country over time. With the exception of Poland, the other countries, 
from the 1990s onwards, have Gini coefficients27 in the range 0.25-0.28. Scotland 
with Poland had a coefficient of 0.32. Although these differences may appear 
marginal, they should not be underestimated: the OECD (2008) considers a 
difference in the Gini coefficient of +/- 0.025 significant.  
                                         
27 A Gini coefficient is a widely used measure of income inequality. It measures the dispersion or 
inequality of a distribution. The Gini coefficient can have a theoretical value between zero and 
one, with zero indicating complete equality of income distribution and one complete inequality. 
In reality, most middle- and upper-income countries tend to have a Gini between 0.20 and 0.40.  
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At the regional level (Figure 4.8), income inequality is only marginally higher in 
WCS than it is in NRW. Both in terms of poverty rates and income inequality, the 
significant increases in German figures are noteworthy and perhaps unexpected, 
as Germany has historically been closer to France in this regard. As such, these 
findings probably reflect the impact of reunification and the significant 
geographical divisions in terms of income and wealth, expansion of low wages, 
lack of minimum wage and the number of single person and lone parent 
households. Moreover, since the late 1990s, incomes of the richest people have 
increased far greater than those of other income groups. As Aust and Bönker 
conclude: 
 
―The system of social insurance reproduces the distributional effects 
of the labour market in the welfare systems and is therefore – given 
the rising numbers of non-standard work and incomplete families 
highly selective. Those not engaged in standard work arrangement 
and/or standard family arrangements are particularly vulnerable to 
social-exclusion and poverty‖ (2005:4).  
4.3 Social protection  
As has been noted, to cope with economic restructuring and labour market 
adjustments during the 1980s and 1990s German governments utilised 
unemployment protection and early retirement schemes (and even definitions of 
disability) to protect the long-term unemployed. Income replacement rates in 
retirement and unemployment were also significantly greater than in the UK and 
WCS (Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011). In the Ruhr, unlike in WCS the programme of 
closures was gradual and socially controlled. This included providing subsides to 
the coal and steel sector to avoid mass unemployment. After consolidation those 
Miners who lost their jobs received significant sums of money in compensation or 
were allowed to retire at the age of forty-nine (Danielzyk & Wood 1993).  
New regional policies aimed at an integrated policy which was committed to the 
―triangle of objectives with equal status‖: competiveness, social and 
environmental compatibility (Schlieper 1988). Not only were the powerful and 
influential economic interests taken into account, but well-organised social and 
ecological interests were able to establish their agenda as well (Danielzyk & 
Wood 1993).  
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The main elements of social protection at a regional level simply mirror national 
arrangements. It is clear that the level of social protection available in the Ruhr 
relative to WCS during the period of deindustrialisation was greater. However, 
all welfare states are in transformation and subject to increasing austerity. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, German governments utilised unemployment 
protection and early retirement schemes (and even definitions of disability) to 
protect the long-term unemployed. Income replacement rates in retirement and 
unemployment were significantly greater than in the UK and WCS (Seeleib-Kaiser 
et al. 2011).  
In Germany, employers have lobbied to reduce social insurance contributions. 
However, as Seeleib-Kaiser et al. note: ―In France and Germany, employers had 
to navigate more complex governance structures to achieve cost reductions‖ 
(2010:46).  That said, in Germany the major parties have negotiated reforms to 
reduce the cost to employers. This reform process has exacerbated dualisation 
or inequality in old-age and unemployment protection. However, the level of 
social protection is still comparatively high. Germany continues to operate a so-
called dualist regime where strong rights have been established for a core 
workforce of skilled long-term employees, whilst those on the periphery are 
vulnerable to what are, in the context of their own country (but not the UK), 
poor conditions and low security. 
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5. Nord-Pas-de-Calais (NPdC) 
Figure 5.1: Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region 
Nord Pas de-Calais (NPdC) is one of the 22 regions of France. It comprises 1,550 
communes, including 7 cities of more than 100 000 inhabitants and a metropolis 
of one million inhabitants: the largest city and administrative centre of the 
region Lille. The second largest city is Calais, a major continental 
economic/transportation hub. Other urban centres include Valenciennes, Lens, 
Dunkirk, Boulogne and Saint-Omer.  
 
The region is densely populated and has approximately four million inhabitants, 
about seven per cent of France‘s population, making it the fourth most populous 
region in France. Eighty three per cent of the region‘s population live in urban 
locations (INSSEE 2010). It is the region with the youngest population in France: 
37 per cent of the inhabitants are under 25. 
 
During the 19th century, NPdC underwent significant industrialisation becoming a 
major centre of heavy industry, second only to Alsace-Lorraine, with coal-
mines, steel-mills and traditional textile manufacturing. Due to the loss of the 
Alsace-Lorraine region during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, NPdC was able to 
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consolidate its pivotal role in French industry. In the immediate post-war period 
between 1945 and 1974, France experienced 30 years (Les Trente Glorieuses) of 
significant growth making it the second biggest economy in Europe (behind 
Germany). NPdC, while hampered by its war-related damage, shared in this 
prosperity. 
 
One consequence of industrialisation has been waves of migrant workers: 
Belgians, and some Irish and Welsh in the late nineteenth century; Poles, 
Czechs, Italians and Portuguese in the 1920s and 1930s; North Africans, Greeks, 
Slovaks and Yugoslavs in the post-war period.  As a result, large cities like Lille, 
Calais and Boulogne are now home to sizeable communities of immigrants and 
their descendants.  
 
The industrial legacy of the region is reflected in its political traditions, with 
Socialists controlling the principal cities, in addition to regional and 
departmental councils (Reid 1993). Many of these same politicians provided the 
impetus for the decentralisation of power in the 1980s. From which, in recent 
decades, the region has benefited as regional politicians and policy makers have 
lobbied successfully for major government and European Union investment and 
developed mutually beneficial ties with regional partners abroad.  
 
The opening of the Channel Tunnel in 1994 was welcomed in the region as a 
means of boosting its prosperity. Tourism, particularly in Lille at the apex of the 
London-Brussels-Paris railway lines, has grown considerably, to the extent that 
in 2004, seven million passengers used the Eurostar, and there were two million 
vehicles on the Eurotunnel (formerly Le Shuttle). The extension of the TGV 
network to Lille and the associated Euralille project (high speed train station, 
large commercial centre and convention centre) also aided regional economic 
development with 5,000 million francs of public and private funds invested 
between 1990 and 1994. Consequently, the banking and financial sector 
developed in the 1990s making Lille one of France‘s financial & insurance 
centres (Fraser & Baert 2003).  
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5.1 Deindustrialisation  
Deindustrialisation in France is associated with the 1980s (Singh 1989; Iversen & 
Cusack 2000). As Figure 3.1 (pg.82) indicates, Industrial employment was 
increasing until the early 1970s, when the decline occurred. Relative to the UK, 
it was less acute. Similar to Germany and unlike the UK, once deindustrialisation 
was under way it was to some extent gradual and socially managed. Figure 3.2 
(pg.82) indicates that although there was unemployment in the 1980s as a 
consequence of  deindustrialisation, it was less severe than in the UK. As in 
Germany, the use of early retirement and limited female entry alleviated many 
of the labour market pressures the UK faced. However, unlike in the UK, 
unemployment persisted into the 1990s. 
The situation in NPdC was more severe than nationally. As Table 3.1 (pg.81) 
indicates, the selected regions share an industrial legacy of coal and steel. From 
the end of the 19th century to the 1960s, the economic development of NPdC 
was based around three dominant industries: coal mining and steel industry 
dominated in the ‗coalfield area‘ and the textile industry that grew up in the 
urban region of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing (Tuppen 1983). However, as in WCS and 
the Ruhr, these industries were facing decline by the 1960s. 
In 1963, NPdC produced 8.3 per cent of French GDP and 11 per cent of France‘s 
industrial output. Between 1962 and 1995 the contribution to GDP fell to 5.6 per 
cent. Overall, between 1967 and 1992, the number of industrial jobs dropped by 
47 per cent in the NPdC region compared with 18 per cent nationally (Paris 
2002). Some of this decline was fast, particularly in the textile industry, where 
an estimated 130,000 jobs were lost between 1945 and 1996. Although decline 
was steadier in other sectors, similar reductions happened in the agricultural 
sector (164,000), the mining sector (90,000), the chemical industry (8,000) and 
the metalworking industry (7,000) (Baert & Fraser 2003).  
The scale of decline was not offset by an expansion of the service sector. 
Although employment increased in the sector, the growth was small and the 
number of jobs created was modest. Most of this growth occurred in the public 
sector and deindustrialisation was not offset by tertiarisation, which meant that 
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the region had to undertake further economic restructuring (Liefhooge 2005). 
This will be discussed later.  
So how severe has deindustrialisation been in NPdC relative to WCS (and the 
other regions)? As Table 3.1 (pg.81) shows, by 2005 the share of industrial 
employment (as a percentage of total employment) had fallen in every region 
but farthest in WCS. NPdC continues to have around a quarter (26.4%) of its 
workforce engaged in industrial employment. In terms of the number of 
industrial jobs lost (Table 3.1 pg.81 column 3), during the period 1970 – 2005, 
NPdC lost 43 per cent of its industrial employment: WCS in contrast lost roughly 
two-thirds (62 %).  
5.1.1 National response 
The first steps to reverse the process of deindustrialisation came from central 
government: the Dirigiste tendency of the French government meant it played 
an active role in industrial policy and regional development.  In response to 
regional and spatial concerns a specific administration (the Délégation à 
l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale (DATAR)) was established in 
1963. It coordinated the regional aspects of the national economic plans. It 
served to stimulate, guide and coordinate the regional planning efforts of other 
agencies and to distribute regional development funds and was directly 
answerable to the prime minister. In November 1974, the Comité 
Interministériel d‘Aménagement des Structures Industrielles was established to 
handle the process of deindustrialisation at the (national) government level 
(Newman & Thornley 1996; Leboutte 2009). 
Central government established a strategy to divert growth away from Paris (the 
centre) to other regional (peripheral) centres. This strategy of Métropoles 
d‘Equilibre (balancing metropolises) established a means of diverting state 
investment towards, and within, provincial city regions. Limitations were 
introduced to restrict the industrial and service development within the Paris 
region. To offset the predicted growth and relative advantage of Paris, projects 
for industrial expansion were scrutinised (the proportion of new industrial 
building did fall), taxes were introduced on office floor construction and special 
sanctions were required for large scale investments. Attempts were also made to 
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encourage the development of infrastructure in transport, education and 
communications within targeted regions. Eight Métropoles d‘Equilibre were 
selected, the majority of which were demonstrating at the time significant 
development in new service and technological industries. Lille-Dunkerque in the 
NPdC was an exception. Its choice indicated the need for renewal and 
investment in NPdC, while at the same time recognising its prime geographic 
position: although peripheral in France, it was a highly favoured location in 
relation to the major economic regions of north-west Europe (Balchin et al. 
1999; Hall & Tewder-Jones 2002).  
Subsidies were provided to enterprises locating or expanding in designated 
areas. National economic conversion policies fostered specific restructuring, 
supported through the relocation of new industries settled by the state. One 
example was the development of the automobile industry in NPdC.  Finally, 
decentralisation by the state in 1982 transferred some state functions to the 
regional councils (Conseils Régionaux). The councils manage economic 
development and, in consultation with the state, establish planning agreements 
relating to transport, infrastructure and other significant public investment 
projects (Rodwin & Sazanami 1991:116; Morgan & Nauwelaers 1999:58).  
5.1.2 Regional response 
Due to the degree of fragmentation at a local government level in France, sub-
national policymakers have often been inhibited in their execution of policies. In 
the case of NPdC, which is divided into 335 communes, the problem of 
cooperation and coordination was very problematic. For this reason the mayor, 
able to command several elective offices at once, was a key policy and decision 
maker, not only in his commune but also in national government. This 
arrangement, referred to as the Cumul des Mandats (Accumulation of Mandates) 
facilitated the representation of local interests at the national level. 
Accordingly, the power of any given region was (often) determined by the 
political proficiency of the mayor (Budd 1997). 
A critical influence on the recovery of NPdC region has been the political and 
technical leadership. Of particular importance on the path to regional economic 
development has been the role of Pierre Mauroy, Mayor of the Urban Community 
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of Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing, and Prime Minister at the beginning of 
Mitterrand‘s first Socialist administration of 1981. In fact the whole region was 
dominated by politicians from the left who had a greater political empathy with 
similar struggling regions like Wallonia in Belgium rather than D‘Estaing‘s 
Parisian government of the right. Consequently the political elite of NPdC were 
assertive in raising the economic and political profile of the region.  
In 1977, Mauroy established an economic development service as part of his 
office as Mayor of Lille and similar initiatives occurred throughout the urban 
agglomeration of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing. In addition, Mauroy was able to 
exploit his status as one of the grands patrons, and later as prime minister to 
implement his plan for the economic modernisation of NPdC. His commanding 
regional position and national standing allowed him to utilise national 
programmes for local and regional development, particularly in a most critical 
phase, 1976-1980, the period of the VIIth National Plan. Furthermore, for both 
economic and political reasons, the region actively sought to develop and 
maintain Pan-European associations, and re-establish itself as the linking 
economic area between Britain, France and the Low Countries (Budd 1997:190; 
Wannop 1995:253).  
Rather than being ideological or partisan, Mauroy‘s approach to economic 
development was pragmatic. His goal was to ―stimulate the enterprise and not 
replace the entrepreneur‖ (Hayward 1986:119). As Budd notes: ―he would set up 
technically sound schemes backed by financial support and then find an 
industrialist to run them‖ (1997:191). At the time, the political right held the 
centre and the left the periphery. Mitterrand‘s victory and the introduction of a 
socialist government in 1981 led to the institutionalisation of this form of 
politics, as legislation for French regional decentralisation28 was introduced in 
1982 (Regional Studies 1997). 
Although decentralisation empowered the French regional councils, the context 
was unlike that within which the Scottish (and English) councils had been 
created several years before. A long legacy of central government ensured there 
were fewer territorial interests for the regional councils to marginalise. The 
                                         
28
The decentralisation legislation introduced even bears the name of Gaston Deferre. 
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problem for the regional councils was that they did not have the resources to 
match their new found responsibility. The councils were not providers of public 
services like those in Scotland. Consequently finance could only be applied 
indirectly to regional objectives. Nevertheless, as Mauroy and others 
demonstrated, they had the facility to garner support for regional objectives, 
thereby enabling them to develop a more coherent public transport network, 
pursue environmental improvements such as the renewal of derelict land, and 
develop leisure and cultural facilities — all priorities a central government would 
not have pursued independently (Wannop 1995:253).  
Development agencies were established in each metropolitan area in 1990. The 
Agence de Dévelopment et d‘Urbanisme de la Métropole Lilloise coordinated 
physical planning for Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing and the new town of Villeneuve 
d‘Ascq. The agency‘s board was nominated by the communes and chaired by 
Mauroy, who was now leader of the Communauté Urbaine de Lille. A primary 
objective was to develop relationships with London and Brussels and cultivate 
the area‘s metropolitan character. Trans-national relationships had already been 
formalised in RETI (Régions Européenes de Tradition Industrielle), an assembly 
of Europe‘s OIRs formed in 1984. However, with the opening of the channel 
tunnel and progressive restructuring of its regional industrial base, the region‘s 
sense of itself was somewhat reconstructed. In 1991, NPdC, along with Kent (in 
England) and the regions of Belgium reached an agreement to form a self-
constructed Euro-region. This region had a combined population of 
approximately 15 million people and programmes concerning collaborative 
efforts in economic and technological development, land use and transport 
planning, the environment and promotion and exchanges were proposed 
(Wannop 1995:255).  
Since the 1990s, improvements have been made in the use of the Contrat de 
Plan Etat-Région and Contrat De Ville. The contrat is a legally binding agreement 
between the state and region or city detailing the programmes which will be 
achieved between them. This, in theory, should facilitate a more co-ordinated 
approach. Local Mayors also have the power to grant development permission 
where there is already an approved land use plan. Similarly, there have been 
attempts, in the 1990s and 2000s, to improve the organisation of urban 
initiatives (Reid 1993; Green & Booth 1996; Colomb 2007). 
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Broadly speaking, the region pursued a policy of diversification into new and 
related areas and technological modernisation (Martin & Sunley 2006; Boschma 
2007). Research (Birch & Mykhnenko 2009; Birch et al. 2010) indicates that 
between 1996 and 2005 in NPdC, there was, relative to WCS, some increase in 
overall employment: this growth exceeded the French national trend by some 
amount. Similarly, there was also an increase in manufacturing employment. 
This calls into question the narrative of deindustrialisation as inevitable. 
Importantly, it highlights the potential ameliorating influence of national and 
regional political economies when they are prepared to be interventionist in 
nature. Although growth in manufacturing employment was recorded for both 
low and high-tech employment, the high-tech sector showed the greatest 
increase.  Service employment growth was also significant, outperforming the 
national trend with significant growth in both routine and knowledge intensive 
high-tech services (Birch & Mykhnenko 2009; Birch et al. 2010).  
 
5.1.2.1 Coalfield areas 
From the 1960s onwards, it was clear that the French coal mining industry was in 
decline: the main reason was the cheapness of imported coal. In response, 
legislation was passed for a national programme of pit closures. Coal mining in 
France had been nationalised in 1946, and the mines of NPdC were owned by a 
regional (state-owned) mining company, Houillères du Bassin du Nord et du Pas-
de-Calais et de Charbonnages de France (HBNPC). Prior to deindustrialisation, 
the mines employed approximately 200,000 workers and the HBNPC had to 
consider how to maintain jobs and redeploy those it made redundant (Hough 
1982:36).  
Initially the HBNPC tried to develop new manufacturing activities. For example, 
it tried to transform established products in the chemical industry by using coal 
instead of petroleum. In the construction industry it attempted to utilise by-
products such as granules for tennis courts and prefabricated materials for 
building cheaper houses. Such initiatives attempted to adapt the endogenous 
capacity of HBNPC to develop new areas and means of employment for the 
future. Exogenous factors undermined HBNPC‘s efforts. Much of what the 
company was trying to achieve was concerned with developing petroleum 
substitutes, but low petroleum prices and the state of the building market 
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meant their new areas were never profitable. The HBNPC abandoned these 
manufacturing innovations and embarked on a new strategy - reorienting the 
skills developed in the coal industry towards services.  
The result was that a number of knowledge-intensive-technical-services (KITS) 
developed around the mining industry: engineering, data processing, security, 
project management, quality control and material analysis. New markets were 
identified - such as the automobile industry, steel industry, and software 
industry. However, due to the historical high levels of protection towards many 
French workers, the effect of the high and protected wages of HBNPC workers 
priced them out of the market (Liefhooge 2005:14). 
By the mid-1980s the strategy had changed again. The HBNPC sought to assist its 
internal service providers into becoming subsidiaries. The purpose of this would 
be to free them from the path dependency of coal production. No longer was the 
goal to maintain employment for the coalmine workers: rather, it was to 
facilitate the conversion and redeployment of managerial and highly qualified 
employees in the hope they could endure independently of the HBNPC. This was 
a particular concern as the company was scheduled to close in 1992, when it 
would be absorbed into the Charbonnages de France (CDF, the national coal 
mining company) which was unlikely to prioritise the fortunes of NPdC-based 
employees (Liefhooge 2005). 
In many instances the measures taken to assist HBNPC subsidiaries were 
undermined by exogenous factors such as the cheap price of petroleum or the 
existence of established firms. However, firms were established in construction 
and were able to establish a presence due to the need to redevelop brownfield 
sites that were both common place and problematical following 
deindustrialisation. As a consequence of being awarded EU objective 1 status29, 
contracts were acquired for the building of new houses, schools and hospitals. 
Similarly, the utilisation of HBNPC knowledge proved valuable in the automobile 
industry, which first emerged in the area in the 1960s (as a consequence of 
national economic conversion policies). From the 1980s onwards the coal 
                                         
29
 European Union policy (and funds) for the purpose of redeveloping regions seriously lagging 
behind the EU average. 
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industry was able to adapt its expertise to areas such as quality control, 
organisation of industrial process, robotics, and software (Morgan & Nauwelaers 
1999:58).  
The other significant success can be attributed to the development of expertise 
in chemical analysis. In the 1990s, in response to new environmental laws which 
resulted in the creation of new regional markets, HBNPC used existing 
knowledge to provide chemical analysis services (on coal, dust and industrial 
atmosphere then on polluted soils). A new independent service firm (called 
SMC2) was created to carry out environmental studies and consultancy. In order 
to sustain its knowledge-based enterprise, SMC2 aggressively pursued a strategy 
of consolidation, buying up regional competitors in order to broaden its 
knowledge base and maintain its superior position in what is considered a very 
competitive market. Taking into account the demands for environmental 
consultancy and advice services in the industrial NPdC Region, regional 
authorities prioritised support for those sectors, with the aim of facilitating the 
long-term sustainability of environmental industries. One such initiative has 
been the establishment of the CD2E, a public service organisation whose 
objective is to encourage and assist regional firms and new entrepreneurs in the 
development of new environmental products, services and knowledge (Liefhooge 
2005:14-15).  
5.1.2.2 Lille conurbation 
With approximately 200 firms and 28,500 jobs in 2004, the NPdC is the principal 
location for France‘s mail order industry (65 per cent of all activity in France 
and 15 per cent of the total European market). Most of the major businesses in 
European distance selling have located in NPdC, based primarily in the Lille 
Metropolitan Area and in the cities of Roubaix and Tourcoing. The two major 
French groups in distance selling are La Redoute (Redcats) and Les Trois Suisses, 
both of which have their headquarters in the region, as does the main French 
subsidiary of the German Quelle business. Roubaix and Tourcoing are located on 
the eastern part of the Lille Metropolitan Area and dominate the sector to such 
an extent that they are known as ‗the golden triangle of the distance selling 
industry‘ (Schulz et al. 2004:2). 
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This is a prime example of successful industrial restructuring. The genesis can be 
traced to measures taken by La Redoute in the 1920s  when, in a saturated 
market, they opted to sell surplus wool by mail order. This proved successful, 
leading to the development of a catalogue offering first wool and then clothes 
and linen. Their model was imitated a few years later by Les Trois Suisses, and 
then by other textile firms of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing (Schulz et al. 2004). 
The continuing success of this Lille cluster is sustained by the existence of a 
large variety of knowledge-intensive and highly industry-specific business 
services working for the mail order firms: logistics, advertising, graphics, photo 
studios, packaging, printing, direct marketing, call centres, software and so on 
(Morgan & Nauwelaers 1999). There is evidence to suggest that this local cluster 
is also embedded in social, familial and professional networks. The cluster, 
although open to outside influences, has managed to maintain its local critical 
mass. Furthermore, local entrepreneurs have been particularly effective at 
―identifying key innovations in external distance selling organisations and then 
adapting them to the demands of the local situation‖ (Liefhooge 2005:15). Close 
social and business contacts ensure this success is replicated in the region via 
the rapid diffusion of innovations throughout the cluster. 
Increasingly, and perhaps inevitably, a number of tasks were being outsourced to 
business service providers. However, location remains a key factor in this 
development: external service producers in the ‗golden triangle area‘ are able 
to work collaboratively with internal departments of the mail order firms in 
delivering industry innovations. The outcome is that the emerging new services 
are firmly embedded in the NPdC region. This process is aided by the increasing 
number of large retail company headquarters that have located to the region, 
again, as a consequence of restructuring and the closure of the regional textiles 
industry. The overall effect has been to stimulate the creation of a new service 
employment sector in the Lille metropolitan area (Schulz et al. 2004; Liefhooge 
2005).  
Although the development of e-commerce could threaten the mail order and 
retail cluster, it is likely that the endogenous capacity of the region will enable 
it to take advantage of the increased potential for distance selling provided by 
the internet. If firms are able to adopt new competitive models, the region 
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could consolidate its leading position. Such examples already exist: 
Madeinsport.com, an internet retailer owned by La Redoute and based in 
Valenciennes, has used its existing expertise in warehousing and logistics and 
new expertise in e-commerce to provide e-boutique outsourcing services to 
global customers. It handles all online merchandising for the Tour de France and 
the Paris-Dakar rally, thereby instantly gaining access to the global sports 
market served by these events. This re-enforcement of knowledge at the local 
level, and the interaction and the convergence between the distance selling 
industry and trade chains are the factors which will determine the future of the 
mail order cluster in the NPdC Region (Liefhooge 2005). 
5.1.2.3 Transport infrastructure 
The development of the Channel Tunnel and related transport infrastructure has 
facilitated the regeneration of the Lille conurbation and the region of NPdC as a 
whole. Although its establishment was effectively under the remit of a national 
planning process, a key player was the then prime minister (discussed earlier) 
Pierre Mauroy, local politician and former mayor of Lille. In 1982, Mauroy and 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agreed to the construction of the 
tunnel and a treaty was ratified in 1986 after intense lobbying by NPdC region 
and Lille authorities. Their efforts ensured the link from London and Brussels to 
Paris should pass through Lille instead of going across country. In order to 
construct a new station and capitalise on the potential benefits of the link, 
EuraLille was established. In 1994, links to London and Brussels were opened 
providing TGV links to other areas of France, particularly the south, thus 
ensuring that Lille restored its historic position as the interchange city between 
Flanders, north-west Europe and France (Simon 1993; Fraser & Baert 2003).  
Mauroy described Euralille as a ‗tertiary turbine‘. The hope was it would 
facilitate the development of Lille and drive the city‘s economy into the post-
industrial era. Euralille was a large and coordinated project which was able to 
utilise public land holdings. Although it has received some criticism (Moulaert et 
al. 2001) the project is generally considered a success and as well as being a 
location for conference and exhibitions facilities, it serves as a major European 
transport hub and has become the third largest business district of France after 
La Defense (Paris) and La Part-Dieu (Lyon).  
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5.1.3 Unemployment  
Figure 3.3 (pg.83) presents regional unemployment rates in 2008 and 2011 for 
the five regions. In 2008 at 5.8 per cent the unemployment rate in WCS was 
lower than the other regions. NPdC had the worst rates of unemployment at 11.4 
per cent. By 2011, unemployment has increased in all regions (except the Ruhr). 
However, although unemployment remains higher in NPdC than WCS (12.9%-
10.2%) the increase in WCS is significantly more severe. This is a concern for 
WCS as NPdC, like the Ruhr, has historically had higher structural unemployment 
due to aforementioned eurosclerosis. Moreover, relative to NPdC, in WCS there 
is seemingly a significant degree of hidden unemployment.  
 
Figure 5.2: Unemployment in WCS and NPdC. 
 
 
It is also possible to examine trends in unemployment over time. Figure 5.2 
shows the change in unemployment between 1985 and 2008. In the early 1980s, 
unemployment was greater in WCS reflecting the earlier onset of 
deindustrialisation. Subsequently, rising unemployment rates in NPdC and falling 
rates in WCS meant that by the mid-1990s the situation had reversed: by 1990-01 
unemployment in NPdC was 10 per cent higher than in WCS. This speed is 
perhaps surprising given the use of early retirement in France as a response to 
deindustrialisation.  
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5.1.4 Employment rates  
As discussed, a problem with utilising unemployment rates as an indicator of 
labour market disadvantage is the degree of hidden unemployment.  
Figure 5.3: Male employment in WCS and NPdC. 
 
Figure 5.4: Female employment WCS and NPdC. 
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As historically France has also operated a bread-winner model of welfare, 
gender division is important as female labour market participation has 
historically been higher in the UK: Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show this. Figure 5.3 
shows that employment rates for men aged 15-64 are typically higher in WCS 
than NPdC. During the mid-1990s employment rates fell in NPdC, however, they 
are now increasing and starting to converge on WCS rates. For females, 
employment rates (Figure 5.4) in WCS have increased steadily since the mid-
1980s. In NPdC the level of employment for females has been consistently 
around 40 per cent. However, since the mid-1990s there has been a steady 
increase roughly at the same rate as WCS. 
 
5.1.5 Worklessness 
Figure 3.4 (pg.83) shows the percentage of men aged 25-49 not in employment 
in 2001, the significance of this measure in this context has already been 
outlined. NPdC fairs comparatively well in this regard, with 17.3 per cent of 
males aged 25-49 not in employment: this is similar to N.Moravia (17%) and 
significantly lower than the other regions including WCS (21.7%).  
 
5.2 Context 
Although discussed earlier and above, a key element of the context of NPdC is 
the economic and development model that has been applied. Like WCS, the 
region suffered from being on the periphery which made it an unattractive 
location for investment. When deindustrialisation occurred, France like 
Germany, sought to maintain its traditional economic (and social) structure: the 
state facilitated a consolidation of major industries. Subsequently, the autonomy 
of firms has been increased but government still retains an active role (Schmidt 
2003). Consequently, in France, change is driven by both firm and state action. 
The autonomy of firms gives them significant influence in terms of business 
strategy, investment, production and wage bargaining.  However, the state 
continues to exercise control in labour rules and pension systems and when there 
is a need to adjust the general economic environment to promote 
competitiveness. In either case, as Schmidt notes: ―the interaction is one of 
hierarchical direction rather than joint decision or unilateral action‖ (2003:549). 
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All of these developments facilitated the restructuring of the local economy and 
helped maintain a degree of economic diversity relative to WCS.  
In comparison to WCS, the restructuring of the NPdC industrial base has been 
relatively successful. Industries such as glass, plastics, automobiles and printing 
have formed the foundation of a new industrial culture. This transformation has 
been augmented by the creation of 400,000 new jobs in the service sector  
between 1946 and 1996. In addition, more recent initiatives have led to the 
creation of high-tech and service-based industries (Fraser & Baert 2003:91). 
Since 1990, NPdC has diversified its activity by supporting, for example, the 
manufacture of new textile fibres and biotechnologies (Colomb 2007). As a 
result, there are still comparatively high levels of technical workers and craft 
and related trade workers. The number of managers and professionals also 
indicates that, although general skills are more prevalent, these are high general 
skills and therefore the level of deskilling has not been as severe. Research by 
Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001) confirms that France still has a high 
degree of skills specificity and a high level of vocational training.  
5.2.1 Skills and Education 
France and NPdC have eschewed the low wages-low skills route as pursued in the 
UK and recognised the difficulties in establishing a high wage-high skills model 
such as Germany‘s. Instead, the state gradually reduced its role in the economy 
affording (preferred) large companies more autonomy. As a consequence, 
companies restructured their production networks and practices in ways that 
encouraged the upgrading of skills, production quality and industrial cooperation 
and coordination.  As in the Ruhr, new educational institutions (grandes écoles) 
were also established. As Fraser and Baert conclude: 
―This public sector initiative did strike a chord with the private sector 
as it too realised the assets that the region possessed in terms of 
potentially educated labour force and a location at the heart of the 
west European industrial area‖ ( 2003:90). 
5.2.1.1 Education  
Figure 3.7 (pg.85) shows the percentage of adults (25-64) with tertiary (post-
secondary) qualifications in 2008 for all the regions. It shows that NPdC had a 
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smaller proportion of adults with tertiary qualifications30 than SWS (used as a 
proxy for WCS), 23 per cent and 33.3 per cent respectively. Figure 3.8 (pg.85) 
shows the percentage of adults with no or low level qualification (ISCED Level 0-
2) in all the regions: it shows that SWS has a significantly lower proportion of 
adults with low or no qualifications relative to NPdC, 27.3 per cent and 35.1 per 
cent respectively. This is a significant difference, although traditionally a lack of 
formal education would not have necessarily been a barrier to old industrial 
work. A lack of skills and education in the contemporary labour market are 
considered significant NSRs.  
Figure 5.5: Percentage of NEETs in WCS and NPdC. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of young adults not in education, employment 
or training: so-called NEET‘s, in WCS and NPdC. WCS had a marginally higher 
percentage of young male‘s NEET than NPdC (18% and 15%). The percentage for 
young female‘s NEET was the same for both regions (18%). The figures for WCS 
were based on census data, so cannot be updated at present. Taulbut et al. 
(2011) note that some of the difference observed in NEET rates is attributable to 
low levels of participation for this age group in WCS compared to NPdC. 
However, as unemployment rates (Figure 3.5 pg.84) suggest and international 
                                         
30
 These include university degree or NVQ level 4/5 level qualifications and above. 
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comparisons demonstrate (OECD 2009), this is a rapidly changing picture. In 
2009, the level of NEET (aged 15-19) was around 11 per cent in the UK and 6 per 
cent in France.  
 
5.2.2 Social context  
Each country and region, to varying degrees, has had to counter the problems of 
urban economic restructuring which is an acknowledged problem in OIRs 
(Boschma & Lambooy 1999; Birch et al. 2010; Couch et al. 2011). In the UK and 
France this has meant the renewal of neglected neighbourhoods, both in inner 
urban areas and in peripheral social housing estates (Whithead & Scanlon 2007; 
Couch et al. 2011). This has been a concern of the UK, particularly in WCS. 
However, despite similar issues existing in NPdC, large-scale social housing 
estates are less prevalent (Whitehead & Scanlon 2007).  
 
In NPdC, social housing accounts for 69 units of social rented housing per 1000 
inhabitants compared to the UK figure of 106 per 1000 and the German figure of 
30 per 1000. In the aftermath of the Second World War the stock grew 
considerably, as Levy-Vroelant and Tutin note: ―Its mission then was to house 
the homeless and poorly housed - the majority of the population, given the 
tremendous shortage of housing‖ (2007:70). As such, the social or rented sector 
catered for the majority. Since the 1980s however, various initiatives (tax 
breaks, interest free loans) have encouraged home ownership and social housing 
has become increasingly (yet not exclusively) a tenure of the poor. However, as 
Levy-Vroelant and Tutin conclude: ―at the moment, no process of residualisation 
can be observed, as in some other European countries‖ (2007:70). One possible 
reason for this is that, in the 1990s, new laws on planning and ‗inter-communal‘ 
assistance aimed to facilitate solidarity between areas and consolidate a greater 
social mix in communities (Couch et al. 2011).  
In terms of city development, and as we shall see in contrast to WCS and 
Glasgow‘s experience, France has pursued different strategies. Authorities were 
less concerned than their UK counterparts with attracting new employment and 
retailing to central areas but more concerned with increasing public open space 
and maintaining housing provision (Couch 1997). More recent policy emphasises  
developing  an attractive, sustainable, socially mixed city, mixing generations 
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and the different activities of living and working,  facilitating a ‗nouvel art de 
ville‘ a new approach to living in the city: through limiting urban sprawl, 
developing public transport, addressing issues of renewable energy, improving 
the environmental assets of water, air and agricultural land (Kuklowsky & Provan 
2011). Such an approach is possible due to the role of national funding 
programmes which operate with local, regional, and intermediary partners to 
deliver large scale projects. Typically, such projects emphasise continuity, 
culture and local traditions in setting the direction and context for planning, not 
globalisation and internationalisation of capital, but still with the purpose of 
restoring economic well-being to the city (Power et al. 2010).  
Decentralisation measures of the 1980s augmented the power of local 
stakeholders and there were initiatives that emphasised solidarity between the 
poorer urban communes and other communes. The approach was more 
concerned with social regeneration than physical. In the 1990s new laws on 
planning and ‗inter-communal‘ assistance aimed to facilitate even development 
encouraging solidarity between areas and consolidating a greater social mix in 
communities. Thereby, reducing the socioeconomic (and potentially health) 
disparities between communes (Couch et al. 2011). In the region and France 
generally, there was a resistance to the ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ policies of economic 
development, based upon deregulation and the physical environment (Meunier 
2000).  
With the divergent approaches of NPdC and WCS in mind, some regional 
comparisons will be made. First, family structures and relationships 
acknowledged as having an influence on population health. Second, health 
behaviours which are indicators of the individual and population health but also 
markers for the degree of social dislocation present in an area - particularly as a 
consequence of post-industrial change.  
 
5.2.2.1 Lone parent households  
Figure 3.9 (pg.86) shows the percentage of households with children headed by a 
lone parent in the five regions. In 2001, less than a quarter (23.6%) of 
households with children in NPdC were headed by a lone parent. This is 
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significantly lower than WCS (31.1%) and the Ruhr (32.3%) and closer to the CEE 
regions. Figure 3.10 (pg.86) shows the rate of change in lone parent household 
with dependent children between 1990 and 2001. Although the rate is increasing 
in NPdC, the rate and level, as has been case historically, is less than WCS.  
5.2.2.2 Single person households 
Figure 3.11 (pg.87) shows the percentage of households that are single person 
households in each region. In NPdC, just over a quarter (26.6%) of adults live 
alone. This is significantly lower than the other West European regions and more 
in line with CEE regions. Figure 3.12 (pg.87) shows the change in single person 
households over time between 1990 and 2001. As with lone parent households, 
the number of single person households increased in NPdC and WCS over time. 
However, although the percentage of single person households has increased in 
both regions, the rate of increase was much steeper in WCS.  
5.2.2.3 Marital Status  
Figure 3.13 (pg.88) shows the percentage of adults aged 25-64 reporting that 
they were married31. Results are shown for adults aged 25-64. As explained, this 
accounts for different population structures across the regions and the fact that, 
predominantly, adults in these regions did not marry until their mid-20s 
(Eurostat 2006). As indicated, in the western regions the rate of marriage is 
roughly two-thirds. It was marginally higher in NPdC (66.4%) than in WCS 
(63.0%).  
5.2.2.4 Births to teenage mothers 
Figure 3.21 (pg.92) compares the percentage of births to mothers aged below 20 
in the five selected regions. It shows that the rate for WCS is almost double that 
for the NPdC, 8.5 per cent and 4.7 per cent respectively. Longitudal data 
(Taulbut et al. 2011) indicates that although the teenage birth rate in both 
regions is falling, the relative gap between the regions persists.  
                                         
31 Including those separated from their partners but still legally married or in a civil partnership 
across the regions in 2001. 
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5.2.2.5 Health behaviours  
The relevance and impact of health behaviours to individual and population 
health has been outlined previously.   
5.2.2.5.1 Smoking  
 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 (pg.90) show the percentage of adult daily smokers, 
defined as those who smoked at least one cigarette a day, for males and females 
respectively. While male smoking rates were similar in WCS and NPdC (29.9% and 
31.8%), female smoking rates were significantly higher in WCS than in the NPdC 
(28.4% and 19.9%).  
5.2.2.5.2 Alcohol 
 
Direct comparisons of the total levels of alcohol consumption between the 
selected regions are not possible. However, frequency of drinking alcohol among 
adults in NPdC and Greater Glasgow can be compared. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show 
survey data for the years 2002-2005 comparing the percentage of adults 
describing themselves as never/ex-drinkers, those drinking once a month or less 
and those drinking two or three times a month. Habits were relatively similar. 
However, for both males and females, the key differences were in those 
reporting they drink three or more times a week (considerably higher in NPdC) 
and those reporting they drink once or twice a week (considerably higher in 
Greater Glasgow). This difference was more pronounced among males than 
females. This probably reflects historic differences in drinking cultures between 
the two regions. Although there are similarities in drinking patterns, daily 
moderate wine drinking with dinner continues to be more common in France, at 
least amongst adults32, whilst heavy drinking concentrated over one or two days 
is more common in Scotland.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
32
 It is widely reported that young people are drinking less in France (BBC 2013). 
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Figure 5.6: Frequency of male alcohol consumption Greater Glasgow and NPdC. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Frequency of female alcohol consumption Greater Glasgow and NPdC. 
 
 
In terms of international comparisons, Figure 3.19 and 3.20 (pg.91) indicate that 
France has a higher proportion of daily drinkers than Scotland (18%- 12%), it also 
has higher proportion of abstainers (21%-12%). Note, the Scottish data is based 
on consumption over a week as opposed to a month; this may impact the results 
(Walsh et al. 2008).  
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5.2.3 Social capital  
The significance of social capital has been outlined previously.  
5.2.3.1 Religious participation 
Figure 3.14 (pg.88) is based on survey-based measurement and indicates the 
percentage of adults who never attend religious ceremonies except on special 
occasions in each region. However, NPdC results not shown as the European 
Social Survey French sample is not representative at regional level.  
 
5.2.3.2 Voter turnout 
Figure 3.15 (pg.89) shows turnout rates at national parliamentary elections, 
across each region. In 2005, election turnout in NPdC was very similar to WCS, 
59 per cent and 58.3 per cent respectively. In terms of change over time as 
indicated in Figure 3.16 (pg.89) NPdC and WCS have broadly followed the same 
trajectory decreasing over time. However, whereas in 1990 turnout in WCS 
exceeded NPdC it is now marginally lower.  
5.2.3.3 Relative poverty  
Figure 3.5 (pg.84) shows the risk of poverty in selected countries across time. 
Note, although all countries exhibit fluctuations, levels of poverty are 
consistently higher in the UK. Moreover, although the level of poverty in France 
was broadly similar to Germany in the late 1990s, since then, it has been 
consistently and significantly lower than both Germany and the UK.  
 
At the regional level (Figure 5.8), roughly one in five people are classified as 
living in relative poverty. However, the rate was higher in NPdC than SWS (proxy 
for WCS): 21.6 per cent and 18.9 per cent respectively. This difference is 
statistically significant but not substantial.  
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Figure 5.8: Relative poverty SW Scotland and NPdC. 
 
 
5.2.4 Income inequality  
Figure 3.6 (pg.84), tracks income inequality in the selected host countries from 
the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. It shows that, relative to the other countries 
(exception Czech Republic), income inequality has been falling since the mid-
1980s in France. Whereas the difference was around 0.1 in the mid-1980s, it is 
now around 0.5.  
At the regional level, as Figure 5.9 shows, income inequality in WCS is also 
higher than levels seen in NPdC. Household income may also play a role as Figure 
3.11 (pg.87) indicates the unemployed are more likely than the UK or German 
unemployed to be living in a household with other people. 
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Figure 5.9: Income inequality in WCS and NPdC. 
 
5.3 Social protection 
It is clear that the level of social protection available in NPdC relative to WCS 
during the period of deindustrialisation was greater. However, as discussed, all 
welfare states are in transformation and subject to increasing austerity. Policy is 
primarily determined at the national level with varying degrees of autonomy at 
the regional level to deliver programmes.   
 
The development of massive unemployment in the 1980s led to concerns 
regarding social exclusion as a consequence of poverty. As Mandin and Palier 
explain: 
―Social exclusion became an endogenous constraint since it revealed 
specific problems in the predominantly contributory social insurance 
system. Evidence suggested that the unemployment compensation 
system was unable to meet the needs of those that have never worked 
or have exhausted their entitlement and thus reinforced social 
exclusion, particularly among young people, women and the long-term 
unemployed‖ (2002:27). 
Non-contributory minimum welfare benefits are provided to those individuals 
who require the most support, due to a lack of finances and resources. The 
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provision of minimum welfare benefits is the key component in the fight towards 
alleviating poverty. 
In France, as in Germany, during the period of post-war prosperity, the core 
industrial sectors instituted the benchmarks for the wider economy in terms of 
wages and working conditions, labour contracts, and social protection. In 
France, this was embedded in the nationalised champions nationaux such as 
Renault and the large public enterprises such as EDF (electricity) or SNCF 
(railways) that historically fulfilled the role of vitrine sociale (―social window‖, 
i.e. setting a benchmark for social practices within companies). As in Germany, 
the social partners from industry, unions from the public sector and state 
policies contributed to institutionalising their standards to cover most of the 
population, either directly for male wage earners, or indirectly for their wives 
and families (Palier & Thelen 2010). 
 
In NPdC, as in the Ruhr, early responses to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 
1980s were centred on maintaining the core manufacturing economy, which 
provided the foundation for both the economic and the social model. This was 
accomplished by reducing the size of the workforce employed in the industrial 
sectors, largely through early retirement schemes, and increasing the 
productivity among remaining workers through increased internal flexibility and 
intensification of work. 
 
In France, employers have lobbied to reduce social insurance contributions. 
However, as discussed, they have had to negotiate within existing socioeconomic 
relations (Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2010). Despite many employers advocating cost 
reductions, the unions and some sectors of the business community remained 
committed to the idea of social partnerships and effectively vetoed reforms.  
There is a process of dualisation: this means greater reliance on social assistance 
programs on the one hand and greater reliance on occupational social protection 
for certain labour market insiders on the other hand. Although the number of 
atypical jobs is increasing, these jobs are still subject to extensive state 
regulation, and even outsiders benefit from state support so that a minimum 
income is guaranteed.  
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6. Katowice (Upper Silesia) 
Figure 6.1: Katowice region 
The Upper Silesia industrial region formed the greatest area of the Voivodship 
(province) of Katowice from 1975 to 1998. The region is situated in the south of 
Poland and borders the North Moravia region of the Czech Republic. A 
restructuring of the voivodships in 1999 created the Voivodship of Śląsk/Silesia 
which contains 86 per cent of the former Voivodship of Katowice (as before the 
Upper Silesian industrial region forms the centre of the new Voivodship of Śląsk) 
(Eckart et al., 2003:148).  Around Katowice, which is the regional capital, 
fifteen cities are agglomerated to form a spatial entity of more than two million 
inhabitants. 
During the nineteenth century, many mining sites, coking plants and smelting 
works were established in the Silesian region. On-going industrialisation and the 
intensive exploitation of coal mines and steel production led to the urbanisation 
of Upper Silesia.  At that time, power within the region was shared between the 
Russian, Prussian and Austrian Empires and this shaped significant urban and 
identity differences within the region (Durand 2009).  The development of rail 
infrastructure facilitated the establishment of urban centres around areas of 
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industrial production. The main urban areas were formed around Gliwice, 
Bytom, Zabrze, Katowice and the industrial area of Zagłębie Dąbrowski. 
Expansion of these areas was achieved mainly through funding from private 
investors (mainly Prussian) in the burgeoning economy. Industrialisation required 
manpower and this led to a large influx of people into the region, primarily 
settlers of Polish and German origin (Durand 2009).  
 
The end of the First World War led to the restoration of the Polish state and the 
termination of imperial borders. Upper Silesia and its industrial area were 
divided between the Germans and Polish. Gliwice, Zabrze and Bytom remained 
affiliated with Germany, while Katowice, Chorzów and Mysłowice became Polish. 
Continued urbanisation and industrialisation of the region helped the Polish 
economy and radically transformed the structure of the population. In the early 
1930s, 22.5 per cent of Silesian inhabitants earned their living from agriculture 
and 51 per cent worked in industry or mines (325,000 workers) (Klarner 1934 
cited in Durand 2009). 
 
With the establishment of a communist regime after the Second World War, the 
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation intensified. All boundaries in 
Upper Silesia were removed and all the cities and industrialised areas were 
grouped together into a single administrative region: the Voivodship of Upper 
Silesia. The purpose of creating a powerful industrial centre was to integrate all 
the Silesian populations to the central state project. The continued expansion of 
industrial production was complemented by an increase in population. This was 
the result of the baby boom and the post-war territorial transformation of 
Poland which forced people of the former eastern territories to migrate to the 
Recovered Territories33, particularly Upper Silesia, where labour was in demand 
(Szczepànski 1997).  
 
 
 
 
                                         
33 The term Recovered Territories identified the Polish territories after the war, which were 
German territories before 1945 (mainly the regions of Pomerania, a part of the Mazowieckie, the 
Prussian Silesia). 
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In 1989, the end of the command economy led to the privatisation of state 
assets and the creation of private enterprises. By the early 1990s, many of these 
former state enterprises were in crisis and unable to meet the requirements of 
the market system.  Heavy industries were not efficient or competitive and, as a 
result, it was necessary to restructure those sectors. These political and 
economic changes profoundly affected the Silesian area and the region is still 
marked by the industrial and cultural legacies of the nineteenth century and by 
the socialist policies of the twentieth century.  
 
6.1 Deindustrialisation  
When we refer to deindustrialisation in the context of the CEE regions we refer 
to the rationalisation and privatisation of heavy industry and state enterprises, 
and tertiarisation that occurred after the collapse of communism.  
Figure 3.1 (pg.82) shows the level of industrial employment: the proportion 
seems low relative to the other countries. This is due to when the figures are 
available from and the level of agriculture that remains. Like the Czech Republic 
(and Germany), Poland retains a significant industrial capacity. Moreover, the 
degree and rate of loss in industrial employment was not as severe as it was in 
WCS, particularly if you consider the level of over-staffing prevalent. This 
reflects the gradual path the country and region took in terms of industrial 
restructuring. However, although Poland pursued a gradual approach, there was 
still significant restructuring of workforces as a consequence of transition.  
Figure 3.2 (pg.82) shows unemployment as a percentage of labour force: it 
indicates the effect of restructuring on unemployment in Poland was marked. 
The degree of unemployment in the early years of transition and the late 1990s 
recession far exceed that experienced in West Europe. However, when 
considering the level of unemployment, one must take into account several 
factors, namely: what was effectively full employment prior to transition; the 
degree of hidden unemployment found in the UK and in particularly in WCS; and, 
as shall be discussed later, the easy access to unemployment benefits in the 
early years of transition which likely inflated unemployment rates. Moreover, 
there are significant geographical variations in the levels of unemployment in 
Poland (Gawronska-Nowak et al. 1998).  
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Interestingly, unlike the other selected regions, the situation in Katowice 
(śląskie) was less severe than it was nationally (Suchacek 2005). As Table 3.1 
(pg.81) demonstrates, these regions share an industrial legacy of coal and steel. 
These industries were particularly vulnerable after the collapse of communism 
and transition. However, as shall be discussed below, Katowice has had some 
success restructuring its economy and continues to retain and develop a 
significant degree of industry.  
The problems faced in Katowice should not be underestimated. After the entry 
of Poland into the global market economy in 1989, the Katowice region found 
itself in economic crisis and due to the legacy of state-socialism, with serious 
structural concerns: deteriorating infrastructures, a lack of profitability from 
production and modes of operation not tailored to the global capitalist system. 
Massive industrial complexes, such as the steel works Huta Katowice, dominated 
the local economy. Typically, they employed a disproportionately large 
workforce, received massive state subsidies and utilised outmoded technology 
and production methods.  
In 1989, the region was the location of 520 state-owned industrial enterprises, 
some 10 per cent of the state-owned enterprises in Poland. These included 65 
hard coal mines, 13 power plants, and 19 steel works. In addition, there were 
255 construction firms and 82 farming and agricultural enterprises  of which 20 
were state farms. The voivodship also hosted 45 foreign enterprises and 
approximately 35,000 small workshops, the majority of which were private 
family enterprises. The public sector employed 1.3 million people in 1989, while 
the private sector employed 265,500 (Szczepañski & Cybula 1998:99). In the 
immediate era of transition (until the mid-1990s), the removal of state 
subsidies, privatisation and the restructuring of heavy industry and mining in the 
region resulted in acute socioeconomic change and put the local economy 
further into recession.  
The restructuring of the two key industrial sectors, steel and coal, resulted in 
the closure of many works and mines. In 1989, 70 mines were operational. By 
2007 there were only thirty still extracting coal and the number of mineworkers 
had reduced from 415,700 to 116,400. The story of the steel sector was just as 
severe. Several works ceased to function and steel production fell significantly, 
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from 20 million tonnes in 1980 to 11 million tonnes in 1994: over 100 000 jobs 
were lost in the sector. The remaining (20) works consolidated in 2002 in the 
Polskie Huty Stali Consortium, which is now owned by the Anglo-Indian venture, 
Mittal Steel (Bafoil 2010:3),  the Polish headquarters of which is in Katowice.  
Although the economic base of the region remains in flux and new sectors are 
emerging, the traditional sectors persist. In 2010, the extraction of ore and 
heavy industries continued to employ 38.2 per cent of the working population 
and contributed up to 22.5 per cent of regional GDP.  Poland continues to be the 
leading producer of coal in the European Union (and the seventh globally). The 
output in the region amounts to 90 per cent of national production. After a sharp 
decline in the early years of transition, coal production has now increased again 
due to concerns over energy dependence (in 2002, Poland depended on 92 per 
cent of its coal for electricity production) and higher oil prices. Due to these 
circumstances, the extraction of coal continues to be profitable (Bafoil 2010:7).  
Research by Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) demonstrated that in Katowice (Śląskie) 
between 1990 and 2005 (as expected) the loss of industry exceeded the national 
average. In the service sector there was growth at just below the national rate. 
However, although there has been significant deskilling, as in other OIRs, with 
reductions in both high and low-tech employment, there has been, 
simultaneously, significant growth in the high-tech services. This so-called path 
creation of new sectors is the product of what has been described as a weakly 
coordinated capitalism (Mykhnenko 2007) which as Myant concludes: ―had to 
start as a capitalism without capitalists and also without capital‖ (2007:105).  
So how severe has deindustrialisation been in Katowice relative to WCS (and the 
other regions)? As Table 3.1 (pg.81) shows, by 2005, the share of industrial 
employment (as a percentage of total employment) had fallen in every region – 
but farthest in WCS. Katowice, of all the regions, maintained the largest 
industrial workforce (42.8%). In terms of the number of industrial jobs lost 
(Table 3.1 pg.81 column 3), during the period 1980-2005 Katowice lost 55 per 
cent of its industrial employment. Katowice, like the Ruhr and WCS, has been 
hardest hit in this regard. However, as established, more accurate comparisons 
in terms of the speed and intensity of deindustrialisation are difficult.  
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The next section will look at the policy responses, both national and regional, to 
privatisation in Katowice and highlight some important developments in the 
region.  
 
6.1.1 National response 
The problems associated with economic restructuring and the large number of 
job losses in the Katowice region necessitated significant state intervention. It 
seems that this level of intervention was augmented by the powerful political 
lobby that exists in the region. Accordingly, the reform programmes of central 
government consisted of solutions formulated at the national and regional level. 
On 6 June 1995 the ‗Regional contract for Katowice voivodship‘ was signed. This 
was essentially an agreement between regional and national government that 
established the framework for regional transformation not only in industrial and 
economic terms, but also in education, environment and infrastructure. The 
primary aim was to rejuvenate the entire region in order to maintain the 
economic strength of Upper Silesia and its labour force (Szczepañski & Cybula 
1998; Sucháček 2005). 
 
Eckart et al. (2003) assert that this contract was of particular importance for 
restructuring of the region. It was critical in attracting inward investment and, 
as a result, the quality of the environment improved and a vision for the future 
was established: based on knowledge, innovation, advanced technologies and 
competitiveness. EU funds subsidised a number of these actions and ensured a 
favourable legal environment for investors. New economic sectors thrived, 
particularly in the service sector. As Bafoil explains: 
 
―The aim of regional policy in the medium and long term was to keep 
the key role played by the industry while developing the activities of 
services in a region which sorely lacked. This requires a redefinition of 
industrial activities, either by the modernization of production tools 
or by creating new economic sectors (particularly in high technology)‖ 
(2010:6). 
6.1.1.1 Foreign investment  
Since the mid-1990s, Poland has attracted a significant amount of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and this has contributed to the expansion and diversification of 
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the region‘s economy. In addition, new institutional arrangements have 
facilitated a favourable juridical and economic framework for foreign 
investments. Poland's active participation in organisations such as the OECD and 
NATO, and its successful accession to the EU in 2004 provided the necessary 
assurances for foreign investors and capital. Since 1996, the share of FDI in the 
Katowice region has totalled 11,712 billion PLN (2.5 billion Euros), making it the 
most successful region in Poland to attract FDI. As Bafoil explains: 
 
―Although the economic situation of the region was difficult at the 
end of communism, the local actors (municipalities, Voivodship, 
development agencies) have established programs to develop and 
revitalize the regional space, putting forward the benefits of Upper 
Silesia: many available lands (including Special Economic Zones), 
qualified manpower, (and a) significant local market‖ (2010:11).  
Furthermore, FDI has created dynamism in the local economy which has led to 
the creation of many home-grown enterprises in the form of subcontractors and 
service providers.  
The French concern Saint-Gobain was one of the first transnational companies to 
invest in the region, establishing a float glass factory in Dąbrowa Górnicza. In 
addition, they established factories for windshields, glass products and the 
production of insulation materials.  Food and beverage companies such as 
Unilever and Danone have also provided investment for existing factories. 
Similar to continental Europe in the immediate post-war era, much of the room 
for expansion has come from the underdevelopment associated, in this case, 
with state-socialism. The critical question is whether, in the long-term, this will 
facilitate cumulative causation, as Domanski explains: 
―(Will) the recent expansion and diversification of the regional 
economy provide impetus for self-perpetuating growth based on 
urbanisation economies including a variety of potential buyers and 
specialised suppliers as well as a vast pool of labour‖ (2002:10).  
6.1.2 Regional response  
In contrast to the Czech Republic, the regional level of self-government was not 
abolished in Poland post-transition. However, the institutional arrangements at 
the national and regional level had to be reconfigured in order to provide an 
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active role for local authorities to manage the post-communist transition and 
subsequent economic development.  
The structure of regional governance in the region is, due to its cultural and 
economic heterogeneity, at best multifaceted. Major actors include regional 
authorities, local governments, NGOs, state agencies, state-owned enterprises, 
local businesses and foreign investors. All of whom have their own agenda, 
constituencies, politics and practices and vary in their perception of, and 
commitment to the region. However, since 1990, local government has been 
augmented, particularly in major cities and regions. In political terms, and 
similar to France (as illustrated by the NPdC example), mayors are now strong 
political players. Mayors are elected to office for four years via universal 
suffrage and this affords them a significant degree of legitimacy and political 
capital and allows them to directly choose their preferred social partners. In 
economic terms, municipalities now find themselves with more autonomy and 
latitude in terms of their development strategies. Although in many areas local 
government remains financially dependent on central government, 
decentralisation allows them to respond to local needs and focus their efforts on 
restructuring and re-stimulating the local economy and to pursue outside 
investment (Domanski 2002; Bafoil 2010).  
 
Further decentralisation occurred in 1999 as the newly formed voivodships were 
also granted a significant degree of autonomy. Regional actors acquired new 
powers in the areas of: definition of regional strategic planning; signing of a 
development contract State/Region; promotion of economic development; and 
the design and implementation of a Regional Operational Programme coming 
from the Structural Funds of the European Union (Bafoil 2010:9). The Katowice 
Voivodship sought to promote growth in the region by creating favourable 
conditions within which heavy industry, tourism and the cultural potential of the 
region could thrive. To achieve this, local decision makers have acted to remove 
any impediments to that development for example, environmental pollution and 
infrastructure. 
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6.1.2.1 Development agencies  
In order to maintain jobs in light of the inevitable restructuring of the coal and 
steel industries in the region, local (and national) decision makers looked to 
revitalise the local economy by encouraging the creation of new business 
enterprises, part of this strategy entailed the establishment of development 
agencies.  
In November 1992, the Voivodship of Katowice and the Ministry of Regional 
Development established the Agency for Regional Development of Upper Silesia 
(GARR). The agency had two primary goals: to promote the region and to advise 
on the best way to attract and encourage investment. It also served to advise 
local authorities and entrepreneurs who hoped to establish small and medium 
sized enterprises (SME) (Blazyca & Klazik 2003).   
 
In January 1994, another development agency was established in the region: the 
Agency for the Transformation of Enterprises (GAPP). This was again a joint local 
and national initiative, founded by the Ministry of the Treasury, the towns of 
Bytom and Zory and a development company in Warsaw. The agency acted to 
deal with some of the consequences of restructuring in the region and to assist 
in the creation of new SMEs (Blazyca & Klazik 2003). To achieve its stated aims 
of creating the conditions, methods and tools to improve the competitiveness of 
Upper Silesia, the agency provides high quality support in the following fields: 
consulting, training, information and financial support (assistance in obtaining 
EU funds) (Bafoil 2010:10).  
 
Other development agencies exist in the Silesian region, such as RCITT (The 
Regional Centre for Innovation and Technology Transfer, created as a result of 
the new Structural Funds 2007-2013) and the ARP (Agency for Industry 
Development) both assist in the transfer of technology. In the 2000s, the main 
aim of the agencies is to build on the growth poles they have helped established 
ensuring they maintain their dynamism and competitiveness (Bafoil 2010).  
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6.1.2.2 Special economic zones (SEZs) 
In 1994, central government, eager to reduce the structural unemployment 
which was a consequence of transition, passed the law on Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) in Poland. In 1996, four such regions were established in the 
Katowice region covering a total area of 827 hectares. The zones offered total 
tax exemption of corporate tax during the first 10 years of activity and 50 per 
cent in the years up to the expiry of the area. Enterprises were also exempt 
from property tax. To qualify, investment had to exceed 2 million Euros and at 
least 100 workers had to be employed. Preferred applicants were manufacturers 
from the sectors of precision engineering, electronics, automobile industry, food 
processing, medicine and medical instruments (Sucháček 2005:20).  
The sites chosen were brownfield and the SEZs were established in order to 
facilitate the development of the location within which they were established. 
The hope was they would create employment and help consolidate the post-
communist industrial fabric of the region via the establishment of new industries 
and overhaul of local infrastructure. As Domanski concludes:  
―The establishment of special economic zones proved to be an 
influential intervention that fostered the influx of large foreign 
manufacturing capital and the creation of new jobs‖ (2002:16). 
Since 1996, the SEZs have attracted over 268 companies and in excess of 3 
billion Euros have been invested creating over 37,000 new jobs. Investment has 
come from a number of countries and has facilitated economic growth and 
allowed the region to broaden its economic base. The new industries, although 
modern, are still concerned with production (Bafoil 2010:13). In addition, new 
SMEs have been established in order to fulfil the industrial and commercial 
activities that large companies are unable or unwilling to perform in the region. 
However, with Poland‘s accession to the EU, the position of SEZs has become 
uncertain as the concessions provided contravene the acquis communautaire34. 
As a result, the EU has requested Poland abandon them by 2017 (OECD 2008a).  
It should also be noted that the formation of SEZs has led to economic, and 
possibly social, inequalities in the region as not all areas contain one. Similar to 
                                         
34
 Accumulated legislation, legal acts and court decisions which constitute the body of European 
Union law. 
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WCS, many of these areas have sought to establish commercial areas, this often 
being to the detriment of towns and city centres, as they have been established 
in peripheral areas where the land is cheaper (and access for consumers and 
suppliers is easier)  (Bafoil 2010).  
 
6.1.2.3 Diversification of the economy: new activities  
Post-transition, a major driver of the economic growth experienced in the 
region, contributing to the creation of new jobs and below average 
unemployment rates, has been the development of economic activities that had 
hitherto been of secondary importance (for example, consumer services, 
retailing and new manufacturing sectors). Although some of the capacity to grow 
is due to the underdevelopment of these sectors under state-socialism, certain 
attributes of the region have also been a decisive factor.  
Katowice‘s geographical position is an advantage, being situated on 2 trans-
european road routes: corridor III (connecting Berlin – Wroclaw – Katowice– 
Cracow – Lvov) and corridor VI (connecting Gdansk – Katowice– Zylina), as is the 
sizeable labour market and sizeable population. Many companies in the region 
have attained national prominence in a number of industries including 
construction materials, plastic products and food and drink. In 2000, the number 
of local industries exceeded 280,000 (Domanski 2002:6).  
A particular success in the region is the automotive industry. The region is 
significant in terms of automotive production and in 2010 accounted for 82.7 per 
cent national production (Bafoil 2010). Despite no tradition in the region, Fiat 
was the first to establish itself regionally in 1975. The site chosen was Tychy and 
was determined by the need to secure employment in this ‗socialist new town‘. 
A contract between the Polish government and Fiat in 1987 established Tychy as 
the production plant for the (then) new small Fiat, the Cinquecento. This 
ultimately led to Fiat‘s take-over of the Polish concern FSM and $1.4 billion of 
investment. In addition, Fiat in the search for cost-reduction began to use 
suppliers in Poland: by 1995 more than 40 firms produced car components for 
Fiat (including their traditional suppliers who were encouraged to invest there) 
(Domanski 2002; Dyker 2010).  
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The automotive industry has continued to grow. In 1995, General Motors located 
in Gliwice-encouraged by the established companies and the incentives provided 
by the national government in the form of SEZs (including 10 year income tax 
exemption). The plant began production in 1998 and encouraged further 
investment from foreign component manufacturers. Many came as suppliers for 
car manufacturers present in Poland (Delphi, Lear, Electrolux, HP) others (for 
example Isuzu, who provide engines) served West European markets (Domanski 
2002; Dyker 2010). 
 
These types of investment in Upper Silesia contradict the theoretical 
explanations for industrial location, namely weak trade unions and low wages, 
and are in stark contrast to the experience of WCS, where these were 
considered as critical location factors. Moreover, the expansion of the 
automotive industry in the region is not path dependent since it is not an 
extension of any lasting legacy and could have occurred elsewhere in Poland or 
CEE. 
 
Before discussing the consequences of deindustrialisation and subsequent post-
industrial change on context and the level and nature of social protection, some 
comparisons on employment will be provided.  
 
6.1.3 Unemployment  
Figure 3.3 (pg.83) presents regional unemployment rates in 2008 and 2011 for 
the five regions. In 2008, Silesia had unemployment rate of 6.6 per cent almost a 
percentage point higher than SWS (proxy for WCS) and the second lowest rate of 
all the regions. As the figures show for 2011, unemployment has increased in all 
the regions: the gap between Silesia and SWS remains around one per cent. 
Unemployment in both CEE regions remains below both the Ruhr and NPdC.  
It is also possible to examine trends in unemployment over time. Figure 6.2 
shows the change in unemployment between 1985 and 2008. Unemployment in 
Silesia was similar to SWS in the mid-1990s: this reflects the use of early 
retirement and the gradual and relatively successful approach to economic 
restructuring.  
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Figure 6.2: Unemployment in SW Scotland and Silesia. 
 
In some respects, this is indicated in the steep increase in unemployment from 
1998-2002. At the time GDP was growing, yet the region and the country 
experienced an increase in unemployment. In part, this was due to the delayed 
effects of privatisation as newly privatised enterprises continued to rationalise 
employment. In addition, new technologies were being introduced which lead to 
reductions in labour, and, as in other OIRs, the service sector was not growing as 
quickly as might have been hoped. Finally, reforms to the pension and health 
insurance system led to an increase in the number of registered unemployed 
people. Since 2002 unemployment levels, broadly speaking, have improved 
consistently.  
6.1.4 Employment rates  
As established, a problem with utilising unemployment rates as an indicator of 
labour market disadvantage is the degree of hidden unemployment. The 
comparisons made here are from the 1990s onwards. To compare employment 
opportunities during the 1980s would present a false picture. Under communism, 
as discussed, there was ostensibly full employment for people of working age. 
Before looking at the figures it should be noted that due to early retirement 
schemes and early retirement in general the average age of retired person in 
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Poland (2006) is 56 years. Employment levels for both sexes have been low since 
transition.  
 
Figure 6.3: Male employment in WCS and Silesia. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Female employment in WCS and Silesia. 
 
 
As Figure 6.3 indicates, employment rates for men aged 15-64 are typically 
higher in WCS than Silesia. During the late-1990s, employment rates, for reasons 
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outlined above, fell in Silesia. Although the decrease has stopped, this has 
severely affected male employment levels, which have plateaued around 55 per 
cent. Although the same is true for WCS, the rate is healthy in comparison (73%). 
For females (Figure 6.3) employment levels also fell in the late 1990s. Like the 
males rates, they recovered. However, unlike the male rates they now show 
signs of improvement.  
 
As Figures 6.3 and 6.4 highlight, employment rates in the Katowice region are 
comparatively low. However, this is a situation that is improving both nationally 
and regionally. This is in part due to improvements in labour market conditions.  
However, a more probable explanation is the shift in policy in 2004 which 
curtailed the eligibility for the so-called pre-retirement benefit. Since 
transition, labour force participation has been particularly low among three 
groups: older workers, women and youth. The difference between Poland and 
other EU countries is greatest in the case of older workers, which reflects the 
(until recently) very generous rules governing early retirement. In 2009, only 35 
per cent of persons aged 55-64 were economically active compared with EU 
average 51 per cent (World Bank 2011:25).  
 
Other contributing factors include the significant reductions in public sector 
employment which occurred as a result of transition, which, due to retirement, 
saw people pushed out of the labour force rather than into unemployment (Boeri 
1994). Other factors cited include the low regional and trans-professional job 
reallocation (Bukowski et al. 2007). The shadow economy should also be taken 
into account as it is significant in CEE across all sectors: it is estimated that 20.2 
per cent of employment is informal (Surdej 2004:14). Moreover, in Poland in 
2004/5 it accounted for 27.3 per cent of GDP (Aidukaite 2011:3). 
 
6.1.5 Worklessness 
Figure 3.4 (pg.83) shows the percentage of men aged 25-49 not in employment 
in 2001: the significance of this measure in this context has already been 
outlined. As one would expect, given the early retirement, relatively high 
unemployment and historically low levels of employment, Silesia does not fare 
well in this regard, with 29.5 per cent (noticeably lower than the Ruhr). 
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An additional comparison can be made between Silesia and WCS. Figure 6.5 
shows the percentage of adults living in workless households. In the mid-1990s 
the situation was far worse in WCS than Silesia (18.1% vs. 9.6%).  The situation 
had completely reversed by 2001: as we have seen the unemployment situation 
in the late 1990s early 200s was severe. Although the gap continues to widen, 
the situation is improving in both regions.  
 
Figure 6.5: Number of working age adults in workless households: Strathclyde and Silesia. 
 
 
 
6.2 Context 
Due to the reform tendencies of the 1970s and 1980s the countries of CEE had 
different starting points when transition began. Poland had market elements in 
its economy prior to 1989. Broadly speaking, living standards were acceptable 
and there was an historic and institutional legacy of industrial capitalist 
development. Geography was also critical with Katowice (and Poland) 
benefitting greatly from proximity to economic powerhouse - Germany.  
Unlike many of the workers in the West European regions, those in the region of 
Katowice (and Moravia-Silesia) have only recently experienced the disruptions 
associated with post-industrial change. The region and the workers therein have, 
in the context of CEE, remained central to the economic development of the 
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region. The closures of mines in the early transition period were not welcome as 
miners had held a privileged position both regionally and nationally. Many had 
housing reserved and subsidised, in addition to food benefits and a salary twice 
the national industrial average. As a result, the region experienced strikes in the 
winter of 1992-1993 (Bafoil 1997). However, the process of restructuring was 
gradual. Mindful of the potential social costs and tensions in a region so densely 
and heavily populated (10 per cent of the Polish population lived in the region) 
further restructuring of heavy industry was put into hibernation. Central 
government began to take an active role in the region, which appeared to be 
suffering in relation to the other regions (Domanski 2002).  
The political capital of the region meant lobbying also contributed to the pace 
of restructuring in the region. Significant financial support was secured from 
central government, often in the form of tax exemptions. In addition, both 
metallurgical and mining enterprises received generous bank loans, often as a 
result of political pressure. By 1995, the debts of all mines in Upper Silesia 
totalled approximately 8 billion zloty (approximately £1.5 billion). It is 
noteworthy that every minister of industry between 1989 and 1999 came from 
the Katowice voivodship and had been employed within heavy industry (Tkocz 
2001). In addition, after transition, the old power arrangements were 
transformed into a powerful and influential mining (and to a lesser extent steel) 
lobby within the social and political networks of major parties and trade unions. 
As Domanski concludes:  
 
―Their efforts to preserve the status quo have prevented the decline 
of the importance of coal institutions and people proportional to its 
shrinking market role‖ (2002:5).  
As a result, most of the heavy industries in the region remained state 
enterprises. In spite of this, during the phase of ‗shock therapy‘ (1989-1995), 
production in heavy industry reduced by 32 per cent and employment by 15 per 
cent. As seen in Germany and France, much of this reduction was in the form of 
regular and early retirements. Other workers were retrained and absorbed into 
the service sector and the numerous new enterprises established in the SEZs. As 
a result, and despite job losses, unemployment in the early to mid-1990s 
remained below the national average. However, it should be noted that the 
significant subsidies provided to industry in the region, particularly mining, are 
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likely to have been secured at the expense of other sectors and social groups in 
the country. The failure of mines to pay local taxes, royalties and debts meant 
that many of the towns within which the mines are located were deprived of 
much needed revenue for investment and infrastructure and firms that supply 
and service the mines were left out of pocket (Domanski 2002; Sucháček 2005).  
 
As discussed, FDI has been significant in shaping the restructuring of former 
socialist economies and informs many of the characteristics of the emerging 
form of capitalism (King 2007; Nolke & Vliegenthart 2009). In 2007, 25 per cent 
of investment in Poland was FDI. This is the major source of investment 
particularly in Katowice. It should be noted that the FDI received has meant 
Katowice has become an integral link in the global network of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) (Birch & Mykhnenko 2009): this is in stark contrast to the 
branch-plant scenario in WCS.  
 
Although limited innovation and external dependency are likely to prove 
problematic in future, the approach of Poland and Katowice has facilitated 
significant economic growth. The existence of relatively cheap but skilled labour 
gives Katowice (and other CEE regions) a comparative advantage in the assembly 
and production of relatively complex and durable consumer goods (Czaban & 
Henderson 2003). Consequently, Poland has undergone a remarkable shift with 
regard to its export structure, moving from agricultural products and industrial 
materials to consumer goods such as vehicles and vehicle parts (King & Sznajder 
2006). 
 
6.2.1 Skills and education  
In many instances, CEE adheres to the low-skill equilibrium of the UK with low 
levels of employee control, trade union density and wage bargaining which 
encourages competitiveness in terms of wage costs and flexibility. However, 
there are high levels of human capital dispersed relatively equally between 
sexes and socioeconomic class. Due to the state-socialist legacy of high 
redistribution and heavy investment in public education, CEE generally had 
higher education attainments than its western counterparts (Cerami 2006). 
However, many of the skills acquired under communism are becoming 
increasingly redundant. Moreover, to accommodate the costs of transition and 
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incentives offered to TNCs, spending on higher education and vocational training 
has been reduced.  
As innovations were transplanted, policymakers, particularly during transition, 
were unlikely to support generous public education system or invest heavily in 
workforce-innovation relevant skills. This could potentially prove problematic in 
the future. In 2007, a period of strong economic growth, Polish employers 
considered skill shortages their top problem (Rutkowski 2007). However, Poland 
unlike the UK, does relatively well in vocational training with a similar 
proportion of upper secondary students on vocational courses to France (Gaille 
2011). Moreover, in the case of Katowice, TNCs have accelerated the diffusion of 
technology and innovation and new sectors are emerging. 
 
6.2.1.1 Education 
Figure 3.7 (pg.85) shows the percentage of adults (25-64) with tertiary (post-
secondary) qualifications in 2008 for all the regions. It shows that SWS (proxy for 
WCS) had a higher percentage of adults with tertiary qualifications than Silesia, 
27.3 per cent and 8.7 per cent respectively. However, SWS also has a higher 
percentage of adults with low or no qualifications (Figure 3.8 pg.85) than Silesia, 
27.3 per cent and 8.7 per cent respectively. This suggests a greater degree of 
educational polarisation in WCS relative to Silesia. It also reflects, as discussed, 
the lack of development in HE and FE sectors since transition in CEE generally 
and the socialist educational legacy which was orientated towards vocational 
studies.  
 
6.2.2 Social context  
Post-communist geographies such as OIRs and cities are subject to a particular 
set of challenges stemming primarily from the legacy of socialism. In addition, 
with the state‘s policy priorities moving away from heavy industry to service, 
technology and information services, industrial workers became one of the 
groups most adversely affected by the political and economic reforms (Dunn 
2004; Stenning 2005).  
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One change popularly associated with post-communist capitalist development in 
Poland is the growth of single-family housing and spaces of consumption. 
Szelenyi (1996) notes that post-communist cities (and in this case regions) have 
distinct patterns of development and are not therefore, simply converging upon 
a western model. While every region is different, there are common trends 
emerging across CEE. As has been discussed, with limited and reduced budgets,  
Municipal governments have sought to promote local economic development, 
typically by attracting inward (generally foreign) investment. Consequently, 
public space and infrastructure are becoming increasingly privatised and as a 
result, development is uneven. For example, when it comes to residential 
spaces, as the more desirable areas become subject to gentrification, the less 
desirable areas, such as former state housing, are left to deteriorate. However, 
researchers also highlight particular positive developments in post-communist 
geographies, such as the rise in entrepreneurship and a greater role for public 
participation (Andrusz, Harloe & Szelenyi 1996; Stanilov 2007). 
 
Many regions and cities in CEE have sought to find new foundations for economic 
development and many have fallen into socioeconomic decline. Katowice, has 
positioned itself, relatively successfully, as a ‗financial, educational and regional 
metropolis‘. As such, the city and region has managed to maintain and augment 
its position in Poland. However, the region is no longer synonymous with the 
mining and steel industry. It has been transformed by many forces including 
commercial investors and developers, both domestic and foreign, and 
democratically elected local and regional authorities (Murzyn-Kupisz & Gwosdz 
2011). 
 
With the approaches of Katowice and WCS in mind, some regional comparisons 
will be made. First, family structures and relationships acknowledged as having 
an influence on population health. Second, health behaviours also indicators of 
the individual and population health but also markers for the degree of social 
dislocation present in an area-particularly as a consequence of post-industrial 
change.  
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6.2.2.1 Lone parent households  
Information on household composition in both regions is available from 
Population Censuses conducted in Scotland in 2001 and Poland in 2002.  Figure 
6.6 shows the percentage of households with children headed by a lone parent in 
both regions. The proportion of lone parent households is higher in WCS (28.5%) 
compared with Silesia (16.9%). Given the role of the Catholic Church and socially 
conservative nature of the country, this divergence is not surprising. Further 
research by Taulbut et al. (2011) indicates that this household structure is 
generally a characteristic of the region, even within the most urbanised powiats 
(districts).  
Figure 6.6: Number of lone parent households with dependents: WCS and Silesia. 
 
6.2.2.2 Single person households 
Figure 3.11 (pg.87) shows the percentage of households that are single person 
households in each region. In 2001-02 in Silesia just over a quarter (26.4%) of 
adults lived alone. The figure was significantly higher in WCS (33.8%). Again this 
is perhaps indicative of the cultural context of Catholicism and cultural 
conservatism.  
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6.2.2.3 Marital Status  
Figure 3.13 (pg.88) shows the percentage of adults aged 25-64 reporting that 
they were married35. Results are shown for adults aged 25-64. As explained, this 
accounts for different population structures across the regions and the fact that 
predominantly, adults in these regions did not marry until their mid-20s 
(Eurostat 2006). As indicated, in the western regions the rate of marriage is 
roughly two-thirds. As expected the rate is significantly higher in Silesia with 76 
per cent, the highest of all the regions.  
6.2.2.4 Births to teenage mothers 
Figure 3.21 (pg.92) compares the percentage of births to mothers aged below 20 
in the five selected regions. It shows that the rate for Silesia (5.2%) is 
significantly lower than WCS (8.5%) and more in line with the other selected 
regions. Longitudal data (Taulbut et al. 2011) indicates that while in both 
regions the teenage birth rate is falling, the relative gap between the regions 
persists.  
6.2.2.5 Health behaviours  
6.2.2.5.1 Smoking  
 
Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of adults who were daily smokers in WCS and 
Silesia (2003-04). For all adults, smoking rates were almost identical in two 
regions (28% vs. 29%).  An analysis by gender was not available for Silesia. 
Therefore, the Global Adult Tobacco Survey for Poland has been used to provide 
estimates by gender. This entails using the larger South Poland region (Silesia 
plus Malopolskie36) as a proxy.  Note, that as smoking rates are lower in 
                                         
35 Including those separated from their partners but still legally married or in a civil partnership 
across the regions in 2001. 
36
 In 2009, Silesia (Slaskie) had a population of 4.6m and Malopolskie a population of 3.3m.  
Source: GUS. Regions of Poland 2010. GUS: Warsaw; 2010. 
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Malopolskie, estimates for South Poland are likely to understate smoking rates 
for Silesia37.    
Figure 6.7: Number of adult daily smokers in WCS and Silesia.  
 
 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 (pg.90) show the percentage of adult daily smokers, 
defined as those who smoked at least one cigarette a day, for males and females 
respectively. For males, smoking rates were significantly greater in South Poland 
than they were in WCS, 39.3 per cent and 28.1 per cent respectively. This was 
not the case for females, 27 per cent of females smoked regularly compared 
with 23.3 per cent in South Poland.  
6.2.2.5.2 Alcohol 
 
Direct comparisons of the total levels of alcohol consumption between the 
selected regions are not available. However, Eurobarometer surveys, conducted 
in 2006 and 2009 allow patterns of alcohol consumption to be compared for 
Southern Poland and Scotland (note, not WCS).    
 
                                         
37 In 2004, estimated smoking rates were 28% in Silesia and 22.1% in Malopolskie.  Source: 
I2ZARE: http://www.i2sare.eu/.   
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Figure 6.8: Frequency of alcohol consumption in Scotland and South Poland. 
 
Figure 6.9: Degree of alcohol consumption in Scotland and South Poland. 
 
Figure 6.8 shows frequency of alcohol consumption in each geography. They 
indicate that adults in Scotland have a greater tendency to drink more often and 
regularly than those in South Poland. They were more likely to report drinking 
two to three times a week (31.2% compared to 12.6%) and four times a week or 
more (14% compared to 3.9%).  They were significantly less likely to report 
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drinking 2-3 times a month (10.8% compared to 25.6%) or not to have drunk 
alcohol at all in the last 30 days (10.2% compared to 18.2%). 
 
Figure 6.9 shows, for each geography, the average number of alcoholic drinks 
consumed at a single sitting. It shows that Scottish adults were significantly 
more likely than those in Southern Poland to report drinking 5 or more drinks in 
an average sitting (16% compared to 6%), and significantly less likely to report 
consuming 2 drinks or less (38% compared to 54%). 
 
In terms of international comparisons, Figures 3.19 and 3.20 (pg.91) indicate 
that Poland has a significantly lower proportion of daily drinkers than Scotland 
(or any of the selected countries) (1%-12%), it also has a significantly higher 
proportion of abstainers (28%-12%). Note, the Scottish data is based on 
consumption over a week as opposed to a month; this may impact the results 
(Walsh et al. 2008).  
 
6.2.3 Social capital  
The significance of social capital has been outlined previously.  
6.2.3.1 Religious participation 
Figure 3.15 (pg.89) is based on survey-based measurement and indicates the 
percentage of adults who never attend religious ceremonies except on special 
occasions in each region. As one would expect, given the role of the Catholic 
Church in the country, the adult population of Silesia appears far more religious 
than WCS or the other regions with only 5.7 per cent of adults indicating that 
they had never attended a religious ceremony. Further data (Figure 6.10) shows 
only 8 per cent of men and 4 per cent of women have never attended religious 
ceremonies except on special occasions: the figures for WCS were 56 per cent 
and 50 per cent respectively. 
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Figure 6.10: Number of adults with no religious affiliation in WCS and Silesia. 
 
 
6.2.3.2 Voter turnout 
Figure 3.15 (pg.89) shows turnout rates at national parliamentary elections, 
across each region. In 2005, election turnout in Silesia was lower than WCS, 54.9 
per cent and 58.3 per cent respectively. Comparisons over time, as indicated in 
Figure 3.16 (pg.89), are not available.  
6.2.3.3 Relative poverty  
Figure 3.5 (pg.84) shows risk of poverty in selected countries across time. Note, 
although all countries exhibit fluctuations, levels of poverty are consistently 
higher in the UK. Until recently, Poland had the second highest level after the 
UK. However, it has now been overtaken by Germany and rates of poverty have 
recently fallen (Figure 3.5 (pg.84). In 2010, the rate was 25.1 per cent in Poland 
compared to 32.5 per cent in the UK.  
 
At the regional level (Figure 6.11), the percentage of people living in relative 
poverty was marginally lower in Silesia (16.8%) compared to South Western 
Scotland (18.9%).  Although the difference appears insignificant, the data covers 
a seven year period (1994-2001): within that time relative measures of poverty, 
particularly in CEE, may have altered. As discussed, in the period 1997-2002 the 
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level of unemployment increased significantly at a time when GDP continued to 
grow.  
 
Figure 6.11: Relative poverty in SW Scotland and Silesia. 
 
 
6.2.4 Income inequality  
Figure 6.12: Income inequality in WCS and Silesia. 
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Figure 3.6 (pg.84), tracks income inequality in the selected host countries from 
the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. It shows that, relative to the other countries, 
income inequality has fluctuated considerably in Poland and is now significantly 
higher than it was in the early 1990s. In 2004, at the national level, income 
inequality was roughly the same in Poland and Scotland. At the regional level 
(Figure 6.12) in 2003-2004, income inequality was greater in WCS than Silesia. 
The level of income inequality present in WCS relative to Silesia helps explain 
why, although there are higher levels of prosperity recorded in WCS (Walsh et al. 
2008), relative poverty is marginally higher.  
 
6.3 Social protection   
Social protection systems during communism were broad and universal and 
coverage of important social programmes such as pensions, sickness, family 
support systems and medical care was very high, often close to 100 per cent. In 
a region of industrial production like Katowice, the firm was primarily a social 
unit rather than an economic one and economic and social policy were not 
separated (Wagener 2002).  Social policy augmented and was inherently linked 
to the production process. Firms and employers provided housing, health 
services and welfare for workforce and cash benefits linked to the job. A 
particular feature was the low-wage differentials. Therefore, one might have 
expected the impact and legacy of transition to be more acute, particularly in 
terms of income inequality.  
However, in the case of the Katowice region, restructuring of industry occurred 
relatively slowly and was accompanied, as in France and Germany, by early 
retirement (and disability) and the considered creation of working places in 
other related sectors of the economy (previously discussed in detail). As such, 
protracted social conflict and significant increases in income inequality were 
avoided. Moreover, the unemployment benefit schemes introduced in the first 
phase of the transition process were rather similar to the corporatist schemes 
existing in Western Europe, with earnings-related benefits at levels and 
durations similar in size to the OECD average (for an overview, see Boeri 1997; 
Boeri & Edwards 1998).  
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The rationale for this reflects the position of Katowice and industry in the 
national context. Unemployment was expected to have a relatively greater 
effect on high-wage sectors (such as heavy industry and mining), governments 
were afraid that unions would oppose the lower benefits these workers would 
get under a flat-rate or targeted regime. In addition, long-term unemployment 
was initially not regarded as an important issue in these countries and the fiscal 
viability of relatively generous earnings-related schemes was therefore not 
considered to be a major problem (Nesporova 1999).   
Many of the CEE welfare states, particularly those of Poland and the Czech 
Republic share, as has been described, a Bismarckian legacy. In this respect they 
reflect the conservative or continental regimes described by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). However, broadly speaking, in CEE the social protection arrangements 
established during transition were effectively emergency and interim creations 
that have become ―de-facto permanent structures, no less resistant to reform 
than the commonly recognised welfare regimes‖ (Inglot 2009:75; Vanhuysse 
2009). With the so-called welfare crisis in the West, there was no real exemplar 
to follow and, as was the case with labour market polices in Western Europe 
(Thelen 2004), they have experienced periods of both expansion and 
retrenchment. The influence such developments have on socioeconomic 
attainment has typically been framed in terms of ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ 
(Brainerd 1998; Gerber 2002). 
For example, in Poland, policy makers attempted to diminish the threat of 
reform opposition and protest by fragmenting ―groups of well-networked and 
formally organised at-risk workers into different sub-groups with conflicting 
interests and fewer common social ties‖ (Vanhuysse 2009:57). So, in Poland, 
during the transition period, thousands of workers were awarded early pensions 
and disability and exited the labour market. The effect was that the number of 
old age pensioners increased by 46 per cent and the number of disability-
pensioners increased by one-fifth (Vanhuysse 2006, 2009).  
As discussed, this eased the pressures associated with economic restructuring, 
mirroring the labour shredding strategies of the advanced continental welfare 
states. It also created competing social status constituencies: for example, the 
working age population was split into jobholders, unemployed workers and 
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‗atypical‘ pensioners on early or disability pensions. Accordingly, policy makers 
were able to award material benefits to those target groups whose opposition 
may have hindered the reform process. These processes shaped a distributional 
conflict between groups that had traditionally shared social cleavages and 
objective interests. The outcome was ―decreasing social ties among the 
marginalised labour market outsiders and individualistic coping strategies such 
as informal economy activities by working-age pensioners and unemployed 
people‖ (Vanhuysse, 2009:58).   
Verhoeven et al., analysed those groups with the least economic resources: the 
unemployed, disabled and retired, during transition. In the case of Poland, they 
demonstrated that the relative income of pensioners was higher in 2002 than it 
had been in 1991. Moreover, in the same period, the relative income of 
pensioners significantly exceeded the unemployed and workers with few 
resources. In 2008 (as they had done with the munificent unemployment 
schemes of the early transition period) the Polish government sought to redress 
the balance and various early retirement schemes affecting more than one 
million Poles, were abolished by the Polish Sejm (lower house of Polish 
parliament) despite a veto by (then) President Kaczynski. However, many 
exceptional pension privileges persist (Verhoeven 2009:113-114). 
 
The unemployment benefit scheme introduced at transition set benefits at 50–70 
per cent (depending on the duration of unemployment) of the previous wage for 
an unlimited duration and was granted to practically everyone, regardless of 
previous work history (provided they registered with an employment office). 
Financial strain and widespread abuse prompted the government to take action. 
In 1992, the Polish unemployment benefit system was reformed in a radical 
fashion: benefits were made flat-rate at a replacement rate of 36 per cent of 
the average wage in the economy in the previous quarter; a means-test based on 
the household income of the unemployed was introduced; eligibility was 
restricted to those with an employment record of at least 180 days in the past 
year and the duration of benefits was restricted to one year. 
 
Despite this, as Figure 3.5 (pg.84) shows, in terms of the risk of poverty amongst 
the unemployed, Poland performs better than the UK, considering the reforms to 
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benefits and their comparative value, for a number of reasons. Poland, in the 
context of CEE, does well in terms of minimum wage, benefit levels and social 
spending. Relative to the West, although the minimum wage is low, it is 
indicative of the cost of living. In addition, other household income may play a 
more important role in accounting for that. As Figures 6.6 and 3.11 (pg.87) 
show, the Polish unemployed (and population generally) are more likely than the 
UK (or German) unemployed to be living in a household with other people.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that in the context of CEE, poverty rates are 
somewhat misleading. A reason for this is the pervasiveness of a shadow 
economy. The shadow economy on average is higher in the new EU countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (31 per cent) than in the old EU-15 member states 
(18 per cent) (Cerami & Vanhuysee 2009). Schneider (2007) notes that 
paradoxically the shadow economy has a positive function too, as it contributes 
to the elimination of poverty in low-income societies.  
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7. Northern Moravia (Moravia-Silesia) 
Figure 7.1: Northern Moravia region 
The region of Northern Moravia (Severomoravský) had 11 districts until the 31st 
December 1999. With the introduction of a new administrative structure, the 
region is now Moravia-Silesia (Moravskoslezský) with the Ostrava region becoming 
the Moravian-Silesian region on 31st May, 2001. Moravia-Silesia is one of the 14 
administrative self-governing regions of the Czech Republic. The region lies in 
the north-eastern part of the Czech Republic and borders two other countries: 
Poland to the north and Slovakia to the east. The region has an area of 5,427 
km2 (6.8 per cent of the Czech Republic) and a total population of 1.25 million 
(2010) (12.1 per cent of Czech population) and is the largest region in the Czech 
Republic. The regional capital, the city of Ostrava, is home to approximately 
311,000 citizens (Eckart et al. 2003; Tödtling et al. 2013). 
After the discovery of coal around Ostrau and Karwin in the mid eighteenth 
century, the region‘s development came to be based on coal mining, metallurgy 
and heavy machinery industries. Coal mining started in 1763 and in 1828, the 
first steelworks in Vitkovice (then Witkowitz) started production. Further 
industrial growth was facilitated by the construction of the Emperor Ferdinand 
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Northern Railway38 (Kaiser-Ferdinands-Nordbahn) from Vienna in 1847. The rapid 
industrialisation that followed led to significant immigration of 
Czechoslovakians, along with Poles and Germans to the region, making it the 
most populated area in Moravia and the industrial centre of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. However, during World War II, Ostrava (an important source 
of steel for the arms industry) endured bombing raids that caused extensive 
damage to the city. 
After the war, the Germans were expelled from Ostrava in accordance with 
the Potsdam Agreement39. Thus, the population of the region has become a 
mixture of Silesians, Moravians, Czechs, Slovaks and Poles. With the 
establishment of a communist regime after World War II, the process of 
industrialisation and urbanisation intensified. Throughout the 1950s, 
Czechoslovakia concentrated on the development of mining, the steel industry 
and other areas of heavy industry. Ostrava was its centre, becoming that 
period‘s ―city of coal and iron‖ and also the ―steel heart of the republic‖ 
(Rachlík 1958 in Eckart et al. 2003). By the 1980s, the Ostrava region was 
producing 25 million tonnes of coal, approximately 75 per cent of the total 
production of Czechoslovakia. At the time, Czechoslovakia was the largest 
producer per capita in the world (Eckart et al. 2003:276). The suitability of the 
region‘s hard coal ensured the largest steelworks were also located in the 
region. In 1983, the steelwork Klement Gottwald in Ostrava- Vítkovice had 
30,000 employees and an annual production of 8 million tonnes of steel (Eckart 
et al. 2003:285).  
 
Since the Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of state-
socialism, the region has undergone significant change. Restructuring and 
privatisation of industry occurred. Mining activities in the area were significantly 
                                         
38
 The Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway was the name of a former railway company during 
the time of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Its main line was supposed to 
connect Vienna with salt mines in Bochnia near Kraków. The Northern Railway Company was 
nationalized in 1907 and owned a number of coal mines and other industrial enterprises in 
the Ostrava region. After the nationalization of its railway network, it continued its coal and 
industry interests.  
39 The Potsdam Agreement was the Allied (UK, US, USSR) plan of tripartite military occupation 
and reconstruction of Germany—referring to the German Reich with its pre-war 1937 borders 
including the former eastern territories. 
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reduced and the Vítkovice blast furnaces were turned off in 1998. Vítkovice then 
began concentrating on machine engineering. The steel industry in the region 
was then centred in Nová Huť (now Arcelor Mittal). The flood of July 1997, 
known as the ‗thousand-year flood‘, dramatically affected the Ostrava region 
and many of its inhabitants. The damage caused by the most extensive flooding 
in Ostrava‘s history was estimated at more than four billion Czech Koruna. In 
2000, Ostrava became the administrative centre of the newly established 
Ostrava region, today‘s Moravian-Silesian Region. 
 
7.1 Deindustrialisation 
Figure 3.1 (pg.82) shows the level of industrial employment of all the selected 
countries. The Czech Republic retains the largest industrial workforce. As 
indicated, the degree and rate of loss in industrial employment is not as severe 
as it was in WCS, particularly if you consider the level of over-staffing prevalent. 
This reflects the gradual path the country and region took in terms of industrial 
restructuring. Relative to Poland, the Czech Republic was slow to restructure its 
workforce. As Figure 3.2 (Pg.82) indicates, after the initial shock of transition, 
unemployment didn‘t start to rise severely until the economic crisis of 1997 
when labour hoarding was no longer sustainable.  
Moravia-Silesia was hit hard by transition and, unlike Katowice, unemployment 
was higher than the national average. As Table 3.1 (pg.81) shows, these regions 
share an industrial legacy of coal and steel. In 1990, the new post-communist 
government reduced subsidies for coal mines and steelworks and announced that 
the new enterprise executives were responsible for the further development of 
their companies. In addition, the former state enterprises would have to 
contend with a dramatic reduction in demand from their traditional markets 
(Sucháček 2005). Three enterprises dominated the region: the Ostrava-Karvina 
Coal Mines (OKD) which had 16 mines and numerous other enterprises, and 
employed in excess of 112,000 people; Vitkovice steel production which 
employed 38,000 people and Nova Hut steel works which employed 23,000 
people (Eckart et al. 2003; Sucháček 2005).  
In the early 1980s, the region of Moravia-Silesia produced 25 million tons of coal. 
It produced four-fifths of the total production in Czechoslovakia: the largest 
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producer per inhabitant in the world. OKD, the regional producers, have been 
active for more than 200 years (Eckart et al. 2003:276). As a consequence of 
restructuring, OKD reduced its workforce from 62,100 in 1990 to 21,400 in 2001. 
Although the production in mines decreased from 29.8 million tons to 19.3 
million tons, the labour productivity effectively doubled from 481 tons per 
worker to 900 tons per worker (Sucháček 2005:11).  
 
In the early 1990s, the metallurgy industry in the region already faced major 
problems: in addition to the necessary restructuring and rationalisation, there 
were technological and environmental gaps between local producers and foreign 
competition.  There were two major enterprises in the region - Vitkovice and 
Nova Hut. Vitkovice, the second largest firm in the region, was a massive steel-
making and machine building enterprise which employed 40,000 people pre-
transition.  As a consequence of the restructuring, which will be discussed 
below, the workforce was reduced from 40,000 in 1989 to 25,000 in 1995, 
without any major social conflict. The third largest regional employer Nova Hut 
was, at the time, considered successful in its restructuring. The company 
reduced its workforce only in the immediate transition period, from 23 000 in 
1990 to 21 000 in 1991 avoiding the need to introduce any significant redundancy 
measures (Nesporova 1998). 
 
Research by Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) shows that between 1990 and 2005 the 
loss of industry in Moravia-Silesia exceeded the national rate. Although there has 
been some growth nationally in the service sector, Moravia-Silesia has lost jobs 
in that sector. The majority of employment loss in the region is in low-tech 
sectors and exceeds the national trend. Although there is some growth in the hi-
tech sector again, this does not reach the national average. The regions 
fortunes, like many in CEE, are largely dependent on TNCs and foreign banks to 
supply capital, technology and expertise as well as access to world markets (King 
2007). It should be noted that the FDI received has meant that Moravia-Silesia 
comprises an integral link in the global network of TNCs - in this case automotive 
manufacturers. As was observed for Katowice, this integration into a global 
network of production is in stark contrast to the branch-plant scenario in WCS.  
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So, how severe has deindustrialisation been in Moravia-Silesia, relative to WCS 
(and the other regions)? As Table 3.1 (pg.81) shows, by 2005, the share of 
industrial employment (as a percentage of total employment) had fallen in every 
region and farthest in WCS however Moravia-Silesia maintained an industrial 
workforce at 42 per cent (high, but marginally lower than Katowice). In terms of 
the number of industrial jobs lost (Table 3.1 pg.81 column 3), during the period 
1993-2005, Moravia-Silesia lost 19 per cent of its industrial employment. 
Considering the degree of labour hoarding in the early years of transition, this 
loss, relative to the other regions, albeit over a shorter time period, is not as 
acute. However, as established, more accurate comparisons in terms of the 
speed and intensity of deindustrialisation are difficult.  
 
The next section will look at the policy responses at both national and regional 
levels to privatisation in Moravia-Silesia.   
 
7.1.1 Restructuring 
7.1.1.1 Coal 
With the collapse of state-socialism, the company was forced to rationalise its 
production.  This entailed the closure of unprofitable mines, the modernisation 
of profitable ones and the privatisation of most non-mining assets. The state 
would bear the costs (economic and social) of closing the unprofitable mines and 
OKD would finance the modernisation. The essential steps in restructuring the 
enterprise were the swift closure of Ostrava mines, leaving the profitable pits in 
Karvina, the subsequent lowering of manpower and the gradual privatisation of 
the company (Sucháček 2005).  
 
To mitigate the costs of restructuring, a number of strategies were pursued. The 
privatisation of subsidiary enterprises reduced the work force by approximately 
20,000, and contracts of foreign workers were not renewed. Similar to the 
restructuring strategies pursued by France and Germany, many older workers 
retired (50 being the legal age of retirement for miners) and those with 
disabilities or poor health were entitled to financial compensation. The 
remaining workers were either transferred to the Karvina mines or offered 
redundancy pay. Redundancy pay was equivalent to ten months wages, plus an 
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additional four months for those who worked in hazardous or difficult conditions, 
plus a bonus payment of CZK 1900 per month for up to 36 months to facilitate 
re-employment (Nesporova 1998:84).  
 
In addition, an Agency for Business and Employment Support was established: 
this retrained and redeployed workers and facilitated business start-ups: unused 
OKD premises were offered to employers creating jobs for former OKD workers. 
As a result of the gradual restructuring strategy pursued and the cooperation of 
the miners‘ union, the restructuring of the mines occurred without any 
significant social conflicts. In fact, by the mid-1990s there was even a shortage 
of qualified miners and foreign workers again resumed work at OKD (Nesporova 
1998; Bruha et al. 2010).  
 
7.1.1.2 Metallurgy  
The costs of transition were great for two primary reasons: first, Vitkovice was 
burdened by debt, a consequence of the cessation of the Czech Republic‘s 
nuclear programme; second, exports to the east comprised one-third of its 
output. This was a particular problem as, due to the collapse of communism, 
these exports were unlikely to continue (Myant 2010). Initial efforts to 
restructure were nominal and concerned the engineering side of the operation 
for example, developing new products and finding foreign partners. In contrast 
to the restructuring of OKD, as Myant notes: ―It took acute financial difficulties 
and direct and persistent government involvement to push Vitkovice into 
treating restructuring as a matter of urgency‖ (2010:201).  
 
As in the restructuring of OKD, some of the job losses were reduced via the 
privatisation of subsidiary enterprises. Redundant workers were offered 
redeployment and retraining where positions existed. Those not able or unwilling 
to redeploy were eligible for severance pay or were offered assistance in 
starting new enterprises. To facilitate this, Vitkovice established a Technical and 
Innovation Centre to assist business start-ups. The forms of assistance included 
subsidised loans and renting of premises and equipment. Subsidised rent of 
Vitkovice premises was also available to enterprises willing to employ redundant 
workers.  
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The dissolution of COMECON (primary market) and the economic recession of the 
early 1990s put the company into severe difficulty. Eventually, however, 
favourable conditions in foreign markets and a recovery in domestic demand saw 
a recovery in the firm‘s fortunes. Consequently, the company started to invest in 
technological modernisation and, in the late 1990s, obtained approval and a 
government guarantee for the construction of a new mini mill, co-financed by 
Nova Hut and a consortium of American banks.  
 
However, the privatisation of the metallurgy industry before the necessary 
restructuring had taken place proved ultimately to be a mistake. The Vitkovice 
blast furnaces ceased to function in 1998 and the company began concentrating 
on machine engineering. By 2000, both Vitkovice and Nova Hut were facing 
bankruptcy. There were a number of reasons for this. First, each enterprise had 
failed, in contrast to coal, to reduce the workforce quickly enough. Second, 
privatisation had taken the form of ‗manager privatisation‘ effectively meaning 
that the state remained in charge yet neglected their management. Finally, 
modernisation programmes had created a significant amount of debt in both 
enterprises (Eckart et al. 2003:289; Myant 2010).  
 
Although there were calls to consolidate the enterprises into one holding the 
‗Czech Steel Enterprise‘ (Radio Prague 2002 cited in Eckart et al. 2003), they 
were eventually sold off. Nova Hut became part of the Ancelor Mittal group in 
2003 and, after some controversy, Vitkovice went to Evraz Holdings in 2005 (Daly 
& Dalli 2005). In both cases there were job losses as a consequence of 
restructuring by the new owners. In the case of Mittal workers, those who took 
voluntary redundancy received a severance payment well above the legal 
minimum requirement (EIRO 2006).  
 
7.1.1.3 Diversification of the economy: new activities  
The scale of restructuring in heavy industry, particularly coal and steel, has been 
significant in Moravia-Silesia.  Nevertheless, significant progress has been made 
including major improvements in the physical environment and the reduction of 
pollution. Moreover, an expanding service sector, so underdeveloped during 
socialism, has generated new employment, while inward investment has 
facilitated the restructuring of the region‘s economy (Skokan 2002).  
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As outlined below, the Czech Republic‘s economic problems of the mid to late 
1990s exacerbated what was a fragmented approach to restructuring. 
Consequently, the development of new activities largely depended on the 
initiative of local stakeholders. Among other things their concerted efforts 
contributed to the establishment of the first duty-free zone in the country; the 
creation of a regional bank (now bankrupt); and the modernisation of the 
railway corridor that facilitates the connection with other regions. Development 
agencies have also played a critical role, establishing a technology park, an 
innovation centre and small industrial zones. However, due to the favourable 
investment incentives offered in the SEZs in Poland, particularly the Katowice 
region, the areas remained, until recently, relatively undeveloped.  
 
The relative disadvantage of Moravia-Silesia during the 1990s was compounded 
by the distribution of public funds. As Sucháček explains: 
 
―Investments in the Czech Republic are not directed in compliance 
with regional needs and problems, but according to the lobbying of 
individual regions, which often further augments regional 
inequalities‖ (2005:13). 
Although Moravia-Silesia established economic zones in 1998, they were at a 
relative disadvantage.  The SEZ in the Katowice region is the most successful in 
Poland and there was little incentive for established enterprises to move. In 
terms of new investors, the Moravia-Silesia region not only had to compete with 
Katowice but also better embedded Czech regions, for example Central 
Bohemia, home to the Czech Republic‘s car cluster.  
 
In 2000, the Czech government, in acknowledgment of these problems, 
identified the region as a priority for economic development. In 2001, a regional 
development plan was established and approved by the regional assembly. Part 
of that plan was to encourage an engineering cluster. Today, the cluster 
accounts for a significant part of the region‘s manufacturing base. As of 2002, 
the cluster employed (including related industries) approximately 100,000 
people in over 800 companies and represented one third of private sector 
employment in the region (Skokan 2002:3).  
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In 2008, Hyundai started production in Nošovice. The FDI of one billion euro was 
the biggest in Czech Republic and had the production capacity to facilitate 
economic growth of 1.3 per cent per annum. However, to secure this deal the 
Czech government, eager to stimulate employment, offered 200 million euro in 
investment incentives such as tax exemptions. As of 2008, the Nošovice plant 
had 1,800 employees, a figure which was expected to reach 3,400 by 2011. In 
addition it was hoped another 9,000 jobs would be created in related industries 
(Guidote 2008:7). 
Augmenting these developments was the creation of the Moravia-Silesia auto 
industry cluster, where a training and education centre was established aimed at 
the auto industry, specifically in the area of slim production, project 
management, logistics and leading people. As Abrhám and Vošta note: 
―The aim of the project is to prepare workers according to the current 
needs of the auto industry and to expand their knowledge so that they 
can be deployed in the auto industry cluster‖ (2011:6). 
7.1.2 Political and policy responses 
7.1.2.1 National level 
At the national level, in the initial post-war period, there was no coherent 
response to the accumulating regional problems.  Lacking a long-term strategy, 
central government adopted an ad hoc approach, neglecting not only regional 
policy, but also housing policy and physical planning.  When regional 
governments were abolished in early 1990, local stakeholders developed their 
own approaches as the regions served merely as an administrative area for 
different state departments (Illner 1997).  Although self-government existed at 
the municipal level, it was essentially checked by the excessive power and 
influence of state administration. According to Sucháček: 
 
―In the Czech Republic the excessive influence of state administration 
to the detriment of the self-government manifested itself as one of 
the most important factors of the increase in interregional disparities‖ 
(2005:8). 
Chapter 7  186 
State ministries assumed responsibility for regional matters and established local 
representation. District Offices (that covered approximately NUTS IV40 areas) 
were subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and those matters that were 
deemed ‗regional policy‘ were developed and implemented at the national level 
through sectoral policies. The post-communist government‘s primary focus was 
fundamental, large-scale national economic, political and social reform 
(McMaster 2004). The remit of the district offices was limited to the 
management of public facilities. The degree of centralisation and lack of 
autonomy is best reflected by the so-called ‗manager train‘, a train that (until 
2005 at least) every day transported managers and officials from the region to 
Prague to fulfil administrative and business duties. The train had two stops, 
Ostrava and Prague, and the total travel time was 10 hours. Due to this degree 
of centralisation, many companies are compelled to establish branches in Prague 
in order to facilitate better communication with central institutions and remain 
close to information and networks. This phenomenon has been termed 
‗Pragocentralism‘ (Sucháček 2005:9).  
 
A number of factors have contributed to the degree of centralisation and lack of 
decentralisation in the Czech Republic. First, historically there is no tradition of 
strong self-government or regional autonomy. Second, the tribulations of 
transition have generally overshadowed the need or will for decentralisation 
resulting in little political or public pressure for regional reform. Finally, the 
government, led by Václav Klaus, advocated a highly centralised approach to 
policy making. At the same time, it pursued a neoliberal policy approach 
typically opposed to interventionist and redistributive policies (McMaster 2004). 
 
The recession and increased unemployment of the 1990s, particularly in Moravia-
Silesia and brought a renewed impetus for change. As such, reforms led to 
increased levels of participation and involvement of the regions in the 
development and delivery of policy. In 2001, the Act on Support to the Regions 
was introduced. However, the Ministry for Regional Development assumed strong 
overall responsibility for regional policy, including regional business support, 
housing, regional investment and the development of urban and rural 
                                         
40
 NUTS refers to the  Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics and are instrumental in 
European Union's Structural Fund delivery mechanisms. 
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development. It also coordinated the allocation of Structural and Cohesion 
funds, with sectoral ministries supervising some areas of regional assistance. 
Although in 2001 self-governing regions (Kraje) were established, the majority of 
their duties concern state-devolved tasks (McMaster 2004; OECD 2010).   
 
7.1.2.2 Regional level 
Around 1990, key regional institutions and actors concerned with the future 
development of the region and the prevailing degree of centralisation created an 
informal civic association: The Economic and Social Council of Ostrava-Karviná 
Agglomeration (ESC OKA). The aim was to establish an institution that offered 
representation for regional stakeholders — district authorities, municipalities, 
enterprises, trade unions, banks, labour offices, and educational and research 
institutions at the national level — as well as to provide a forum for deliberating 
and initiating measures for the economic recovery, restructuring and 
development of the region. ESC OKA also invited representatives of the Ministry 
of Economy and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to become members 
(Nesporova 1998). 
 
The ESC OKA prepared development plans to submit to central government in 
order to mobilise state resources and ultimately create jobs in the region. The 
state accepted the proposals codified in the: Government Decree No. 245 of 
1991, Measures for the Restoration and Development of the Ostrava-Karvina 
Agglomeration for 1991–1992 with an Outlook until 1995 (Nesporova 1998).  In 
1991 and 1992, the government provided CSK 200 million for the development of 
SMEs and the creation of new jobs. This sum was fully at the disposal of 
aforementioned regional District Offices. In 1992, it was put into the newly 
founded Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank, which provided 
credits and credit warranty services within a new national programme promoting 
SMEs (Nešporová 1998). However, by the mid-1990s the real costs of transition 
had become clear: the economy was in trouble, and as Sucháček concludes: 
 
―The establishment of the Ministry for Regional Development turned 
out to be rather formal step, which was not accompanied by the 
necessary decentralisation of decision-making. Spontaneous 
restructuring of big enterprises in combination with already limited 
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absorbing capacity of tertiary sector and national economic problems 
manifested themselves in a great rise of unemployment‖ (2005:9). 
It should be noted that economic and lobbying interests did and continue to exist 
in Moravia-Silesia, a consequence of the regionally concentrated heavy-industrial 
sectors. However, although their interests frequently align with regional 
concerns, they remain to a great extent ―centrally-orientated and motivated by 
sectoral rather than regional interests‖ (Ferry & McMaster 2005:182). This is in 
contrast to Katowice and perhaps indicative of the relative weakness of 
regionalist structures and regionalist traditions.  
7.1.2.3 Development agencies  
Since the abandonment of regional government at the end of 1990, there have 
been numerous efforts to coordinate activities at the regional level. Although 
performed on an ad hoc basis, the most important of these was probably the 
establishment of regional development agencies, such as ESC OKA. The 
development agencies promoted partnerships among public authorities, private 
sectors and NGOs and attempted to coordinate and stimulate regional 
development in place of the centrally constrained Kraje.  
 
In 1995, the ESC OKA merged with the regional employers‘ association (the 
Northern Moravian Economic Union) and became known as the Union for the 
Development of Northern Moravia and Silesia (UDNMS). The establishment of the 
agency was in response to the centralising tendencies of the state and their 
perceived failure to react to the costs associated with economic restructuring 
and failing heavy industries (Nesporova 1998). The organisation was regarded as 
one of the main drivers of change in the region, promoting major regional 
development initiatives such as: improvements in transport infrastructure and 
energy production; promotion of international links with other regions; help to 
establish new institutions such as a regional bank, a regional development 
agency, a university and other projects and encouragement of cooperation and 
coordination amongst the region's institutions and initiatives (Pyke 1998).  
 
Responsibility for the coordination of projects developed under the auspices of 
the UDNMS lay with the Regional Development Agency (RDA), which was 
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established in 1993 and funded by the EU‘s PHARE programme41. It was one-third 
owned by UDNMS, one-third by an association of municipalities and one-third by 
the Czech Ministry for Regional Development (Balchin et al. 1999). In the 
absence of significant regional self-government (or decentralised decision 
making) the RDA effectively became the executive branch for regional 
development projects (Sucháček 2005). The RDA‘s primary role entailed the 
supervision of major regional projects, for example, the establishment of the 
Ostrava Airport Business Zone and the Technology Park Ostrava. In addition, it 
also performed a number of other development activities, such as training and 
support for SMEs and maintaining international contacts with other regions faced 
with similar concerns. In concertation with the UDNMS, the RDA continued to 
work on updating regional development strategies. 
 
In Moravia-Silesia, a variety of regional development institutions worked in 
concertation. The most prominent was the Regional Entrepreneurial Fund, which 
provided venture capital, principally to SMEs. Other agencies of note included 
the Business Development Institute Ostrava, the Ostrava-Mosnov Airport Business 
Centre, the Technology Park Ostrava, the Regional Information Centre and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. According to Nesporova (1998), the 
institutions worked closely to promote regional restructuring and development, 
with the UDNMS playing the leading role in coordinating these activities.  
 
Before discussing the consequences of deindustrialisation and subsequent post-
industrial change on context and the level and nature of social protection, some 
comparisons on employment will be provided.  
 
7.1.3 Unemployment  
Figure 3.3 (pg.83) presents regional unemployment rates in 2008 and 2011 for 
the five regions. In 2008 Moravia-Silesia had an unemployment rate of 7.4 per 
cent - over a percentage point higher than SWS (proxy for WCS) but lower than 
the other West European regions. As the figures show, for 2011, unemployment 
has increased in all the regions  and the gap between N.Moravia and SWS 
                                         
41
 The Phare programme is one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the European 
Union to assist the applicant countries of CEE in their preparations for accession to the 
European Union. 
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remains around one per cent. Unemployment in both CEE regions still remains 
below both the Ruhr and NPdC.  
Figure 7.2: Unemployment in SW Scotland and N.Moravia. 
 
It is also possible to examine trends in unemployment over time. Figure 7.2 
shows the change in unemployment between 1985 and 2008. Unemployment in 
Moravia-Silesia was lower than SWS until around 1997. This reflects the approach 
to economic restructuring in the Moravia-Silesia and the Czech Republic 
generally, which as discussed, was gradual and prone to significant labour 
hoarding. In 1997, unemployment grew significantly in the region just as it did in 
Katowice. Although there were some similarities, namely the delayed effects of 
privatisation, as newly privatised enterprises continued to rationalise 
employment and introduce new labour saving technologies. The Czech Republic, 
as discussed, also went through a significant depreciation of its currency as the 
market disciplined the Czech economy for slow economic restructuring and poor 
control of its deficit (Blazyca 2003).  Since 2002, broadly speaking 
unemployment levels have fallen consistently.  
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7.1.4 Employment rates  
As established, a problem with utilising unemployment rates as an indicator of 
labour market disadvantage is the degree of hidden unemployment. The 
comparisons made here are from the 1990s onwards. To compare employment 
opportunities during the 1980s would present a false picture. Under communism, 
as established, there was ostensibly full employment for people of working age.  
 
Figure 7.3: Male employment WCS and N.Moravia. 
 
 
As Figure 7.3 shows, employment rates for men up until that late 1990s were 
marginally higher in Moravia-Silesia than WCS. This reflects both the levels of 
employment that existed during communism and the subsequent labour hoarding 
prevalent in the region. Since then, the rates have become marginally lower 
than WCS. In both regions, employment levels seem to have plateaued with little 
fluctuation between 2000 and 2004. For females (Figure 7.4) employment levels 
in Moravia-Silesia were marginally higher in the mid-1990s. Since then, broadly 
speaking, rates in WCS have improved in contrast to a downward trend for 
Northern Moravia. However, as was the case for the men, these rates seem to be 
levelling out.  
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Figure 7.4: Female employment in WCS and N.Moravia. 
 
 
It should be noted that female employment levels in Moravia-Silesia may be 
exacerbated by the paternal allowance, which created a strong incentive to 
leave the labour market, particularly for those on low incomes (Večerník 
2009:52-53). The shadow economy should also be taken into account as it is 
significant in the Czech Republic accounting for 18.3 per cent of GDP in 2004/5 
(Aidukaite 2011:3).  
 
7.1.5 Worklessness 
Figure 3.4 (Pg.83) shows the percentage of men aged 25-49 not in employment 
in 2001: the significance of this measure in this context has been established. Of 
all the regions, Moravia-Silesia had the lowest level (17%). Considering the high 
level of unemployment (Figure 7.2) and relatively low male employment (Figure 
7.3), this is surprising and difficult to explain.  
 
Figure 7.5 shows the level of economic activity between 1980 and 2001 for WCS 
and the Northern Moravia region‘s two constituent parts: Moravskoslezský and 
Olomoucký. As indicated, in 2001, rates were broadly similar having been 
marginally higher in Moravia-Silesia. This reflects the policy of full employment 
during communism. In addition, whereas in WCS rates are slowly improving, 
there is generally a decline in Moravia-Silesia.  
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Figure 7.5: Level of economic activity WCS and N.Moravia. 
 
 
7.2 Context 
Due to the reform tendencies of the 1970s and 1980s, the countries of CEE had 
different starting points when transition began. Like Poland, the Czech Republic 
had acceptable living standards and an historic and institutional legacy of 
industrial capitalist development. In addition, at the time of transition, it also 
enjoyed macroeconomic stability and low levels of foreign debt. Geography was 
also critical with Moravia-Silesia (and the Czech Republic) benefitting greatly 
from its proximity to economic powerhouse Germany.  
Like the Katowice region post-1989, Northern Moravia ossified by a legacy of 
state-socialism, found itself struggling to compete in a global market economy.  
It appeared that large-scale restructuring was inevitable and, as a consequence, 
mass unemployment was expected. As this was the most industrialised region in 
the Czech Republic, social conflict was expected and there were fears the region 
would become an area of acute crisis. At the beginning of restructuring in 1989, 
the region provided 86 per cent of Czechoslovak coal mining, 82 per cent of coke 
production and 70 per cent of steel production. However, the real importance of 
these industries for the local economy and employment was even more 
significant than these figures indicate, for numerous other enterprises were 
directly or indirectly dependent on them as suppliers, customers, or as providers 
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of consumer goods or services to industrial workers and their families (Nesporova 
1998). Approximately 52 per cent of inhabitants worked in the secondary 
(industrial) economic sector, 7 per cent in the primary sector and 41 per cent in 
the tertiary sector (Sucháček 2005:8). 
Post-transition change occurred quickly. By 1990, state subsidies were no longer 
available for coal and steel and enterprise managers assumed responsibility for 
the future development of their industries. There was a reduction in demand 
domestically and from the traditional markets. Strong currency devaluation in 
1990, followed by economic reforms introduced in 1991, protected the Czech 
Republic from foreign imports and reduced the costs of labour. This provided 
time for adjustment and alleviated pressure to dramatically reduce the 
workforce (Sucháček 2005).  In addition, as Nesporova notes: 
―small privatisations and the restitution of previously nationalised 
smaller production and service units attracted many workers who had 
left large enterprises, which helped relieve social tensions and 
contributed to lower unemployment‖ (1998:81). 
In addition, unlike Katowice, many of the industries, by the mid-1990s, were 
now under management control and, as a consequence, retained inflated 
workforces. As such, social costs and social conflict were largely avoided. Post-
transition, local government structures ceased: as a result, projects and 
interventions in terms of economic development were often poorly coordinated. 
The region was, relatively speaking, neglected by central government. The lack 
of intervention led to significant endogenous development in terms of local 
stake holders and decision makers. However, as Sucháček concludes: ―in the 
situation, when local and regional actors lack the competences and financial 
resources, transformation based on inner, endogenous potential can be only 
hardly successful (sic)‖ (2005:22).  
Path dependency exacerbated the slow decline of Moravia-Silesia: the 
recentralisation of government had restricted and in some instances removed 
formerly influential structures. Accordingly, there was a lower level of mutual 
trust and cooperation among regional and local actors. The situation eventually 
changed as regional associations and development agencies, such as the UDNMS 
facilitated economic development and established itself with central 
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government. Although there were continued redundancies as heavy industry in 
the region continued to restructure, there was the development of new sectors 
such as the automobile and engineering clusters.  
 
7.2.1 Skills and education  
The 1990s saw substantial cutbacks in government spending on education 
(Commandor & Kollo 2008) and a decentralisation of the responsibility for 
education (Barrow 1998). Between 1995 and 2000, government spending on 
education in the Czech Republic was reduced from 4.9 per cent to 4.4 per cent 
of the GDP (Feldmann 2004:278). Although the socialist system‘s focus on 
vocational training remained, the orientation changed markedly. Training was 
now structured to meet demand of TNC‘s. 
 
The CEE states find it difficult to invest heavily in public education, a major 
precondition for a comprehensive general skills education, given the fiscal 
constraints that come as a consequence of the intense competition for FDI. For 
example, the massive tax reduction packages provided in SEZs (Bohle & 
Greskovits 2006). As CEE is largely used as an assembly platform for semi-
standardised goods existing vocational skills are largely adequate. Any major 
investment to upgrade required skills would endanger CEE‘s cost advantages and 
would be difficult to organise, due to the firm-centred system of industrial 
relations that has emerged.  
 
7.2.1.1 Education 
Figure 3.7 (Pg.85) shows the percentage of adults (25-64) with tertiary (post-
secondary) qualifications in 2008 for all the regions. It shows that SWS (proxy for 
WCS) had a higher percentage of adults with tertiary qualifications than Moravia-
Silesia, 33.3 per cent and 11.9 per cent respectively. However, SWS also had a 
higher percentage of adults with low or no qualifications (Figure 3.8 pg.85) than 
Moravia-Silesia, 27.3 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively. This suggests a 
greater degree of educational polarisation in WCS relative to Moravia-Silesia. It 
also reflects, as discussed, the lack of development in HE and FE sectors since 
transition in CEE generally and the socialist educational legacy which was 
oriented towards vocational studies.  
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7.2.2 Social context  
As discussed in the Katowice case study, the transition from state-socialism to 
market capitalism presents a particular set of problems. However, like the post-
industrial transition, it is generally industrial workers who are most affected 
(Dunn 2004; Stenning 2005). In addition, as discussed, although the pattern of 
development is in many ways different to the West, the result is often uneven 
development (as it is in the West). A particular feature of Moravia-Silesia, in 
direct contrast to Katowice, was the removal of government at the regional level 
and the reliance on the market to create opportunities for those affected by 
transition and economic restructuring.  
The transformation of the region and urban centres has been predominantly 
propelled by private sector activities, FDI and property led development (Sýkora 
& Bouzarovski 2012). In some respects, the role of the public sector has been 
undermined. This is in part due to the removal of local government post-
transition and also the aversion to planning, a consequence of the legacy of 
communism (Sailer-Fliege 1999). To some extent, this is highlighted in the 
adoption of short-term ad hoc solutions accommodating market needs (Sýkora 
2002) and neoliberal pro-growth strategies (Rink et al. 2012).  
 
Depopulation continues in the region. As such, it is considered to be in medium-
term decline (Turok & Mykhnenko 2007; Rumpel et al. 2010). The restructuring 
process accompanied by deindustrialisation has led to the creation of many 
brownfield sites. Moreover unemployment, after the significant growth of 2004-
2008, is increasingly becoming a problem again. Since 2009, the unemployed of 
Moravia-Silesia have been obliged to participate in the ‗voluntary work 
programme‘ and work at least twenty hours per month in order to maintain their 
level of benefits (€125 per month). Otherwise, only the subsistence level income 
is remitted (€81 per month) (Havlíčková 2009). Increasing income polarisation 
and significant changes to the housing market have exacerbated internal social 
and ethnic segregation within urban centres of the region. The privatisation of 
housing and land allocation has led more affluent residents to relocate to the 
regions hinterlands in the hope of a better standard of living (Solanský 2008, In 
Rumpel et al. 2010).  
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With the approaches of Moravia-Silesia and WCS in mind, some regional 
comparisons will be made. First, family structures and relationships 
acknowledged as having an influence on population health. Second, health 
behaviours also indicators of the individual and population health but also 
markers for the degree of social dislocation present in an area particularly as a 
consequence of post-industrial change. 
 
7.2.2.1 Lone parent households  
Figure 3.9 (pg.86) shows the percentage of households with children headed by a 
lone parent between 1999 and 2002. It shows that WCS had a significantly higher 
percentage than Moravia-Silesia, 31.1 per cent and 22.2 per cent respectively. 
Figure 3.10 (pg.86) shows the rate of change in lone parent household with 
dependent children between 1990 and 2001. Although the rate is increasing in 
the region, the rate and level, as it has been historically, is less than WCS. 
Interestingly Moravia-Silesia and WCS shows, the greatest rates of increase of all 
the regions. However, the difference between the two persists42.  
7.2.2.2 Single person households 
Figure 3.11 (pg.87) shows the percentage of households that are single person 
households in each region. In Moravia-Silesia over a quarter (28.7%) of adults 
lived alone. Figure 3.12 (pg.87) shows the change in single person households 
over time between 1990 and 2001. As with lone parent households, the number 
of single person households increased, although at a slower rate, in Moravia-
Silesia and WCS over time. However, although the percentage of single person 
households has increased in both regions, the rate of increase was greater in 
WCS.  
                                         
42 There are differences in the exact manner in which this indicator is defined in Scotland and 
the Czech Republic. This is unlikely to significantly affect the differences between the regions, 
although it may slightly overestimate the figure for Northern Moravia compared to WCS. 
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7.2.2.3 Marital Status  
Figure 3.13 (pg.88) shows the percentage of adults aged 25-64 reporting that 
they were married43. As explained, this accounts for different population 
structures across the regions and the fact that, predominantly, adults in these 
regions did not marry until their mid-20s (Eurostat 2006). The rate of marriage in 
Moravia-Silesia (70.3%), although higher than the West European regions, was 
less than Silesia (76%).  
A known strategy to secure higher benefits is to avoid marriage as child 
allowances for single mothers are higher, this may be reflected in the marriage 
rates (Maes, Loopmans & Kesteloot 2012).  
7.2.2.4 Births to teenage mothers 
Figure 3.21 (pg.92) compares the percentage of births to mothers aged below 20 
in the five selected regions. It shows that births to teenage mothers are far more 
common in WCS than Moravia-Silesia, 8.5 per cent and 4.2 per cent respectively.  
7.2.2.5 Health behaviours  
The relevance and impact of health behaviours to individual and population 
health has been outlined previously.  
7.2.2.5.1 Smoking  
 
Figure 7.6 compares the percentage of male and female adult smokers (45-69 in 
Glasgow and Karvina/Havirov. It shows that in both cases, adults in Glasgow are 
more likely than their Czech contemporaries to smoke. This divergence is 
particularly evident amongst the females with 38 per cent smoking in Glasgow 
compared to 23.4 per cent in Karvina/Havirov.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
43 Including those separated from their partners but still legally married or in a civil partnership 
across the regions in 2001. 
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Figure 7.6: Percentage of adult smokers in Glasgow and Karvina/Havirov. 
 
7.2.2.5.2 Alcohol 
Direct comparisons of the total levels of alcohol consumption between the 
selected regions are not available. However, the ‗CAGE‘ survey tool allows for 
some comparisons of ‗problem‘ drinking.  
CAGE is compiled from answers to four questions relating to whether 
respondents have: felt the need to reduce their levels of drinking; been annoyed 
by other people‘s criticism of their drinking; felt guilty about drinking; ever 
taken an alcoholic drink first thing in the morning.  A score of two or more has 
been used to indicate potential problem drinking. As Figure 7.7 shows, although 
analysis of the two surveys indicates that a higher percentage of respondents in 
Greater Glasgow obtained a score of 2 or more, the small sample size means any 
divergence cannot be considered significant. 
 
In terms of international comparisons, Figures 3.19 and 3.20 (pg.91) indicate 
that the Czech Republic has a smaller proportion of daily drinkers than Scotland 
(4%-12%), it also has a higher proportion of abstainers (18%-12%). Note, the 
Scottish data is based on consumption over a week as opposed to a month; this 
may impact the results (Walsh et al. 2008).  
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Figure 7.7: Percentage of problem drinkers in Greater Glasgow and Karvina/Havirov. 
 
7.2.3 Social capital  
The significance of social capital has been outlined previously.  
7.2.3.1 Membership of an organisation 
As established, social capital, as measured by membership of an organisation, 
was one of the potentially mitigating factors against the social costs of mass 
privatisation outlined in Stuckler et al. 2009. Some comparison can be made 
between WCS and Moravia-Silesia in this regard. Figure 7.8 shows the percentage 
of 45-69 year olds who are members of clubs and organisations in Glasgow and 
Karvina/Havirov. It shows that a significantly lower proportion of Glasgow 
residents are members of clubs or organisations compared to their 
contemporaries in the two Northern Moravian towns44.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
44 Note, the question is worded slightly differently in the two surveys and this may impact the 
results to some extent. 
Chapter 7  201 
Figure 7.8: Percentage of adults who are a member of a club or organisation in Glasgow and 
Karvina/Havirov. 
 
7.2.3.2 Religious participation 
Figure 3.14 (pg.88) is based on survey based measurement and indicates the 
percentage of adults who never attend religious ceremonies except on special 
occasions in each region. Notably, Moravia-Silesia had even less attending 
Church than WCS, with 54.6 per cent of those surveyed indicating that they had 
never attended a religious ceremony.  
 
7.2.3.3 Voter turnout 
Figure 3.15 (pg.89) shows turnout rates at national parliamentary elections 
across each region. In 2005, election turnout in Moravia-Silesia was higher than 
WCS, 62.2 per cent and 58.3 per cent respectively. In terms of change over 
time, as indicated in Figure 3.16 (pg.89), Moravia-Silesia and WCS have broadly 
followed the same trajectory, decreasing over time. However, turnout in WCS 
continues to decline while rates are steadily improving in Moravia-Silesia.  
7.2.4 Relative poverty  
The low levels of poverty and income inequality in the Czech Republic are 
widely reported (OECD 2008). Figure 3.5 (pg.84) shows the risk of poverty in 
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selected countries over time. Note, although all countries exhibit fluctuations, 
levels of poverty are consistently higher in the UK. The risk of poverty rates in 
the Czech Republic are the lowest of all the regions: 16.9 per cent. At the 
regional level (Figure 7.9), the rates for Moravia-Silesia and SWS (proxy for WCS) 
are 9.5 per cent and 18.9 per cent respectively. In absolute terms, residents of 
WCS are less poor (Walsh et al. 2008) but this difference suggests a significantly 
higher proportion of the population have a low income relative to the rest of the 
region.  
 
Figure 7.9: Relative poverty in SW Scotland and N.Moravia. 
 
 
7.2.5 Income inequality  
Figure 7.9 suggests that inequalities in income in WCS may be greater than in 
Northern Moravia. Figure 3.6 (pg.84) tracks income inequality in the selected 
host countries from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. It shows that although income 
inequality has increased, as one would expect, in the early years of transition, 
since the mid-1990s, it has remained comparatively stable and significantly 
lower than the other regions.  
The level of poverty and income inequality in the Czech Republic is the lowest of 
all the selected countries. Those groups worst affected include unemployed 
people, single mothers and families with a large number of dependents. 
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Although access to assistance is straightforward, conditions have been created 
that tend towards extended periods of state dependency. As Ripka and Mareš 
conclude: 
 
 ―even if the recent recalibration of the system has seemed to reduce 
the scale of dependency, there is not enough evidence yet to support 
it by analysing its impact‖ (2009:109).  
Although there is no discernible variation in the distribution of poverty according 
to gender, single mothers remain most dependent on social assistance. Sirovátka 
(2006) describes an ‗unemployment trap‘ for single mothers. Benefit fraud is 
assumed to be relatively high among single mothers, predominantly due to the 
‗refused partnership‘ which would affect the subsistence level: that is, they 
deny or hide their relationship status in order to maintain their level of benefit.  
Although the system of benefits generally reduces the risk of poverty (in the 
short term), it clearly contributes to a longer-term dependency. However since 
2006, subsistence level and part-time job incentives have been introduced, re-
orienting the system to reward activity and to penalise inactivity. Whether these 
reforms resolve issues regarding benefit/state dependency remains to be seen.  
 
7.3 Social protection   
As has been established, a similar system of welfare provision existed across CEE 
during the period of stage socialism (Deacon 2000; Cerami 2006). Protection was 
broad and universal and generally linked to place of work. As was typical during 
state-socialism, workers in these enterprises were afforded a number of 
services. These included housing in enterprise flats or generous loans for building 
private houses, childcare facilities, recreational facilities in attractive parts of 
the country, generously subsidised holiday‘s abroad, very good health care in 
their own hospitals, rehabilitation centres and so on. In addition, they 
traditionally contributed to the regional economy and society by subsidising the 
construction of roads and other aspects of infrastructure, or by funding cultural 
and sporting events (Nesporova 1998:81).  
 
With the collapse of communism and the transition to a market economy, the 
approach of Moravia-Silesia was much like that of WCS and the UK when faced 
with deindustrialisation. In Moravia-Silesia, unlike Katowice (and France and 
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Germany), it was believed that the market would stimulate the economy and 
create working opportunities. Although levels of unemployment (Figure 7.2) 
were significant, they could have been more severe. However, the large former 
state enterprises engaged in labour hoarding and there was limited restructuring 
of workforces.  
Despite the difficulties of transition, the Czech Republic continues to converge 
with the West in many social indicators. Due to the high levels of social 
solidarity and low poverty rates, although not unemployment rate, it continues 
to converge towards the profile of a so-called inclusive regime (typical of 
Scandinavia): providing relatively generous support to those exposed to labour 
market vulnerability to enable them access to jobs with good employment 
conditions. However, although there has been some retrenchment in social 
protection since transition, as in Poland, the level of benefits available in the 
early years of transition were, in the context of former communist states, 
generous. The divergence between outsiders and insiders or winners and losers is 
not as marked as the relative level of poverty (Figure 7.9) and income inequality 
(Figure 3.6 pg. 84) indicate.  
 
Family policy remains generous in the context of CEE, although there has been 
some retrenchment as a result of increased means testing and reductions in the 
earnings relatedness of maternity insurance. The unemployment benefit system, 
which previously had benefit levels at 60–70 per cent of the previous wage and 
duration of 12 months (Ham, Svejnar & Terrell 1998), was reformed in 1992 and 
replacement levels, duration and maximum benefits were reduced. However, 
replacement rates are still around 60 per cent for the average worker (in the UK 
they are around 30 per cent) (SPEC database 2011).  
 
Activation polices have been introduced for the unemployed. The activation 
policy scheme, although centralised, is administered by local labour offices. 
Sirovátka characterises the activation policy as ―soft‖, especially when 
compared to the more radical policy introduced in Slovakia (2007). Retraining 
schemes are becoming a key feature of employment policy, with the number of 
participants doubling between 2000 and 2007. During this period, there was a 
fall in aggregate unemployment of approximately one third. This may be the 
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result of incentives, namely higher benefits, or the quality of retraining schemes 
on offer (MPSV 2008). Long-term unemployment remains a problem, peaking in 
2007 with 55 per cent of the unemployed out of the labour market for more than 
12 months (Eurostat database). The rise from 30 per cent in 1998, although 
largely due to economic restructuring, also reflects some degree of welfare 
dependency. The activation policies, while reasonably successful, have failed to 
meet the expectations and dependency of the long-term unemployed. 
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8. West Central Scotland (WCS) 
The introduction to this thesis defined and introduced the region of West Central 
Scotland (WCS).  
 
8.1 Deindustrialisation 
Relative to the other selected regions, the onset of deindustrialisation came 
earlier to WCS and was more acute (Wells 1989; Thirlwall & Gibson 1992). On the 
continent, there were attempts to maintain industrial employment and socially 
manage the speed and costs of deindustrialisation. However, the UK was marked 
by a different macroeconomic policy (Crouch 1977; Soskice 1984).  
 
By the early 1970s the rate of job loss in WCS was 4,700 a year (compared with 
an average of 400 per annum in the 1950s). By the late 1970s and into the early 
1980s the rate of job loss had reached 25,000 a year (Rodwin & Sazanami 
1991:64). The scale of deindustrialisation was significant: in WCS between 1979 
and 1981 manufacturing fell by 11 per cent and employment by 20 per cent 
(Blazyca & Klasik 2003:4). By 1984 the unemployment rate had reached 14.9 per 
cent. Clydeside was among the worst affected areas in the UK (and Europe) with 
unemployment rates reaching 21.2 per cent by the end of 1984 (Lever 1984:6). 
The scale of this decline is emphasised by Paddison, who concludes: ―Whether 
viewed at the European scale or nationally Glasgow represents one of the more 
extreme cases of an industrial city in decline‖ (1993:343).  
More contemporary research (Birch et al. 2010) shows deindustrialisation and, as 
a consequence, deskilling is an on-going process in WCS with approximately 40 
per cent loss in manufacturing jobs, both low and high skill, between 1996 and 
2005. This is despite continued rhetoric from the UK political class concerning 
manufacturing and export led growth.  Although there has been some increase in 
service employment it has typically been in routine services, with high-tech 
service employment actually decreasing.  
So, how severe has deindustrialisation been in WCS relative to the other regions? 
As Table 3.1 (pg.81) shows, by 2005, the share of industrial employment (as a 
percentage of total employment) had fallen in every region but the fall was 
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greatest in WCS. The result is that, while WCS continues to have around a fifth 
(19.9%) of its workforce engaged in industrial employment, this is the lowest 
proportion amongst the five regions. In terms of the number of industrial jobs 
lost (Table 3.1 pg.81 column 3), during the period 1970 to 2005, WCS lost 
roughly two-thirds (62%) of its industrial employment - the most of all the 
regions. As discussed in the previous case studies, more accurate comparisons in 
terms of the speed and intensity of deindustrialisation are difficult.  
8.1.1 National responses 
The legacy of state enterprise relations, poor and fragmented industrial 
relations and an ongoing failure to rationalise and modernise industry, 
effectively precluded the kind of path taken through deindustrialisation in, for 
example, Germany (Carlin 1998). Earlier sections of this thesis have already 
outlined the broad approach to economic development taken in the UK in the 
post-war period (Maddison 1991; Crafts 1998; Hall 2007). These arguments will 
not be repeated here. Instead, some information will be provided about how the 
UK government sought to respond to the challenges presented by WCS. 
 
In both the inter-war and immediate post-war periods there was already an 
acknowledgment that the industrial base of WCS required restructuring in order 
to maintain the region‘s competitive advantage. Since the mid-nineteenth 
century, Glasgow had been Scotland‘s industrial heart (Payne 1985, 1996; Foster 
2001, 2003). That position had been a function of geography (Glasgow as a port 
on the Atlantic), resources (locally available coal and iron ore) and its position in 
the British Empire. However, since the early 1900s, it had become apparent that 
the industrial nexus of the region was unbalanced and vulnerable to economic 
change. The main problem was the industrial mono-structure (Blazyca & Klazik 
2003). A government white paper on employment policy highlighted the over 
dependence in WCS upon a group of related industries that were inclined to 
fluctuate together (Ministry of reconstruction 1942). An additional concern, in 
light of the rapid American domination of the world economy, as facilitated by 
the Marshall Plan, was an over-reliance on export trade, an area not in the 
control of domestic policy. However, in the immediate post-war period, WCS 
still, as Foster notes: 
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―Possessed significant competitive advantages in the production of 
transport and power equipment: turbines, pumps, aircraft engines, 
generating equipment, mining equipment, guidance systems, rail 
locomotives and ships‖ (2003:57). 
The Clyde Valley Regional Plan (CVRP) of 1946 concluded that in order to 
maintain economic development, planning was required on a regional basis. 
Furthermore, state intervention was required, particularly in the steel and ship 
industries (Payne 1985; Foster 2001).  
 
An additional recommendation of the CVRP was to encourage an industrial policy 
that would develop a wide variety of industrial skills, emulating the diversity 
found in cities like London and Birmingham. The industrial mono-structure, once 
able to benefit from the advantages of empire, had now effectively created a 
‗lock-in‘. The limited skills base, lack of employment opportunities for women 
and low-wage regime had all restricted the development of a new manufacturing 
capacity (Abercrombie & Matthew 1949). 
 
The ‗Bruce Report‘ (Bruce 1945), commissioned by the city fathers, criticised 
the CVRP proposals, noting the unsuitability of applying a London solution to the 
wider Glasgow conurbation. The inherent problems of industry in WCS and arm‘s 
length state enterprise relations led central government and the Scottish Office 
to attract new manufacturing capacity rather than attempt to restructure or re-
industrialise indigenous manufacturing. The location for these firms would be 
the new towns in the peripheral areas around Glasgow. The primary function of 
the New Town was, it seems, to facilitate the restructuring of the WCS 
economy, as advocated by the Scottish Office, by attracting new light or sunrise 
industries to ‗growth poles‘ (Abercrombie & Matthew 1949; Robertson 1998), 
rather than to resolve the problems of Glasgow‘s tenement slums, as commonly 
perceived.  
As Table 3.1 (pg.81) indicates, 1965 marked WCS‘s industrial peak. By the mid-
1960s, inflationary pressures, a lack of competitiveness and the structural 
weakness discussed above had begun to take their toll on Clydeside (Foster 
2003). In addition, the increased presence of new firms in the ‗growth poles‘ had 
forced up wages (Robertson 1998): WCS had in the past derived some of its 
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competitive advantage by paying significantly lower wages than other parts of 
the UK (Slaven 1975).  
 
In 1974, the Labour Party returned to power, perhaps offering a final chance for 
Scotland, particularly WCS, to pursue a different path for economic 
redevelopment. There was some nationalisation in order to protect heavy 
industry, the Scottish Development Agency was established, and there was even 
a failed attempt to establish a Scottish parliament. These policies were similar 
to some that we have observed as being successful in NPdC and the Ruhr but 
they proved to be unsuccessful in the context of WCS. 
 
In 1979, the Conservatives returned to power eager to bring to an end the ‗cycle 
of rising expectations‘ (Foster 2003:65). National policy created conditions that 
encouraged capital flight and created the large scale unemployment necessary 
to end the trade union movement‘s power and create a context for the 
repatriation of capital on its own terms (neoliberalism). Interest rates were 
increased to slow the growth of the money supply and thus lower inflation. The 
government preference was for indirect taxation rather than taxes on income 
and VAT was raised sharply to 15 per cent, with a resultant actual short-term 
rise in inflation (Foster 2003; Mohamed 2008). 
 
The fiscal and monetary squeeze, combined with the North Sea oil effect, 
appreciated the exchange rate. These moves hit businesses, particularly those in 
the manufacturing sector. Consequently, unemployment soon passed two 
million, doubling the one million unemployed under the 
previous Labour government (Woolfson, Foster & Beck 1997). This served to 
politically disenfranchise, even radicalise, the inner cities and regions, 
particularly in WCS, an area with no political representation in government. 
Such a context only served as a barrier to redirect capital back into Britain, 
particularly to those areas of most need (Harvey 2005; Mohamed 2008).  
 
From the early 1980s, the government began to push a secondary agenda which 
entailed comprehensive micro-economic intervention. The economic model 
would be ‗Japanisation‘ and the goal would be the encouragement of ‗sunrise‘ 
industries (Ackroyd 1988). What this entailed was the encouragement of new 
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work place relations and new core periphery relations between large and small 
firms. In addition, in Scotland, where the Conservatives all but lost any support 
during the 1982 and 1987 elections, there would be ―ambitious experiments in 
the social re-engineering of urban working class communities‖ (Foster 2003:65). 
The focus was on creating the necessary supply-side conditions, the most 
important being flexible labour (Foster 2003).  
The level of intervention that followed was unprecedented. Scotland no longer 
had a core around which an industrial district could evolve. Therefore, that 
process and those conditions would have to be encouraged. Scottish agencies 
lobbied core companies from the US and Japan to establish branch production 
facilities. Inter-firm relations between the new core and local small enterprises 
would then be restructured by the Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) (Danson & 
Whittam 2003).  
The key beneficiaries were the multinationals. The maintenance of sterling as a 
world banking currency and the adherence to Keynesian economics required US 
support and US dollars (Harvey 2005).  Therefore, government policies supported 
multinational firms in order to compete and survive in the US trading area. It 
was hoped that regional bases for these firms would facilitate a level of growth 
comparable to other competing nations. The business of the multinationals was 
mainly in motors, petrochemicals, and electrical engineering. The old industrial 
base was now denounced, while the emerging branch plants of the 
multinationals were portrayed as progressive modernisation (Payne 1996; Foster 
2003).   
WCS had become a ―parking ground for American branch plants‖ and a dual 
economy45 was established (Foster 2003:62).  New towns, originally advocated as 
solutions to urban congestion and deprivation, now formed the geographical 
centre of the dual economy. Branch-plant industries favoured union free sites 
                                         
45 A dual economy is the existence of two separate economic systems within one country or area. 
Regions such as South East and South West England and East Anglia were less affected by 
manufacturing job loss and benefitted more from on-going tertiarisation. The growing divide 
between north and south led some commentators to describe Britain as a dual economy-with 
a deindustrialised north and west and a post-industrial south and east (Marshall, Damesick & 
Wood 1987). At the level of WCS, the deteriorating old heavy industries and the emerging 
sunrise/branch plant industries created a similar dynamic (Foster 2003). 
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well removed from the old centres of production. However, WCS never became 
an integral part of the business model of these multinational firms and when 
economic circumstances changed or government subsidies ran out, most of these 
factories closed (Blazyca & Klazik 2003) – this important issue needs to be 
understood in more detail and will be discussed below under ‗regional 
dimensions‘. 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a shift away from equity-based 
development to promoting economic growth almost anywhere within the region. 
As this creates intraregional competition, Glasgow, in particular, has pursued 
development practices and policies that illustrate the lack of regional 
governmental involvement. Pro-growth strategies were augmented by 
interventions that promoted job growth in newer towns and suburban areas 
(Kantor 2000).  
 
8.1.2 Regional dimension 
A government quango, the Toothill Committee, having excluded representatives 
of Scottish heavy industry from its advisory panel, published an Inquiry Report in 
1961 which advocated a widening of the industrial base (Toothill 1961). New 
hubs of mass production would be centred on New Towns such as East Kilbride 
and Cumbernauld and labour would transfer from the old industries to the new. 
The aims of central government seemed conflicted between minimising 
unemployment and mobilising labour. As MacInnes explains: 
 
―The first aim was congruent with the protection of declining 
industries to weak regions; the second aim implied letting such 
industries fail in order to mobilise the surplus labour released‖ 
(1995:6). 
The branch plants of American owned companies that located in the new towns 
brought with them two main problems. First, foreign owned companies provided 
little in the way of training or the development of the industry in Scotland. With 
core production located elsewhere, they only outsourced low skilled work.  This 
restricted the economic multiplier effect of their investment while 
simultaneously stifling indigenous development. The jobs created were subject 
to wholesale change from non-domestic company directors.  Second, the jobs 
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available provided little opportunity for career development, significantly 
undermining the autonomy and control felt by workers (Payne 1996; Harvie 
1998).   
It seemed to many that these plants were more aligned with other parts of their 
parent multinational company than with the local economy (MacInnes 1995) 
although some saw in these changes the potential for a reform of the local 
Scottish economy (Firn 1975). For example, MacInnes noted how: 
―Inward investing plants competed for the 'labour surplus' with more 
traditional industries offering less attractive rates of pay and different 
labour relations traditions. The lines of conflict of outlook and 
interest here ran in quite complex ways. Foreign plants often brought 
higher rates of pay, but more hostility to trades unions than 
indigenous capital‖ (1995:6). 
One example is the Rootes car plant at Linwood, opened in 1963.  The company 
saw the jobs it brought to the area as a gift to the workers, presumably on the 
back of negotiations and discussions with government over locating there to ease 
unemployment. As a result they were: 
―…taken aback when the workers of central Scotland exhibited an 
unwillingness to accept their status as a reservoir of cheap labour that 
could be utilised to lower production costs for manufacturers and ease 
inflationary pressures within the UK economy‖ (Phillips 2008:34).   
The company failed to agree conditions with the unions before production began 
and believed that it could maintain regional wage differentials. From the outset 
the Linwood factory faced difficulties. The Imp car it produced did not sell as 
well as had been expected.  Furthermore, production costs were high because 
car bodies, and other parts, had to be transported back and forward between 
Linwood and other Rootes factories. A combination of poor management and 
powerful trade unions led to frequent and costly breaks in production. Massive 
losses from 1964 to 1967 led to redundancies and 4 day working weeks and were 
often blamed on poor industrial relations and a militant workforce, but Phillips 
(2008) has argued that this is highly unlikely and was instead due to export 
market conditions and the implausibility of the enterprise in the first place. The 
American company Chrysler took over the Linwood factory in 1967. Production of 
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the Imp ceased in 1976 and Chrysler sold the factory to the French company 
Peugeot-Citroen in 1979. Peugeot-Citroen closed Linwood in 1981. 
Another important case study is the shipyards of the Clyde. In 1971, the 
Conservative government moved to close the remaining Upper Clyde Shipyards 
(UCS). Their fate had already been outlined, two years prior, when Nicholas 
Ridley had warned Yarrows, one yard in the conglomerate, that the Conservative 
government would not be continuing to subsidise UCS and that it would be best 
to sell off its assets to the Lower Clyde Shipyards immediately. This was not 
acceptable to the workers of Clydeside, especially in the face of a full book of 
works to be carried out and 8,000 workers occupied the yard and began a ‗work-
in‘ (Foster 2003). The result was the creation of a broader social alliance to act 
as a bulwark against national objectives. As Foster notes: 
―This alliance encompassed most of Clydeside‘s small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), Scottish Local Authorities and the wider trade 
union movement. Its unifying demand was a comprehensive reversal of 
economic policy to save what remained of Clydeside as an industrial 
district‖ (2003:64).  
In the event, the government eventually reversed its decision and offered 
substantial aid to the regional economy. In February 1972 the ‗rationalisation‘ of 
the yards, namely the closure of the less profitable before privatisation, still 
went ahead, although with fewer job losses than previously declared. The Govan 
yard received a £35 million rescue package securing 4,300 jobs, and some of the 
2,500 jobs at Clydebank were retained by heavily subsidised investment from the 
Texan firm Marathon. However, this did not prevent the eventual closure of all 
but the Govan and Scotstoun yards by the 1980s46. Consequently, there was 
massive unemployment. The area became littered with expansive industrial 
wastelands and abandoned commercial enterprises. This led to unprecedented 
decline in population, closure of schools, loss of social infrastructure and the 
break-up of the historical community (Foster 2001). 
At the same time the process of rationalisation was also being applied to the 
coal industry. Scottish employment in coal had fallen drastically: approximately 
                                         
46
 These two yards now comprise BAE Systems Surface Ships a wholly owned subsidiary company 
of BAE Systems plc, specialising in naval surface shipbuilding. 
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half of all employment was lost between 1963 and 1971 and pay was still 
artificially low. Following unofficial strikes in 1969 and 1970, the National Union 
of Miners elected more militant members to office and by 1972 they were able 
to lead an official strike in protest at their low pay.  In comparison to workers at 
the Linwood car plant, who received £35pw, they were asking for £28pw, which 
was a 35 – 47 per cent increase on their existing wages. The press portrayed 
them as militants, manipulated by their leadership (Gilmour 2007). So much 
pressure was put on the police force by the government in order to save face 
(especially within the context of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilder‘s work-in) that, in 
February 1972, at a picket at Longannet, 13 arrests were made on serious 
charges of mobbing, rioting and assaulting police officers, the cases for which 
were later undermined by a lack of evidence (Harvie 2001).  Eventually, the 
government partially conceded following the Lord Wilberforce Enquiry, which 
recommended a 19-21 per cent pay increase that was overwhelmingly accepted 
by the workers (Phillips 2008). However, the Conservative government achieved 
its goal of rationalisation when it returned to power in 1979.  Of the eighteen 
deep mines that were open in 1979, only Longannet had survived by 1981 (Harvie 
2001). 
 
Union membership declined after 1978 and organised labour was, thus, less 
prevalent in Scotland‘s new industries (Harvie 2001).  The foreign-owned branch 
plants of Silicon Glen47 preferred part-time female workers and school-leavers 
with little experience of unionisation, so that while women made up the 
majority of the workforce, they were still paid on average one fifth less than 
men for the same work (Devine 2000).  The pressures on women, unlike their 
West European contemporaries, were widening from primary caregiver to 
encompass the dual role of breadwinner. Their male counterparts, on the other 
hand, endured chronic unemployment.  
 
The poor structure of the outer Clydeside conurbation became apparent once 
the competitive growth of the 1960s had slowed. The basis of this lack of 
competitiveness was low labour productivity (Lever & Moore 1986). The best 
                                         
47
 The high-tech sector of Scotland based around the Central Belt triangle between Dundee, 
Inverclyde and Edinburgh, which includes Fife, Glasgow and Stirling is commonly referred to 
as Silicon Glen; although electronics facilities outside this area may also be included in the 
term.  
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available measure indicates that Clydeside had 65.9 per cent of the national 
average productivity for manufacturing in 1978. This helps to account for 
employment disappearing so rapidly relative to national trends (Lever & Moore 
1986:18). The root of low productivity lay in firms experiencing ―low value 
added per head because they overspend on labour despite lower wage costs in 
the conurbation‖ (Lever & Moore 1986:18-19). They were often geared towards 
the labour intensive, small batch, specialist and often custom-specific end of the 
production spectrum. The solution to this problem would be product innovation. 
Lever and Moore‘s study concludes that although product innovation is not 
synonymous with the establishment of new firms, they are often related. The 
failure of WCS to encourage a sufficient rate of new firm (or new product) 
formation presented a severe problem (Lever & Moore 1986). 
 
In the 1980s, Local government ‗councils‘ were given the power to intervene in 
local economies. In Glasgow, the local authorities started a consumer-based 
recovery policy, based on retail development, tourism (hotels, restaurants), 
cultural industries (theatre, music, arts, culture, media), and certain services 
like call centres (16,000 jobs in call centres), shared services and public services 
(growth in education and services) (MacInnes 1995; Turok & Bailey 2004). These 
measures, in addition to the physical regeneration of the east end as part of the 
Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) scheme and the ongoing ‗image‘ 
campaigns (form ‗Glasgow‘s Miles Better‘ to the more recent Scotland with 
Style), helped transform (for a while) the city‘s international image (Gomez 
1998).  
 
However, in reality, these interventions have only marginally compensated for 
the degree of deindustrialisation WCS endured in the 1970s and 1980s. For 
instance, the GEAR scheme had very little success in attracting new 
manufacturing employment to the depressed east end. Between 1975 and 1983 
the GEAR area lost 12,000 jobs, and GEAR created only 2-3000 additional jobs 
(McGregor & Maclennan 1992:52).  
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In the late 1990s the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance (GRA)48 set aside investment 
of £1.5 billion (over 10 years) to be invested in 8 ‗priority regeneration areas‘ 
with a total population of approximately 300,000 (two-fifths of Glasgow‘s 
population). At the time, each of these areas had male unemployment rates 
between 25 and 40 per cent. All had long-term unemployment rates over 38 per 
cent in 1989. The proportion of council tenants on housing benefit varied 
between two-thirds and three-quarters (Mooney 1994:15). A clear aim of the 
GRA was to ‗activate‘ the significant numbers of unemployed, many of whom 
were unskilled, into employment via the attraction of inward investment 
(McGregor, Maclennan & Stevenson 1992).  
8.1.3 Unemployment  
Figure 3.3 (pg.83) presents regional unemployment rates in 2008 and 2011 for 
the five regions. In 2008, at 5.8 per cent, the unemployment rate in WCS was 
lower than the other regions.  As the figures for 2011 show, unemployment has 
increased in all regions except for the Ruhr. The increase in WCS is greater than 
the other regions and this is a concern for two reasons: first, all the other 
regions have, historically, had higher structural unemployment; second, in WCS 
there is seemingly a significant degree of hidden unemployment (Beatty et al. 
2002, 2012; Webster 2002).  
 
8.1.4 Employment rates  
Broadly speaking, employment rates for both males and females have and 
continue to be greater in WCS than the other regions. However, this is a 
consequence of the low-skills equilibrium (Rubery 1994). In particular, the 
processes associated with economic restructuring and deindustrialisation have 
facilitated significant increases in female labour market participation. 
Accompanying this shift has been an increase in the use of atypical forms of 
employment such as part-time, temporary and casual employment contracts 
(Gallie 2007).  
                                         
48
 The GRA was an alliance between District and Regional Councils, Glasgow Development Agency 
and Scottish Homes. In 1998 it became the Glasgow Alliance. Members include: Glasgow City 
Council, Glasgow Development Agency, Greater Glasgow Health Board, Communities Scotland 
(the new Executive Agency formerly known as Scottish Homes), the Scottish Executive, 
Glasgow Council for the Voluntary Sector, and Scottish Business in the Community.  
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Moreover, as we have seen, this is a picture that is changing. Whereas WCS 
seems to have reached some level of capacity, in that new job creation has 
stalled, NPdC has managed to create low and high skills jobs in manufacturing 
and services. The Ruhr, although struggling to create and maintain jobs like 
WCS, has had some success in increasing high skill service jobs. In addition, 
nationally, the number of low-general skill jobs, considered a major contributing 
factor to the structurally high unemployment, is now increasing (OECD 2009). In 
CEE, employment rates, although comparatively low for the reasons outlined, 
have for women and to a lesser extent men started to recover. Moreover, both 
Katowice and Moravia-Silesia have recorded growth in high-tech services.  
In short, the economic changes attributed to the post-industrial shift 
experienced in WCS did not increase productivity and failed to create sufficient 
jobs. As Turok & Bailey note:  
―The contrast between the two variables in Glasgow suggests a more 
segmented economy, possibly reflecting a more severe history of 
deindustrialisation and the emergence of a narrower economic base‖ 
(2004:40). 
Writing in the 1990s MacInnes noted with irony how: 
 
―the major criticism levelled at the shift from production to 
consumption has been that jobs in this sector are more often low-
paid, part-time, short-duration jobs for young people and women. The 
picture is more bleak in Glasgow: even the low-paid part-time jobs 
are harder to come by than in the rest of Britain‖ (1995:17). 
This, combined with the faster than average falls in manufacturing employment, 
resulted in a 10 per cent reduction in jobs over the decade 1985-1995 compared 
to a small increase in the UK as a whole. The wider WCS region fared marginally 
better and was closer to the UK average, reflecting the continued shift of jobs 
from the city.  
 
From the late 1990s until the recent economic crisis, the main drivers of 
employment were the public sector, financial services and construction (SLIMS 
2005).  
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8.1.5 Worklessness 
Figure 3.4 (pg.83) shows the percentage of men aged 25-49 not in employment 
in 2001. In WCS, unemployment for males aged 25-49 is still relatively high 
(21.7%). Moreover, WCS, like other similar regions in the UK, has a significant 
amount of hidden unemployment (Beatty et al. 2002, 2012). In the UK there are 
long-established mechanisms that divert the unemployed between different 
parts of the benefits system, particularly from unemployment benefits to 
incapacity benefits, or out of the benefits system entirely. Although some 
affected are included in the official unemployment figures, others are 
completely absent (Beatty et al. 2000).  
 
Research undertaken by Beatty, Fothergill and Gore estimates the real level of 
unemployment for April 2012 in different areas of the UK. For Glasgow, official 
figures show 24,720 claimants - that is, 6 per cent of the working population. 
They estimate the real figure to be 61,600 - that is, 14.9 per cent of the working 
population (2012:35).  
 
In addition, Glasgow City (and WCS) has a remarkably high proportion of its 
resident population on sickness-related benefits (12.3 per cent, compared to 
Scottish 8.1% Great Britain 6.6% of the working age population claim ESA and 
incapacity benefits) (Turok & Bailey 2005).  
 
8.2 Context 
The effects of deindustrialisation were exacerbated by the city‘s poor housing 
conditions. By the 1950s, Glasgow had the worst housing stock of any major city 
in Western Europe (Lever 1991). As deindustrialisation progressed, large-scale 
housing programmes were implemented, city slums were demolished and urban 
populations were relocated to housing schemes and new towns on Glasgow‘s 
periphery and more widely in WCS. What often remained were neighbourhoods 
fragmented by tenement demolition and deteriorated tower block schemes 
whose maintenance became increasingly problematic (Pacione 1989; Mooney 
1994; Mooney & Danson 1997).  
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The response to these problems was several waves of ‗redevelopment‘ along 
with the establishment of a major urban motorway programme which, 
paradoxically, had the effect of driving jobs out of the city. Whereas previously 
displaced industry would have relocated within the city core, redevelopment 
drove firms to find safe locations in the New Towns and ex-urban locations 
(Lever 1991).  
 
Physical redevelopment was accompanied by serious attempts to address the 
external image of Glasgow and WCS (Paddison 1993). From the 1980s onwards, 
Glasgow began to project itself as an area of consumption rather than 
production. However, the motivation for this strategy was the creation of a new 
form of post-industrial economic growth (Kantor 2000; Mooney 2004; Trettor 
2008).   
 
After a shock defeat by the Conservatives in 1977, Glasgow‘s Labour Party was 
re-elected as the city council in 1980 and as Boyle et al. note:  
 
―Reading their rejection at the polls as a reaction to Glasgow‘s deep 
experience of deindustrialisation and the failure of politicians to 
address decline, New Labour in the city had an especially heightened 
sensitivity to the imperative of promoting local economic growth‖ 
(2008:315).  
This changing economic structure, decline in national fiscal support, shift away 
from the Keynesian welfare state and rolling back of the state, probably led 
regional decision makers to reconsider their constituencies of support and 
strategic priorities. Consequently, they became less concerned about wealth 
distribution and welfare and more concerned with facilitating economic 
enterprise and courting private sector interests (Macleod 2002). As such, 
Glasgow's potential as a centre of consumption and hub of leisure and 
entertainment for the wider area, clearly informed the strategies pursued in 
changing the region‘s image and securing future economic development.  
 
The Scottish Development Agency (SDA) commissioned a report on Glasgow‘s 
potential as a location for corporate headquarters. The report recommended 
establishing a business-led organisation to steer the way in the city‘s urban 
redevelopment. Accordingly, the then SDA pressed the city‘s political elite to 
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facilitate more active private sector participation (Boyle & Hughes 1994; Tretter 
2008). This led to the establishment of the private-public quango Glasgow Action 
(GA), the aim of which was to develop ―a strong business and consumer service 
industry base…to stimulate the regeneration of the city as a whole‖ (Glasgow 
Action 1985). The city council and the local business power structure now 
influenced the urban development of Glasgow. GA ‗commissioned‘49 consultancy 
company McKinsey and Co. who concluded that Glasgow‘s deindustrialisation was 
irreversible and that the city‘s future development was contingent upon it 
emerging as a post-industrial service economy (Boyle et al. 2008; Tretter 2008).  
 
Within this context, ‗place marketing‘ (Paddison 1993) would become one of the 
chief means of establishing and sustaining a post-industrial economy and GA and 
the City Council pursued numerous strategies for developing the area‘s 
reputation as a post-industrial centre in order to attract service industries and 
consumers or visitors. These included the 1983 ‗Glasgow‘s Miles Better‘ 
campaign designed to combat the image of Glasgow as an area of poverty, 
crime, violence and squalor; and the designation as the European City of Culture 
in 1990 (see Booth & Boyle 1993; MacLeod 2002). Although these developments 
purported to make Glasgow a better place to live, actual tangible benefits to 
the local population had little basis in policy or reality. In fact some suggested 
these measures would in fact accelerate existing patterns of inequality 
associated with post-industrial restructuring (Jones & Wilks-Heeg 2004).  
 
Combined with these initiatives and investments was the substantial and 
continued investment in what MacInnes (1995) terms ‗cultural infrastructure‘. 
For example the Royal Scottish Academy of Music and Drama (now The Royal 
Conservatoire of Scotland), a national exhibition and conference centre, the 
Burrell museum and art gallery complex, the Tramway performance space and, 
more recently, the Zaha Hadid designed Riverside Museum.  
 
                                         
49 The reality is McKinsey & co carried out the analysis for free. GA chief executive David 
Macdonald is alleged to have convinced them to do it free of charge. According to the report 
‗Glasgow‘s city centre is amorphous and lacks memorable features‘. Predictably the report 
focused on the city‘s business environment and gave precise suggestions for a market-oriented 
economic restructuring (McKinsey & CO 1994; Urban 2013).  
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It is difficult to assess the true impact of this strategy. For example, in an 
evaluation report for the leading partners in Glasgow, Myerscough calculated 
that, for a public sector investment of £33 million, Glasgow saw a net economic 
return to the Glasgow area economy of between £10.3 and £14.1 million 
(Myerscough 1992). Moreover, Myerscough's (1988) study estimated that almost 
15,000 jobs were dependent on leisure industries and tourism. Although this is 
likely to have increased, and not discounting the cultural and regeneration 
aspects of the investment, there was and continues to be little evidence of 
significant job creation. Moreover, many of the jobs were flexible, temporary 
and part-time, with few rights and traditionally the preserve of women and now 
increasingly students and retired workers (Moorhouse et al. 1995). 
 
Figure 3.22 (pg.92) indicates the degree of tertiarisation in the UK relative to 
the other selected countries: a proliferation of management at the upper end of 
the scale and significant increase in service/sales and elementary workers at the 
lower end. The change for WCS is particularly acute (Helms & Cumbers 2004; 
Danson 2005). The transition to a service-dominated economy has had a 
significant impact on the traditional (and predominantly male) industrial labour 
force.  Many of the jobs in the old industrial sectors were stable, relatively well 
remunerated and provided some paths to career advancement. The proliferation 
of low-skilled and low-waged work in services or occasionally construction has 
contributed to the polarisation present in the labour market. Between 
professional and managerial workers able to benefit in sectors such as financial 
services and information technology and those at the lower end who lack the 
education, skills and social networks.  
 
As a consequence, contradictions arise from the tensions between processes of 
capitalist production on the one hand and social reproduction on the other.  
These are particularly acute in WCS where, as a consequence of restructuring, 
―a growing residual segment of the labour market is excluded from the 
mainstream and constituting an emerging ‗underclass‘ of urban poor‖ (Helms & 
Cumbers 2004:2). For, even if these former workers moved location, the market 
and policy regime in place was unlikely to create what they would consider 
viable employment opportunities (Beatty & Fothergill 1996; Beatty et al. 2002). 
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In the UK and WCS context, the deregulation of the labour market (while 
contributing to the growth of low-wage employment) has also led to massive 
increases in pay for those at the top end of the wage hierarchy, in both public 
and private sectors and a stagnation or even decline of what are seen as 
traditionally working class occupations.  National systems of wage bargaining and 
pay grading were first criticised by the Thatcher government as they resulted in 
over payment of wages for the less skilled relative to the market rates. 
However, subsequent deregulation and individualisation (a policy pursued by 
both parties) has not only seen the wages of the low paid reduced but also 
facilitated excessive rises in managerial and executive salaries, all of which has 
contributed to income inequality experienced in the UK and WCS (see Figures 3.5 
and 3.6, pg.84). 
These inequalities are particularly relevant to those with low or obsolete skills. 
Many employers now emphasise ‗soft‘ skills such as customer service, 
communication skills, IT skills, team working and problem solving (Future Skills 
Scotland 2002, 2003). More generally, and in line with the low-skill ‗equilibrium‘ 
outlined previously, the skills required are typically the product of school and 
higher education, rather than apprenticeships. Employers now seek 
qualifications and accredited learning not the labour power, trades and crafts of 
old. The perception of a fall in demand serves to limit recruitment and training 
in these sectors and we now have a situation where the economy is deficient in 
craft skill (Danson 2005; Future Skills Scotland 2003).  
 
8.2.1 Skills and Education 
A major concern for WCS is that employment opportunities demand new and 
different skills: there is a mismatch between the skills and attributes of former 
industrial workers and the new economy (Future Skills Scotland 2002, 2003; 
Danson 2005). The UK has pursued a voluntarist approach to training, leaving it 
to the market or firms to organise independently of the education system. The 
result is a mismatch between educational provision and the jobs market 
(Gardiner & Wilson 2012). In addition, Rubery (1994) notes, as a feature of the 
UK social system, the existence of negative attitudes towards vocational 
education and training. The Scottish Vocational Qualification SVQs (and NVQs) 
were established to provide an alternative to academic study and are based 
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upon work place competency. However, they may well be a means of 
consolidating the low-skill base of the economy. The standards expected do not 
meet those of, say, the German system, and the focus is on narrow work-related 
skills. Moreover, many employees fail to recognise or merit vocational 
qualifications. As Rubery concludes:  
―In Britain, outside the apprenticeship system which affected 
primarily craft male manual workers, the relationship between 
training and career opportunities has been at best intermediate and at 
worst negative‖ (1994:354). 
8.2.1.1 Education  
Figure 3.7 (pg.85) shows the percentage of adults (25-64) with tertiary (post-
secondary) qualifications in 2008 for all the regions. It shows that SWS (used as a 
proxy for WCS) had a higher proportion of adults with tertiary qualifications50 
than any of the other regions. This is the result of UK policy which has seen a 
massive expansion in Higher Education from 400,000 in the 1960s to 
approximately 2.5 million in 2012 (Blanden & Machin 2004; HESA 2012). 
However, differences in the quality of qualification and experience are vast. 
Moreover, many of the qualifications are for sectors in which there are limited 
employment opportunities (Gardiner & Wilson 2012).    
Figure 3.8 (pg.85) shows the percentage of adults with no or low level 
qualifications (ISCED Level 0-2) in all the regions. It shows that SWS, with 27.3 
per cent in this category, is the second worst placed region (only NPdC has a 
higher proportion). This is important because, although traditionally a lack of 
formal education would not necessarily have been a barrier to old industrial 
work, a lack of skills and education in the contemporary labour market are 
considered significant NSRs, particularly in the current context of the UK and 
WCS where job growth, particularly in jobs requiring low-general skills, is 
stagnating (Leitch 2006).  
The problem in the UK, relative to all the countries covered here, has 
deteriorated further in the past few years. The number of young people not in 
                                         
50
 These include university degree or NVQ level 4/5 level qualifications and above. 
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education or training (NEET)51 has grown significantly. As discussed in the NPdC 
case study, in 2000 WCS already had more NEET than NPdC. In the UK, 12.1 per 
cent of those aged 20-24 came into this category but by 2008 this had increased 
to 17 per cent. In Germany, the percentage fell over these five years from 12.8 
to 11.8; in France it fell from 13.2 to 11.8; in Poland it fell from 6 to 5; in Czech 
Republic it fell from 6.5 to 5.6 (Eurostat 2010).  
 
Research concerned with OIRS in Scotland (Forsyth & Furlong 2003) and Northern 
Ireland (McVicar 2000) highlights a number of difficulties regards employability. 
These include: low social class position of parents; lack of advanced skills and 
qualifications; poor training offered by employers who are not national or 
multinational corporations and inappropriate or inadequate placing of the 
vulnerable in training schemes (Danson 2005:293). It seems reasonable to assume 
that these are all relevant factors in WCS. 
 
8.2.2 Social context  
Glasgow and its hinterland have seen considerable private investment in 
housing, retailing, hotels and offices. Brownfield sites have been transformed 
into areas such as parts of the Merchant City and International Financial District. 
Shopping centres both in the city centre (St Enoch Centre, Buchanan St) and 
outside (Silverburn, Braehead) have made Glasgow a shopping destination for 
some and the developers very rich (The Sunday Times, April 26, 2009). However, 
examining the question of who these developments benefit and the extent to 
which they stimulate the wider economy, McInnes looked at whether a link could 
be established in WCS between cultural activity and economic development and 
concluded: 
 
―Such an effect is very difficult to measure objectively: does a vibrant 
culture count for more than good housing or golf courses? And do any 
of these matter as much as a cheap, productive, appropriately skilled 
and plentiful labour supply?‖ (MacInnes 1995:19).  
Despite these developments and initiatives, the question remains as to how and 
to what extent shopping malls and cultural centres of Glasgow and the wider 
area of WCS benefit the wider population and resolve the ongoing legacy of 
                                         
51
 Percentage of population not in employment, education or training aged 20-24. 
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deindustrialisation. Is the situation of the peripheral housing estates dotted 
about WCS, or the 29.1 per cent of Glasgow‘s population who are economically 
inactive, the 14.2 per cent of men and 10.1 per cent of females who are 
registered unemployed, or the 21.3 per cent of Glasgow‘s population claiming 
key benefits52 being improved (Nomis 2011)? As MacInnes concludes: ―In some 
ways both the virtuous and vicious circles of decline have become stronger‖ 
(1995:19). 
 
Economically, in the period between 1970 and 2000, WCS remained the poorest 
region in the UK (Dorling et al. 2008). Moreover, analyses estimate that, for WCS 
to achieve employment rates of eighty per cent, as experienced in the South 
East of England, an additional 131,000 jobs would need to be created (SLIMS 
2005). 
 
As we have seen, the various agencies and initiatives involved with the 
(re)development of Glasgow and WCS have prioritised economic rather than 
social objectives. In the context of a deindustrialising WCS, national economic 
issues seem to have taken precedence over local social issues. This is in contrast 
to France and Germany (and Katowice) - as has been noted. A number of 
perspectives emerged to account for WCS‘s ongoing malaise.  Webster (2000) 
noted the lack of employment opportunities; particularly for those with a 
background of manual employment. The government has cited the lack of 
‗employability‘ of the local population as a barrier to economic development 
(note: not the low job creation rate) (Scottish Executive 2001, 2002). Others 
suggested a culture, possibly consolidating, of welfare dependency (Middleton 
1991). As such, parts of the city and surrounding areas are depicted as areas 
occupied by a maladapted ‗underclass‘ (e.g. Murray 1996) where problems are 
social and economic in nature, with high incidences of unemployment and social 
pathologies. Speaking of the population shift to peripheral housing estates in 
WCS at the time of deindustrialisation, MacInnes describes: 
 
―(how) the razing of older 'slum' areas rather than their rehabilitation, 
together with the path cleared for the urban motorway network, 
                                         
52
 These figures are for November 2011 and in each case exceed the Scottish and UK totals. In 
the case of claiming key benefits the Scottish total is 14.2 per cent and Great Britain 12.3 per 
cent. 
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destroyed existing communities and scarred the city centre. The 
peripheral estates were isolated, lacking in any amenities, were 
drably laid out and had higher than target population densities. Many 
high rise and other schemes were badly designed‖ (MacInnes 1995:7). 
The peripheral estates that characterise much of WCS continue to be 
particularly problematic. Although established at a time of relative economic 
growth and increased housing provision, deindustrialisation and economic 
decline means many of these areas function effectively as ‗cashless societies‘ 
with high levels of welfare dependency (Jackson 2009).  In addition, as Pacione 
concludes: 
 
―The high levels of poverty have resulted in the closure of local shops 
because of lack of demand, thereby further restricting consumer 
choice. The increased indebtedness of many families on the estate has 
led to an increase in rent arrears, abscondencies, eviction and 
disconnections by the electricity board‖ (1989:110). 
These peripheral areas came to be regarded as ‗problem spaces‘ (Mooney & 
Danson 1997) where many ―are deprived both of a livelihood in the capitalist 
economy and of support from a welfare economy devastated by the effects of 
the urban fiscal crisis‖ (Lee 1989:69). In 1989, unemployment rates in the 
peripheral housing schemes of Glasgow ranged from 39 per cent to 46 per cent 
long-term unemployment (Alliance 1993). Despite the poor health, 
unemployment, poverty and lack of skills present in these areas, there was little 
opposition to the social and spatial inequalities emerging and consolidating. For 
as Boyle concluded in 1989: 
―Glasgow‘s poor are simply no longer part of the city. In the 
economic, political, or social terms, their alienation from the city is 
now almost complete. Years of isolation bred hopelessness; the 
response of the very poorest has been to withdraw into a personal 
world of survival, far removed from city centre renewal, waterfront 
housing, and new shopping centres‖ (1990:129).  
Although many of these commentators were writing in the late 1980s, these 
same problems persist today and have, in many cases, become entrenched. In 
stark contrast to the city centre investment and regeneration, the peripheral 
estates and towns were becoming ‗welfare cities‘ (Pacione 1989; Mooney & 
Danson 1997) where residents survived via welfare dependency or through low-
skill, poor quality, low paid employment. This degree of ‗dualism‘ was 
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exacerbated as policies for future development regarded these peripheral areas 
in isolation from Glasgow and the wider WCS economy. Increasingly, they came 
to be considered an impediment to economic growth and the future fortunes of 
WCS. As such, the peripheral estate became what Wacquant classifies as spaces 
of ‗advanced marginality‘ where: 
―the novel regime of socio-spatial relegation and exclusionary 
closure…has crystallised in the post-Fordist city (or region) as a result 
of the uneven development of the capitalist economies and recoiling 
welfare states‖ (2008:2-3).  
A consequence of this, particularly in a WCS context, is territorial stigmatisation 
(Gray & Mooney 2011). The peripheral estates came ―to represent a morally and 
culturally problematic place(s) where unproductive and flawed lifestyles 
flourish‖ (Gray & Mooney 2011:13). The media in particular have sought to 
promulgate such a notion. In 2008, The Times ran the headline ‗Glasgow‘s 
Guantanamo‘: 
―Shettleston, Barlanark, Garthamlock, Easterhouse, Parkhead … 
communities that figure with monotonous regularity both on the 
charge sheet at Glasgow Sheriff Court and at the top of the lists of the 
most socially deprived wards in Britain. They might as well be called 
Guantanamo. For many thousands of welfare prisoners on sink estates, 
marooned by bad housing, violence, addiction, unemployment, ill 
health and shattered relationships, there is little chance of escape‖ 
(Reid 2008). 
Glasgow‘s Guantanamo was home to the infamous so-called ‗Shettleston Man53‘ 
as characterised by conservative MP and now Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions (May 2010) Ian Duncan Smith: 
―This individual has low life expectancy. He lives in social housing, 
drug and alcohol abuse play an important part in his life and he is 
always out of work. His white blood cell count killing him directly as a 
result of his lifestyle and its lack of purpose‖ (Smith 2008). 
These developments put into context the extent and nature of Glasgow's (and by 
extension WCS‘) shift from an area of production to one of consumption: 
industrial to post-industrial. Social and economic changes and associated policy 
responses have seemingly deepened and widened socioeconomic polarities, 
                                         
53
 Shettleston is a particularly deprived area of Glasgow‘s east-end. 
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creating additional marginalised groups and further excluding strata of society 
long considered disadvantaged. However, despite the continuing focus on WCS‘s 
and Glasgow‘s issues of poverty, deprivation, health and wellbeing (Scott 2004; 
Mooney 2004; Walsh et al.2010; Taulbut et al. 2011) these developments 
continue.  For some, the processes of neoliberalism in the context of WCS 
constituted a ‗political attack‘ (Collins & McCartney 2011) and the evidence does 
little to refute that thesis - particularly considering the path destruction (Peck & 
Tickell 2002; Birch & Mykhnenko 2009) and socioeconomic costs that have been 
outlined.  
 
As in the previous case studies some regional comparisons will now be discussed. 
 
8.2.2.1 Lone parent households  
Figure 3.9 (pg.86) shows the percentage of households with children headed by a 
lone parent. In 2001, roughly a third of WCS with children (31.1%) were headed 
by a lone parent. This figure is high compared to all of the selected regions, 
apart from the Ruhr (26.9%). Figure 3.10 (pg. 86) shows the change in number of 
lone parent households over time. WCS and Moravia-Silesia had the fastest rate 
of increase – both almost 10 per cent in a decade. Although rates in the Ruhr 
were higher, the slower rate of increase saw WCS overtake the Ruhr in 2001.  
 
8.2.2.2 Single person households 
Figure 3.11 (pg.87) shows the percentage of households that are single person 
households in each region. In WCS around a third (33.8%) of households are 
single occupancy. Although this is lower than the Ruhr (36.8%) it is higher than 
the other regions where the figure is closer to a quarter. Figure 3.12 (pg.87) 
shows the change over time. It indicates that the percentage of single person 
households grew at a faster rate in WCS compared to other regions.  
 
8.2.2.3 Marital Status  
Figure 3.13 (pg.88) shows the percentage of adults aged 25-64 reporting that 
they were married54. Results are shown for adults aged 25-64. As explained 
                                         
54 Including those separated from their partners but still legally married or in a civil partnership 
across the regions in 2001. 
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previously, this accounts for different population structures across the regions 
and the fact that, predominantly, adults in these regions did not marry until 
their mid-20s (Eurostat 2006). With just under two-thirds, the marriage rate in 
WCS (63%), although lowest of all the regions, was similar to the Ruhr and NPdC. 
Rates in CEE remain above 70 per cent.  
 
8.2.2.4 Births to teenage mothers 
Figure 3.21 (pg.92) compares the percentage of births to mothers aged below 20 
in the five selected regions. In 2005, 8.5 per cent of births in WCS were to 
mothers under the age of 20. This is significantly higher than the other regions. 
Silesia (Katowice) is closest with 5.2 per cent.  
 
8.2.2.5 Health behaviours  
The relevance and impact of health behaviours to individual and population 
health has already been outlined.  
8.2.2.5.1 Smoking  
 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 (pg.90) show the percentage of adult daily smokers, 
defined as those who smoked at least one cigarette a day, for males and females 
respectively. Just under a third (29.9%) of men in West Central Scotland (WCS) 
reported smoking daily in 2003-04.  This is roughly the same in all regions except 
Southern Poland (used as a proxy) where the rate is 39.3 per cent. Smoking rates 
for women were lower than men in every region. However, at 28.4 per cent, the 
percentage of female daily smokers in WCS was highest of all the selected 
regions.  
8.2.2.5.2 Alcohol 
 
Direct comparisons of the total levels of alcohol consumption between the 
selected regions are not possible. However, as we have seen, where comparisons 
can be made, WCS seemingly has higher levels of frequent drinking and lower 
levels of abstinence. This mirrors international comparisons (Figure 3.19 and 
3.20, pg.91) which indicate that Scotland has the second highest proportion of 
daily drinkers (12%) and lowest proportion of abstainers (12%). Note, the Scottish 
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data is based on consumption over a week as opposed to a month; this may 
impact the results (Walsh et al. 2008).  
 
8.2.3 Social capital   
The significance of social capital has been outlined previously.  
8.2.3.1 Religious participation 
Figure 3.14 (pg.88) is based on survey based measurements and indicates the 
percentage of adults who never attend religious ceremonies except on special 
occasions. WCS is close to Moravia-Silesia in this regard with just over 50 per 
cent falling into this category. The figures for the Ruhr (30.6%) and Silesia (5.7%) 
are significantly lower.  
 
8.2.3.2 Voter turnout 
Figure 3.15 (pg.89) shows turnout rates at national parliamentary elections, 
across each region. Turnout was high in the NRW (78.3%) and Moravia-Silesia 
(62.2%). Silesia had the lowest with (54.9%) comparable with WCS (58.3%) and 
NPdC (59%). In terms of change over time, Figure 3.16 (pg.89) shows that in 
1990-93, Moravia-Silesia had the highest turnout and NPdC the lowest, WCS was 
mid ranked. Throughout the 1990s, turnout declined steadily in Moravia-Silesia, 
NPdC and WCS to around 55-60 per cent in 2001. In contrast, turnout in NRW 
remained constant at around 80 per cent across four elections.  
 
8.2.4 Relative poverty  
Figure 3.5 (pg.84) shows the risk of poverty in selected countries across time. 
Although all countries exhibit fluctuations, levels of poverty are consistently 
higher in the UK - although rates in Germany are converging, the rates in the 
other selected countries remain significantly lower. In short, regional level 
poverty rates are typically higher in WCS. This is indicative of the labour market 
and level of social protection in the UK. As Nickell notes: 
 
―Britain has a particularly large number of working-age ―workless 
households‖… these tend, on average, to have significantly lower 
earning power than those in work so that getting them to work would 
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have much less of an impact on poverty than might be imagined, 
unless they receive other benefits‖ (2004:2-3).  
8.2.5 Income inequality  
Figure 3.6 (pg.84) tracks income inequality in the selected host countries from 
the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. With the exception of France, the selected 
countries recorded increases in income inequality between the mid-1980s and 
2004. However, the ranking has remained and Scotland (and the UK) maintained 
the highest level of income inequality for that period. In the 2000-2004 period, 
income inequality in Poland began to converge with Scotland. As discussed in the 
previous case studies, at the regional level, income inequality is higher in WCS 
than the other selected regions.  
 
The national context is important. The increased inequality in gross earnings is a 
consequence of wage inequality and employment polarisation. In the UK, since 
the 1970s, there has been a significant increase in the inequality of weekly 
wages for both male and females. The inequality among female workers is 
greater than between males (Smith 2003). Nielsen et al. (2005) note that the UK 
is unique among West European nations. Income inequality is generally a 
consequence of polarisation. However, in the UK more than any other nation, 
that polarisation is driven by movement from the middle to the bottom of 
income distribution rather than by movement from the middle to the top. 
Deskilling and deindustrialisation have contributed to the rise in income 
inequality which, in a UK context, is exacerbated by the rise of the financial 
services elite (OECD 2011).  
 
Clearly, given the comparative employment rates and levels of income 
inequality and poverty, the anti-poverty strategies of successive UK governments 
that focus predominantly on labour market participation are not working.  
 
8.3 Social protection 
As we have seen, due to the process of deindustrialisation and associated 
pressures of cost-containment, social protection arrangements have been 
transformed in each country. Typically, in the UK, income replacement rates in 
unemployment and retirement were and continue to be lower (Scruggs 2006; 
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Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011). As a consequence of deindustrialisation, many in the 
UK entered into a period of long-term unemployment with meagre benefits: this 
contrasts with the more generous replacement levels in France and Germany and 
the high level of replacement (albeit in a lower wage economy) in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. Also, many in the other regions entered early retirement or 
enjoyed a greater chance of finding a job similar to the one they used to have 
(skilled and possibly in industry or manufacturing). In the UK, the process of 
deindustrialisation itself led to a loss of social protection. The manufacturing 
sector provided workers with a reasonable level of occupational social 
protection but the decline of this sector and the limited re-employment 
opportunities for many of its former workers in the low general-skills service 
sector jobs has significantly reduced overall coverage and security (Seeleib-
Kaiser et al. 2011). 
 
In addition, there has been a steady undermining of the traditionally defined 
‗standard employment relationship‘ as a result of the increase in part-time 
work, fixed-term contracts, temp-agency work and self-employment (Gallie 
2007, 2011; Taylor-Gooby 2004). Although some regard this as essential for 
maintaining flexible labour markets, competitiveness and economic growth 
(Lisbon Process 2000), many worry about the consequences - such as low or 
precarious income, ‗dead-end‘ jobs instead of a career ladder, high job 
insecurity, and poverty in old-age (Schmid 2011). Although these are changes 
that can be seen in all countries, labour market flexibility has been pushed 
further in the UK. Scandinavian countries, like the UK, maintain flexibility 
through low employment protection: however, they ensure income security 
through a generous benefit system. Since the 1980s, the UK has sought to 
improve protection in old age. However, for workers that don‘t have access to 
extra-statutory redundancy, unemployment protection is becoming increasingly 
residual and contingent (Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2010).  
 
In short, the UK‘s liberal welfare regime emphasises deregulation and is 
predicated on a logic that assumes market adjustments will naturally lead, in 
the longer term, to higher employment levels than the dualist coordinated 
regimes typical of Germany and France (Gallie 2007:17). It needs to be 
emphasised again that, in WCS, for much of the 1990s and 2000s, the levels of 
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employment were relatively healthy compared to all the regions covered here. 
However, as we have seen the nature of employment was often atypical, 
protection was minimal and the employment situation is now rapidly changing.  
 
Although there is a danger of repetition, it is worth noting that there are other 
indices that point to social vulnerability: namely (i) with the exception of the 
Ruhr, WCS has the highest number of lone parent and single person households 
(ii) income inequality and poverty rates are also indicative of the low living 
standards. Given the UK skill and production regime, poor levels of income 
security, relative employment protection, increasing unemployment post the 
2008 crisis (relative to the other countries here) this must give rise to concerns. 
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9. Discussion  
Health in West Central Scotland (WCS) has been improving since the industrial 
revolution but its position relative to trends within similar old industrial regions 
across Europe has been deteriorating. Orthodox public health analyses of this 
phenomenon have already been conducted (Walsh et al. 2009; Taulbut et al. 
2011). Therefore, this thesis has sought to augment this understanding with a 
comparative inquiry into the socioeconomic and political contexts of 
deindustrialisation in five countries and regions.   
9.1 Main findings  
This thesis has shown that there was a broad correspondence between life 
expectancy and the socioeconomic/political success of states in CEE and 
Western Europe during the 20th century. The evidence presented clearly shows 
that, in CEE, life expectancy during the 20th century followed the fortunes of 
the party-state (Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000). For decades, 
material circumstances improved and the state acquired increasing legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population - the result was improved health (as reflected in life 
expectancy). This mirrors the arguments made by McKeown about how life 
expectancy improved in England and Wales in the 19th and early 20th century 
(McKeown 1976; Link & Phelan 2002). 
  
  
When the communist states of CEE (and FSU) moved into a period of stagnation 
and stasis, improvements in life expectancy plateaued and then life expectancy 
began to decline (Hertzman et al. 1996; Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 
2000). These trends reflected not only a failure to meet the population‘s 
material needs but also a psychosocial process which involved increasing 
disenfranchisement from the state. Importantly, as illustrated by the 
experiences of Poland and the Czech Republic, the degree to which this 
happened varied between countries of CEE.  
  
The primary drivers of change were privatisation, the associated socioeconomic 
impacts of transition and the introduction of market forces. Where health 
impacts were most severe (e.g. FSU), the process typically involved a 
complete collapse or removal of the state and rapid privatisation on a massive 
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scale (Stuckler King & McKee 2009). Again, the degree to which this happened 
varied between countries of CEE: where social and/or political cohesion were 
preserved for other reasons, health was protected. The examples of Poland and 
the Czech Republic provide evidence of a relationship between political and 
economic stability and health/mortality. Relative to the FSU and other CEE 
countries, both were in a stronger economic position and had relatively well-
developed infrastructure. In addition, their societies had been traditionally more 
open and equal. They were closer politically, geographically, historically and 
culturally to Western commercial traditions and markets.  
  
Individual determinants of health (like health care, pollution or a single health 
related behaviour like alcohol consumption) matter but their importance is 
subordinated within the macro-analysis presented here because they are the 
more proximal causes of ill health. This thesis has been exploring the so-called 
‗causes of the causes‘ or social determinants of health. However, psychosocial 
factors relating to stress, socioeconomic inequality, and health behaviour are 
considered a key - and possibly the critical - factor in the health and mortality 
trends observed in CEE (and the FSU) (Shapiro 1994, 1995; Bobak & Marmot 
1996, 2005; Hertzman et al. 1996; Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià, 2000). 
  
From the review carried out for Western Europe a parallel set of observations 
can be made. During the three decades that followed the Second World War, a 
broad political consensus prevailed (even in the UK), genuine economic 
growth improved living standards, inequalities declined and the state had 
legitimacy (Ruggie 1982; Berend 2006; Persson 2010). The economic pressure 
commonly associated with the oil crises of the 1970s heralded a change (Schmidt 
2003; Hall 2007). Increasingly, the state was regarded by many as powerless in 
the face of globalising forces and, although, for a while at least, a level of 
economic growth was maintained, living standards, particularly in the UK, 
stagnated and inequalities increased (Pierson 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2004; 
Armingeon & Bonoli 2006).  
  
It is again clear that life expectancy follows successful socioeconomic 
development within a state that enjoys support from the population. Economic 
decline and distributive conflict experienced from the 1960s to 1980s provided a 
challenge for each country. The institutional path dependencies and country-
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specific factors outlined in this thesis help to explain the divergence in policy 
responses and subsequent economic development. These societal changes also 
had visible effects on individual determinants of health.  
This conclusion – that life expectancy follows successful economic, social and 
political development - is one of the key findings of this thesis because it 
suggests that the relative failure of life expectancy growth in WCS compared to 
the other regions may well reflect relative economic, social and political failure.  
A second important finding is that, in all the countries covered in this analysis, 
deindustrialisation damages health and slows improvements in life expectancy 
(in some cases putting it into reverse). Clear evidence has been presented that 
deindustrialisation has damaged the social fabric of countries, regions and 
communities and contributes to increasing territorial and social inequality. The 
associated social costs include the loss, to varying degrees, of jobs, homes and 
social protection; reductions in public revenue, which have led to retrenchment 
in necessary public services; increases in crime; deteriorating local 
environments; increases in suicide and other social pathologies; loss of cultural 
resources and a loss of confidence in institutions such as government, business, 
unions and traditional political organisations (Iversen & Cusak 2000; Ostry et al. 
2001; Wren 2001; Russo & Linkon 2009; Walsh et al. 2009; Collins & McCartney 
2011). 
 
Deindustrialisation and the associated job losses increased economic insecurity 
due to long periods of unemployment, intermittent employment and increased 
underemployment. The detrimental effects extended beyond the loss of earnings 
and benefits. Financial insecurity and unemployment contributed to stress and 
increased health problems (Iversen et al. 1987; Martikainen & Valkonen 1996; 
Bartley & Ferrie 2001).  
In all the countries and regions discussed, deindustrialisation, whether defined 
in terms of rapid decline in manufacturing employment or increased 
tertiarisation, has created significant numbers of unemployed who have not 
been reintegrated into the expanding service economy. This has led to the 
emergence of long-term and mass unemployment and an increase in social 
exclusion as secure employment and decent wages are less a feature of the new 
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economy (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2005, 2006; Pintelon et al. 2011). In the 
post-industrial labour market, jobs typically are less well remunerated, offer 
less social protection and are, in many instances, temporary, contingent or part-
time. In addition, post-industrial labour markets are characterised by wage and 
skill polarisation which, in turn, leads to increased inequality (Hamnett 1996; 
Cornia & Paniccià 2000; Danson 2005; Bonoli 2012).  
 
Against this general background, the key point here is that, in common with all 
the regions examined, WCS experienced deindustrialisation and this has been 
associated with particularly poor mortality outcomes. The overarching question 
being addressed by this thesis is why? A series of judgements based on the 
weight of evidence presented earlier in the literature review and case studies 
provide some important learning points.  
 
The tables below (Tables 9.1 – 9.8) summarise the key areas of divergence 
between the selected countries and regions. For each table, a judgement has 
been made concerning the relative advantage or disadvantage for WCS of the 
findings presented. It should be noted that these judgements are made within 
the context of WCS comparative life expectancy and the research concerning the 
socioeconomic determinates of health. For example, although there is an 
acknowledgment of the GDP growth and high levels of employment, the model 
shown in table 9.6, secured for the UK. Those gains relative to the associated 
social (and health) costs are questionable.  
 
Table 9.1 summarises the post-war (1945-1980) models of capitalism in each of 
the countries discussed.  There is divergence in the post-war economic models 
that shaped each of the selected countries and regions. These models influenced 
both post-war economic development and subsequent post-industrial change. In 
each country and region, relative to UK and WCS, the state was able to play a 
greater role in economic development. The role of the UK government is defined 
as liberal (or arms-length): to some extent a consequence of early 
industrialisation, low capital requirements and autonomous elite. This meant 
historically, production in the UK, was decentralised with little state 
intervention, hence the arbitrator role in industry and bystander role in labour. 
This did not stop it from providing assistance to industry on an ad hoc basis or 
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intermittently intervening i.e. nationalising industries. However, relative to the 
other selected countries, it undermined the role of the state in many areas: 
inter-firm relations; investment sources and priorities; and industrial relations.  
 
The path dependencies, shaped by the divergence in models, as highlighted, 
help explain post-war policies and subsequent socioeconomic development. The 
nature of these models shaped the ability of each of the selected countries and 
regions to respond to exogenous economic pressures and negotiate and 
implement necessary domestic reforms. In the UK, enterprises were in 
competition with each other. This affected productivity and labour relations and 
the limited role of the state meant it had little capacity to affect change. 
Businesses were liable to takeovers and investment sources relative to the other 
countries were short-term and motivated by profit. Germany and France by 
contrast, although coordinated differently, both experienced 30 years of 
unprecedented economic growth. In each case, the coordinating institutions and 
state respectively were able direct economic growth. Moreover, due to the level 
of economic growth and inclusion of social partners, labour relations were 
relatively stable. In addition, sources of investment were stable and priorities 
were long-term and in the national socioeconomic interest.  
 
In CEE the state was all encompassing.  Although the development of a military-
industrial complex was a priority so also was the provision of welfare and basic 
needs for the population. The regions selected here, due to their industrial 
speciality, were critical to socialist development as were the workers. This 
remained the case up until the collapse of communism. Relative to the UK and 
WCS, in terms of industry, skills, income equality (and health), the features of 
these models facilitated a more successful economic restructuring and in some 
cases, greater social protection. It is a key conclusion of this thesis that the 
other models managed the course of deindustrialisation and/or were better 
equipped (institutionally) and more concerned ex ante to maintain, to some 
extent, existing socioeconomic relations and mitigate the social costs. This, 
ultimately, had a beneficial impact on life expectancy.  
 
Table 9.2 summarises the industrial development of the five selected regions. 
WCS lost its competiveness earlier than the other selected regions. The 
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industrial development of the region meant the state‘s role in terms of industry 
was narrow. Inter-firm relations were competitive and individualistic; 
investment generally came from private investors and was concerned with 
profit; industrial relations were adversarial; labour, in terms of its collective 
power was fragmented; men typically worked for family owned firms and were 
employed casually with no security.  As a result, demarcation proliferated, 
ossifying customs and practices and preventing modernisation of industry and 
the effective redeployment of labour. The enterprises were locked-in and 
reluctant to do this due to the costs and lack of support from unions (and state) 
(Scott 2004). 
 
The state was unable and unwilling to give direction and reluctant to invest in 
modernisation or accept the social costs of closures due to the political 
consequences. Where decisions were made they were based solely on political 
calculations. Consequently, even by the inter-war period the region was already 
losing its competitive advantage particularly relative to the other regions. The 
other states developed the institutional capacity to direct economic 
development: providing property rights, land reforms, subsidies, state aid and 
protective policies (Persson 2010). Due to cooperation between large enterprises 
(not family owned firms) and the state and more stable sources of capital, 
industries were able to modernise and rationalise more effectively than their UK 
counterparts. This was done via mergers, re-equipment and closer links with 
workers.  
 
By the inter-war period, conditions and practices in coal, steel and shipbuilding 
were superior. For example in coal, mechanisation and electrification was 
common in the inter-war years. Between 1913-1936 output per man per shift 
increased: 81.34 per cent in the Ruhr; 72.46 per cent in Upper Silesia; 50.31 per 
cent in Czechoslovakia; 22.40 per cent in NPdC and only 9.63 per cent in Britain 
(Scott 2004:3). Subsequently and comparatively, in plant terms, in work-practice 
terms on the shop floor, in management-skills terms and in strategic planning 
terms, industry did not develop as its European counterparts had. Moreover, as a 
consequence of this economic development, many of the workers in these 
regions would come to be protected by ‗bismarkian‘ corporatist, compulsory 
health and social insurance schemes (Cerami 2006). It is important to note that 
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the level of development and institutional legacy present in Poland and the 
Czech Republic is one source of their advantage after the collapse of 
communism. Thus, the legacy of industrial development in WCS is judged to be 
relatively disadvantageous compared to the other regions.  
 
Table 9.3 summarises the timing and speed of deindustrialisation and the 
national responses. The deindustrialisation of Europe‘s economies presented a 
significant challenge, the greatest since World War II, heralding an era of 
profound change. In the past four decades, the share of manufacturing 
employment in France, Germany and the UK has fallen dramatically. In the 
corresponding regions this decline has been most acute. A similar change has 
taken place in CEE. However, these regions, and the workers therein, remained 
critical to the development of socialism until its collapse in 1989. Moreover, 
although there has been significant privatisation, both of the countries and 
regions in CEE maintain and continue to develop relatively large industrial 
sectors.  
 
Deindustrialisation was quick and severe in the UK, particularly in WCS. For 
reasons outlined, manufacturing and industry were already in decline. The UK‘s 
introduction of a Keynesian stimulus and attempt at industrial control to protect 
against recession were ultimately unsuccessful. The UK model of market or 
liberal capitalism seemingly lacked the institutional capacity to maintain or 
diversify its industrial structure. Effectively, this failure to intervene saw the 
Conservatives under Thatcher come to power. From this point, 
deindustrialisation became inevitable as monetarist policies were adopted, 
industrial subsidies scrapped, labour market flexibility sought and further 
deregulation and liberalisation introduced. Manufacturing and industry 
experienced a form of ‗shock therapy‘ as the accelerated and blunt 
‗rationalisation‘ led to a comparatively high proportion of industrial jobs lost, 
high unemployment and social discord. Subsequent government policies 
facilitated the ongoing tertiarisation of the economy which led to 
deindustrialisation, deskilling, income inequality and a reduction in social 
protection.  
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In contrast, both France and Germany pursued solutions with established social 
partners within the established structures of governance and economic relations. 
In Germany, this was driven by strategic coordination and in France it was 
mediated by the State. Both were resistant to the notion of deindustrialisation 
as an inevitable process and were reluctant to bear the social costs. The process 
of deindustrialisation entailed a period of state investment and increased 
subsidies followed by consolidation and diversification into new and related 
industries and technologies. Both countries sought to improve productivity and 
also to introduce some labour market flexibility and deregulation. Although 
tertiarisation is a feature in both countries, broadly speaking there has not been 
the associated levels of deindustrialisation and deskilling either nationally or 
regionally. Relative to the UK and WCS, French and German enterprises were 
able to diversify and, to a degree, maintain some industrial identity, capacity 
and employment.  
 
In CEE, when communism collapsed both Poland and the Czech Republic were, in 
the context of CEE (and FSU), relatively stable macro-economically and able to 
facilitate the transition to market capitalism reasonably effectively. However, 
the changes were significant and both countries (and the region generally) 
experienced recession and increasing unemployment as a consequence. 
Privatisation in terms of economic restructuring or deindustrialisation was 
gradual and often piecemeal. The timing of deindustrialisation in CEE compared 
to Western Europe meant the changes occurred in a different global and political 
context. In CEE, deindustrialisation took place both within the developing 
globalisation of the 1990s and also within the transition to post-Communist rule. 
Thus, there were additional pressures of institutional and social change in CEE 
compared to the context for deindustrialisation in WCS and the rest of Western 
Europe.  
 
In the Czech Republic, as in the UK, the market was expected to stimulate the 
economy and create working opportunities. In addition, local government 
structures were abandoned. As a result, projects and interventions to stimulate 
economic development were often poorly coordinated. As such there was limited 
restructuring of workforces, although some alternative employment and training 
places were established. In Poland, efforts to manage and mitigate the 
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restructuring process, although not always coordinated or united, were 
relatively well financed by central government. Moreover, regional governments 
and authorities were preserved and so, consequently, was a level of mutual trust 
and cooperation at the regional level. Thus, the rate and severity of 
deindustrialisation in WCS can be judged as having placed the region at a 
relative disadvantage.  
 
Table 9.4 summarises the comparative levels of social protection available 
during the period of deindustrialisation. In Western Europe, a feature of the 
post-war period was the further development of social protection to protect 
against unemployment, sickness and retirement. In this respect, Germany and 
France went further than the UK. By 1960, spending as a proportion of GDP or 
per capita was greater than in the UK. Moreover, these countries had a greater 
hand in achieving some level of equality. While the UK limited its role to 
redistribution, Germany and France intervened in the labour market to secure 
social policy objectives via collective agreements and legislation respectively.  
 
In the UK, the advent of deindustrialisation led to a reduction in what was 
already a comparatively low level of social protection. Typically, benefits were 
means tested and provided at a flat rate. Moreover, the income replacement 
rates did not match that of Germany or France. In addition, the proportion of 
the workforce likely to receive redundancy was also low. As a result, many 
workers, particularly men from manufacturing and industry, entered into long 
periods of unemployment and inactivity while all the other countries augmented 
their social protection to limit the social costs of deindustrialisation and 
transition in CEE. Successive UK governments, starting with the Conservatives 
under Thatcher at the height of deindustrialisation, have instigated welfare 
reform and looked to limit social expenditure even though that has led to 
increasing inequality.  
 
In Germany, the comparative level of social protection was higher. In addition, 
labour market pressure was alleviated via the bread-winner model. Although, 
deindustrialisation nationally was a feature of the 1980s and 1990s, many 
industrial areas were experiencing deindustrialisation by the 1970s. 
Consequently, social protection was further augmented and measures were 
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introduced to mitigate against the expected social costs. Notably, early 
retirement and disability was used to reduce the size of the workforce. 
Additional measures included limiting immigration and extending the amount of 
time the young spent in education. Although, in the mid-1980s there was some 
reduction in income replacement rates for benefits, they remained 
comparatively high when compared with the UK. The significant restructuring of 
the economy in Germany was done gradually, accompanied by creation of 
working places, training schemes and compensation packages.  
 
In France, the comparative level of social protection was also high. 
Deindustrialisation and particularly unemployment were a concern for France by 
the 1980s. However, like Germany, France sought to limit the social costs. The 
influence and spending of the state saw firms restructure their workforces and 
put plans in place to provide retraining and compensation packages. In the 
1980s, rather than reduce protection and entitlements to compensate for the 
increases in the unemployed, like the UK, France also expanded its early 
retirement schemes to alleviate labour market pressures and ensure former 
workers had adequate incomes. Money that had formerly subsidised industries 
was now used to increase benefits and subsidise training and job creation 
schemes. In addition, the minimum wage was increased, working week reduced 
to 39 hours and many additional public sector jobs created.  
 
In CEE, until 1989 the social protection systems were broad and universal and 
coverage of important social programmes such as pensions, sickness, family 
support systems and medical care was very high, often close to 100 per cent. 
With transition, employment reduced dramatically as GDP declined and foreign 
and domestic demand for goods reduced. Within this context, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland‘s proximity to the West and legacy of civil society was an advantage. 
For a time, both countries alleviated the transition costs by increasing social 
spending and providing benefits similar in scope to Germany and France. In 
addition, the Czech Republic limited levels of unemployment by delaying 
restructuring of many enterprises – in effect labour hoarding. Poland, like 
Germany and France, introduced early retirement and extended disability 
payments. In addition, both used job creation and public works schemes to 
engage unemployed workers. These measures were clearly designed to limit the 
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costs of transition. By the mid-1990s, the levels of benefit were scaled back. In 
addition, employment legislation was revised significantly reducing workers‘ 
protection. Thus, the relatively low levels of social protection in WCS can be 
judged as a relative disadvantage. 
 
Table 9.5 summarises the regional responses to deindustrialisation. In WCS, the 
role of local authorities and agencies is somewhat determined by the actions and 
policy direction of central government. The degree of autonomy or 
decentralisation, relative to all the other selected regions is limited. Although, 
local government was a relatively strong player in the post-war era, reforms by 
the Conservatives in the early 1980s have undermined its role. Since then, 
governments have imposed financial constraints on local government through the 
capping of local rates and finally replacing them first by the poll tax and 
subsequently by the Council tax. The functional role of local government was 
also curtailed by the Scottish Development Agency, through compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT) which exposed traditional local tasks to market 
forces and the option granted to certain institutions to opt out of local control 
into Quango‘s financially dependent on the central government (e.g. grant 
maintained schools, Housing Associations etc.). Accordingly, the options 
available to WCS at the local level were restricted, particularly considering the 
limited role it had in industry. As such, policies implemented at the regional 
level mirror the approach nationally in that they are primarily concerned with 
facilitating consumer spending and ongoing development of the service sector.  
 
Attempts to facilitate a new industrial base, in the ‗new towns‘, were largely 
unsuccessful with many of the so-called branch-plant and sunrise industries 
eventually closing or relocating. As such, policies implemented at the regional 
level reflect the lack of a coordinated approach - be that national or regional. 
They also reflect a lack of concern with national economic context and 
differences in industrial structure and divisions of labour. The primary driver is 
growth or competitiveness. As such, they were/are primarily concerned with 
urban regeneration and facilitating consumer spending and ongoing development 
of the, predominantly routine, service sector. This policy has contributed to 
ongoing deindustrialisation and deskilling in the region and has only just 
maintained the level of employment in the region.  
Chapter 9  245 
In Germany, federalisation ensures a politically and functionally strong level of 
regional government. Moreover, the coordinating institutions, a characteristic of 
Germany nationally, are also a feature regionally. As such, relative to WCS, the 
Ruhr was able to restructure its economy successfully, whilst maintaining 
existing social and economic relations to a significant degree.  
 
In France, decentralisation measures were introduced in part as a response to 
the socioeconomic pressures associated with deindustrialisation. Regional and 
local government in NPdC have successfully exploited national programmes for 
economic development and facilitated a degree of concerted action regionally 
(and inter-regionally). Moreover, industry facilitated by the state was able to 
diversify into new and related technologies and enterprises.  
 
In CEE, the level of local autonomy was greater in Katowice and this was 
reflected in the relative fortunes of each region. However, in N.Moravia 
stakeholders were able to coalesce and lobby effectively for state investment. In 
addition, the role of inward investment has been particularly successful and 
durable. Thus, the lack of autonomy and decentralisation in WCS relative to the 
other regions (with the possible exception of N.Moravia) is considered a 
significant disadvantage.  
 
Table 9.6 summarises the current economic models or varieties of capitalism of 
the selected countries. The typologies outlined are idealised but are useful in 
characterising the current economic contexts of the countries and regions 
analysed in this thesis.  
 
Comparatively speaking, in terms of coordination, the UK is if anything more 
reliant on the market and formal contracts as a means of coordination.  France 
and Germany still rely on inter-firm networks and associations albeit to a lesser 
extent.  If one considers the comparative levels of deindustrialisation, skill and 
income polarisation in each country and region, this means of coordination has 
been a particular advantage when it comes to economic restructuring.  
Moreover, the presence of those coordinating institutions has facilitated 
restructuring and the necessary implementation of policy reform largely within 
the sphere of existing socioeconomic relations.  Due to the high levels of FDI and 
Chapter 9  246 
foreign ownership in CEE, which exceed that in the other selected countries (and 
regions), the investment decisions of transnational corporations (TNCs) have 
become a significant coordinating mechanism in both Poland and the Czech 
Republic.  
 
In terms of raising capital, the UK remains reliant on the less stable sources 
provided by domestic and international markets. Although this is increasingly a 
feature in Germany and France, the level remains balanced due to the ongoing 
support of domestic banks and more stable sources of internally generated 
funds. In CEE, the dependency on foreign capital and foreign owned banks for 
domestic lending is greater than in Western Europe. This means newly emerging 
SME‘s are largely dependent on foreign financing. Moreover, the areas in which 
Poland and the Czech Republic are most successful, automobiles, manufacturing 
and electronics are predominantly foreign owned. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, one would expect a degree of change given 
the increase in globalisation. While the number of family owned interests in the 
UK has decreased, control was historically exercised in many cases by markets 
and shareholders. The degree to which this occurs has obviously increased as 
corporate control based on financial markets ultimately supervises management. 
In Germany and France, managers remain accountable to holders of large blocks 
of stock and the domestic banks that continue to provide funding fulfiling their 
role as social partners. In CEE, the level of foreign ownership means corporate 
decisions are negotiated between managers of CEE subsidiaries and their 
supervisors based in the Western headquarters of the TNCs, rather than 
negotiated between managers and shareholders.  
 
In terms of industrial relations, but for a few remaining agreements (largely in 
the public sector), they are in the UK increasingly market based, more so than 
any country or region selected here. In Germany and to a lesser extent France, 
there remains a significant degree of cooperation and sector-wide and national 
agreements are still common place. Poland and the Czech Republic have no 
culture of hiring and firing like the UK or a corporatist system of collective 
bargaining and agreements such as in Germany or France. Given that high wages 
and union density might deter TNCs, the position of labour in CEE is relatively 
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weak. However, given that enterprises and workers in these TNCs are part of a 
global commodity chain, and that TNCs have invested heavily within the region 
(in contrast to WCS) it is within their interest to keep labour content. Moreover, 
replacing skilled labour and avoiding free-rider problems are a concern. As such, 
TNCs tend not to promote the hire and fire relationships observed in the UK, and 
seek to conciliate workers in terms of their work conditions.  
 
In terms of technology transfer and innovation, in the UK this continues to be 
facilitated by the market and formal contracts. Typically, in Germany and 
France this is facilitated via business cooperation. In Poland and the Czech 
Republic, broadly speaking research and development is conducted outwith the 
region and introduced via TNCs when required. However, technology transfer has 
occurred in the region and this has contributed to their current competitive 
advantage. Thus, the current variety of capitalism in the UK and, therefore, WCS 
is considered a relative disadvantage.   
 
Table 9.7 summarises the current levels of social protection available in the 
selected countries and regions. Important in comparative terms, is the fact that 
in the UK social protection can, in the absence of collective bargaining 
agreements, be curtailed further. The support provided to vulnerable labour 
market groups is relatively poor and the level of income inequality is high as are 
the at risk of poverty rates. Income inequality and poverty rates are also 
indicative of the low living standards for the unemployed: a consequence of a 
low-level largely means tested, benefits system. This is particularly critical given 
the UK skill and production regime, poor levels of income security, relative 
employment protection, increasing unemployment post the 2008 crisis (relative 
to the other countries here) and experience of WCS within that context. As 
established, there are wide country variations in the level of state support for 
the integration of the unemployed. They diverge in terms of the extent to which 
they provide benefits that maintain the living standards of the unemployed and 
in the expenditure on training provision and assistance in finding new work.  
 
In light of the experience of OIRs and increased prevalence of New Social Risks 
more generally, over the last two decades, so-called active labour market 
policies have been established across OECD countries suggesting some degree of 
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convergence. The UK has chosen, almost exclusively, to focus on incentive 
reinforcement i.e. ‗welfare to work‘. In this context a number of, often local, 
social inclusion initiatives have emerged to re-regulate local labour markets, by 
introducing conditionality, increasing the degree of employability of individuals 
and inducing them into the jobs being created through processes of economic 
restructuring. As such, contemporary macroeconomic policy practice eschews 
traditional regional policy interventions tending towards supply-side 
interventions in the labour market. In WCS, rather than reduce polarisation and 
exclusion this has created new divisions and increased inactivity. In the UK and 
WCS, deindustrialisation, as we have seen, has lowered levels of social 
protection. Again, this is judged to be a comparative disadvantage in terms of 
health. 
 
Table 9.8 provides a summary of the wider determinants of health for each of 
the selected regions.  In terms of education and skills, WCS seemingly does well 
with the highest proportion of the adult population with tertiary qualifications. 
However, when one also notes the proportion of adults with few or no 
qualifications and considers the divergence in Higher Education in the UK, the 
data indicate the level of skill polarisation in WCS relative to the other regions. 
In terms of household structure, WCS along with the Ruhr, has the highest 
proportions of lone parent and single person households. In terms of social 
capital, voter turnout and religious participation, WCS is comparatively low. Two 
factors which some would consider symptomatic of social dislocation are 
teenage pregnancy and alcohol and tobacco use. In terms of teenage pregnancy, 
WCS has a significantly higher rate than the other selected regions. In terms of 
alcohol and tobacco use, WCS is only exceptional in terms of female smoking, 
with the highest rate of all the regions. However this is somewhat misleading. As 
Figure 1.4 (pg.24) illustrates, alcohol harm figures show WCS suffers 
comparatively more than other regions (Walsh et al. 2009; Taulbut et al. 2011).  
 
It is important to note that the other regions are not ‗better‘ than WCS on all 
factors: there is a complex picture to be understood in each region. Rather, 
what is being argued is that there are a series of national and regional factors at 
work in WCS which have made the aftershock of deindustrialisation particularly 
severe. Each of the countries and regions that have been analysed in this thesis 
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took a different path. However, no single common factor seems to emerge as an 
explanation for this. Rather, a complex picture has emerged which can only be 
interpreted through judgement and nuanced arguments. That is what this thesis 
has sought to achieve.  
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9.1.1 Summary tables  
Table 9.1: Characteristics of post-war economic models (1945-1980) 
 UK (1) West Germany (2) France (3) CEE’s (4) 
Government Role 
Policy on Industry 
Policy on Labour  
Liberal 
Arbitrator 
Bystander  
Enabling 
Facilitator 
Bystander 
Interventionist 
Director  
Organiser  
Totalitarian 
Controller 
Representative 
Inter-firm relations 
 
 
Competitive 
Contractual 
Individualistic 
Cooperative 
Mutually reinforcing 
Network based 
State led 
State mediated 
Centrally controlled 
Command economy  
Investment sources 
Time horizons 
Goals  
Capital markets 
Short-term 
Secure profits 
Banks 
Long-term 
Increase firm value 
State 
Medium-term 
National political economic 
priorities 
State 
Long-term 
Military-industrial complex 
Industrial relations 
Management-labour 
Wage-bargaining  
 
Adversarial 
Fragmented 
 
Cooperative  
Coordinated  
 
Adversarial 
State-controlled 
 
Determined by the party- State 
Judgement  Disadvantage Advantage Mixed Mixed 
Source: adapted from Schmidt 2002 
1. UK model discussed section: Appendix A and section 3.2. For further discussion see also: Shonfield 1965; Lane 1989; Grant 1995; Schmidt 2002; Hall 2007 
2. West German model discussed section: Appendix A and section 3.2 For further discussion see also: Shonfield 1965; Lane 1989; Katzenstein 1995; Schmidt 2002; Hall 2007 
3. French model discussed section: Appendix A and section 3.2 For further discussion see also: Shonfield 1965; Lane 1989; Schmidt 2002; Hall 2007 
4. CEE model discussed section: Appendix A and section 3.1 For further discussion see also: Lane 1982, Brus 1986; Kornai 1992; Berend 1996
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Table 9.2: Industrial development of selected regions  
  
 
WCS (1) 
 
 
Ruhr (2) 
 
 
NPdC (3) 
 
 
Katowice (4) 
 
 
N.Moravia (5) 
 
 
Historical 
Industrial 
development 
 
 
 
Initial development linked to 
geography and wealth originating 
from the British Empire. 19th 
century coal, steel and related 
industries developed within WCS. 
The region‘s peak was in the 
early 1900s. Due to wars 
affecting competitors region 
remained competitive until the 
1950s.  
 
 
Development due to presence 
of coal and ore. 
Industrialisation in mid-19th 
century led to urbanisation and 
population growth. Coal and 
steel nexus led to power 
generation and a chemical 
industry. Region‘s industry in 
terms of coal and steel peaked 
in late 1950s.  
 
 
 
Region became industrial centre 
during the nineteenth century 
specialising in steel coal and 
textiles. Due to geography suffered 
extensively during both wars The 
region industrial peak was in the 
late 1950s by which time coal was 
in decline followed by steel and 
textiles in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Coal and steel led to 
industrialisation and urbanisation 
of the region. By 1930s majority 
of regions inhabitants, unlike 
Poland generally, worked in 
industry. 
 
Establishment of communism 
meant process of industrialisation 
and urbanisation intensified. The 
industrialisation was 
accompanied by increase in 
population. This continued until 
1989. 
 
Coal and steel led to 
industrialisation and urbanisation 
of the region.  
 
Establishment of communism 
meant processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation 
intensified. By the 1980s the 
region was producing 75 per cent 
of Czechoslovakia‘s coal. At the 
time Czechoslovakia was largest 
producer per capita in the world. 
 
Historical 
institutional 
development  
In the inter-war and post-war 
period the early industrial 
development and arms-length 
approach of the state.  Meant 
WCS context characterised by a 
lack of inter-firm coordination 
and stable sources of investment, 
hostile industrial relation 
hindered economic development, 
particularly in post-war, and 
shaped the future path of 
deindustrialisation.  
Institutional legacy developed 
which in post-war would be 
developed and augmented. 
Included: inter-firm networks 
and technology sharing, stable 
sources of investment, 
corporatist industrial relations 
and skills formation.  
Institutional legacy determined by 
the interventionist role of the 
state. This was augmented by 
shared educational background of 
decision makers at level of 
government and industry. 
 
Dirigisme facilitated indicative 
planning and enabled the state to 
mediate inter-firm relations; 
sources of  investment and 
coordination with social partners  
Initial institutional development 
similar to that found in Germany. 
This would prove an important 
legacy in the future. 
 
Although under communism 
region subject to central planning 
and command economy. Due to 
industrial speciality workers in 
region remained central to 
industrial development. In 
addition region able to develop a 
strong sense of identity.  
Initial institutional development 
similar to that found in Germany. 
This would prove an important 
legacy in the future. 
 
Although under communism 
region subject to central planning 
and command economy. Due to 
industrial speciality workers in 
region remained central to 
industrial development.  
 
Judgement  
 
Disadvantage 
 
Advantage 
 
Advantage 
 
Mixed 
 
Mixed 
(1) WCS discussed sections:  1; 8; 8.1; 8.1.1; 8.1.2; 8.2 (2) Ruhr discussed sections: 4; 4.1; 4.1.1; 4.1.2; 4.2 (3) NPdC discussed sections: 5; 5.1; 5.1.1; 5.1.1.2; 5.2 (4) Katowice discussed sections: 6; 6.1; 6.2 (5) N.Moravia discussed 
section: 7; 7.1; 7.2 
 For further UK/WCS discussion see: Coates 1994; Grant 1995;  
 For further W.Germany/Ruhr discussion see: Katzenstein 1989; Bross & Walter 2000; Hospers 2004 
 For further France/ NPdC discussion see:  Hayward 1973; Tuppen 1983; Baert & Fraser 2003; Paris 2009 
 For further Poland/ Katowice (Upper Silesia) discussion see: Szczepanski 1997; Durand 2009 
 For Czechoslovakia/ N.Moravia (Moravia-Silesia) discussion see: Eckart et al. 2003 
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Table 9.3: Timing and speed of deindustrialisation and national responses  
 UK (1) West Germany (2) France (3) Poland (4) Czech Republic (5) 
 
Timing 
Loss of manufacturing 
employment 1960-1979 which 
accelerated in the 1980s and 
1990s. Unemployment was 
significant in the 1970s becoming 
acute in the 1980s. 
Loss of manufacturing jobs 
becomes significant in mid-1970s. 
The rate of manufacturing 
employment decline slows after 
1980s. Unemployment significant 
in the 1990s. 
Loss of manufacturing employment 
1960-1979 which accelerated in the 
1980s and 1990s. Unemployment 
becomes significant late 1980s and 
through the 1990s.  
Loss of manufacturing 
employment expected post 
1989 due to overstaffing. 
Unemployment significant 
early 1990s and late 1990s 
early 00‘s.  
Loss of manufacturing 
employment expected post 
1989 due to over staffing. 
Unemployment broadly 
speaking low although became 
significant in late 1990s.  
Speed Fast and facilitated Gradual and socially managed Gradual and  socially managed Fast but socially managed Resisted and  then fast  
 
Policy Response 
Economy 
End of Keynesian economic 
management and orientation 
towards monetarism. 
Unemployment no longer priority. 
Focus on inflation and interest 
rates.   
Broadly maintained Keynesian 
approach and introduced 
‗competitive austerity‘ to restrain 
inflation through 1980s.  
Broadly maintained Keynesian 
approach attempted to 
accommodate inflation via wage 
restraint.  
‗Shock therapy‘ via 
institutional and market 
liberalisation, deregulation and 
macroeconomic stability.  
‗Shock therapy‘ via 
institutional and market 
liberalisation, deregulation and 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
Policy Response  
Industry  
Unsuccessful intervention 
followed by privatisation and 
blunt rationalisation. 
Facilitate tertiarisation via labour 
market policy. 
Maintain and augment where 
possible HQP for export. 
1980s increase productivity via 
‗negotiated –adjustments‘ i.e. 
increased flexibility in working 
hours and practices. 
Increased state support and 
subsidies to industry – particularly 
‗national champions‘.  Mid 1980s 
state directed privatisation, 
introduction of market forces and 
some deregulation.  
Privatisation initially by various 
schemes. Broadly speaking the 
process was gradual and 
piecemeal.  
Post 1995 so-called mass 
privatisation however pace still 
comparatively gradual. 
Privatisation seemingly fast 
however privatised assets 
indirectly controlled by State. 
Therefore process gradual and 
protracted. 
 
Policy response  
Labour  
 
Undermining and marginalisation 
of trade unions. Increased labour 
market flexibility and 
deregulation.  
Labour reduction via breadwinner 
model of welfare and use of early 
retirement and disability.  
Strengthening of employment 
protection laws. 
Labour reduction via breadwinner 
model of welfare and use of early 
retirement and disability. 
Strengthening of employment 
protection laws. Increase role for 
workers and unions in economic 
decision making.  
Labour reduction via use of 
early retirement and pre-
retirement benefits. 
Significant labour hoarding in 
Czech Republic hence increase 
in unemployment late 1990s 
once this became 
unsustainable.  
Judgement  Disadvantage  Advantage Advantage Advantage Disadvantage 
(1) Appendix A: UK discussed sections:  2.3.1; 2.4.1 (2) W.Germany discussed sections:  2.3.1; 2.4.2   (3) France discussed section:  2.3.1; 2.4.3 (4) Poland discussed sections:  1.3.1; 1.3.2 (5) Czech Republic discussed sections: 1.3.1; 
1.3.3 
 For further discussion deindustrialisation see: Singh 1977; Martin & Rowthorn 1986; Glyn & Rowthorn  1988; Rodwin & Sazanami 1991. For privatisation see: Roland 1994, 2002; Baltowski & Mickiewicz 2000; Meggison & Netter 
2001; King 2007; King & Sznajder 2008; Hamm et al. 2012 
 For further discussion policy responses to deindustrialisation see : Katzenstein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall 1993, 2007; Esping-Andersen 1996;  Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; Iversen & Cusack 2000; Wren 2001 
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Table 9.4: Level of social protection from the state at time of deindustrialisation and privatisation  
 UK (1) Germany (2) France (3) Poland (4) Czech Republic (5) 
 
Existing  
protection  
1970s and 1980s level of social 
spending as proportion of GDP and 
per capita less than Germany and 
France.  
Typically benefits universal, means-
tested and provided at a flat rate.  
Consequently comparatively low 
income replacement rates in 
unemployment and retirement  
1970s and 1980s highest levels of 
social spending of all selected 
countries.  
Typically benefits variable linked to 
occupation and previous earnings.  
Consequently higher income 
replacement rates in retirement and 
unemployment.  
1970s and 1980s slightly lower level of 
social spending than Germany 
significantly higher than UK. 
System managed by social partners. 
Benefits variable generally linked to 
occupation and previous earnings.  
Consequently higher income 
replacement rates in retirement and 
unemployment. 
Unemployment benefit 
schemes introduced in the first 
phase of the transition process 
were similar to the corporatist 
schemes existing in Western 
Europe, with earnings-related 
benefits at levels and durations 
similar in size to the OECD 
average.  
1992 benefit scaled back to 
means tested flat rate.  
Unemployment benefit schemes 
introduced in the first phase of 
the transition process were 
rather similar to the corporatist 
schemes existing in Western 
Europe, with earnings-related 
benefits at levels and durations 
similar in size to the OECD 
average.  
1992 replacement levels, 
duration and maximum benefits 
were reduced. Still earnings (not 
occupation related) related. 
 
Additional 
protection  
 
Coverage for redundancy packages 
low.  
Early retirement schemes and some 
use of disability.  
Increased pension benefits for low-
paid.      
Early retirement schemes and some 
use of disability.  
Public job creation. 
Increase minimum wage. 
Early retirement schemes and 
some use of disability. Easy 
access to benefits during 
transition.  
Public works.  
Job creation schemes. 
Some use of retirement and 
disability. 
 
 
Alleviating 
Factors 
 
Degree of tertiarisation and labour 
market flexibility. Led to an 
increase in employment (albeit 
atypical) and reduction in 
unemployment levels relative to 
Germany and France.  
Coordinated economic development.  
Pace of deindustrialisation.  
Breadwinner model.  
Return of migrant workers. 
Influence of the State. 
Pace of deindustrialisation. 
Breadwinner model.  
Return of migrant workers. 
Pace of deindustrialisation. 
 
Pace of deindustrialisation. 
Labour hoarding. 
Judgement  Disadvantage Advantage Advantage Mixed Mixed 
1. Appendix A: (1) UK discussed sections:  2.5; 2.5.1 (2)  W.Germany discussed sections:  2.5; 2.5.2    (3) France discussed sections:  2.5; 2.5.3   (4) Poland  discussed section: 1.4 (5) Czech Republic discussed section: 1.4 
 For further UK discussion see: Esping-Andersen 1989; Whiteside & Salais 1998; Whiteside 2000; Scruggs 2006; Fleckenstein et al. 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011 
 For Germany see: Esping-Andersen 1989; Lewis 1992; Scruggs 2006; Palier & Thelen 2010; Fleckenstein et al. 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011 
 For France see: Esping-Andersen 1989; Whiteside & Salais 1998; Whiteside 2000; Scruggs 2006; Palier & Thelen 2010; Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011 
 For discussion use of early retirement (and disability) see: Mirkin 1987; Ebbinghaus 2006 
 For CEE see: Nesporova 2002; Cazes & Nesporova 2004; Cerami 2006, 2007; Cerami & Vanhuysse 2009; Izyumov 2010 
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Table 9.5: Regional responses to deindustrialisation  
 WCS (1) Ruhr (2) NPdC (3) Katowice (4) N.Moravia (5) 
De-centralisation Low: due to level of decentralisation regional 
responses were indicative of national policy. 
Carried out by unelected regional 
representatives of national government or 
quangos i.e. Scottish Office, Scottish 
Development Agency etc.  
High: Coordinating institutions 
typical of Germany particularly 
strong at regional level due to 
industrial historic legacy.  A 
situation augmented by federal 
nature of Germany. In that Land 
rather than federal interests take 
priority.  
Medium: Critical influence was regional 
mayor Pierre Mauroy who aggregated 
local interests and raised economic and 
political profile of the region.  This 
political capital increased the ability of 
the region to utilise European and 
national programmes for regional 
development.  Succeeding mayors 
maintain this influence.  
Medium: strong regional 
lobby and government 
often well represented at 
national level. Developed a 
‗regional contract‘ as a 
road map for future 
industrial and socio 
economic development of 
the region. 
Low: removal of regional 
government led local 
stakeholders to concert efforts. 
Establishing regional bank and 
creation of special economic 
zones. In addition lobbied 
central government to recognise 
problems and establish a 
regional development plan. 
 
Regional 
response  
 
 
 
Interventions in traditional industries 
effectively limited to nationalisation leading 
to rationalisation and closure. UK neoliberal 
model effectively abandoned industrial 
policy.  
Up until 1980s development of new towns to 
create hubs of mass-production and create 
‗new‘ industrial base out of Glasgow and 
Clydeside. Local agencies would lobby or 
compete to attract inward investment from 
branch-plant/sunrise industries. 
Post 1980s UK reduces regional spending. 
Local authorities/agencies in conjunction 
with private sector start regeneration and 
consumer-based recovery based on 
development of retail, cultural industries and 
routine services. A policy which effectively 
continues to this day.  
Initially coordinating institutions 
sought to maintain existing 
socioeconomic structure through 
defensive policies: increasing 
investment and productivity. 
Closures and redundancies that did 
occur were typically gradual and 
socially controlled.  
Mid 1980s coordinating institutions 
shifted emphasis to diversification 
into new and related technologies 
and enterprises, In particular 
environmental technologies. Also 
utilised industrial heritage to great 
acclaim.  
Although ‗new‘ approach broke up 
established milieus it remained in 
corporatist tradition.  
State sought to direct growth from 
centre to periphery this has meant 
development of educational institutions 
and transport infrastructure.  
Existing industries sought to diversify 
into new and related technologies and 
enterprises with some success.  
Geographical location and development 
of transport infrastructure and education 
has consolidated regions position as a 
hub for home shopping and mail order.  
‗Inter-communal‘ assistance introduced 
to facilitate even development and 
solidarity between poorer urban 
communes and wider region.  
Region although not 
completely autonomous 
from central government 
able to direct restructuring 
and associated efforts to 
stimulate regional 
economy. 
Number of development 
agencies established to 
promote region, encourage 
investment and facilitate 
establishment of SMEs.    
Special economic zones 
facilitated influx of 
transnational corporations 
and creation of new jobs. 
Regional enterprises slow to 
restructure subject to labour 
hoarding.  
Had some success in creating 
economic zones. However, 
Katowice has the advantage in 
this regard.  
Some success in the 
development of automobile and 
electronic clusters. Both of 
which have had success in 
creating new employment.  
Judgement Disadvantage Advantage  Advantage Advantage Disadvantage 
(1) WCS section: 8.1.1; 8.1.2; 8.2 (2) Ruhr section:  4.1.2; 4.1.2.1; 4.2   (3) NPdC sections: 5.1.2; 5.1.3; 5.2 (4) Katowice sections: 6.1.1; 6.1.2; 6.2 (5) N.Moravia section: 7.1.1; 7.1.2; 7.2 
 For further WCS discussion see: Payne 1985; MacInnes 1995; Robertson 1998; Kantor 2000; Foster 2003; Tretter 2008 
 For further Ruhr discussion see: Grabher 1993; Hassink 1993; Danielzyk & Wood 1993; Kilper & Wood 1995; Goch 2002; Hospers 2004; Hilbert et al. 2004;  
 For further NPdC discussion see: Wannup 1995; Budd 1997; Morgan & Nauwelaers 1998;  Fraser & Baert 2003; Schulz et al. 2004; Liefooghe 2005;  
 For further Katowice (Upper Silesia) discussion see: Szczepañski & Cybula 1998; Domanski 2002; Eckart et al. 2003; Sucháček 2005; Bafoil 2010; Dyker 2010 
 For N.Moravia (Moravia-Silesia) discussion see: Nesporova 1998; Eckart et al. 2003; McMaster 2004; Sucháček 2005; Myant 2010; Sucháček et al. 2012
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Table 9.6: Current economic models i.e. three varieties of capitalism  
 
 
 
Liberal Market Economy 
UK 
Coordinated Market Economy 
Germany and France  
Dependent Market Economy 
Poland and Czech Republic 
Mechanism of coordination  
 
 
Competitive markets and formal contracts Inter-firm networks and associations Dependence on intra-firm hierarchies within 
transnational enterprises  
Primary source of capital 
 
 
Domestic and international capital markets  Domestic banks and internally generated 
funds  
Foreign direct investment and foreign-owned 
banks  
Corporate governance  
 
 
Outsider control and dispersed shareholders Insider control and concentrated shareholders Control by headquarters of transnational 
corporations 
Industrial relations 
 
 
Pluralist, market based; few collective agreements  Corporatist, consensual; sector-wide even 
national agreements  
Concessions to skilled labour; company level 
collective agreements 
Transfer of innovation and 
technologies  
 
 
Based on markets and formal contracts  Central role of joint ventures and business 
associations  
Intra-firm transfer within transnational enterprise  
Comparative advantage 
 
 
 
Radical innovation of technology and service sector  Incremental innovation of capital goods Assembly platforms for semi-standardised 
industrial goods 
Judgement  
 
Disadvantage  Advantage Mixed 
Source: (Nolke & Vliegenthart 2009:680) 
 
 For West European discussion see: Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Soskice 1994, 1999; Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancké et al. 2007 
 For CEE discussion see: Lane & Myant 2007; Nölke & Vliegenthart 2009; Drahokoupil & Myant 2010; Myant & Drahokoupil 2012 
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Table 9.7: Current levels and type of social protection  
 UK (1) Germany (2) France (3) Poland (4) Czech Republic (5) 
 
Character  
Underdeveloped ‗universal‘ benefits 
provide basic and minimal levels of 
social protection. Social transfers are 
low leading to strict entitlement 
criteria; recipients are typically 
means-tested and many suffer 
stigmatisation. 
Benefits often earnings and 
occupation related. Comparatively 
high levels of social protection and 
historically lower levels of income 
inequality and poverty. Though 
there is a distinction between 
insiders and outsiders. Outsiders 
receive a level of protection as good 
as the UK.  
Benefits often earnings and 
occupation related. Comparatively 
high levels of social protection and 
low levels of income inequality and 
poverty-which continue to fall.  
Currently system shares features of 
continental and UK system. Although 
rights have been established for a core 
workforce of skilled long-term 
employees. The regime is more typical 
of the UK as it has comparatively low 
coverage and higher vulnerability 
rates. 
Due to high level of social solidarity 
currently Czech system offers social 
protection similar to Germany and 
France. It has the lowest rates of 
poverty and provides good support 
to those exposed to labour market 
vulnerability. 
Social spending 
average (OECD) % GDP 
2000s: 25.4% 2000s: 29.2% 2000s: 30.7% 2000s: 19.9% 2000s: 19.3% 
Unemployment 
protection: Funding; 
Qualifying period; Net 
replacement rate %; 
Benefit duration 
(months). 
 
Social insurance and social assistance; 
contributions equivalent to 25 and 50 
times the lower earnings limit must 
have been paid in the last 2 years; 54 
%; 6 months.   
 
 
Social insurance and social 
assistance; 12 months in last 2 years; 
69 %; 12 months. 
 
Also social assistance, means-
tested): €299, €337, or €374 a month 
is paid, depending on the person's 
family composition. Dependent's 
supplement also available. 
Social insurance and social 
assistance; 6 months in last 22 
months; 75 %; 23 months.  
Social assistance also available: 
benefit is the difference between 
the household income and €1,094.10 
or €1,719.30 (a month depending if 
single or a couple) respectively. 
Social insurance; earnings in 18 months 
prior to claim must be at least 
equivalent to the minimum wage; 59 
%; 12 months. 
 
Social insurance; 12 months in last 3 
years;  56%;  5 months. 
 
Family Policy 
High level of childcare services but 
the services are provided on a private 
basis, therefore high cost to 
individual. 
Period of parental leave short – six to 
twelve weeks when calculated at full 
rate of compensation: lowest of all 
EU countries. 
Families with dependents receive 
economic incentives/compensation in 
form of family allowance £20.30 a 
week is paid for the eldest qualifying 
child, and £13.40 is paid for each 
additional child (April 2012), plus tax 
credits.  
Germany introduced child care for 
children aged between 3 and 6. 
Germany now has almost 100% 
affordable and high quality child 
care. 
Historically male breadwinner model 
means long parental leave relatively 
well compensated. 
Benefits‘ spending is relatively high. 
Child benefit: €184 a month is paid 
for the first and the second child; 
€190 for the third; €215 for each 
additional child. 
High level of affordable institutional 
childcare (children aged 0-2) and a 
high quality of services for children. 
Parental leave relatively short (16-34 
weeks depending on number of 
children) however well 
compensated. 
Spending on family policy is high. 
Family allowances: €125.78 a month 
is paid for two children; €286.94 for 
three children; €448.10 for four 
children plus €161.17 for each 
subsequent child Families also 
compensated via tax breaks and 
additional benefits. 
Low coverage of institutional child 
care, typically the mothers stay at 
home for three years or more caring for 
their children. 
Historically male breadwinner model 
means long parental leave relatively 
well compensated. 
Cash benefit (2.45% of gross earnings) 
and Medical benefits: (9% of gross 
earnings) available for families (30-90 
days). In addition Maternity benefit: 
100% of the insured's average earnings 
in the last 12 months is paid for 20 
weeks (31 to 37 weeks for multiple 
births. 
Low coverage of institutional child 
care, typically the mothers stay at 
home for three years or more caring 
for their children. 
Historically male breadwinner model 
means long parental leave relatively 
well compensated. 
Due to level of benefits spending is 
relatively high. Income tested family 
allowance and birth grants 
compensate families.   
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Judgement  
 
Disadvantage 
 
Mixed 
 
Advantage 
 
Mixed 
 
Advantage 
 
1. For further UK discussion see also: Taylor-Gooby 2001; Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby 2005; Mitton 2009; Fleckenstein et al. 2011 
2. For further Germany discussion see also: Ostner et al. 2004; Aust & Bönker 2005; Hegelich & Meyer 2009; Palier & Thelen 2010; Barbier & Knuth 2011; Fleckenstein et al. 2011 
3. For further France discussion see also: Mandin & Palier 2002; Gallouj & Gallouj 2009; Palier & Thelen 2010 
4. For further  Poland discussion see also: Fodor et al. 2002; Cerami & Vanhuysse 2009; Siemieńska & Domaradzka 2009; Siemieńska et al. 2011 
5. For further Czech Republic discussion see also: Sirovátka 2006, 2007; Cerami & Vanhuysse 2009; Ripka & Mareš; 2009 
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Table 9.8: Summary wider determinants of health  
 
Determinant of health 
 
WCS (1) Ruhr (2) NPdC (3) Katowice (4) N.Moravia (5) 
Skills and Education  
 
Rating  
 
 
 
Character  
 
 
 
Highest proportion population 
with tertiary qualifications. 2nd 
highest proportion low or no 
qualifications. 
 
General skills; high skill and job 
polarisation.  
 
The Ruhr ranks 3rd  in both 
proportion of population with 
tertiary skills and with low or 
no qualifications.  
Company and industry 
specific skills, vocational 
training. 
2nd highest proportion 
population with tertiary 
qualifications. Highest 
proportion with low or no 
qualifications.  
General skills, industry specific 
and vocational skills.  
2nd lowest proportion 
population with tertiary 
qualifications. Lowest 
proportion with low or no 
qualifications.  
 
High degree of social capital 
from communist era although 
this is becoming increasingly 
redundant. Limited expenditure 
on further qualifications. 
Lowest proportion population with 
tertiary qualifications. 2nd lowest 
proportion with low or no 
qualifications.  
 
High degree of social capital from 
communist era although this is 
becoming increasingly redundant. 
Limited expenditure on further 
qualifications. 
 
 
Household structure  
 
WCS and Ruhr have highest 
proportion of lone parent 
households. However rate of 
increase greater in WCS. 
 
Although Ruhr has the highest 
rate of single person households. 
WCS with 2nd highest rate is 
increasing at faster rate.  
 
Ruhr has highest proportion of 
lone parent households 
although is due to be 
overtaken by WCS.  
 
Ruhr has the highest rate of 
single person households. 
However, WCS is increasing at 
faster rate.  
NPdC has significantly lower 
lone parent households than 
WCS and Ruhr. However the 
rate is increasing as in all 
regions.  
 
NPdC 2nd lowest proportion 
single person households 
increase over time is 
insignificant.  
Although no data to compare 
Katowice with other regions. 
Comparison with show WCS 
number of lone parent 
households is low.  
 
Katowice has lowest proportion 
of single person households.  
N.Moravia has low proportion of 
lone parent households. Although 
the rate is increasing at a rate 
similar to WCS. 
 
N.Moravia has 3rd highest 
proportion of single person 
households. Significantly lower 
than WCS and Ruhr.  
 
Teenage pregnancy  
 
 High 8.5%  
 
Low 4.5% 
 
Low 4.7% 
 
 Low 5.2 
 
Low 4.2% 
                            Alcohol 
 
 
Health Behaviours (national) 
 
                           Smoking  
Lowest proportion for abstinence. 
2nd highest drinking daily.  
 
Male smoking comparable with 
other nations except Poland. 
Highest rate female smoking. 
 
Middle ranking for not 
drinking and abstinence. 
 
Male smoking rate 
comparable with other 
nations. Female rate 
significantly lower. 
Highest proportion drinking 
daily. 2nd lowest for abstinence.  
 
Male smoking rate comparable 
with other nations. Lowest 
proportion female smokers.  
Highest proportion of 
abstinence. Lowest proportion 
drinking daily.  
 
Male smoking rates highest. 
Female smoking rates 2nd 
highest.  
2nd lowest proportion of 
abstinence and daily drinking.  
 
National rates not available. 
Regional comparison show smoking 
rates higher WCS, particularly 
among females.  
    Religious participation 
 
Social Capital: 
                  Voter Turnout 
Low comparable N.Moravia 
 
 
2nd Lowest (58.3%)  
Significantly higher than WCS 
lower than Katowice 
 
Highest (78.3%)  
Not available  
 
 
3rd Lowest (59%) 
Highest by significant margin 
 
 
Lowest (54.9%) 
Low comparable with WCS 
 
 
2ND Highest (62.2%) 
          At risk of poverty 
 
Poverty and inequality  
 
            Income inequality  
 
Highest  
 
 
 
Highest 
2nd Highest and increasing 
 
 
 
3rd Highest and increasing 
2nd Lowest and improving 
 
 
 
2nd Lowest and improving  
3rd Highest and improving  
 
 
 
2nd Highest fluctuating  
Lowest  
 
 
 
Lowest  
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9.2 Have the research aims been achieved?  
The main aim of the thesis was to determine what aspects of the political and 
socioeconomic context in WCS diverge from comparable post-industrial regions 
of Europe and whether these might form the basis of potential explanations for 
the region‘s relatively poor health record.  
The objectives for the five specific countries and regions, as described in section 
2.3.3.1, were to: 
1. Define/describe in broad terms the political and socioeconomic changes 
that affected them since WWII. 
2. Describe what happened to life expectancy in this period and 
identify/assess hypotheses that explain links between political and 
socioeconomic change and life expectancy.  
3. Describe the pattern (timing, rate and nature) of 
deindustrialisation/privatisation and identify variations to the general 
pattern.  
4. Define the typologies of policy response to 
deindustrialisation/privatisation.  
5. Define the level of social protection, including welfare provision and 
broader social support, available to those affected by 
deindustrialisation/privatisation. 
6. Summarise the factors that emerge as being most important in alleviating 
the health and social impacts of deindustrialisation/privatisation.  
It can be stated that all the more specific research objectives have been 
achieved. The thesis has been structured to address each of these points in turn. 
The question of whether the overarching aim (determine what aspects of the 
political and socioeconomic context in WCS diverge from comparable post-
industrial regions of Europe and whether these might form the basis of 
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potential explanations for the region‘s relatively poor health record) has been 
achieved is more open to discussion. In the introduction to this thesis four 
pathways between determinants of health and subsequent levels of mortality 
(life expectancy) were outlined. These were: 
 
1. Direct causation – for example, industrial pollution leading to lung 
disease. 
2. Complex causation – for example, increased prosperity leading to diets 
richer in fats and sugars and an increase in smoking.  
3. Emergent – this refers to circumstances where a complex, interacting 
system of causation causes the emergence of health outcomes without a 
clear pathway to explain causation.  
4. Emergent but with a clearer final pathway – for example the alcohol-
related harm experienced in Russia arising out of a historical drinking 
culture in a country that was then subjected to the social, economic and 
cultural changes that accompanied the fall of communism.  
In each of these four, alternative protective factors can mitigate the potential 
hazards and positively enhance health. For emphasis, it is repeated that this 
thesis is not an analysis of the determinants of health in each of the regions of 
interest. Rather it is a description of socioeconomic and political history in the 
context of a known public health phenomenon (excess mortality in WCS).  
 
The argument being made is that there are sufficient disadvantageous 
dimensions to the sociopolitical and economic histories of deindustrialisation in 
WCS to postulate that lower rates of improvement in life expectancy are an 
emergent phenomenon arising from these influences (that is option 3 – although 
there are arguably also some clear final pathways – option 4). This argument 
needs to be placed in the context of the models of the determinants of health 
set out in the introduction in section 1.2 (Evans & Stoddart 1990; Adler et al. 
1993). These models seek to capture the interaction of a complex set of factors 
(physical environment, social environment, poverty and prosperity, levels of 
inequality, health related behaviours, quality of services and so on) which 
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operated and interact differentially over a lifetime. These are, in short, 
simplified models of a truly complex system (Rayner & Lang 2012).  
 
Consider, in this context, the issue of the speed and severity of industrial job 
losses. There is a robust literature on the links between the fear of 
unemployment and adverse health outcomes (Martikainen & Valkonen 1996; 
Bartley & Ferrie 2001). There is also clear evidence that being unemployed is 
bad for health (Iversen et al. 1987; Dorling 2009) and that unemployed 
individuals report higher rates of poor health (Bambra & Eikemo 2009). However, 
the true complexity of the situation becomes clearer when interactions with 
other determinants of health are considered.  
 
This thesis has presented evidence to show that deindustrialisation increased 
socioeconomic inequalities in all regions but this was particularly true of the 
neoliberal ‗Anglo Saxon‘ economies (Korpi & Palme 1998; Huber & Stephens 
1998; Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). It is well established that the level of economic 
inequality in a country has adverse effects on life expectancy. 
Deindustrialisation also has an impact on the social environment: the workplace 
is a setting for friendship and social support and the loss of established patterns 
of work can damage social capital – which influences health (Putnam 1995; 
Wilkinson 1996; Kawachi, Subramanian & Kim 2008). Psychological impacts also 
have to be considered.  The stress associated with job loss is obvious. Less 
obvious, but perhaps equally important, is the loss of ‗identity‘ and ‗a social 
role‘ that goes along with job loss (Vinokur, Caplan, & Williams 1987; Siegrist 
2000). Thus, when it was observed in the case studies that the Ruhr region 
succeeded in maintaining a degree of engineering industry and with it high skill 
jobs, this may carry with it psychosocial benefits that are hard to quantify. The 
point being made here is that there is a further plausible pathway linking the 
degree and pattern of job loss and health outcomes. Finally, there is the issue of 
health related behaviours like smoking, diet, alcohol consumption and drug use. 
There is good evidence linking these damaging behaviours to the experience of 
unemployment (Bartley & Owen 1996; Bartley & Ferrie 2001; Rosenthal et al. 
2012).  
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Therefore, it is plausible to make an argument that the speed and severity of 
industrial job losses in WCS might have led to adverse health outcomes. It is only 
possible to postulate rather than prove this conclusion because we are 
considering causation within the context of multiple complexities: the 
complexities of the determinants of health (Evans & Stoddart 1990; Adler et al. 
1993), the complexities of the national socio/economic/political systems 
(Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Soskice 1994, 1999; Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancké et 
al. 2007; Lane & Myant 2007; Gaille 2007); and the complexities of the local 
socio/economic/political systems (Hudson & Williams 1995; Crouch & Voelzkow 
2009; Birch & Mykhnenko 2009). 
 
It seems reasonable to claim, therefore, that the research questions have been 
addressed and answered to the degree that data and information allow. 
 
9.3 Political decisions have consequences for health – 
the example of inequalities.  
Although it is difficult always to demonstrate links to health outcomes, the 
material presented in this thesis makes it clear that political decisions have 
consequences. In coping with deindustrialisation and subsequent economic 
restructuring, context has changed considerably in WCS (and UK) and society has 
become increasingly unequal. However, this inequality, particularly income 
inequality, is indicative of, or is a proxy for a range of socioeconomic conditions, 
mediated through individual and collective, material and psychosocial pathways. 
This is important because it is too simplistic to argue that income inequality is a 
single main cause of poorer health. Reality is always more complex (Coburn 
2004:43). This thesis has placed inequalities in an historical, geographic and 
comparative perspective. As such, inequalities can be attributed to fundamental 
changes in the nature of work (deindustrialisation), context and social 
protection.  
 
From the 1920s to the 1970s there was an understanding that uneven economic 
development had a socioeconomic and political impact that affected be it 
directly or indirectly the population‘s wellbeing. The introduction of neoliberal 
economic policies under Thatcher effectively put an end to this. Subsequent 
policies designed to stimulate economic development (for example, inward 
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investment and ongoing tertiarisation) have only slowed the decline and in fact 
contributed to the growth in income and wealth inequality, decline in social 
mobility and growth in long-term worklessness. Worryingly, increasingly 
entrenched deprivation and poverty is being passed down through generations. 
In the UK, globalisation and the associated policies commonly characterised as 
neoliberal, have returned business to a dominant class position undermining the 
accommodation of both labour and capital: a feature of the previous epoch of 
nationally focused capitalism. Since the 1970s, in WCS as across the UK, the 
proportion of economic growth going to ‗capital‘ rather than ‗labour‘ has 
increased, as too few jobs, particularly quality jobs, have been created and 
wages have stagnated (Harvey 2005; Kristal 2010; Holmes & Mayhew 2012).  
 
The deindustrialisation of WCS left a void that the growth in service employment 
has failed to fill. Typically, the new jobs, in comparison to manufacturing, do 
not represent ‗quality work‘. They epitomise an insecure work environment 
characterised by low-wage and low-skill work, with high levels of turnover and 
increasing casualisation and under-employment. Moreover, efforts to ‗improve‘ 
the region through revisionist branding and marketing have served to exacerbate 
social exclusion and marginalisation and diminish some of the region‘s culture 
and life. As Lennon notes, the region‘s ―model of renaissance and regeneration‖ 
is also one of ―deprivation and disadvantage‖ (2014:21).  
 
In the developed nations, the onset of neoliberalism has been allied with 
increasing within-nation inequalities (Gottschalk & Smeeding 2000; Atkinson & 
Bourguignon 2000). Available evidence also indicates that there is an association 
between neoliberal policies and health outcomes and health inequalities which is 
of a causal nature (Beckfield & Krieger 2009; Leinsalu et al. 2009).  The rise of 
capital and its complementary neoliberal ideology and policies, undermined both 
working class rights in the market and citizenship rights to social 
protection/welfare. As Coburn concludes: ―Labour‘s lessened market power and 
fragmentation, and the shredding of the welfare state also led to major 
increases in social inequality, poverty, income inequality and social 
fragmentation‖ (Coburn 2004:44; see also Coburn 2000). 
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Collins and McCartney (2011) argue that, from 1979, in WCS (and the UK) 
working class people were subject to a concerted and ongoing ‗political attack‘. 
An explicit aim of the then Conservative and subsequent Labour and 
Conservative governments has been to weaken, undermine and delegitimise 
equalising institutions such as trade unions, local government and dimensions of 
the welfare state. As has been discussed, this has led to increased inequality, 
erosion of union rights and employment legislation, residualisation of welfare 
and social housing, increase in the wealth and influence of unelected elites 
(usually economic), and the ongoing stigmatisation of benefit recipients. Such a 
course of events has the potential to affect the wider society – as increasing 
vulnerability becomes a feature across the social scale (see Standing 2011); 
widening the gap between the rich and poor, whilst, conversely undermining 
equalising institutions which might curb poverty and income inequality and limit 
their effect on health.  
 
Contemporary research (Brandolini & Smeeding 2007; Levy & Temin 2007) 
attributes the rise in income inequality in uncoordinated economies such as the 
UK (and US) to post-industrial changes in norms and institutions rather than, as 
is commonly assumed, to skill-biased technological change, immigration and 
trade. The Scottish and UK economies have polarised into ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ jobs 
and that gap is widening, particularly in the current economic climate (Truss 
2011). Bad jobs have the potential to undermine and erode social fabric and 
economic potential (Trebeck 2011). WCS is an exemplar of this polarisation: 
there are now more (professional) jobs at the top, and more routine jobs at the 
bottom of the labour market. This polarisation is not accidental. It is a product 
of UK economic policy and has in fact been facilitated respectively by the 
establishment of so-called creative clusters, such as the TV industry and the 
promotion of Glasgow as a regional hub for shopping and entertainment - 
‗Scotland with style‘ (Mooney & Danson 1997; Helms & Cumbers 2004; SLIMS 
2005; Boyle et al. 2008; Warhurst 2011).  
 
Social protection comprises a set of public and private policies and programmes 
aimed at reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty 
and deprivation. The extent and nature of social protection is indicative of the 
social, political and economic institutions and extent to which societies 
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accommodate an individual‘s or population‘s wellbeing or leave that to the 
market. As such, inequality is a symptom, not a determinant, of societal types 
(Navarro 2002; Coburn 2004).  
 
Prior to the neoliberal era, income inequality (and health inequalities) in WCS 
(and the UK) had been relatively low and declining since the Second World War: 
effectively, the welfare state worked. From about 1977/78 income inequality 
exacerbated and health inequalities worsened, particularly in WCS. 
Deindustrialisation and neoliberalism have challenged the welfare state and in 
many instances lessened social protection. To varying degrees, states have 
resisted international trends regarding the increased pervasiveness of market-
based inequalities.  There is divergence in the extent to which each regime 
decommodifies the population‘s relationship to the market. Decommodification 
refers to the degree to which citizens have an alternative to complete 
dependence on the labour market (on working for money), in order to have an 
acceptable standard of living (Olsen & O‘Connor 1998). As discussed, in each 
country the means of reconciling the market and state welfare is based on 
differing class structures and class coalitions and constitute not only welfare 
state regimes, but distinct sociopolitical cultures (Olsen & O‘Connor 1998). 
So, what this thesis has shown (and what has been summarised for inequalities 
above) is that, at both the national and regional level, the political 
economies/varieties of capitalism have responded and engaged in different ways 
to the process and change associated with deindustrialisation. This thesis has 
engaged with these multiple levels of complexity and a narrative have emerged 
that should be taken seriously.  
9.4 Theoretical consideration 
The varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach is the leading paradigm in 
comparative political economy (at the national level). As demonstrated here, it 
can contribute to our understanding of health inequalities within and between 
populations. Importantly, this work has also shown that the VOC and the 
institutional arrangements that characterise them have consequences for 
regional development and ultimately health. 
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The typology categorises countries into distinct types of economies: liberal 
market economies (LMEs), coordinated market economies (CMEs), and 
dependant market economies (DMEs) which have all been covered here. In the 
long term, each of these political economies is capable of securing similar 
degrees of economic development. In addition, to varying degrees, that  
development will occur unevenly over space and time and be subject to periodic 
crisis (Harvey 2010; Hadjimichalis & Hudson 2013). The character of this 
development is, to a great extent, determined on the basis of different 
institutional arrangements. Broadly speaking, these arrangements manifest in 
the distinctive comparative institutional advantages/disadvantages.  
 
In terms of regional development, the contemporary regional policy framework 
in the EU is primarily based on a competitiveness agenda promoting the 
development of ‗knowledge-based‘ economies and learning regions (Gardiner et 
al. 2004). This is associated with the rise of a new model of regional policy 
which aimed to facilitate growth and innovation by utilising local capacities. In 
contrast to the ‗old‘ regional policy prevalent in the 1960s/70s (Amin 1999), the 
new model of regional policy emphasises endogenous potential, to facilitate 
growth and innovation, by utilising local capacities and skills.  
 
However, in the WCS context this meant ‗path destruction‘ (Birch & Mykhnenko 
2009). Path dependence, as discussed, is characterised as an overreliance on 
large organisations and embedded regional institutional arrangements. As Hay 
(2004) discusses, to erode this path, neoliberalism induced a crisis to which 
neoliberal adjustment was considered the natural fix. Rising inflation in the late 
1970s provided a crisis and 1980s UK monetary policy provided the fix: by 
stabilising inflation and facilitating the ongoing deindustrialisation of WCS (and 
other parts of the UK) (Peck 2001). In addition, the new context supported and 
encouraged those sectors (and regions) least exposed to international 
competition, namely market-services. This is problematic on a number of levels, 
above all for WCS, where ‗path-destruction‘ has severely undermined any 
historical endogenous potential, particularly in regard to industry and 
manufacturing. More broadly, this approach is founded upon the role of the 
market in terms of competitiveness. Such an approach demonstrates an 
ahistorical and asocial understanding of regional economic performance and 
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development (Gill 2005). Moreover, this policy agenda also treats ‗unequal 
regions equally‘ (Morgan 2006:189). This contrasts with the ‗old‘ approach to 
regional policy which unambiguously favoured struggling regions, with the 
explicit intention of reducing disparities between the core and periphery (Martin 
1989).  
 
At the government level, market failure i.e. a lack of competitiveness is 
generally cited as the root cause of regional inequalities and barrier to future 
economic development. As such, it is the state‘s role to facilitate the effective 
functioning of all markets: product, labour and capital. As Gill concludes: ―that 
means promoting competition, the flow of information, and the swift response 
of business and workers to price signals‖ (2005:662). This is in contrast to the 
historical approach and the approach more generally of the other regions. 
Where, the state have emphasised the role of the public sector in encouraging 
regional development. Thus, for example, in NPdC there has been significant 
investment in transport infrastructure and educational institutions both of which 
are considered critical in promoting regional development. Contrast this with 
the efforts to introduce the HS2 links to the north of England and Scotland (BBC 
2011).  
 
The current approach to regional development, in the UK and WCS, neglects the 
differences in industrial structure and divisions of labour that characterise OIRs 
such as the regions selected here (Gill 2005). The problems OIRs present are not 
necessarily the result of internal deficits in productivity or competitiveness as 
dominant policy discourses suggest. Rather, they reflect the structural basis of 
their economies, in terms of a historical over-reliance on a narrow group of 
heavy industries, not adequately replaced in recent decades by routine services 
and foreign-owned manufacturing plants (Hudson 1994). The problem being that 
while the new approaches emphasise regional assets, such as the endogenous 
capacity to adapt to change, they tend to neglect the influence and importance 
of the national level. 
 
As this research indicates, in accounting for regional decline and renewal it is 
important to account for the inter-relatedness, complexity and diversity of 
processes of regional development in producing divergent outcomes (Martin & 
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Sunley 2006). For example, identifying different paths of regional adaptation or 
‗de-locking‘ or the upgrading of existing industries and the diversification into 
technologically-related industries. Although the VOC approach focuses on the 
national level and although it has a role in shaping them, it still neglects 
regional institutional arrangements. However, there are similarities between 
VOC and the contemporary regional policy framework. First, the prominence 
afforded to the influence of institutional factors over economic ones in their 
account of territorial divergence in the character and functioning of capitalism. 
Second, they neglect the dynamic or inter-relatedness that exists between 
regional and national factors. This research, and the VOC approach, indicates 
that regional performance will to some extent be shaped by the underlying 
influence of national institutional frameworks.  
 
Different national institutional arrangements, for example, between the more 
market-driven approach of the UK and the more statist and corporatist 
arrangements in France and Germany, have led to different patterns of regional 
adaptation. The latter states, in particular, have sought path reconstruction and 
renewal, to build on existing regional assets via the processes of diversification 
into related technologies and the technological upgrading of existing industries 
(See NPdC). Whilst the market-centred approach of the UK favoured the 
transplantation of new technologies and organisational practices into OIRs from 
outside through the attraction of inward investment (Martin & Sunley 2006; Birch 
et al. 2010). As such, WCS performance in comparison with the other selected 
regions (and within the UK context) likely reflects the failure of transplantation 
process in WCS and the national institutional arrangements that stress factor 
mobility and price competition, encouraging uneven regional development 
(Dunford & Perrons 1994). Therefore, the nationally orchestrated regional policy 
frameworks that are seemingly indicative of each VOC remain central to regional 
development and performance. 
 
Historically, all the countries discussed here adopted traditional regional policies 
focused on reducing spatial disparities, although important differences in focus 
and timescale were apparent. Regional policy was traditionally more centralised 
in CEE and had a longer history in the UK and France than in Germany 
(Armstrong & Taylor 2004). In the 1980s, however, the UK effectively reduced 
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regional spending whilst other European countries like Germany and France 
doubled it (Tondl, 2001). Policy approaches in OIRs in France and Germany 
focused on unlocking and facilitating endogenous potential.  Whilst attraction of 
inward investment based upon labour market flexibility was important for UK 
OIRs such as WCS.  
 
In the UK, and to some extent the Czech Republic, the influence of local 
authorities became increasingly marginalised as central government sought 
market solutions as private sector investors defined objectives and financed 
projects. On the continent different solutions were pursued. In France (and 
Poland), power was devolved to local communities supported by substantial 
state expenditure while in Germany ―wealthy regional and local governments 
attempted to spend their way out of the crisis, at least until reunification 
changed the priorities for investment‖ (Couch, Fraser & Percy 2003:3).  
The importance of systemic coordination and interaction implied by the VOC and 
confirmed in the regional case studies presented here, indicates that the 
institutional arrangements at the national level can limit the ability of firms and 
stakeholders to negotiate changing economic conditions which can lead to path 
dependency and ‗lock-in‘ (Arthur 1989). National institutional structures and 
different favoured ‗paths‘ of regional adaptation play an important role in 
shaping the fortunes of OIRs. For example, the Interventionist policies adopted 
in France and Germany, and to some extent in CEE, together with the policy of 
regional diversification and upgrading in the former cases and transplantation 
through the attraction of inward investment in the latter. This contrasts with the 
UK‘s more market-orientated approach and failures of inward investment as 
illustrated by the branch-plant industries of the 1980s and 90s.  
 
Traditional regional policy saw convergence in 1960s and 1970s and divergence 
from late 1970s as ‗spatial Keynesianism‘ (Martin 1989) gave way to a neoliberal 
emphasis on national and regional competitiveness. As a result, stronger 
nationally orchestrated policies for supporting the diversification and 
technological upgrading of OIRs have been maintained in statist and corporatist 
countries such as France and Germany, but less so in neoliberal ones such as the 
UK (Cooke 1995). Therefore, the influence of national political economies linked 
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to different regional ‗paths‘ may be expected to generate significant national 
differences in the performance of OIRs. In particular, neoliberal models such as 
the UK may perform better than corporatist economies like France and Germany 
in terms of GDP growth, but also foster lower quality and less stable forms of 
employment: both of which are known determinants of health.  
 
9.5 Strengths and limitations 
Before addressing the strengths and weaknesses in any detail, a personal 
observation should be addressed. Namely, that the critical weakness of this, and 
related research, is despite the healthy level of coverage and funding into WCS 
health profile and the determinants of health more broadly. There is, if one 
considers the characteristics of the labour market and social protection, little 
evidence of it informing or influencing policy directly and to a significant extent.  
 
This is demonstrated by the long-standing well-established consensus and 
growing body of evidence regarding the determinants of health, particularly the 
influence of income inequality and economic security. It is also demonstrated by 
the lack of explicit policy and rhetoric coming from the independence campaigns 
on these issues which so clearly affect Scotland and most acutely WCS. Broadly 
speaking, this is due to such research being contested or not implemented on 
political and ideological grounds, often within the context of globalisation and 
increasing austerity (Glyn 2007).  
 
This context of a global environment undermines a modern welfare state, 
marked by intervention and publicly provided social protection and threatens to 
create a ‗race to the bottom‘ (RTB)55, or at least convergence along the lines of 
the more modest social provision characteristic of a liberal welfare state such as 
the UK (Huber & Stephens 2001).  Post-industrial change and the demands of 
globalisation have led to debate, and in some cases concern, regarding the level 
of convergence that now exists between economies and the degree to which 
they engaged in a `race to the bottom‘, converging towards a single ‗one size 
fits all‘ new-liberal version of capitalism.  
                                         
55
For review of race to the bottom argument see Drezner, D. (2001) ―Globalisation and Policy 
Convergence‖ International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No.1, pp.53-78 
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Capitalism has emerged as the dominant ideology and model for economic 
growth in the richest, most developed countries, although it‘s questionable 
whether or not capitalism has really brought the levels of economic growth and 
prosperity that were hoped for (Glyn 2007). The discussion at the national level 
and case studies, presented here, demonstrate that even within the capitalist 
model the race to the bottom is not inevitable.  To varying degrees the other 
countries/regions have to some extent maintained growth and 
protected/retained some competitive advantage whilst retaining a commitment 
to social protection as evident in the degree of deindustrialisation and 
deskilling, the relative levels of benefits and comparative levels of poverty and 
income inequality.  
 
Therefore, it is critical to determine the institutional arrangements in each 
model of political economy and regional economy that mediate health 
inequalities as these indicate the policy options, available within each model, 
possible for reducing such inequalities. As this research demonstrates, the 
institutional arrangements typical of a political/regional economy are mutually 
reinforcing. Identifying the arrangements and subsequent policies can both 
inform the political decision makers of the options available and augment the 
body of evidence required to convince them that policies successfully 
implemented have a potential health dividend. In that regard, this thesis has 
pertinence for a wider sphere beyond ‗public health‘, for example, comparative 
political economy and regional geography. As such, it may facilitate the 
communication of the socioeconomic determinants of health and health 
inequalities to a wider audience of relevant stakeholders and researchers.  
 
In terms of specific strengths and weaknesses, as indicated, the poor health of 
WCS is an important and long-standing concern for both policy makers and 
citizens. The excess mortality in the region is an issue that continues to receive 
significant attention and coverage. Consequently, the questions considered in 
this thesis are of considerable importance and interest and the findings will 
contribute to a substantial and multifaceted ongoing programme of research 
coordinated by GCPH.  In addition, as a comparative study this research has an 
objectivity that has undermined national myths pertaining to WCS, for example 
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the generosity of the UK welfare state. As such, it manages to transcend some of 
the more common sense explanations applied to WCS and other regions. More 
broadly, this comparative analysis has contributed to a widening research 
agenda that seeks to understand how socioeconomically-determined health 
inequalities vary across (and within) post-industrial countries and regions. 
 
In light of the stated aims and identified weaknesses from the first submission of 
this PhD study, two main research methods have now been applied. The 
strengths and limitations of each method have been outlined and discussed in 
Chapter 2, and informed the author‘s consideration of their applicability to the 
research being undertaken. The key strength of the narrative-literature review 
method was that it facilitated a broad coverage of themes and situational 
choices in terms of the inclusion of findings that would enable description and 
understanding of evolving socioeconomic and political change at both a national 
and regional level. The key strength of the case study method was its inherent 
suitability: typically case studies are anchored in real-life contexts and can 
provide detailed and holistic accounts of change and processes.  Moreover, the 
case study method offered the necessary flexibility in terms of an organising 
framework to combine and present findings (both qualitative and quantitative). 
As such, the dual methods applied have facilitated a depth and breadth of 
coverage. Moreover, it has been possible to undertake a degree of triangulation 
by considering the findings from the narrative literature review in conjunction 
with quantitative data within the case studies.  
Data driven and health-oriented approaches to understanding the context of 
WCS‘s health profile and the determinants of health have been conducted by 
others.   From this body of work, research issues and questions emerged that 
needed further understanding. These have been the primary focus of this thesis. 
The approach taken to understanding health outcomes has been neither narrow 
nor reductionist. This is consistent with systems thinking and the complex 
pathways that affect health (Rayner & Lang 2012). The methods and associated 
long-term and deep emersion in so many different literatures have led to 
insights that might not have otherwise emerged. In addition, the work presented 
in this thesis has provided context and illuminated the findings of the Aftershock 
reports and associated research. Its particular, unique contribution has been to 
provide a more nuanced account of WCS‘ (and the other post-industrial regions‘) 
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path, in light of its comparative health profile, moving from the old picture of 
deprivation and deindustrialisation towards a new understanding that might 
influence future policy discourse.  
A key limitation of this work (which is, arguably, also one of its strengths) is its 
breadth. The history of a region is such a complex phenomenon that even with 
time and a great deal of reading it is hard to capture all the relevant 
complexity. In addition, inherent in the methods is the potential for subjectivity 
and bias. The lack of a systematic review of the literature may mean that 
material has been missed – although the level of immersion applied, and the 
scale of literature considered, will have mitigated this risk. The sheer mass of 
potentially relevant literature available and the scope of the project generally, 
both geographically and chronologically, is a weakness. It proved to be 
impossible to comprehensively review any one body of literature far less the 
whole range. The author had to exercise considerable degree of judgement as to 
the depth and scope of each part of the investigation. This introduces a degree 
of subjectivity. Nonetheless, any narrowing of the enquiry would have 
diminished its final interest and relevance.   
 
9.6 Conclusions 
The conclusions summarised below have all emerged in previous parts of the 
thesis. They are listed here in bullet point format to make the main conclusions 
clear. 
 There is a relationship between prosperity and political legitimacy in a 
state/region on the one hand and life expectancy on the other.  
 There is a broad correspondence between life expectancy and the 
economic/political and social success of states in CEE and Western Europe 
during the 20th Century. 
 Socioeconomic institutions affect health inequalities and institutional 
variation in terms of economic development and associated post-industrial 
change is an important (and complex) determinant of socioeconomic 
health inequalities. 
 Deindustrialisation in WCS can be largely attributed to the industrial 
mono-structure of heavy industry, government policy and the failure to 
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diversify into new and related technologies or lighter consumer-based 
industries successfully. 
 In the short to medium-term deindustrialisation is bad for health – this is 
true in all countries and regions examined. 
 The low levels of life expectancy growth in WCS suggest that the process 
of deindustrialisation has not gone well – has not been managed well. This 
is not proof but evidence has been presented to support this contention. 
 The five countries and regions have each taken a different approach to 
deindustrialisation, have varied in the levels of social protection provided 
and each manifests a very different context – therefore, variable impacts 
on health are to be expected.  
 In response to economic restructuring (and associated social costs), policy 
in WCS (and the UK) has focused primarily on narrow economic growth 
policies, emphasising employment and physical regeneration, but not 
social outcomes such as community cohesion and sustainability.  
 Post Thatcher, neoliberal approach adopted and augmented by new 
Labour and Conservative-Lib Dem coalition. As a result socioeconomic and 
spatial inequalities have become embedded in WCS. In the current 
political and economic climate these inequalities are likely to widen and 
deepen. If this to change, a fundamentally different approach to national 
and regional socioeconomic policy is required.  
 The deprivation and inequality present in many areas of WCS have 
resulted from social and economic policy, be it intentionally or 
unintentionally.  
 The structure of WCS economy creates inequality. The structural basis for 
this is the financial and consumer centred economy which transfers 
wealth from the broader population to a small number of corporations 
and individuals.  
 Policy makers can make a difference to health outcomes. The relative 
successes of each country and region attests that polices successfully 
implemented have a potential health dividend.  
 Policy makers can make a difference to health, not so much by focusing 
on health per se, but by creating a successful society with a strong diverse 
economy. The problem with WCS is that in many key respects it has been 
weak on both. 
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9.7 Recommendations 
Health inequities across Europe are known to be high, and, as the Aftershock 
work demonstrated, they even exist between post-industrial regions that share 
an industrial legacy and have experienced similar economic forces associated 
with post-industrial change. The findings presented in the thesis support and 
provide additional evidence to the consensus on determinants discussed here 
and most recently stated in the Review of social determinants and the health 
divide in the WHO European Region: final report (2013). Namely, that the 
causes of the causes: the environment and conditions in which people are born, 
grow, live, work and age and inequities in power, money, and resources – 
significantly contributed to the increase in health inequalities so acutely 
experienced in WCS.  
 
The divergence in approach, between these countries/regions, to post-industrial 
change, provides policy insight and an evidence base for future 
recommendations.  To state it clearly, the work here demonstrates that in terms 
of health inequalities, an individual or group‘s situation vis-à-vis society and the 
economy or political system is particularly germane. This is perhaps best 
understood in terms of position relative to the labour market, for example: 
security; inequalities in income, skills and knowledge (and ultimately health); 
status and control both in the work place, society and family and anomie.  
 
As such, what this thesis illuminates is that the VOC (approach to socioeconomic 
development) evolved and adopted in the UK, particularly given the associated 
response to economic restructuring, future economic development (i.e. post-
industrial change) and critically, social protection, have health and social 
consequences. This is particularly evident in WCS given its life expectancy 
relative to other post-industrial regions. The large body of public health 
evidence, on health inequalities and the determinants of health, suggests and is 
supported by the divergence between the regions highlighted here, that by 
adapting our approach to economic development we can also tackle some of the 
determinants of health inequalities.  
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However, it is important to note that many of the policies are the product of 
particular institutional arrangements or socially embedded cultures. It is 
noteworthy that these same arrangements and cultures have, relative to WCS, 
also provided protection and security against the industrial and economic 
restructuring that has been such a feature of these regions. Consequently, 
context is critical in understanding WCS trajectory and it is crucial that context 
is maintained as a theme in future research.  For example, in researching WCS in 
isolation from other regions and country contexts, the importance of the 
national political economy in terms of a regions trajectory may not have been 
evident. Moreover, the socioeconomic and political context is likely to 
determine the viability of certain policy responses. 
 
In addition, policy analysis of public health can be broader both in terms of what 
is analysed and who it is aimed at. Public health literature often makes 
reference to socioeconomic and political systems as underlying influences on 
health. More engagement and dialogue between disciplines can provide more 
explanatory potential in this regard and also highlight future areas that require 
inquiry or analysis from those outside public health. This thesis has achieved this 
to some degree.  
 
As discussed in the strengths and weaknesses one of the inherent problems of 
research such as this is there is little evidence of it informing or influencing 
policy directly and to a significant extent. This is particularly apparent when one 
considers the lack of direct action on income inequality, economic security and 
poverty. Although this research supports reform in those areas the specific 
reccommendations will not be repeated here. However, there are 
recommendations pertinent to the findings of this thesis, specifically:  
 
 Further research is needed. The additional mortality in WCS is not trivial 
in scale. The issues discussed in this thesis speak of human suffering and 
loss of life. WCS needs a better understanding of the causes of its poor 
health and, in particular, its additional mortality compared to other old 
industrial regions. Two areas of research are recommended. First, in 
terms of continuing European comparisons, it would be useful to combine 
and maintain the data driven approach of the original Aftershock of 
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Deindustrialisation Report (Walsh et al. 2009) with the methods employed 
by this thesis. As has been demonstrated here this leads to new insights 
and increases understanding. This is evident when one considers previous 
confounding findings for example the socioeconomic and educational 
advantage WCS seemingly had over the other regions. Such an approach 
could be applied to comparative analysis (currently being pursued) 
between Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester. 
 The centrality of ‗deindustrialisation‘ as a focus needs to be updated. 
Deindustrialisation is a historical event. However, this thesis has shown 
that countries and regions need to react to global economic and social 
forces which are ongoing i.e. post-industrial change. Looking forward, 
modernisation or the need to constantly respond to or accommodate 
global market forces might be a more germane focus.   
 The current health of the people of WCS has been shaped by decisions of 
policy makers in past decades. This history needs to be debated and 
understood if decisions made in the future are to reverse these trends 
 If Glasgow and WCS‘s regeneration and brand campaigns are not intended 
to contribute to tackling low life expectancy and inequality, they must 
begin to as a matter of priority.   
 Social protection measures such as education, minimum/living wage 
regulations and social insurance should be utilised as methods to 
adequately reduce inequality. In addition, they need to be advocated and 
utilised as a collective good not a financial burden.  
 Interventions and policies to reduce health inequities must not limit 
themselves to intermediary determinants; but they must include policies 
specifically crafted to tackle the underlying structural determinants of 
health inequities. In particular those asscoaited with the labour market 
and quality of work.  
 Seemingly a high proportion of interventions are aimed at those 
determinants that fall within the domain of regular preventative care, 
including behavioural factors (individual health promotion and education). 
Social factors rarely appear to have been the object of interventions 
aimed at reducing inequity. 
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The research here has also highlighted some areas in which more novel, yet 
controversial recommendations could be suggested. 
 As the experiences of NPdC and Katowice indicate. Increased autonomy 
for the region and more concerted planning at the regional level (note not 
national level i.e. Scottish level) could prove beneficial for WCS. Both in 
terms of realising and augmenting endogenous potential in order to 
develop the regional economy and in better securing social policy 
objectives. 
 A particular consequence of post-industrial change in WCS has been the 
increase in single person and single parent households. Given the 
enhanced vulnerability and economic insecurity these groups face, they 
should be given, at least, the same consideration by the state in terms of 
state support (welfare, tax credits etc.) as traditional family units.  
 Given the effect of post-industrial change particularly in terms of 
increased technology and the impact that has in terms of manpower or 
employment rates. Serious consideration needs to be given to how we 
occupy and financially support individuals or certain groups in the future. 
As we have seen in the case of WCS. Employment rates have only 
ostensibly been maintained. A significant number of new jobs that have 
been created are atypical and poorly remunerated. Clearly as things stand 
the economy is a long way off from supporting full employment: 
particularly full time and fairly paid employment. One answer may be to 
reintroduce labour market regulation such as the bread-winner model or 
lower rather than increase the retirement age.  
9.8 Concluding remarks/reflections 
What can WCS learn from its own experience and the experience of the other 
regions? The short answer is (i) the pathway adopted by a region matters (ii) the 
level of social protection matters, and significantly (iii) the context also matters 
– whether the UK and WCS could, for example, have followed the pathway 
adopted by Germany and the Ruhr is questionable – the context is different.  
 
In this regard, all the countries and regions covered here have had some success 
in relation to WCS.  Although various policies have been discussed within this 
thesis, it is for policy makers to assess particular aspects and discern their 
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viability in a WCS context. Context is important in understanding WCS‘s 
trajectory and it is crucial that context is maintained as a theme in future 
research.  For example, in researching WCS in isolation from other regions and 
country contexts, the importance of the national political economy in terms of a 
region‘s trajectory may not have become evident. Moreover, the socioeconomic 
and political context is likely to determine the viability of certain policy 
responses.  
 
Systematic differences across the regions selected here mediate/influence the 
complex paths/correlation between post-industrial change and health 
inequalities at multiple points. For example, changes to the labour market, skill 
formation, work contract, social protection, and income inequality. These and 
other outcomes should not be regarded as individual-level determinants 
affecting health, but as features of socially constructed institutional 
arrangements that can determine health at the population-level. 
 
There is a clear implication from this thesis that the preservation and creation of 
(good) jobs and high levels of social protection are important determinants of 
health. Job quality and not just job creation need to become embedded in 
future policy. Job quality affects individual and family wellbeing, poverty rates, 
social mobility and social exclusion, even economic productivity.  
 
Health inequalities are to a great extent a consequence of political policies and 
socioeconomic processes — both of which tend to reflect the value systems and 
priorities of the societies/contexts in which they form. As such, they are open to 
debate and possible to transform. This clear message needs widespread 
dissemination. 
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1. Central East Europe 
This chapter covers research objectives 1-5, within the context of CEE, with a 
focus on Poland and the Czech Republic. It will describe and discuss the 
following. First, trends in life expectancy and mortality and the hypotheses that 
best explain the link between political and socioeconomic change and those 
trends. Second, the establishment of state-socialism in CEE, its collapse and the 
subsequent post-communist transitions to market-democracy. Third, the pattern 
of privatisation in Poland and the Czech Republic and the policy responses at the 
national level. Finally, the level and nature of social protection and support 
available to those affected by privatisation and the general population. 
1.1: Life expectancy  
This section explores mortality trends in Eastern Europe during the period of 
communist rule and into its collapse. The key elements are (i) improvements 
until the 1960s (ii) stagnation and decline from the 1960s till the collapse of 
communism (iii) a more abrupt and in some cases serious deterioration 
associated with collapse and transition. Each will be explored in turn. 
 
The history of health in CEE and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) is a complex one 
(Eberstadt 1990; Field 1991, 1995; Makara 1991; Miller & Wolchik 1994; Nanda et 
al. 1993) which has been discussed in enormous detail (Hertzman et al. 1996; 
Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000), with different theories and views 
(Shapiro 1994; WHO 1994; Bobak & Marmot 1996, 1996a; Watson1995, 1998). 
From the end of World War II until the late 1960s, health improvement in the 
Soviet Bloc was rapid, consistent and prevalent (Mezentseva & Rimachevskya 
1990; Eberstadt 1994; Cockerham 1999). Indeed, improvements were such that, 
by the mid-1960s, life expectancy in communist Europe equalled and in some 
cases exceeded what could be found in the West: communism, it appeared, was 
good for health (Sen 1981; Wilkinson 1996). Evidence for such a conclusion was 
supported by similar improvements in some of the poorer socialist countries of 
the developing world. For example, by 1982 life expectancy at birth was 
approximately 75 years in Cuba, 67 in China, and 64 in Vietnam. These figures 
are approximately 15 years greater than an average non-communist country at a 
similar stage of economic development (Guo 1993:288).  
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In the USSR, where life expectancy had hitherto been significantly lower than in 
Western Europe, life expectancy increased for males from 40.4 years in 1938 to 
64 years in 1965. In Poland, life expectancy in the inter-war period (1931-32) 
was 48.2 years for males and 51.4 years for females. In France the equivalent 
was 54.7 years for males and 59.7 years for females. By 1965, life expectancy in 
Poland was 66.8 years for males and 72.8 years for females. In France it was 
67.5 years for males and 74.7 years for females. This comparison is not an 
isolated example. For example, life expectancy for males in the USA in 1965 was 
66.8 years whereas in Czechoslovakia it was 67.8 years (Cockerham 1999). By the 
1960s the East, in terms of life expectancy at least, had caught up and in some 
cases overtaken the West.  
 
To the outside world and the general population of the Soviet Bloc, the Soviet 
Union appeared to be in rude health. In 1961, Khrushchev boasted to the West 
that ―we will bury you‖ and on the surface, this was no idle threat. Between 
1950 and 1960 the Soviet economy grew faster than that of any other European 
country and at a rate that was double that of the United States. In 1964, when 
Khrushchev was ousted and Brezhnev was installed as Premier, communism had 
just experienced its peak period of productivity (Skidelsky 1995:2).  
 
However, the truth was more complex. From the 1960s onwards the Soviet Bloc 
economies began to stagnate and decline and from that point onwards life 
expectancy began to diverge from what was happening in Western Europe and 
other developed market economies. This was a trend which, at the time, few 
people were aware of: in the East it was a state secret while, in the West, the 
details were unknown (at least for a while) (Cockerham 1999). 
 
By the early 1970s this situation began to change as both infant and adult 
mortality rates started to increase in the Soviet Union. The rise in infant 
mortality was short-term (1972-1975) but adult mortality continued on an 
upward trend. By 1970, life expectancy in the USSR was already four years lower 
for men and one year lower for women compared with CEE (Marmot & Bobak 
2000:1124). Increases in adult mortality led to a fall in life expectancy for Soviet 
men and this trend was also seen in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania (Eberstadt 1994; Cockerham 1999). Not all countries experienced 
   283 
an increase in adult male mortality rates but, during that period, no CEE country 
recorded an increase in male life expectancy (Notzen et al. 1998; Shkolnikov et 
al. 1996). Conversely, in all Western European countries, life expectancy 
improved significantly between 1970 and 1991 (by three to four years on 
average).  
 
With the collapse of communism in 1989 this negative tendency intensified.  The 
deterioration of health and mortality in CEE became more severe and seems to 
have arisen for a new set of reasons (Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000).  
What was being observed was a new adverse trend associated with the transition 
that differed from the gradual but enduring deterioration of the 1970s and 
1980s. Moreover, this new adverse trend occurred in an era initially marked by 
high expectations of improvements in living standards (Cornia & Paniccià 2000).  
Regardless of expectations, the health impact of transition was adverse. As 
Figure 3.1 indicates, during the early 1990s, male life expectancy at birth fell in 
Russia (and most other Soviet Bloc countries), stagnated in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia and, by the end of 1996, was still lower than its 1989 level in 
Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania and Belarus (data not shown for last three).  
 
The longer term stagnation or decline in life expectancy before the collapse of 
communism seems to have been mainly due to increased deaths from circulatory 
diseases (ischemic heart disease, stroke and hypertension) and trauma 
(accidents, homicide, suicide, and poisonings) (Cockerham 1997, 1999; Eberstadt 
1990, 1994; Marmot 1996; Marree & Groenewegen 1997; Notzen et al. 1998; 
Shkolnikov et al. 1996). Yet, while these remained important causes of death 
during and after the transition, they do not explain what happened after 
transition as trauma and chronic diseases only accounted for some of the 
observed decline in life expectancy.  
 
The paragraph above describes an analysis which has now emerged as orthodoxy 
(Bobak & Marmot 1996; Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000). However, a 
more detailed country by country analysis reveals greater complexity and 
heterogeneity: as Figure(s) 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate, some countries experienced 
better life expectancy pre-transition and suffered less adverse health 
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consequences as they experienced the transition from state-socialism to a 
market economy.  
 
Figure A.1: Male life expectancy in four Eastern European Countries 
 
 
Figure: A.2: Female life expectancy in four Eastern European Countries 
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Poland and the Czech Republic (the host countries for the two CEE regions that 
will be examined in more detail later in this thesis) do not represent the most 
extreme examples of the broad mortality trends reported (and now widely 
understood) for the region as a whole. As Figure(s) 3.1 and 3.2 indicate, any so-
called mortality crisis attributable to post 1989 developments took place 
primarily in the FSU and Bulgaria. Indeed, the narrative of improvement, 
stagnation and then collapse really only fits Russia (and former Soviet states like 
the Ukraine and Belarus) – although these countries represent a large part of 
CEE.  
 
By 1997 the life expectancy gap between FSU and CEE exceeded ten years for 
men and six years for women. By this estimate, life expectancy in the FSU fell by 
approximately five years over an eight year period. In terms of the developed 
world, this is perhaps the greatest peace time public health disaster in the 
modern era (Marmot & Bobak 2000:1125).  
 
1.1.2 Explanations for mortality trends  
Many explanations have been offered for the trends described above. First the 
quality of data has been questioned. However, it is now recognised that the rise 
in adult mortality in the Soviet Union and CEE is genuine and not a statistical 
artefact (i.e. as a consequence of improvements in vital registration systems 
following the collapse of communism) (Eberstadt 1994; Field 1994; Leon et al. 
1997).  
 
Some have argued that Eastern Europe had always suffered a shorter life 
expectancy than Western Europe and that mortality trends were typically behind 
the West. This so-called ‗historical long wave‘ explanation (Hertzman 1994) 
gives the impression that Eastern Europe simply needed time to catch up. 
However, as noted previously, life expectancy in CEE exceeded the West at 
some stages of their respective developments so this explanation fails.  
 
The standard of medical care has also been suggested as an explanation. There 
was an institutionalised, geographical and informal inequality in care and 
provision. Institutionally, the best services and professionals were only available 
to elite groups. All CEE states had a ―hierarchy of medical facilities, access to 
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which was determined by a person‘s political, military, or economic role in 
society‖ (Cockerham, 1999:22).  Informally, bribes and blat56 networks were 
often utilised in order to obtain good service and treatment. Geographically, the 
best facilities and best trained professionals were predominantly located in the 
major urban centres, whilst the worst and least trained operated in remote or 
rural locales. In the 1990s, during and after the post-transition period, the 
health and mortality situation remained the same or improved in Poland, Czech 
Republic and the GDR where health expenditure increased, improving services 
and increasing the number of interventions particularly in regards to 
cardiovascular disease (Cornia & Paniccià 2000). In spite of this evidence, the 
judgement of the most informed commentators is that while inadequate medical 
care needs to be considered it is not a major contributing factor to excess 
mortality during communism or during and post-transition period (Boys et al. 
1991; Bobak & Marmot 1996; Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000). 
 
Pollution was and remains a serious problem in industrialised and mining areas 
throughout the former Soviet bloc and there is evidence, pre and post-transition, 
of an increase in respiratory disease, hepatitis, lead contamination and low birth 
weights (Hertzman 1995; Keep 1995). However, environmentally influenced 
diseases do not account for much of the considerable regional deterioration and 
stagnation of adult life expectancy (Hertzman 1995; Watson 1995). In Poland, a 
wide-ranging study of cancer and mortality established that deteriorating trends 
in life expectancy should not be attributed to pollution. The report concludes 
that: 
―risk factors other than pollution, such as diet, tobacco use, alcohol 
consumption, hard living and working conditions, and various socio-
political and economic factors, may, in fact, better describe the 
observed cancer statistics‖ (Brown et al., 1995:65).  
After the collapse of communism, emissions of harmful pollutants declined in 
accordance with the scaling down of industrial production and the gradual 
implementation of less polluting technologies. In addition, the move to 
international market prices for energy and raw materials encouraged a more 
efficient and less polluting use of resources (Pavlínek & Pickles 2004). So, once 
                                         
56
  Blat is a Soviet term used to denote the use of informal agreements, exchanges of services, 
connections, Party contacts, or black market deals to meet needs or to ‗get ahead‘. 
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again, pollution needs to be considered but is not judged to be a major influence 
on the observed trends. 
 
Although there were shortages of food and consumer goods during communism, 
food intake was high (Cornia 1994). Moreover, in the context of CEE during 
communism, income distribution was typically more equitable than in the West. 
Less inequality might have been expected to lead to lower mortality rates 
(Marmot & Bobak 2000; Wilkinson 2005). Yet, adult mortality in CEE was 
significantly higher, which, as Marmot & Bobak conclude: ―suggests that their 
general economic position does not explain the entire difference between East 
and West‖ (2000:131). The likely reason is that while economic gradients may 
not have been large, certain groups were disadvantaged under state-socialism: 
groups that were likely worst affected by the deterioration in health and 
mortality experienced in CEE (Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000). 
 
Infectious diseases have, in the past, also been suggested as a possible cause of 
mortality trends. However, data indicate that it was not infections but a wide 
range of chronic diseases (diseases of the circulatory system, respiratory system 
etc.), cancers and accidents, poisonings and injuries that accounted for the 
longer term increases in mortality (Haub 1994; Marree & Groenewegen 1997; 
Okolski 1993; Shkolnikov 1996). 
 
In short, a wide range of possible causes of the relative deterioration in life 
expectancy in the East have been explored but none has sufficient explanatory 
power to account for the entirety of the observed trends.  
 
1.1.3 Critical explanations/factors 
The most favoured explanations for the stagnation and deterioration of life 
expectancy in CEE (and FSU) relate to a range of health behaviours which have 
been influenced by a number of psychosocial factors which are, in turn, 
influenced by other (upstream) determinants of health. This argument aligns 
with ideas about the determinants of health and emergent health outcomes 
outlined in the introduction to this thesis.  
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The health behaviours that have attracted most attention are: excessive use of 
alcohol with a particular pattern of ‗binge‘ drinking; high levels of smoking and 
tobacco use; a lack of leisure activity; and poor diet. Each as individual risk 
factors and all in combination are considered to be factors underlying the 
mortality trends in CEE and FSU before, during and after communism (Bobak & 
Marmot 1996; Cockerham 1999; Cornia & Paniccià 2000). Of course, the 
identification of behavioural risks merely begs the question – why did these 
behaviours become more problematical – what are the causes of the causes? 
 
State-socialism is considered particularly detrimental to health behaviours as it 
led people to take a passive and often fatalistic approach to their health. This 
was understandable, as the dominant policy orientation under state-socialism 
was to endow responsibility with the state as opposed to the individual, and this 
orientation extended to health. Speaking with regard to Poland, Ostrowska 
(1997) notes the lack of personal strategies to maintain healthier practices. 
Although people were aware of the harm done by certain behaviours, their 
attitudes tended to be fatalistic (Ostrowska 1997 cited in Cockerham 1999).  
 
However, diet, use of tobacco (WHO 1994) or excessive alcohol consumption 
(Eberstadt 1990; Varavasovsky et al. 1996), although clearly significant factors 
(Leon et al. 2003), only account for some of the rise in mortality both during and 
post communism (Cornia and Paniccià 2000). Health-related behaviours are often 
based on the choices available to people. These choices are affected by age, 
gender, socioeconomic position and other structural constraints that influence 
behaviour choice (for example, patterns of socialisation and normative 
behaviours in the home, workplace and community).   
For this reason, psychosocial factors relating to stress, socioeconomic inequality, 
and health-related behaviours (Marmot et al. 1997; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; 
van Oort 2005) are considered key factors in the health and mortality trends 
observed in CEE and the FSU (Shapiro 1994, 1995; Bobak & Marmot 1996, 2006; 
Hertzman et al. 1996; Cockerham 1997, 1999; Cornia & Paniccià, 2000).  
 
The argument that is being made by these authors is that health-related 
behaviours and classical risk factors do not provide an adequate explanation for 
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the excess rates of, for example, cardiovascular mortality: other factors are at 
play (Hertzman et al. 1996; Bobak & Marmot 1996, 2006; Cornia & Paniccià, 
2000). Whilst health-related behaviours clearly contribute to the East-West 
health gap as proximal factors, the role of social and economic factors are 
judged to be the more important drivers, even if it is more difficult to establish 
direct evidence to prove this argument. In addition, those who support or are 
sympathetic to the ‗psychosocial hypothesis‘ maintain that the effect of a poor 
socioeconomic situation is mediated by psychosocial factors (Bobak & Marmot 
1996, 2006; Hertzman et al. 1996; Cornia & Paniccià 2000; Hertzman et al. 1996; 
Lachman & Weaver, 1998; van Oort 2005).  
 
According to this hypothesis, socioeconomic dissatisfaction and people‘s 
inability, perceived or real, to influence their own circumstances by engaging in 
political and civil spheres of life find themselves in a situation of relative or 
perceived deprivation in comparison with, say, the West traditionally, and/or 
other social groups nationally. A consequence of this may well be an increased 
tendency to adopt unhealthy behaviours such as excessive alcohol consumption 
or smoking (Cornia & Paniccià 2000).  
 
In summary, therefore, the Eastern Bloc (dominated as it was by the former 
Soviet Union) experienced initial improvements in life expectancy followed by 
stagnation and then slow decline which was overlaid by a more precipitous 
decline after the collapse of communism. Importantly, different states within 
the Eastern Bloc experienced variations on this theme and the two countries of 
greatest interest in this thesis (Poland and the Czech Republic) experienced 
their own particular trends that will be explored in more detail later. The main 
purpose of this section is to establish what is now the ‗orthodox explanation‘ for 
the wider CEE trends in mortality and to note that ‗unhealthy behaviours‘ (in 
particular alcohol consumption) are influenced by wider determinants of health.  
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1.2 Political and socioeconomic change in Central East 
Europe: communist to post-communist 
The previous section described how, in the last decades of state-socialism, life 
expectancy stagnated and then deteriorated. Yet, during the 1960s, the 
Communist project appeared to be on a successful trajectory as both economic 
output and life expectancy increased. Why did it lose momentum? This is the 
question that will be discussed in this section.  
By the time CEE became absorbed into the Soviet sphere of hegemony in the 
post-war period, a major social transformation had already taken place in the 
Soviet Union. The dynamic for this political, economic and social transformation 
was accelerated industrialisation: Russia was transformed from a largely agrarian 
society to an industrial nation (Kornai 1980; Lewis 1994; Fowkes 1995; Berend 
1996). Joseph Stalin57 (1878 – 1953) was the architect of these developments and 
his main organising principle was coercion. After Stalin, material incentives 
became more important inducements (Zaslavsky 1995) while patronage of the 
party state became the primary mechanism for redistributing the nation‘s 
wealth, with priority given to the nomenklatura (leading members of the 
communist party). The structure of Soviet society was engineered by the state 
which was a single party state. The Communist Party created a command 
economy in which a burgeoning military-industrial complex emerged (Spencer 
1972). This Stalinist model allowed the Soviet Union to pursue its military and 
technological objectives and enabled ―Soviet society to live with the trauma of 
industrialisation and to endure the privations Stalin required‖ (Schöpflin 
1993:81). 
In the aftermath of World War II, even though many of the countries of CEE had 
previously looked west rather than east for political, cultural and economic 
relationships, communism was imposed on CEE and accepted to varying degrees 
                                         
57
 Stalin, a minor player in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, rose through the ranks of the 
Communist Party becoming General Secretary in 1922. After the death of Lenin in 1924 Stalin 
utilised and augmented his position to become, essentially, dictator of the Soviet Union. By 
1928, Stalin had replaced Lenin‘s State Capitalism with a highly centralised command 
economy. He initiated a series of Five-Year (economic) Plans, launching a period of rapid 
industrialisation and economic collectivisation in the countryside. As a result, the USSR was 
transformed from a largely agrarian society into a great industrial power and created the 
foundation upon which the Soviet Union emerged as a global super power.  
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(Swain & Swain 2003; Bideleux & Jefferies 2007).  The post-war aims of the new 
political order were the imposition of communist party rule and enforced 
‗modernisation‘. As in the Soviet Union, the dynamic for this political, social and 
economic transformation would be accelerated industrialisation. The key 
mechanisms for industrialisation were full employment, mass re-settlement, 
mass migration from the countryside and collectivisation (Kolankiewicz & Lewis 
1988:22-23).  This Soviet model was implemented across CEE. Pro-Stalinist forces 
dismissed their national contexts and sought to shape society according to 
ideological models imposed by the Kremlin. One consequence was that patterns 
of consumption and the areas of (post-war) reconstruction were wholly 
determined by the state (Brus 1986).  
The Soviet model was inapt in CEE for two main reasons. First, CEE was already 
in the grip of industrialisation and second, as an entity, the region was socially, 
economically and politically more complicated. Consequently, after 1945 CEE 
initiated political systems that contained progressive institutions and which 
permitted some aggregation and articulation of interests (Kornai 1992). In 
contrast, Stalinism offered little autonomy and sought to replace local solutions 
with ―a single, homogenised, centrally directed set of imperatives, which sought 
to eliminate rather than reconcile these variations and this differentiation‖ 
(Schöpflin 1993:84). The Stalinisation of CEE meant the adoption of a Soviet 
style apparatus: state-socialism. Changes impacted every level of society as long 
established patterns of life were altered and everybody had to adjust to the new 
status quo.  
Stalinism and the establishment of state-socialism in CEE had one further 
impact: the fusion of public and private spheres (Garcelon 1997). Although less 
developed and more regulated than the West, CEE did have separate spheres. 
Stalinism and state-socialism colonised and merged both spheres as a way to 
maintain and enhance control. This included the family which, like all other 
institutions, was expected to serve the state: 
―Society and polity, whether as individuals or as groups, were to be as 
far as possible wholly insulated from alternative and thus deviant 
values, whether these were pre-existing or non-Soviet. All 
unsanctioned values were to be extirpated and replaced by the new 
value system of Marxism-Leninism‖ (Schöpflin, 1993:89).  
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When Stalin died and Nikita Khrushchev58 (1894 – 1971) denounced him and his 
legacy in his ‗secret speech‘ of 195659, all the CEE economies sought to relax and 
reform their respective systems. The 1960s saw decentralisation, firm 
accountability, increased labour incentives and some shift toward real or market 
prices (Brus 1986). The result was improved living standards and social mobility 
(Lovenduski & Woodall 1987:141-142) but the state still controlled travel, 
education, and employment; marginalised and punished dissent and fostered 
narrow careerism. Above all, the state systematically penalised independent 
thought (Maier 1991). 
In short, state-socialism in CEE was economically successful (at least for a time) 
but went against the grain of diverse CEE national cultures and tended to be 
authoritarian and inflexible. As such, there was divergence in the extent to 
which it was accepted, tolerated, or rejected by the populations of different 
states (Kornai 1990, 1992; Schöpflin 1990, 1993).  
The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 (an armed rebellion) and the Prague Spring of 
1968, (a peaceful revolution sparked by the top-down innovation of reform-
minded elites) (Smolar 1996:24), provided evidence of the tensions within CEE 
and  were both suppressed by force. Both were motivated by a desire to remain 
within state-socialism but deviate from the model prescribed by Moscow. Both 
had sought to introduce liberalisation and democratisation within a framework 
of Marxist-Leninism. In both cases, Moscow intervened with military might 
(Fowkes 1995; Berend 1996). 
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet leadership retrenched into ―a reflex of 
centralisation, (and) retreated back to the safe ideological priorities of central 
planning‖ (Maier 1991:43). The Brezhnev doctrine60 was clear. The USSR would 
                                         
58
 Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was able to 
consolidate a position of power becoming ‗Premier‘ in 1956. 
59 In February 1956, Khrushchev made a secret speech to the 20th Party Congress, denouncing 
Stalin. The speech initiated a campaign of partial 'de-Stalinisation' and encouraged people 
living in CEE to believe that there was some scope for independence from the Soviet Union. 
60
 This doctrine was declared to retroactively legitimate the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 that ended the Prague Spring, along with earlier Soviet military interventions, such as 
Hungary in 1956. These interventions were meant to put an end to liberalisation and reform 
efforts that had the potential to compromise Soviet hegemony.  
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not remain passive in the face of ‗anti socialist degeneration‘. This explains the 
homogeneity in the subsequent development of CEE countries. The result was 
poorly realised reforms that proved insufficient to halt a growing deterioration 
which manifested itself in production bottlenecks, the stagnation of consumer 
goods production and internal conflict. However, propitious external 
circumstances in the form of Western demand and cheap commodities from 
COMECON61 ensured the economies of CEE did not completely stagnate until the 
mid-1970s and 1980s (Brus 1986).  
The fundamental problem was that the system was neither equitable nor 
efficient. The result was economic stagnation and social conflict arose as the 
public proved unwilling to reduce consumption or accept inflation. Yet, the 
reforms needed to avoid such a situation conflicted with the imperatives of the 
centralised planning apparatus. The elite, who ran and depended on the 
apparatus, sought to protect their status and therefore failed to implement the 
necessary reforms (Lovenduski & Woodall 1987). 
The economic pressures of the 1970s62 resulted in rising energy costs and 
inflationary pressures in all oil-dependent industrialised economies, both east 
and west. In the West, this led to technological adaptations and advancements: 
in short, Western industrial economies restructured, albeit painfully at times. 
These same forces led CEE states to accept Western credits in order to postpone 
the destabilising forces of structural reform and immediate economic decline. 
This created a contradiction that undermined state-socialism in CEE, as Maier 
explains: 
―Party leaders (had) embarked on a staunch effort to save or resurrect 
as much centralised planning as possible. But this was a strategy that 
could work only in isolation from the West. Yet, at the same time, 
each country became more involved in world markets, if only by 
virtue of the Western loans they contracted to give central planning a 
new lease of life‖ (Maier 1991:43).  
                                         
61 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was an economic organization 
comprising the countries of the Soviet bloc along with a number of communist states elsewhere 
in the world.  
 
62 In particular the oil price crisis that followed the Arab Israeli War. 
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State-socialism was, it appeared, unable to adjust. Surplus labour in the 
countryside and the capital resources amassed before the introduction of 
communism had previously sustained it but these had been exhausted by the 
early 1960s (Schöpflin 1990:5). Success had depended upon a stage of industrial 
development based around large productive units and heavy industry (Fordism - 
assembly lines methods, mechanisation, and repetitive and intensive labour - 
had been pursued as much as it had in the West). However, the Western 
economies were embarking on a shift from the old industrial base to new 
competitive industries which CEE seemed unable to follow.  The system of 
centralised planning suited maintaining a mono-industrial structure that, it soon 
became clear, would struggle to adjust to the challenge of the increasingly 
globalised world market63.  
To summarise, the command economies of CEE failed to keep pace with the 
West and began to decline in absolute terms but their governments sought to 
resist the structural and cultural shift that would have been needed to respond 
effectively. In many cases, to maintain acquiescence, the state spent reserves 
on Western consumer goods to be made available in shops. However, the 
artificial improvements in living standards were unsustainable and as a result the 
economies worsened. The shortages of goods and services and the ongoing 
deterioration in the economy led to widespread discontent (Kornai 1992). 
As it had in agriculture, CEE sought to expand the proportion of workers in its 
heavy industry sectors: the party state needed to maintain the illusion of full 
employment. The Soviet Bloc could not persist as an enclave. It had based its 
ideological legitimacy on its performance in relation to the West and it was now 
failing (Firkowska-Mankiewicz et al. 1990; Maier 1991). Moreover, the 
populations knew this was the case because ties with the West were too 
extensive to be closed. As Maier concludes: 
                                         
63 It is worth noting in passing that state organised strategies to protect the old industrial regions 
of the West usually suffered a similar fate. This, of course, is a politically contentious 
observation but there is no doubt that many of the arguments for market-led solutions in the 
West gathered strength from the failures of Eastern Europe.    
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―the Communist claim to political and societal leadership could no 
longer be sustained in view of the developmental deficit that had to 
be remedied...by the 1980s, the continuing afflictions in the East 
testified to the pathology of communism‖ (Maier, 1991:50) 
Yet, the unproductive and increasingly impotent nature of state-socialism in CEE 
was concealed for a long time – mostly through denial. Political leaders 
disregarded popular concerns in favour of militarisation and industrialisation: 
this afforded the population little or no political agency (contrast this, for 
example, with the demands baby boomers placed on western political elites and 
the state). Party elites failed to counter political and social pressures, tensions 
and conflicts. They did not formulate coherent policies, reforms and strategies. 
The result was an internal and external crisis of legitimation (Ekiert 1991). 
Grievances accumulated which precipitated the emergence of collective protests 
that would ultimately expose the structural deficiencies of state-socialism and 
the inability of party elites to institutionalise reform. 
Internally, decisions were increasingly based on pragmatism rather than 
ideology. This created a crisis of legitimacy as it became evident that the 
impetus of rule was little more than the maintenance of power. The stated 
objectives and goals of state-socialism were now secondary goals, if goals at all. 
As Schöpflin explains: 
 ―The parties were effectively caught in a trap of origins. They 
claimed to rule in the name of the Marxist revolution by which they 
had initially seized power and this was neither negotiable nor 
convertible to any other kind of power, one legitimised by elections, 
for example. Nor could it be bargained in any way, for any attempt to 
argue that the initial revolutionary impulse was no longer valid would 
immediately question the entire basis of the regime‖. [1993:160]  
Soviet leaders had created a false identity. They claimed to rule in the name of 
the proletariat yet, in reality, the system was a bureaucratic oligarchy. In this 
context, the elites faced the increasingly difficult task of maintaining legitimacy 
while resolving forces arising from demands for representation and a distribution 
of power.  
The legacy of the Brezhnev era, when detente ceased in light of the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the command economies stagnated, could be seen to mark the 
beginning of the end. However, this would be a myopic view. The crises of state-
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socialism, as has been argued above, developed much earlier. The events of 
1958 and 1968 had, in hindsight, defined the limits of state-socialism in a CEE 
context. In reality, conflict and disenfranchisement had always been features of 
state-socialism within CEE. It is simply that the 1970s and beyond saw a 
widening and deepening of these feelings within a context of economic decline 
and increasing outside influence. 
Although from the 1970s economic decline was the most proximate cause of the 
crisis in state-socialism, its most salient manifestation was the growing 
disconnect between the party-state and the population. The state‘s loss of 
authority and de-legitimation was replaced by a resignation to a status quo often 
defined by distributive injustice and a broad dissatisfaction with material well-
being. By the end of the 1980s state-socialism in a CEE context was no longer 
capable of self-production (Schöpflin 1990:5). 
In 1989, the swift collapse of party-states in CEE marked a tipping point: the 
conclusion of ongoing economic, social and political decline and the removal of 
Soviet imperial will (Ekiert 1991). With varying degrees of urgency and 
conviction, the countries of CEE, entered a period of transition (Schöpflin 1991; 
Holmes 1997; Lewis 1997). The term ‗transition‘ has been widely used to 
represent, what was ostensibly, a planned transformation from command 
economies and one-party states to market economies and western-style 
democracies (Elster et al. 1998). The collapse of communism and the end of 
state-socialism in CEE saw the emergence of new democratic governments keen 
to implement programmes of reform. The goal was to replace the stagnating 
command economies, characterised by state ownership and central planning, 
with market-based economies founded upon private ownership (Ekiert & Hanson 
2003). The impact was immediate and often dramatic, characterised as Ekiert 
notes: 
―by the rapid disintegration of existing political institutions, the 
further aggravation of economic dislocations, the proliferation of 
various political movements breaking into the political arena and the 
establishment of transitory power arrangements in which opposition 
forces acquired varying degrees of access to the official political 
process and institutions‖ (1991:287).  
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One important consequence was that social conditions deteriorated across the 
region. In CEE, GDP decreased markedly, state-owned enterprises collapsed, and 
the paternalistic system of social protection was, to a significant degree, 
dismantled. Unemployment, whether created or made explicit, once again 
became a feature in a region where it had previously been masked. Increases 
(often rapid) in inflation eroded already meagre living standards. The removal of 
state subsidies led to dramatic increases in rent and utilities. Health care 
facilities and educational institutions, already disadvantaged by the legacy of 
state-socialism, were often unable to function under the new cost-accounting 
frameworks. The outcome was dramatic. Several million workers lost their jobs 
and increases in poverty rates and income inequality resulted in large swathes of 
the population subsisting below the poverty threshold (Deacon 2000; Cerami 
2006, 2007). 
No longer able to command the economy for public expenditures, the countries 
of CEE sought to implement new revenue raising policies: payroll taxes, 
corporate taxes, personal taxes and value added taxes were established in most 
countries by the mid-1990s. However, as a consequence of structural 
deficiencies and cultural norms, tax evasion and poor tax collection were 
common place. Accordingly, there were cutbacks in producer and consumer 
subsidies on energy, housing, food and much else. In addition, public sector 
wages were eroded by inflation. Conversely, social protection expenditure 
increased (as a percentage of the total) primarily due to unemployment benefit 
and pensions (exacerbated by the policies of early retirement) (Cerami 2008). 
 
The transition from state-socialism to capitalism was unprecedented for three 
reasons, as King observes: 
―It was the first where there was no class of private proprietors, and 
it was the first where capital accumulation had already taken place on 
a huge scale. Crucially, in most cases industrialisation was obsolete 
and inefficient from a global perspective‖ (2008:1) 
For the transition to be successful, there had to be a strategy to create a new 
socioeconomic order oriented towards capitalism (and the West, in the case of 
potential EU candidates). King goes on to state: 
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―This would be a massive exercise in social engineering, as large as 
any attempted, including the Stalinist period of industrialisation and 
collectivisation. Not surprisingly, different ways of transforming 
private property had different political, economic and public health 
consequences‖ (2008:1). 
The collapse of Communism coincided with the rise of neoliberalism, as 
advocated in the U.S. by President Ronald Reagan and in the U.K. by Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. Neoliberalism prescribed a transition from command 
to market economies and the ‗road map‘ for such a transition was articulated in 
the so-called ‗Washington Consensus‘. The term  ‘Washington Consensus‘ refers 
to an orientation towards neoliberal policies that was influential among many 
mainstream economists, politicians, journalists and global institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. In a CEE context, it meant a 
combination of shock transition and macroeconomic stabilisation, both of which 
were considered necessary to remedy the macroeconomic imbalances present in 
most state-socialist economies (namely, disparity between supply and demand, 
trade deficits and high levels of foreign debt). According to the doctrine of the 
Washington Consensus, as it was applied to CEE, a programme of stabilisation, 
liberalisation, privatisation and restructuring was required (Gabrisch & 
Hölscher 2006). 
The transition economies of CEE were vulnerable to inflation. Therefore, 
stabilisation was critical if market mechanisms were to function. Liberalisation 
of the economic sphere was also necessary, particularly in light of the failures of 
state-socialism. Some aspects, such as freeing prices and creating space for 
economic enterprise, were essential and widely welcomed. Other aspects, such 
as wage restraint and open and free trade, were less welcome due to their 
disproportionate impacts on certain elements of society and sectors of the 
economy. Privatisation was a critical element of the Washington Consensus for it 
was viewed as a fundamental element of a market economy. The belief was that 
the creation of a private sector would result in the emergence of ‗correct‘ 
economic incentives and would facilitate the removal of the state from 
economic life. Structural change, such as the creation of new institutions, would 
be more difficult for, unlike the other elements, it is costly and time consuming 
(Roland 2002).  
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The free market emphasis of the Washington Consensus came to typify the 
neoliberal approach to post-communist transition. As Blazyca states: 
―It set broad parameters on policy choice even if the detailed 
experience of countries across the region showed particular solutions 
could vary a great deal, a feature especially noticeable in 
privatisation. But what it did most forcibly was to foreclose any more 
‗statist‘ approach to post-communist reconstruction‖ (2003:216-17).  
Two options were available to transform communist economies wishing to 
establish a market-led economy and secure integration into trans-national 
institutions, such as the European Union (E.U64), and the global economy. There 
were the, so-called, radicals who supported an immediate transition to a market 
economy and the, so-called, gradualists who recommended gradual change on 
the grounds that it would bring better economic results and avoid the social 
dislocation often associated with immediate transition.  
The more radical approach was popular and had an immediate and dramatic 
effect on the post-communist countries. Thousands of companies previously 
orientated towards the Soviet and COMECON markets were now competing with 
Western firms who often had more finance, greater experience and more 
advanced technology. As trade shifted West (approximately 90 per cent within 
the first two years), enterprises often laid off staff or shut down completely. 
Simultaneously however, liberalisation and privatisation opened up space for 
whole new enterprises. This was most discernible in the previously under-
developed consumer sector. As Orenstein notes: 
―In Warsaw, Gdansk, and Sopot, kiosks arose selling all manner of 
goods on main thoroughfares and in marketplaces. Shops began to 
transform themselves from dingy operations to glitzy Western palaces 
of consumption... launching entirely new patterns of consumer 
behaviour and choice‖ (2009:5). 
CEE countries were also keen to attract and promote foreign direct investment 
(FDI) which required liberalisation and deregulation in order to ensure free 
movement of capital and profits. Securing foreign investment was a critical 
                                         
64
 Functioning market economy was a precondition to E.U. accession. Privatisation was 
considered critical in establishing a competitive enterprise sector and financial sector in CEE. 
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element of economic strategies in CEE since it stimulated economic growth and 
increased capital, productivity, employment, innovation and technology 
transfer. Foreign exchange was vital to secure imported industrial inputs and 
imported consumer goods. Typically, FDI was attracted to successful export 
industries, providing important foreign currency for the CEE countries (Nowak & 
Steagall 2003). 
The rapid transformation of CEE and FSU created many opportunities for 
enrichment. Chief amongst these were those who were able by corrupt means to 
exploit the system and the entrepreneurs who made fortunes trading consumer 
goods or transformed ailing state enterprises. Importantly, these same forces 
also caused massive social dislocations, particularly among more vulnerable 
populations. As Orenstein concludes: 
―While neoliberal economists and politicians promised a quick 
recession, the transitional recession in CEE proved much more long-
lived. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, in 2002, twelve years after the start of transition, most 
post-Communist countries had not returned to their 1989 levels of 
economic output‖ (2009:6)  
There is some consensus regarding the correlation between transition and its 
social impact (e.g. Cornia & Paniccià 2000), but different conclusions are 
reached as to whether it was failures in the procedures of reforms or their 
inadequacies or incorrect application that caused the social costs (Ionita, 
Mandruta & Pippidi, 2000:2). What is certain is that the socioeconomic 
vulnerability of various social groups increased significantly during and after the 
transition period. In addition, a great number of people were exposed to 
processes of social exclusion including the intensification of social borders based 
on ethnic, cultural and religious differences and discrimination due to age, sex 
and wealth (Musiolek 2002).  
Although some forms of disparities existed under communism and were accepted 
for various reasons (see Milanovic 1998) the transition to market economies 
revealed existing and created new inequalities within post-communist societies. 
As with the establishment of state-socialism, winners and losers emerged. 
Spatial and social inequalities were exacerbated and material inequality 
increased. This is important, for access to vital services such as health and 
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education in CEE was increasingly determined by the market. The prolonged 
economic downturn, high rates of unemployment and income inequality all 
contributed to feelings of frustration, disenfranchisement, and mounting 
political and social tensions.  
In summary, this section has shown that, in the aftermath of World War II, 
communism was imposed on CEE even although many of the countries of CEE had 
previously been aligned with the West rather than East. Initial economic success 
concealed profound societal tensions and in time, the contradictions within the 
system made the economy inefficient and inequitable. As a result, the 
legitimacy of party elites came under a strain that would finally snap.  Finally, 
under neoliberal western influences the movement to a market economy 
following the collapse of communism was rapid and caused considerable 
hardship.    
1.3 Pattern of privatisation in CEE 
This section will examine the impact of privatisation on CEE with a particular 
focus on Poland and the Czech Republic.  
 
1.3.1 Shock therapy 
After the collapse of communism the economies of CEE began a dramatic 
transition (Bradshaw & Stenning 2004; Hamm, King & Stuckler 2012) and a key 
element of the change from command to market-based systems was 
privatisation. For the purpose of this thesis the important point to note is that 
this historically unprecedented change was accompanied by dramatic 
deindustrialisation. As Kuttor and Hegyi-Kéri note:  
 
―the crash of the markets within the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance, the non-realisation of investments, the lack of 
competitiveness, the unfavourable sectoral structure and the 
economic slump in Western Europe led to a marked decrease in 
industrial output‖ (2012:292). 
In short, CEE went through a period of deindustrialisation which makes it 
analogous, up to a point, with what happened in West Central Scotland. 
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For several years leading up to the mid-1990s Poland and the Czech Republic 
(along with other countries in the region except Hungary) experienced economic 
decline. This decline manifested itself in indicators like ‗industrial value-added‘, 
GDP, incomes and unemployment. These deteriorations can be linked to 
structural problems that preceded the collapse of communism and the paths 
selected towards privatisation. Importantly, the degree and duration of 
economic dislocation varied according to the intensity and speed of change 
(Frydman, Rapaczynski & Earle 1993; Dabrowski et al. 2004) and the 
consequences varied from country to country depending on the prevailing 
political environment, the degree of adaptability of economic agents and 
cultural differences (Bennet, Estrin & Urga 2007; Giannaros 2008; Hamm, King & 
Stuckler 2012).  
The Washington Consensus dictated privatisation and the introduction of market 
forces rather than the exploration of other means by which the economy might 
be restructured (Megginson & Netter 2001; Blazyca 2003; Gabrisch & 
Hölscher 2006). Kornai (1990), for example, argued that for real competition to 
exist between privatised firms, it was essential that the entrenched monopoly 
positions of state-owned enterprises should be eliminated before going to 
market. As highlighted previously, once this primary goal was agreed, two 
options were available:  the radical approach commonly referred to as ‗shock 
therapy‘ and a more ‗gradual approach‘. As discussed, the radical approach 
involved immediate and widespread economic system changes, including 
removal of price controls, elimination of most regulations and significant 
privatisation of industries and enterprises. The gradual approach introduced the 
same set of economic system changes but much more slowly. The argument for 
shock therapy was that, without a rapid transition to a market-based economy, 
less efficient systems would become entrenched. Also, the immediate transfer of 
ownership would allow new private market orientated owners to perform any 
necessary restructuring (Marangos 2003; Dehejia 2003; Alam et al. 2009).   
Others, although in favour of prompt transition, believed this was not possible 
and, therefore, advocated a gradualist approach. In short, the argument for 
gradualism was pragmatic. For example, Roland (1994) argued that political 
constraints dictated the need for a gradual approach for two reasons. First, 
privatisation necessitated redistribution and this was likely to be contentious 
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and met with public and political opposition, and second, entrenched sectoral 
interests were likely to promote or prevent policies that were sensible 
economically. Burawoy (1996) argued that a radical approach would lead to 
asset stripping rather than investment and create economic winners who would 
exploit emerging opportunities (see also Aslund 1999).  
Advocates of both approaches agreed upon certain objectives of the transition, 
such as the creation of competitive markets and of incentives for firms to 
respond to market signals. The introduction of flexible price structures through 
the stabilisation of the macro-economy was also seen as important by both sides 
of this debate. Institutions to aid stability in the transition were considered to 
be essential and it was argued that they should protect property rights and 
prevent so-called rent-seeking from pressure groups (Roland 2000). In short, 
both positions considered the market to be the solution to problems, including 
social and environmental problems (Scrieciu & Stringer 2008). It is important to 
note, however, that with hindsight, radicals made one significant concession: 
―institutions and other initial conditions mattered more than they had previously 
acknowledged‖ (Hamm, King & Stuckler 2012:298). Radicals never regarded mass 
privatisation as detrimental and argued that countries are ‗‗better off after the 
flawed privatisations they carried out than they would have been had they 
avoided or delayed divestiture‘‘ (Nellis 2008:81). 
 
Privatisation was not merely a means of generating private ownership: it was 
also a policy mechanism by which certain economic aims could be achieved. 
These included the generation of private enterprises; intensification of market 
forces and competition; facilitation of a fit and functioning market economy; 
reduction in state intervention; establishment of new management and 
organisational structures; increased efficiency and productivity; balanced 
budgets; raised revenues and the attraction of inward investment (Blommestein, 
Geiger & Hare 1993). Privatisation also diffused control from the state to other 
interests. The transfer of ownership, rights and power would weaken any 
remaining legacy of state-socialism and marginalise any Nomenklatura that 
might remain in public office or state employment. It would also create a 
constituency for the market transition and prevent asset stripping. In short, 
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privatisation would remove the structures of state-socialism and obstruct their 
reinstitution (King 2007). 
In the event, the transformation proved to be both demanding and risky. 
Extensive economic resources were reallocated, change was required in the 
management of resources, technology, employment and pricing and financial 
systems and economic institutions were indeed transformed. However, the 
dislocations that accompanied the transition also resulted in a loss of 
productivity, income and employment and the socioeconomic conditions of the 
populations expected to endure these changes were compromised (at least in 
the short to medium-term) (Cornia & Paniccià 2000; Orenstein 2009).  
 
In normal circumstances, such a transformation would have been unpopular and 
might have been expected to encounter resistance from special interest groups 
and the general population. However, when communism collapsed, many of the 
groups that might have been expected to mount resistance were in disarray 
(Cerami & Vanhuysse 2009). Having made this point it should be noted that some 
lobby groups did emerge later. Moreover, the popular goodwill gained from new 
political freedoms and independence meant the population was more open to 
change and people were accepting of the associated cost (even if they did not 
wholly understand what was going to unfold). These circumstances provided a 
window of opportunity for what Balcerowicz described as the ‗period of 
extraordinary politics‘ (Balcerowicz 1994).  
 
1.3.2 Poland: ‘shock therapy’ and privatisation  
In 1990, Poland implemented a programme of shock therapy. The first objective 
of the ‗Balcerowicz Plan‘ was to address macroeconomic concerns regarding the 
budget deficit, inflation, foreign exchange reserves and foreign debt. The view 
was that issues concerning economic efficiency were complex and time-
consuming and should therefore be concluded at a later date. As a result, shock 
therapy was implemented to foster macroeconomic stability and promote 
liberalisation, while institutional changes (including privatisation) were carried 
out more gradually (Baltowski & Mickiewicz 2000:426).  
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In July 1990, Poland introduced legislation to begin privatisation. Privatisation, 
it was believed, would secure foreign investment and/or create a new property 
owning class with a stake in maintaining and developing the economy. Out of 
this arrangement would emerge competitive firms and sectors. The legislation 
set the road map for the transition and a Ministry of Property Transformation 
was established to oversee the process (Smit & Pěchota 1994:120). However, 
among the state and their advisers (both foreign and domestic) there was no 
solid consensus regarding the course of privatisation nor was there a clear 
programme of reform put in place to facilitate the process (Baltowski & 
Mickiewicz 2000:426). 
Essentially, the modes could be grouped into two categories. ‗Equivalent‘ 
privatisation meant that the enterprise was sold on the open market for its real 
value and was considered more likely to create businesses that could flourish on 
stock markets. ‗Non-equivalent‘ privatisation involved a transfer of resources at 
below market value and was often used to make forms of employee or mass 
ownership of shares possible. The non-equivalent schemes received popular 
support because they were seen as egalitarian (Baltowski & Mickiewicz 2000) and 
employee ownership schemes were strongly supported by union activists in 
major industrial sites. As Baltowski & Mickiewicz explain: 
―It was argued that those demands were justified historically (the 
contribution of the Solidarity trade union to the abolition of the 
communist system) and it was also believed that preferential terms 
granted to the work force would ensure vital social support for 
privatisation as well as other structural reforms‖ (2000:427).  
In other words, the non-equivalent schemes provided a social solution for the 
social costs incurred by those enduring the transformation.   
Those who supported the Washington Consensus were wary. They argued that 
such measures would curb the development of a market economy and 
consolidate a legacy of state-socialism resulting in the perpetuation of 
businesses that were unproductive and inefficient. Moreover, the collective 
ownership of shares (a critical feature of employee ownership plans) would be a 
barrier to the development of a capital market with a strong stock exchange. 
These advocates wanted a system where financial considerations were 
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paramount in all investment decisions. The key point to make is that the choice 
between equivalent and non-equivalent privatisation was a political one: ―a 
choice between different social groups that would obtain economic gains‖ 
(Baltowski & Mickiewicz 2000:429).  
Initially, Poland tried to pursue equivalent privatisation and sought to sell firms 
on the open market. However, there were far too few investors and inevitably 
the state retained majority ownership. The next strategy was to secure single 
western buyers or foreign direct investment (FDI). Typically FDI was pursued via 
a closed tender negotiated between the government and foreign investors (King 
2008). This practice proved controversial with many critics asserting that firms 
were being sold below their perceived real value in return for personal reward or 
to ingratiate the State elites with their western counterparts. Yet, this strategy 
was only adopted because there was a real difficulty in securing the perceived 
market value of the businesses for sale. The problem was that the real value of 
these businesses was obscured under the previous system. This is a problem with 
which all CEE countries had to contend (Berg 1994:177).  
The Solidarity government of that period then afforded Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister Balcerowicz the space to implement his neoliberal policies. 
The effect was certainly ‗shocking‘. The fall in Polish output was immediate and 
rapid, far exceeding what was expected. According to projections, GDP in 1990 
was expected to fall by 3.5 per cent and then recover strongly in 1991. In fact, it 
fell by 11.4 per cent in 1990 followed by a further 7.4 per cent in 1991. As 
Bauman concluded: 
―Neither the workers of the communist built industrial dinosaurs, nor 
the state-tied farmers, got what they bargained for, but they got 
much which they did not bargain for (including mass unemployment 
and the cancellation of state credits)‖ (1994:22). 
The willingness of Solidarity to pursue neoliberal policies, given their syndicalist 
roots, is surprising. The fact they eschewed the ‗managed capitalism‘ more 
typical of continental Europe for the ‗market capitalism‘ of the Anglo-Saxon 
model demonstrates the pervasiveness of neoliberal thinking, particularly in a 
context previously characterised by excessive state intervention and centralised 
institutions. The choice also alluded to the unequal power relation between 
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donor and recipient which, in this case, was the western international 
community and the nascent transitional governments of CEE. The conditionality 
of EU accession and IMF and World Bank assistance is typical of these relations at 
the time (Grabbe 1999).  
Despite this, by the end of February 1992, only 407 enterprises had been 
privatised just 5.3 per cent of firms in the state sector (Price Waterhouse 2003). 
Sectoral interests, particularly in heavy industry, (such as politicians and trade 
union leaders looking to maintain their constituencies and political capital) 
effectively lobbied against privatisation. Instead of mass privatisation and 
radical restructuring, they were concerned with maintaining the state-owned 
sector and securing preferential government treatment for chosen enterprises or 
sectors. Moreover, the social costs of the reform (high inflation and 
unemployment) were becoming increasingly apparent. From 1994 to 1996, the 
Democratic Left Alliance, incorporating the former Communist Party and the 
Peasant Party, were in government and plans for privatisation were stalled. The 
government was forced to make concessions and trade union and employee 
interests were effectively bought out by increased privatisation rewards in 
return for self-liquidation (Iankova 2002:107).  
The Polish ‗mass‘ privatisation scheme, years in the making, finally came into 
effect in 1995.  The scheme relied on fifteen government appointed National 
Investment Funds (NIFs). The NIF legislation formed the basis for the mass 
privatisation programme. It afforded every Polish adult the opportunity to 
acquire a stake in national assets for a nominal fee. The programme was 
designed to accelerate privatisation whilst simultaneously providing capital for 
future restructuring (Blaszczyk & Woodward 1999:8). Experienced foreign 
institutions played an important part in the management of these funds and the 
World Bank provided funding for administration. The Poles pursued this policy 
believing good governance was as important as privatisation. They also 
understood that faster privatisation could speed integration with the EU and also 
facilitate structural reforms (Blaszczyk & Woodward 1999:20).  
After the elections of 1997, the ruling coalition was defeated by a new 
government of free market fundamentalist and conservative nationalists. The 
new government committed itself to accelerated privatisation and to lifting 
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limits on previously restricted sectors. Parallel to this programme, the Polish 
Government started preparations to privatise the country‘s telecom system and 
large banks. Ultimately, direct privatisation in the form of management 
employee buyouts or leases proved to be the most common form of privatisation 
(Ellerman 1998).   
In spite of the various means of privatisation available, the pace of privatisation 
in Poland was relatively protracted. This was due to a lack suitable people to 
whom assets could be sold: the legacy of state-socialism was a ‗private sector‘ 
inhabited by artisans, small traders and farmers all of whom were under-
resourced and therefore unable to take over state enterprises (King 2007). This 
led to a context in which those with any economic capital were at an advantage. 
In essence, their capital was converted into a ‗non-equivalent‘ share of national 
assets, thanks to its low market price. In 1995, Guzek estimated that the supply 
of assets to be sold totalled approximately $100 billion, against a demand of $10 
billion (1995:156). Consequently, equivalent privatisation was in effect non-
equivalent with preference being afforded to existing owners of financial 
resources.  This was problematic because this group typically comprised of (1) 
former nomenklatura members, (2) participants in the so-called shadow (i.e. 
illegal) economy, or (3) representatives of the old, licensed, private sector, 
many of whom were directly linked to the former communist power structures 
(Baltowski & Mickiewicz, 2000:429). This, in turn, lead to a situation common 
throughout CEE and FSU, where: 
 ―This reallocation of property rights is regarded as unjust by broad 
segments of the population, because the acquisition of competence, 
information and assets by former members of nomenclature is not 
perceived as legitimate‖ (Brucker 1997:103). 
In summary, therefore, Poland did employ ‗shock therapy‘ in as much as it 
rapidly liberalised and marketised its economy. However, privatisation 
progressed more slowly and was only achieved after several failed attempts.   
1.3.3 The Czech Republic’s ‘mass privatisation’  
In the Czech Republic privatisation was implemented as a mixed programme of 
radical (shock) and slow (gradual) processes. This is important because these 
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two are sometimes presented as a dichotomous choice. Thus, the programme of 
‗mass‘ privatisation was executed via a range of means:  small enterprises were 
sold via auctions; some property was returned to its original owners and foreign 
investors acquired some major plants. The main practice however was voucher 
privatisation (Jeek 1997).  
In 1992, all Czech citizens were invited to purchase, at a nominal price, a book 
of stock shares or ‗points‘, which could then be invested in company shares. This 
was a mass distribution of property rights to the Czech population for a nominal 
fee. The Czech elite, through the adoption of the voucher system, hoped not 
only to enfranchise the population but also to break one of the legacies of state-
socialism (namely state-dependence) and introduce the market concepts of risk, 
profit, and ownership. In short, they believed attitudes could be reconstructed 
and redeveloped. Voucher privatisation offered the state the opportunity of 
―renewing the people‘s ability to look after their own assets‖ (Ministry of 
Privatisation report on the privatisation process in McMaster 2001). 
This Czech approach to privatisation was launched in 1992 and completed by 
1995 and, although there were critics, it was regarded as successful. Moreover, 
it was popular: there were high levels of participation and its proponents 
enjoyed electoral success (especially Czech Prime Minister, 1992-1997 Václav 
Klaus). Part of the idea was that the voucher scheme would prove popular, 
providing legitimacy for market-based reforms and, therefore, affording the 
government enough time to privatise. The Economist described the Czech path 
to privatisation as a ―march to a free market system with panache‖ (19th April 
1997). By 1995, only ten per cent of all large and medium-sized enterprises 
remained state-owned in the Czech Republic. In Poland the figure was 
approximately 54 per cent (World Bank 1995). Klaus himself, who as Finance 
Minister and then Prime Minister had been critical to its implementation, 
referred to it as a ―small miracle‖, that had facilitated a: 
 ―very quick, very successful, relatively painless and non-
confrontational transition from communist society to a free and open 
society and market economy‖ (Lidové noviny 18 June in McMaster 
2001).  
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With hindsight, it can be seen that there were problems with the Czech 
programme of privatisation. The main problem was that, in practice, the 
voucher system was not particularly inclusive. Quite quickly, investment funds 
and banks, predominantly controlled by the state, purchased the majority of 
citizens‘ vouchers. In 1997, eighty per cent of all shares were owned by nine 
investment companies, of which seven were owned by state banks (McDermott 
1997).  The Czech Ministry of Finance report on capital markets was a case of 
self-criticism, stating: 
―The investment funds made the process of finding real owners of 
companies difficult. They obstructed the restructuring and 
revitalisation of the Czech economy and prevented the progress in 
increasing labour productivity and restarting economic growth‖ 
(reported in Ekonom weekly No.45 in Williams & Balaz 2000:96).  
The report also noted that a lack of regulation and oversight in the capital 
markets facilitated the dubious and often illegal actions that enriched fund 
managers at the expense of minority shareholders, stating that:  
―Privatisation created space for those people who are interested in 
personal profits, at any price. Those who organised the privatisation 
process did not take into account the advice given by lawyers and 
international experts with respect to supervising the property re-
distribution. By now, we (the public sector) are lagging behind the 
aggressive class of new owners, who do not respect any of the rules 
commonly applied in the modern world‖ (Ekonom Weekly 1997 in 
Williams & Balaz 2000:96).  
The outcome, notes Ellerman, was a: ―two-sided grab-fest by fund managers and 
enterprise managers...accompanied by drift, stagnation and de-capitalisation of 
the privatised industrial sector‖ (1998:11). 
In the autumn of 1997, it became apparent that the ruling Civil Democracy Party 
had accepted millions of dollars from ‗unknown sponsors‘ to support electoral 
campaigns: in effect bribes to ease the acquisition of attractive enterprises. The 
scandal led to the resignation of the Klaus government and new elections. As it 
transpired, the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, had also been 
offered ‗sponsorship‘ from a group of Czech-Swiss entrepreneurs if, on winning 
the next election, they secured privileged access to privatised companies. This 
kind of controversy stirred public condemnation. 
   311 
The voucher system had, it appeared, been a means to consolidate state 
control. This persistence of state control removed any urgency for enterprises to 
restructure. As a result, the Czech Republic avoided many of the social costs 
associated with rapid restructuring, preferring to delay adjustment and incur 
any costs, such as low growth and unemployment, at a later date.  
1.3.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
In the early 1990s, during the initial transition phase, there was significant 
deindustrialisation across CEE, both in terms of economic activity and the labour 
market. Against this backdrop, both Poland and the Czech Republic brought 
about an early recovery of output, as indicated by GDP, with Poland returning to 
1989 levels by 1996 and the Czech Republic by 2001 (UNECE 2002). Both 
countries facilitated broader and more equal access to new entrepreneurial and 
employment opportunities which cushioned the social costs of transition.  
In each country the relative macroeconomic stability, institutional progress, 
political predictability and the prospects of EU integration attracted a significant 
inflow of foreign investments. The paths of privatisation in Poland and the Czech 
Republic and across the former Soviet Bloc fundamentally determined the 
development and volume of FDI. In this respect both Poland and the Czech 
Republic have been successful: accordingly, they are characterised as dependent 
market economies (DMEs) (Nolke and Vliegenthart 2009; Bohle & Greskovits 
2007; King & Sznajder 2006). The reason why this term is accurate is that, unlike 
developed Western states, the key nexus of economic decision making remains 
largely outside the country (predominantly with transnational corporations). The 
main source of investment is FDI, rather than bank-firm networks or stock 
markets. In addition, many of the foremost companies are wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of foreign firms and this includes a banking sector which is majority 
owned by foreign banks (Epstein 2008).  Foreign bank ownership was considered 
by many as a functional means of transferring both capital and knowledge to 
CEE. Moreover, CEE countries showed little concern about the forfeiture of 
domestic control over the economy (Orenstein 2011). For DMEs such as Poland 
and the Czech Republic their competitive advantage stems from a combination 
of low labour costs and high skills, making these countries prime locations for 
the manufacture and assembly of relatively high-value consumer durables.  
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Significantly, rather than asset stripping, diverting profits and undermining 
domestic firms, as many critics feared, these companies proved to be successful. 
In addition to the capital required for restructuring, they had access to 
technology, knowledge and advanced capitalist markets. A survey of a random 
sample of Polish firms conducted by the World Bank found foreign firms were 
190 per cent more likely to increase sales, 322 per cent more likely to increase 
exports, and 395 per cent more likely to increase employee numbers (King & 
Sznajder 2006:786). This inflow of capital, technology and knowledge led to 
significant expansion of the production capacities of CEE and, simultaneously, an 
increase in the number of industrial jobs and volume of exported goods (Kuttor 
& Hegyi-Kéri 2012).  
1.3.5 Summary   
During the transition period in CEE, the dynamics of deindustrialisation and re-
industrialisation operated in unison. The FSU experienced a protracted period of 
macroeconomic instability and high inflation damaged the economy undermining 
state institutions and placing swathes of the population into poverty. In 
addition, piecemeal reform and gradual progress in terms of liberalisation, 
privatisation and institution building maintained significant remnants of the 
command economy and created new problems (for example the oligarchs65). This 
narrative is in contrast to what is described above for Poland and the Czech 
Republic. The transition period was extremely painful but early and radical 
macroeconomic stabilisation and liberalisation and relatively early 
commencement of privatisation helped to limit the ‗recession‘ and widespread 
pauperisation (WEO 2000; EBRD 1999, 2002; World Bank 2002).  
 
                                         
65
 The oligarchs were able to gain numerous ‗rent opportunities‘ such as direct and indirect 
subsidies, tax exemptions, selective trade barriers, widespread licensing, export and import 
quotas, restricted and non-transparent privatisation process (see Gelb, Hillman, & Ursprung 
1995). As such they were, in some cases, able to exert influence on basic public institutions – 
executive, legislative and judicial power, regional and local self-government, political 
parties, and mass media. Not only has this denied society equal access to enterprise, it has 
also led to frustration and political apathy and created a context for political manipulation 
and populism. 
   313 
1.4 Social protection during and after transition  
This section will outline the level and type of social protection provided in CEE 
to counter the legacies of communism and the costs of transition: the focus will 
primarily be on Poland and the Czech Republic.   
During the communist period the social security system served to maintain the 
paternalist and closed order of the party-state. Thus, social security and the 
command economy were an apparatus which helped lead to the acquiescence of 
the (majority of the) population. A broad range of benefits subsidised groups 
such as the working class, farmers in cooperatives, the ‗socialist intelligentsia‘ 
and nomenklatura (Večerník 2006). Although all social security was financed 
from the state budget, enterprises rather than the state were often the main 
providers of key services such as housing, childcare and social security (Izyumov 
2010).  
In the socialist system work was both a duty and a right. The Soviet concept of 
nezaniatye (not employed) defined those who for some legitimate reason were 
not employed. In CEE (and FSU), the general understanding was that economies 
faced labour shortages rather than excess labour (Nuti 1996). So-called labour 
hoarding (widespread overstaffing) was prevalent in many sectors and this 
distorted the allocation of labour and contributed to low levels of labour 
productivity (Kornai 1995; Blanchard 1998). Wages were low and this had a de- 
motivating effect on workers. Employment was typically concentrated in heavy 
industries and not on the production of consumer goods. There was a very weak 
small business sector and although private enterprise was tolerated, it was 
generally in agriculture. Patterns of foreign trade were determined by economic 
planners within the framework of COMECON which governed trade within the 
Soviet Bloc.  
With the collapse of communism, former command economies were subject to 
world markets. In response, price liberalisation was combined with policies to 
achieve macroeconomic stability. The outcome was a marked deterioration in 
the economic performance which was much steeper than anyone predicted. 
Demand for labour collapsed immediately and after a while, levels of 
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employment also started to fall (Nesporova 2002; Cerami 2006, 2007 Hamm et 
al. 2012).  
 
Under state-socialism the main risks encountered were predominantly related to 
the shortage and quality of goods and services (see the ‗shortage economy‘, 
Kornai 1992). In the post-communist setting, New Social Risks (NSRs) came to 
light. This term refers to the social consequences of deindustrialisation and 
tertiarisation of employment. These changes tend to be associated with more 
women entering the labour market which places new kinds of pressures on the 
family. Typically, the literature concerning new social risks focuses on Western 
Europe and the post-industrial pressures exerted on mature welfare states 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Armingeon & Bonoli 
2006). The risks that are described include, for example, the challenge of 
balancing paid work with family commitments and care for the elderly. Other 
new social risks include workers finding that their skills are now obsolete or 
simply not suited to the new labour market. 
 
These new social risks were now becoming a feature of CEE society. In addition, 
the traditional risks, such as the instability that arises from no longer having 
access to a job, pension, health care, or minimum income also affected CEE to a 
greater degree than they had under communism. In summary, many of the risks 
known to the West became manifest in the East, often in a more extreme form.  
 
In all transition economies, the output shocks were more severe than the 
advocates of neoliberal economics had predicted and labour flows did not follow 
the expected trajectory. The prediction was that workers would move rapidly 
from state employment to unemployment and then into private employment. In 
the event, unemployment became a growing problem not due to large cohorts of 
workers being laid-off from state enterprises but as a result of low outflow rates 
from unemployment to private sector jobs (Boeri & Terrel 2002; Cazes & 
Nesporova 2004). 
 
Consequently, for transition countries, the population affected by new social 
risks tended to be larger and more diverse than in the West. They comprised 
those established groupings, extant in the West, such as the unemployed, 
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women, young, elderly, disabled, minorities, single parents, and the working 
poor (Armingeon & Bonoli 2006; Kitschelt & Rehm 2006) as well as other 
groupings, such as those unable to convert their material, cultural and social 
capital to the new socioeconomic context (for example, middle-aged employees 
of former state-owned enterprises, party apparatchiks, and people outside of 
emerging social networks) (Cerami 2008).  
 
At this stage, the former command economies began to diverge, with CEE 
countries faring better than the FSU. In CEE, nascent political parties and grass-
roots organisations, such as the ‗Solidarity‘ Trade Union in Poland and ‗Charter 
77‘ movement in Czechoslovakia, were active in the development of the reform 
agenda. These countries, with their relatively short experience of communism, 
stronger working-class movements, and legacy of civil society, embarked on a 
path of democratic capitalism similar to the West European social-market 
capitalist model (for discussion see Marangos 2007; Boyer 2005). The result was 
the development of rights (including job security, higher wages, retirement 
entitlements and welfare benefits) that were already well established in the 
West. Conversely, in the FSU reform was often in the hands of the former 
nomenklatura and, therefore, developed with much greater difficulty (Layard 
1998; Izyumov 2010).  
 
The initial stage of transition from 1990 until 1994 was a period of acute 
transformation driven by unprecedented economic and social reforms aligned 
with macroeconomic austerity and exogenous shocks. Employment fell sharply as 
the region adjusted to transition shocks through shedding jobs rather than 
cutting wages. Demand, both foreign and domestic, for goods and services 
reduced. As a result, GDP declined markedly in all transition countries – resulting 
in the so-called transition crisis (see Kornai 1992). The degree and duration of 
the crisis depended, to a large extent, on extant conditions such as the speed of 
transition, the proximity to Western markets and the level of entrepreneurship 
and so on (Nesporova 2002; Boeri & Terrell 2002; Hamm et al. 2012).  
 
Poland‘s ‗shock therapy‘ saw almost complete liberalisation of prices, currency 
devaluation and the introduction of strict macroeconomic austerity measures 
(only gradually relaxed after 1991). However, as noted in the previous section, 
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privatisation and the structural reform of certain sectors (agriculture, coal 
mining, and steel) was prolonged. Although this path allowed Poland to traverse 
the transition crisis relatively quickly and achieve high economic growth, it led 
to mounting structural problems and economic imbalances. The Czech Republic 
also opted for a fast and comprehensive price and foreign trade liberalisation 
and severe devaluation of its currency. Restructuring, as noted previously, relied 
mainly on voucher privatisation and the restructuring of those enterprises with 
strong ties to domestic state-owned banks. Although this path facilitated 
structural change and reform in the economy with comparatively low social 
costs, it eventually resulted in increasing macroeconomic imbalances, the 
indebtedness of many enterprises and a virtual collapse of the banking sector 
(Renshaw 2000; Hamm et al. 2012).  
 
A key part of the economic stabilisation measures was an incomes policy 
designed to limit wage inflation via a punitive tax rate. Most state-owned 
enterprises were subject to this tax, the rationale being to link wage increases 
with enterprise performance. The outcome, however, was a marked decline in 
real (consumer) wages in 1993 equal to around 80 per cent of their 1989 level in 
the Czech Republic and 71 per cent in Poland. Wage regulation undermined the 
link between wages and productivity. Profitable enterprises were unable to 
increase wages above the agreed limit while poorly performing enterprises, 
under pressure from workers, increased their wages to the limit. This restricted 
investment and led to the non-payment of loans, often forcing enterprises to 
seek more credit. As a consequence, the difference in wages between profitable 
and non-profitable enterprises was not sufficient to facilitate the reallocation of 
labour from the latter to the former. Moreover, it was a significant factor in 
delaying enterprise restructuring. Large enterprises persisted in labour hoarding 
while profitable enterprises could not increase wages to attract workers. 
Equally, monopolistic enterprises (principally in the extraction industries, 
metallurgy and energy), adapted their profits (artificially inflated by price 
increases) into greater and faster growing wages than in other industries. Often 
this was achieved without technological upgrading or productivity increases 
(Nesporova 2002; Cazes & Nesporova 2004).  
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In the heavy industries, such as coal mining and steel, strong trade unions were 
able to use industrial action to limit mass dismissals and negotiate higher 
severance payments. In Poland, trade union power resulted in stronger 
protection of jobs but the expiry of privatisation clauses after 1998 was one 
factor in the rapidly increasing unemployment experienced thereafter (Cazes & 
Nesporova 2004). 
 
During this most difficult period of transition, the governments of the Czech 
Republic and Poland introduced policies that alleviated the cost of transition for 
those disadvantaged and attempted to limit income inequality (Nesporova 1999; 
Cerami 2008; Izyumov 2010). Welfare institutions, modelled on western 
European experience, played a major role in compensating for real income falls. 
In Poland, social spending in 1991 increased to 32 per cent of GDP from 25 per 
cent in 1990 (Inglot 2009). In the Czech Republic, during the first years of 
transition, citizens were compensated for cuts in consumer subsidies with direct 
cash payments (Orenstein 1995).  
 
Unemployment peaked in the early 1990s in most CEE countries and then 
stabilised or fell. The Czech Republic was something of an exception. In terms of 
unemployment, the Czech Republic kept employment losses well below what 
might have been expected in light of lower production. The result was a 
decrease in labour productivity. Poland, in contrast, improved labour 
productivity. However, this was achieved through reductions in employment. 
These employment losses led to open unemployment and economic inactivity. 
Nesporova (2002) notes, in all transition countries a decline in participation 
rates of the population aged between 15 and 64 years and that outflows to 
inactivity generally exceeded those to unemployment. The author concludes: 
 
―This imbalance was marked in the initial period of economic 
transition, indicating that strong labour market tensions were resolved 
primarily by pushing certain disadvantaged, less competitive groups of 
workers out of the labour market – and only secondarily resolved by 
open unemployment‖ (2002a:10). 
One response was the expansion of pension schemes. Poland, for example, relied 
largely on early retirement and to a lesser extent disability payments. The result 
was that between 1989 and 1996 the number of old-age pensioners increased by 
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46 per cent in Poland (disability by one-fifth), in contrast to a 5 per cent 
increase in the Czech Republic (Vanhuysse 2006, 2009). It has been argued that 
this targeting of welfare expansion defused potential social conflict (Greskovits 
1998; Vanhuysse 2006) although this might have been an unintended 
consequence of welfare policy (Inglot 2009) rather than a conscious ‗divide and 
pacify‘ strategy (Vanhuysse 2006). Whatever the initial motivation, a strong 
lobby emerged for maintaining the newly-established pension provision.  
 
Employment legislation was extensively and repeatedly revised during the 
transition. The prevailing Washington Consensus demanded workforce 
adjustments: the rationale was to make former state enterprises more flexible 
and economically competitive, whilst maintaining some employment protection 
for workers. A key point, however, is that the new employment protection 
legislation (EPL) significantly reduced workers‘ protection compared with the 
situation that had prevailed under communism (Boeri & Terrell 2002; Cazes & 
Nesporova 2004).  
 
Labour market institutions were significantly restructured to cope with the new 
economic context and the new dynamic between employer and worker. Across 
CEE, labour market policies, both active and passive, were established. In 
comparison to FSU, the countries of CEE, due to their earlier transition, more 
successful reforms and better economic conditions, were able to allocate 
greater resources to social protection. Unemployment benefits, due to the 
assumed transitory nature of unemployment, were generous both in terms of 
eligibility criteria and the level and duration of payment. However, in the mid to 
late 1990s, as the number of beneficiaries increased rapidly, the rules and 
benefit levels became significantly more restrictive. In the Czech Republic, the 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits was halved. In Poland, where an 
open-ended system had been established, a maximum duration of one year was 
set. This saved money and was intended to motivate jobseekers into new 
employment (Boeri 1997; Boeri & Terrel 2002). 
 
Post-transition, Poland and the Czech Republic shifted responsibility for assisting 
redundant workers away from enterprises onto public institutions. Nesporova 
noted that: ―The… model stimulates more effective allocation of labour among 
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sectors. This results in higher labour productivity but may lead to higher 
unemployment and lower participation rates‖ (2002a:34). Between 1991 and 
1993, the Czech Republic was noted for the success of its employment 
promotion programme that contributed to the high flexibility of the labour force 
and to low unemployment (Boeri & Burda 1996; Večerník 2001). In this period, 
factors such as limited privatisation, asset restitution and high demand for 
services contributed to the development of small businesses in the private 
sector. In addition, job creation schemes provided grants to private 
entrepreneurs for self-employment or for the creation of new jobs for 
unemployed persons. Employment promotion was further supplemented by 
public works and labour market training. In 1992, over two-thirds of the 
registered unemployed participated in some kind of labour market programme 
(Nesporova 2000:216). In the same period, Poland established so-called 
intervention work (subsidised employment) that was offered to 45 per cent of 
jobseekers participating in active employment programmes. In the late 1990s, in 
response to rising youth unemployment, Poland augmented its youth 
employment promotion programmes with vocational guidance, extensive 
subsidised vocational training and subsidised first employment (Nesporova 
2002a).  
 
Long-term unemployment also became a feature of transitional economies and 
varied according to age and gender across CEE. In both Poland and the Czech 
Republic the elderly endured higher long-term unemployment rates. Although 
youth unemployment was significant, young people, due to their labour 
flexibility, were less affected by long-term unemployment (Nesporova 2000).  
 
The empirical literature on transition economies outlines a scenario of winners 
and losers (Terrell 1999). Various studies have established the types of 
individuals more liable to become unemployed or experience difficulties re-
entering the labour market (for example, Sorm & Terrell (2000) for the Czech 
Republic and King & Adamchek (1999) for Poland). Those marginalised by the 
emerging labour market included working pensioners who were among the first 
to be dismissed when economic pressures emerged; migrant workers (both 
foreigners and commuters from other regions within the country) because 
employers preferred local workers; disabled persons pushed to accept disability 
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pensions because of their real or perceived low labour productivity; and 
members of some ethnic minorities (e.g. Roma) (Nesporova 2000; Boeri & Terrell 
2002). 
 
Restrictions on the eligibility for unemployment benefits limited access to 
benefits for some categories of potential claimants. As a result, Poland opted to 
introduce income-tested unemployment assistance (paid from the employment 
fund) for individuals whose benefits had expired, while the Czech Republic 
referred these people to social welfare. Typically, the level of social welfare 
was low. However, for the Czech Republic, Večerník (2001) concluded that for a 
family with low-wage earners, the difference between income from employment 
and income from social transfers was minimal. In the late 1990s the Czech 
Republic increased the minimum wage to make employment a more attractive 
alternative than living on social benefits. 
 
Marginalised groups and individuals typically lower skilled, lower paid and often 
with health problems, generally existed on social welfare supplemented with 
subsistence farming and informal casual activities. The extent of informal sector 
employment is estimated to have been between 20-30 per cent of total labour 
input in CEE (Cazes & Nesporova 2004:29). To encourage workers into the labour 
market, there have been varying degrees of retrenchment. However, due to the 
limited amount of regular low-skilled work and the poor wages provided, 
retrenchment has increased deprivation and the marginalisation of 
disadvantaged groups (Nesporova 2000, 2002).  
 
The population responded to these pressures in several ways, these included: 
education, self-employment, multiple employment and emigration/migration. 
Returns to higher education increased sharply after 1989, particularly among 
young people. This was partly an acknowledgment of the higher economic 
returns education might provide in the labour market and partly due to the 
difficulties of finding a job. According to Boeri and Terrell (2002) a year of 
education increased earnings by only 2 to 5 per cent during communism. 
However, by the mid-1990s, the wage premium was between 5 and 9 per cent 
per year of education. In addition, at the time, employers were unwilling to bear 
the additional costs of on-the-job training of inexperienced young workers.  
   321 
Due to unemployment and/or falling wages the number of self-employed workers 
increased significantly across CEE. Many of them became unregistered one-
person businesses, in activities such as the resale of consumer goods, shuttle 
trade66 and home-based businesses such as sewing, repairs, cleaning, day-care, 
and tutoring etc. In the Czech Republic, by the end of 1993, nearly one million 
individuals were registered as private entrepreneurs, more than one fifth of the 
total labour force (Renshaw 2000:13). The levels of self-employment have 
stabilised in recent years largely due to administrative barriers and limited 
opportunities. In addition, increasing job opportunities and better wages have 
meant that many self-employed people have returned to waged employment 
(Cazes & Nesporova 2004; Izyumov 2010).  
 
The combination of political instability, economic hardship, ethnic conflicts and 
the opening of borders that followed the collapse of communism led to a 
significant amount of international migration both from these countries to 
established advanced market economies, and between transition countries. 
 
The fact that the Czech Republic and Poland became attractive destinations for 
populations from other transition economies indicates how well these two 
countries negotiated the transition. The comparatively smooth economic 
transformation that took place in the Czech Republic encouraged immigration, 
with the country becoming a destination for international migrants during the 
1990s. In Poland, the mass exodus to countries with established market 
economies was, by the time of transition, already well established. While official 
Polish sources indicate a total outflow of some 260,000 people between 1981 
and 1989, information from other countries suggests that the number of émigrés 
was around 1.8 million. With transition, emigration waned to 21,000 per year in 
1990-1994 (203,000 according to other sources) and to 22,500 in 1995-1998 
(121,000 according to other sources) (UN 2002:77). Iglicka (2001) cites the new 
opportunities created by the political and economic transformations, particularly 
among young cohorts of urban professionals, as the main reasons for this fall in 
emigration. Moreover, due to the scale of pre-transition migration flows, 
Poland‘s migration potential was inevitably smaller than that of other countries 
                                         
66 Essentially buying goods abroad and selling them at home on street markets. 
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in the region when the transition started. Immigration to Poland has, according 
to Polish sources, increased as a consequence of transition.  
 
In the late 1990s, sluggish economic performance saw a reintroduction of 
macroeconomic stabilisation programmes and structural reforms in some 
enterprise sectors in some CEE countries. After 1998, further structural reforms, 
often associated with the progress in EU accession negotiations, also led to 
increases in unemployment. In the Czech Republic austerity measures introduced 
in 1997 led to an economic recession, mounting layoffs and open unemployment. 
Recovery was achieved only in 2000. In 1998, in response to structural problems 
and economic imbalances, Poland tightened monetary policy and accelerated 
structural reforms. Four major reforms (to the pension system, the territorial-
administrative system, in health care and in education) were introduced with 
many initial problems. These measures, coupled with negative exogenous 
shocks, slowed economic growth and increased unemployment (Nesporova 2002). 
In 2004 ‗successful‘ reformers including Poland and the Czech Republic who had 
achieved economic recovery and stabilised their economies were awarded with 
EU accession (see Baldwin, Francois & Portes 1997, for costs and benefits of EU 
enlargement). 
What emerges here, therefore, is a complex and mixed picture. However, the 
dominant theme is that while Poland and the Czech Republic experienced 
unemployment and a variety of old and new social risks associated with 
transition, their path was less difficult than much of the rest of CEE and the 
level of social protection provided by the state softened many of the potentially 
adverse impacts of transition.  
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2. Western Europe 
This chapter covers research objectives 1-5, within the context of Western 
Europe, with a focus on UK, Germany and France. It will describe and discuss the 
following. First, trends in life expectancy and mortality and the hypotheses that 
best explain the link between political and socioeconomic change and those 
trends. Second, the establishment of post-war economic social models and the 
subsequent political and socioeconomic change. Third, the pattern of 
deindustrialisation in the UK, Germany and France and the policy responses at 
the national level. Finally, the level and nature of social protection and support 
to those affected by deindustrialisation and the general population. 
2.1 Life expectancy 
The pattern of life expectancy trends since the Second World War in Western 
Europe is less complex than for CEE. Figure 4.1 shows life expectancy for 
selected countries between 1950 and 2005. It is clear that since the 1950s life 
expectancy in Western Europe has increased each decade and for each country. 
As such, Western Europe has experienced a steady increase in life expectancy 
and most of the countries therein have longer life expectancies than the 
countries of CEE (Bobak & Marmot 2006; Walsh et al. 2009; Leon 2011).   
 
Figure A.3: Life expectancy between 1950 and 2005 in the five selected countries  
Life expectancy 1950-2005: 
Scotland and France, W. Germany, Poland, Czech Republic
Source: Human Mortality Database
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Also, in Western Europe, significant progress was made during the decades 
following WWII in reducing social inequalities in mortality (Mackenbach et al., 
2003). If we set this observation in the context of the model of determinants of 
health outlined previously we can attribute much of this progress to changes in 
the major ‗health fields‘ namely  general advancements in living and working 
conditions; improvements in the physical environment - for example less 
industrial pollution (de Hollander & Staatsen 2003); increasing levels of 
prosperity (Wilkinson 1999; Mackenbach 2012); declining risk factors e.g. 
smoking (E.U. Observatory 2008; Leon 2011); and better disease management, 
for example, of coronary heart disease and cancer (WHO MONICA 1994; E.U. 
Observatory 2008). This is an important conclusion that improvements in life 
expectancy in Western Europe have followed positive changes in almost all of 
the health fields in the models of determinants of health.  
 
When attention is focused on specific causes of death, a different impression can 
be created. The main causes of death in Western Europe during the period since 
the war have been CHD (coronary heart disease), stroke, cancers and respiratory 
disease (WHO 2010). The age-specific death rates of these chronic diseases 
peaked in the 1970s and have been declining ever since (WHO 2010). CHD is the 
best example. Scotland and Finland once had the highest rates of CHD in the 
world - these figures peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s - however CHD 
age specific rates are now almost half what they were at their peak (WHO 2010; 
Whyte & Ajetunmobi 2012). The reason for this improvement seems to be a 
combination of lower levels of risk factors (less smoking, better control of high 
blood pressure) and better treatment, meaning that people with CHD can now 
survive for much longer. Similar progress has been made in the reduction of 
cancer as a cause of death (Walsh et al. 2009; Whyte & Ajetunmobi 2012). The 
synthesis of these two perspectives is that management of risk factors and 
management of chronic disease has become increasingly successful in advanced 
European economies where prosperity is high and social and physical 
environments are increasingly favourable.  
 
As a result of these developments in the market-economies of Western Europe, 
the proportion of the population living to an advanced age increased 
significantly. The highest life expectancy rates were and are to be found in 
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France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Austria, Sweden and Finland. In all of the 
West European countries (as in all of CEE) women are expected to live longer 
than men. The gap is as large as seven years in some countries such as France, 
Finland and Spain. However, there has been a narrowing gender gap in life 
expectancy among Western European countries since the mid-1990s. An increase 
in smoking-related mortality among women contributed importantly to this 
pattern. Despite these advances, men still have a lower life expectancy than 
women did more than 20 years ago (WHO 2008; E.U. Observatory 2008).  
 
Generalised increases in health mask important trends in inequality. Despite 
general progress and advances in health care and treatment and an overall 
pattern of improving life expectancy, life expectancy (and mortality) 
differentials according to socioeconomic status have deepened and widened 
during more recent decades having narrowed during the decades of immediate 
post-war reconstruction (Drever & Whitehead 1997; Valkonen 1999; for a review, 
see Mackenbach 2006). Serious inequalities in health now persist in all European 
countries: when measured in relative terms, the overall trend is increasing 
rather than decreasing. This widening is caused by a relatively slower 
improvement in health among lower socioeconomic groups than among higher 
socioeconomic groups (WHO 2007).  
 
The mortality rate in lower socioeconomic groups is estimated to be 25–50 per 
cent higher than in the upper socioeconomic groups (WHO 2007). This inequality 
is typically greater among men than among women, beginning early in life, 
peaking during the working years and persisting into old age (WHO 2007). The 
WHO estimates that in most European countries, almost half of the excess 
mortality is explained by social inequalities in cardiovascular diseases. Other 
major diseases with marked social inequalities are certain cancers, psychosocial 
problems and injuries. However, a social gradient is evident for almost all 
common diseases (WHO 2007:12). 
 
The work of Wilkinson (1996, 2005) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) has 
demonstrated that mortality in developed countries is affected more by relative 
than by absolute living standards. Broadly speaking, mortality correlates more 
closely to the level of economic inequality than it does to the gross national 
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product. More egalitarian developed countries have better health and social 
outcomes than less egalitarian countries with higher gross national product. 
Consequently, countries with a long history of redistributive government tend to 
have better population health outcomes (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009).  
 
Over the past two decades, many west European countries have experienced an 
unexpected and significant increase in social inequalities ―without much 
evidence that the widening of the mortality gap will stop in the near future‖ 
(Mackenbach 2006:6). Often these health inequalities are wider and more 
problematical within the deindustrialised regions of Europe (Walsh et al. 2009).  
 
In terms of the model of determinants of health, these regions have, historically 
and characteristically, had less good physical and social environments, less 
prosperity and less good health-related behaviours. In many instances 
deindustrialisation exacerbated existing conditions. In these regions, although 
the social costs of deindustrialisation were felt across society, men were 
particularly affected. In many former industrial communities, unemployment 
and inactivity, often due to long-term sickness and disability, have become a 
norm. Subsequently, particularly in the UK, recruitment into replacement jobs 
favoured new entrants and women returners to an increasingly flexible labour 
market. The new labour market came to be characterised by a secondary or 
peripheral workforce with much poorer conditions, lower wages, security, status 
and prospects (Beatty & Fothergill 1996; Beatty et al. 2002.; Danson 2005). All of 
these combine in post-industrial regions to influence health outcomes.  
 
This is a particular problem for the UK which has greater inequalities in income 
and in health than other countries in Europe. Income inequality grew 
dramatically in the UK in the 1980s and has failed to reduce since then (Marmot 
2010). Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have produced work which maps the 
correlation between inequality and an index of health and social problems. It 
shows the UK at the less desirable end of the spectrum along with the USA and 
Portugal. The situation in Scotland is even graver as there has been a relative 
decline in life expectancy when compared with the rest of Europe and the UK 
(Whyte & Ajetunmobi 2012). 
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Comparisons of life expectancy and mortality trends between Western Europe 
and CEE reveal important differences (set out above) but also some similarities. 
For example, the major causes of death are similar for both East and West 
Europe but trends over time are different. Between 1970 and 1991 while, with 
the exception of Greece, there was a fall in male mortality from cardiovascular 
disease (CVD) across Western Europe, CVD was on the increase in CEE where the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary had the highest rates. The pattern for CVD 
mortality in women was comparable. The trends for the more specific category 
CHD followed a similar pattern with rates falling in Western Europe, yet 
increasing in CEE for both sexes. The Czech Republic and Hungary had the 
highest mortality, approximately three times that for Mediterranean countries 
(Bobak & Marmot 2006:24).  With regards to cancer, in Western Europe incidents 
of all cancers were typically lower than in CEE, although as Marmot & Bobak 
conclude: ―the magnitude of difference is smaller than with CVD and the pattern 
in women is less clear‖ (Bobak & Marmot 2006:30). In both East and West 
Europe, despite advances in care and treatment, mortality differentials 
according to socioeconomic status have also deepened and widened. 
 
In summary, Western Europe has seen continuing progress in life expectancy 
since the end of the War. This progress is offset by widening inequalities in 
health between socioeconomic groups and between more prosperous and less 
prosperous regions. 
 
This section of the literature review is important in as much as it establishes 
these general facts. The real focus of this thesis is socioeconomic change. 
Therefore, the task now is to set out the differences and similarities that have 
emerged in Germany, France and the UK during the period since the war that 
improved health and worsened inequalities.  
 
2.2 Political and socioeconomic change in post-war 
Western Europe  
This section will discuss the capitalist political economies of Britain, West 
Germany and France with a primary focus on the significant growth experienced 
during the post-war economic boom between 1945 and 1973.  
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Hall (2007) outlined a ‗core problematic‘ for Western economies: that is, three 
problems that the post-war institutions of the political economy were required 
to address. The first was the wage problem: how to distribute economic returns 
between capital and labour with a minimum of industrial conflict. The second 
was the work problem: how to maintain rates of employment high enough to 
warrant national prosperity, whilst compensating those without work adequately 
to secure social stability. The third was the productivity problem: how to 
maintain investment and deploy labour and capital efficiently (2007:42-43). 
Each nation developed institutional frameworks and divergent policies to 
reconcile these three problems.  The Governments and political classes that 
drove these were critical as were the various interest groups lobbying for 
particular types of settlements. The post-war institutional structures were 
shaped by various coalitions with diverse interests (Esping-Andersen 1985; 
Horowitz 2002). Accordingly, rather than merely seeking to drive economic 
performance, many of the arrangements that unfolded were also intended to 
achieve a desired distribution of resources. 
 
Ruggie notes that the institutions embodied specific visions of social purpose 
(1982).  Beer (1969) notes with reference to the UK how institutions reflected 
new understandings of collective purpose and how economic and political 
institutions served that purpose. The political economies that developed were 
typically categorised into three ideal-typical models (Shonfield 1965) based upon 
government policies, business practices, and industrial relations. In Europe, the 
UK exemplified market capitalism, West Germany was the leading example of 
managed capitalism (Katzenstein 1989), while France adopted state capitalism 
(Schmidt 2002). The divergence in state policies during the post-war period in 
each of these countries will now be explored. 
 
2.2.1 UK 
In the immediate post-war era, the UK was Western Europe‘s largest economy 
both in terms of population and GDP. West Germany overtook the UK population 
in 1952 and, by the mid-1960s its economy was also larger (Maddison 1991). As 
such, a critical feature of the early post-war British economy was economic 
decline and the loss of competitive advantage relative to France and West 
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Germany. In this period both surpassed British income and productivity levels. 
Between 1950 and 1974 the average annual economic growth (in GDP) in West 
Germany was 5.8 per cent, France 5.0 per cent and Britain 2.8 per cent. In 
terms of productivity, between 1950 and 1974, total factor productivity67 
increased on average by 2 per cent in West Germany, 3.1 per cent in France and 
1.7 per cent in Britain (OECD 1996; Foley 1998).  
With the post-war economy needing a boost, British policy makers developed 
institutional solutions that were heavily reliant on competitive market 
interactions underwritten by formal legal contracting. Under the market 
capitalist model, Britain‘s liberal or ‗spectator‘ state typically afforded business 
a great deal of autonomy (Grant 1995). The state aimed to restrict its role to 
arbitrating among economic actors while leaving the supervision of the rules to 
self-governing bodies. This, however, did not preclude the state from granting 
aid to industry on an ad hoc basis or intervening in other ways (through new 
forms of planning policy, nationalized industries or government-sanctioned, 
privately regulated cartels) (Shonfield 1965). 
 
In Britain, industrial relations were highly adversarial and wage bargaining 
among the loosely organised employer associations and unions was fragmented. 
This, typically, resulted in industrial conflict and inflationary pressure on wages.  
To counter the wage problem, steps were taken to normalise collective 
bargaining between trade unions and employers. However, the British tradition 
of craft unionism meant that, even when settlements were negotiated at the 
sectoral level, firms often had to negotiate several such settlements because 
more than one union was represented in their workforce and shop stewards 
remained influential in many parts of the economy. The state, therefore, limited 
its role to one of bystander, as voluntary or free collective bargaining was 
pursued. This, however, did not preclude the intermittent intervention of the 
state. When the pound came under pressure, wage controls were typically 
pursued by government and the so-called ‗social contract‘ between the Labour 
                                         
67
 In economics, total-factor productivity (TFP) is a variable which accounts for the effects in 
total output not caused by inputs. If all inputs are accounted for, then TFP can be taken as a 
measure of an economy‘s long-term technological change or technological dynamism. 
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government and the unions of the mid 1970s was introduced in a failed attempt 
to co-ordinate wage restraint68 (Edwards 1995).  
 
Britain never secured the high levels of wage coordination that is often 
associated with post-war European growth (Eichengreen 1996). Levels of 
industrial conflict were relatively high and rates of investment and growth 
correspondingly low. The wage issue was never adequately resolved and 
remained high on the political agenda throughout the post-war years (Howell 
2005; Hall 2007).  
 
In order to address the work problem, post-war British governments adhered to a 
few policy principles. The creation of a ‗liberal‘ welfare regime was founded, as 
Beveridge recommended, on benefits administered by the state. However, 
replacement rates offered by UK benefits were low. Also, the policy of full 
employment was restricted to macroeconomic budgetary politics: the regulation 
of demand was to guarantee jobs for all. As Whiteside explains: 
 
―Direct state intervention - to shape working practices, to enforce 
wage bargaining outcomes, to ratify levels of skill, to determine 
demarcations between skilled and unskilled work - was unacceptable. 
Full employment meant that the state underwrote job security, but 
exercised minimal influence over job content or workplace 
rationalisation‖ (2000:3). 
The rationale was to provide full employment, but limited support for those who 
did not work (Esping-Anderson 1989). That regime influenced the direction of 
Britain‘s post-war economic development. It ensured a significant section of the 
labour force sought employment, limited the strain on firms to increase wages 
and provided workers with few incentives to develop industry-specific skills 
(Finegold & Soskice 1988).   
 
Britain adopted a Keynesian activist macroeconomic policy. That is, the 
realisation of full employment via demand management policies, which entailed 
fighting recession by using deficit spending as a lever to boost consumer 
demand.  Keynesian economics, although influential amongst policy makers 
                                         
68
 Although concessions were promised on housing and pensions, the social contract lost 
credibility as public expenditure, inflation, and public sector wages appeared out of control.  
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across Europe, were never employed elsewhere to the degree they were in 
Britain (Crouzet 2001; Hall 2007). Up until the end of the 1970s, despite being 
constrained by a weak balance of payments, governments operated an activist 
fiscal policy and were content to use deficit spending, as it augmented the 
influence they could have in managing the course of the country. However, by 
the 1970s, continued deficit spending came to be increasingly regarded as 
problematic. Deficit budgets exacerbated the cost-push69 inflation characteristic 
of the 1970s. In addition, it became more difficult to combine low 
unemployment with price stability as trade union membership and militancy 
increased. The emphasis in economics in Britain (and the U.S.) shifted from 
managing demand in the economy to making supply more efficient. In the era of 
neoliberal renaissance, Keynesian practices came to be considered less 
appropriate (Hall 1989; Crouch 2009).  
 
In Britain, the problem of productivity was influenced by the institutional 
inheritance of early industrialisation. Low capital requirements and the 
existence of commercial and autonomous elites allowed decentralised 
production and did not require major state intervention (Kurth 1979; Crafts 
1998). Businesses were typically competitive, contractual and individualistic. 
Although ‗gentlemanly‘ agreements, tacit understandings and cartel-like 
arrangements moderated relations to some extent (Coates 1994), financial 
markets, as the main source of investment capital, put pressure on firms for 
steady profits on a quarterly basis or risk take-over. Capital, skills and 
technology were obtained via competitive market dynamics. Typically, capital 
was raised via short-term bank credits and securities on terms linked to current 
profitability (Lane 1992).   
 
Although a few sectors supported active apprenticeship programmes, most 
simply relied hopefully on the formal education system to equip a suitably 
skilled workforce (Fine gold & Soskice 1988; Soskice1994). The absence of 
serious legal limitations on lay-offs discouraged workers from investing in 
specific skills as, in the UK, they provided no guarantee of additional job 
security or income. Firms secured technology through licensing arrangements or 
                                         
69
 Cost-push inflation is a type of inflation caused by substantial increases in wages  or the cost of 
important goods or services. 
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the acquisition of companies with appropriate technology. Organisation within 
firms was highly hierarchical (Lane 1989). 
 
The market-led approach Britain pursued and the institutional arrangements it 
adopted influenced the productivity strategies of British firms. Some retained 
long-standing reputations for high quality production (HQP) based on highly 
skilled labour. In Britain, industrial relations were frequently adversarial and this 
restricted the cooperation many firms could secure or expect from their 
employees. The profusion of general, relative to specific, skills encouraged firms 
to rely on high volumes of production and low labour costs for competitive 
advantage (Porter 1990; Rubery 1994; Nolan & Harvie 1995). Consequently, many 
British firms found it difficult to move up the value chain to compete in HQP 
niches.  As a result, rates of productivity were less than in France or West 
Germany as were rates of growth.  
 
In summary, British economic (and social) development, relative to France and 
West Germany, could be explained in terms of a number of interacting factors. 
British monetary policies created an unstable and unfavourable economic 
environment for business. Its industrial policies did little to promote research 
and development or training. Business practices, as dictated by the market, 
placed an emphasis on profit rather than on investing in new plants, machinery, 
technology or human resources. Finally, industrial relations and labour policies 
cultivated low-waged, poorly trained labour and high production costs. All of the 
above led to products that were low in quality and high in cost, especially when 
the pound was high (Lane 1989; Rubery 1994; Coates 1994). 
 
2.2.2 Germany 
West German economic growth in the period following WWII was, in relative 
terms, exceptional.  The year 1947 marked the start of the Cold War, the 
division of Europe and the beginning of West Germany‘s so-called 
Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). The U.S. committed itself to West 
Germany‘s economic restoration and reintegration in the Western sphere of 
influence. The assurance of Marshall Aid in the same year secured Germany‘s 
position in the West European economy and in the burgeoning international 
trade and exchange rate system (Abelshauser 1995). By 1948, with the security 
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provided by Marshall Aid, currency reform and economic liberalisation was made 
possible. The 21st June 1948 saw the introduction of the Deutsche Mark and all 
restrictions on the availability of goods were revoked (Katzenstein 1989). The 
transition proved successful. Unlike the post-communist transition that took 
place in CEE, post-war West Germany had an ordered supply side. As Carlin 
explains: 
 ―In West Germany, a recovery of production has already taken place 
following the collapse at the end of the war and businesses had 
owners and managers in place. A rapid supply side response to the 
removal of distortions in the economy could have been expected‖ 
(1998:28). 
Although the conditions for recovery were encouraging, additional 
macroeconomic stabilisation was introduced in 1949 as inflationary pressures 
returned. Although the German authorities were encouraged to reintroduce 
price controls and rationing, they declined and chose instead to tighten credit 
conditions. This choice of tight macroeconomic policy was probably important 
for economic growth for it prohibited a return by German business to their 
historical price fixing arrangements. The authorities, by declining to commit to 
full employment by maintaining demand at home, obliged businesses to re-
establish and augment their markets abroad (Carlin 1998:28).  
Germany‘s model of managed capitalism was designed to limit and avert conflict 
(Padgett 2003). Industrial relations were co-operative and wage bargaining was 
centrally administered between stable, amalgamated employer associations and 
unions. This limited conflict facilitated the politicisation of distributive conflicts 
and promoted wage restraint. The ‗enabling‘ state typically remained a 
bystander: wage restraint meant it lacked the motivation and legislation meant 
it lacked the right to intervene (Katzenstein 1989). All this is in stark contrast to 
Britain and France and, indeed to other managed capitalist countries such as 
Sweden and the Netherlands, where the state was the equal third party at 
negotiations along with management and labour (Thelen 2001). The issue of 
wages demonstrates the institutional structure Germany developed to facilitate 
strategic coordination in the national interest. 
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In 1952, the government introduced the Works Council Constitution Act, a 
system of co-determination that gave workers a seat on the supervisory boards 
of many large firms. This, coupled with a labour movement that was influential 
and organised at a sectoral level, meant German employers began to collaborate 
in sectoral wage negotiations, often steered by a leading settlement in the 
metalworking sector70 and mediated by coercion from an independent central 
bank to react against inflationary increases (Thelen 1991). Augmented by an 
ample supply of labour and a national will to rebuild the economy, this 
institutional arrangement meant wage increases stayed in line with productivity 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Significantly, it also created a managed and 
consistent upwards pressure on wages that led firms to invest in the high quality 
forms of production that became a characteristic of Germany‘s economic 
development (Lane 1989, 1992; Thelen 1991). 
As Hall notes, its corollary was the German solution to the work problem: a 
problem exacerbated by the ten million refugees from the east seeking work. 
West Germany transformed its economy, reaching full employment by the early 
1960s (2007:47). To achieve this, investment was centred on an industrial core 
where modes of production depended on a predominantly male labour force 
trained to a high degree in industry-specific skills. Strong institutional 
mechanisms developed such as wage coordination, which reduced incentives for 
workers to free-ride and employers‘ associations, which scrutinised the conduct 
of firms and punished poaching. These mechanisms allowed Germany to achieve 
high skill equilibrium (Finegold & Soskice 1988) and to develop and invest in a 
system of vocational training schemes run collaboratively by employers‘ 
associations and the trade unions. The state contributed by providing schools for 
trainees and by establishing national standards for vocational qualifications.  As 
has been noted, both in studies of matched plants in Germany and the UK, and 
in econometric work, skill differences, particularly at the tertiary or 
intermediate level, were a key explanatory factor for the productivity gap 
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 This bargaining sector covered 13 diverse industries, such as automobiles, mechanical and 
electrical engineering, shipbuilding and aerospace. A series of informal consultations and 
discussions between unions, employers‘ associations, the government and the Bundesbank led 
to the adoption of the metalworking settlements as the basis for agreements across most 
industries. This produced overall pay settlements which were generally sensitive to the 
macroeconomic situation, yet showed little differentiation at the micro level. 
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between British and German manufacturing (Steedman 1988; O‘Mahony & 
Wagner 1994; Soskice 1994; Broadberry & Wagner 1996; Broadberry 2007). 
 
The German system encouraged (and continues to encourage) young people to 
invest in apprenticeships in two ways: explicitly, through accepting low wages 
during the apprenticeship; and implicitly, through their academic performance 
at school. As Carlin explains:  
 
―There is competition for apprenticeship places due to the differences 
in quality of the internal labour market to which the training place 
provides access and the value of the training in the external labour 
market (the best places are in large companies and specific sectors 
such as banking)‖ (1998:41).  
Earnings related pension and unemployment benefits provided young men with 
the incentives to secure the sector-specific skills that would ensure them high 
wages. By raising the relative income of high-skill workers during periods of 
unemployment, the incentive to accept a wage that did not correlate with their 
skill qualifications was reduced (Mares 2003). The result was a system capable of 
accommodating skilled men, but less able to employ women or those without 
the necessary skills. This system was founded upon the traditional notion of the 
male as breadwinner. As a result, once the industrial economy had been 
reconstructed, further expansion of the labour force was discouraged and the 
proportion of the population in employment grew more slowly than in France or 
the UK (Lewis 1992; Ostner & Lewis 1995).  
 
The German institutional set up encouraged a particular approach to issues 
concerning productivity: banks provided capital and guidance and inter-firm 
relations were co-operative. German banks were at the centre of corporate 
finance. They assumed a key role in industry, guiding corporate strategy, 
representing investors, and providing capital based upon longer term prospects, 
rather than profits in the short-term (Zysman 1983). Powerful employers‘ 
associations facilitated inter-firm relations creating mutually reinforcing 
networks of firms and a degree of codetermination to operate vocational 
training schemes or to secure technology through collaborative ventures. While 
British firms acquired finance, technology, and skills in competitive markets, 
German companies relied more heavily on collaborative relationships with other 
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firms rooted in the reputations they built up in the concentrated inter-corporate 
networks (Streeck 1992). 
 
Regulatory regimes that privileged stakeholders (including creditors, managers, 
collaborators, and workers) over shareholders, reinforced this type of strategic 
non-market coordination (Casper 1999). Influential works councils and the two 
board supervisory system advantaged consensus decision-making. The job 
security provided by the German institutional arrangements meant firms 
regarded their competitive edge as a consideration of quality rather than cost. 
As Hall concludes:  
―rather than move aggressively into new lines of business, many firms 
found it easier to cultivate a skilled workforce and use it to make 
continuous improvements to existing product lines and production 
processes‖ (Hall 2007:48).  
In short, the German Model of managed capitalism ensured steady profits over 
the long-term from export-led growth fuelled by high-quality, high-cost, but 
highly competitive goods achieved via cooperation and investment in skills 
(Streeck 1997). 
2.2.3 France 
In the immediate post-war period, France was regarded as politically unstable 
and economically weak. In addition, the basic infrastructure - ports, roads, 
railways and energy - were in ruins. Consequently, France became the second 
largest recipient of Marshall Aid with the result that pre-war levels of GDP were 
reached in 1948/9 (Wakeman 2003:48). The problem, however, was that France 
faced a competitive and open world economy with a third of its labour still 
engaged in agriculture and with many of its firms lacking the capacity to 
compete. In response, France pursued a policy of modernisation, garnering 
support wherever available among the factious parties of the Fourth Republic71. 
France‘s dirigiste or interventionist state directed economic activities via 
planning, an active industrial policy and state-owned enterprises. These levers 
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 The French Fourth Republic was the republican government of France between 1946 and 1958, 
governed by the fourth republican constitution. It was effectively a revival of the Third 
Republic, which was in place before World War II. 
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enabled the state to selectively direct resources into regions, industries and 
even products, making up for the chronic under-investment of the pre-war 
decades (Hayward 1973; Schmidt 1996). 
A key institutional advancement was the development of medium-term national 
planning, particularly on the supply side of the economy. Traditionally, 
compared to the UK, France had been more centralised and interventionist in its 
approach to the economy.  French administrators of the 1940s and 1950s utilised 
state resources to enable French industry (and agriculture) to improve the scale 
of production via mergers and acquisitions, to shift capital and labour into high-
technology sectors and to advance those firms with the capacity to compete in 
international markets. State administrators were also able to organise domestic 
investment. Restricted mobility of international capital limited foreign 
competition and encouraged bankers and financiers to invest domestically (Judt 
2005). As Schmidt notes: 
 ―planning was an unquestioned success between 1946-1963 when it 
had a clear set of goals and limited set of programs focused on 
restoring health to a small number of industries‖(1996:78). 
By the late 1950s the role of planning in France‘s economic recovery, as Foley 
notes:  
―Was beginning to achieve almost quasi-mythical status in the public 
mind, but its contribution to the growth of the post-war economy was 
already in doubt by the mid-1960s‖ (1998:49).  
Despite contemporary accounts and criticisms72, the expansion of the economy 
throughout the 1950s was typically credited to the policy regime: in an era 
distinguished by serious difficulties it provided much needed continuity. 
In France, although industrial relations were adversarial and conflict was 
common, employers‘ associations and unions were fragmented and ineffective. 
Industrial relations were coordinated by legislation that gave unions legal 
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 Dirigisme was criticised for among other things (a) its political objectives i.e. the building up 
of French heavy industry to compete with Germany and control energy resources of the Ruhr 
(b) excessive control of capital (c) preference for energy and transportation over 
manufacturing-thereby denying private sector of valuable resources (for further discussion 
see: Lynch (1984)). 
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recognition and mandated collective bargaining at the sectoral level. However, 
policy makers were reluctant to embolden a labour movement dominated by a 
communist union. Consequently, the State, rather than act as a bystander, 
assumed the presiding role in wage bargaining and even imposed wage 
settlements where business and labour failed to reach agreements, thereby 
restraining wage rises and managing industrial conflicts more effectively than in 
Britain although not as effectively as Germany (Howell 1992; Schmidt 2003).  To 
manage the wage problem, a minimum wage was set to which the wages of 40 
per cent of employees were eventually linked and allocated the legislative 
authority to enforce wage settlements negotiated with some unions on entire 
sectors. By the 1960s, approximately 80 per cent of employees were covered by 
such settlements (Hall 2007:49).  
The French approach to the work problem was multifaceted. A coordinated and 
assertive (Howell 1992; Hall 1986) policy of agricultural modernisation shifted 
labour into the industrial sector. Post-war social security developed, gradually 
attracting independent sub-contractors or agricultural workers into formal 
employment structures with assurances of statutory social protection and a 
pension at the end of a working life (typically determined by one‘s employment 
status and financed by social charges on employers and employees (Hesse 
1999)). Full employment translated as formal subordination to one employer and 
a single employment (and single profession) emerged as a common norm. As 
Whiteside explains:   
―Guaranteed social protection under schemes of social insurance 
compensated workers for the status of employee, thus acknowledging 
the traditional respect for independent artisanal workers, the 
backbone of French trade unionism‖ (2000:3).  
In spite of state funding for child care, many women remained outside the 
workforce. Similar to Germany, France retained what Esping-Andersen (1990) 
characterised as a continental welfare state. 
The French administration‘s solution to productivity (and business practice) was, 
in comparison to the UK, interventionist. An active industrial policy meant 
investment production targets for industrial sectors were set and capital was 
channelled into priority sectors with the support of the financial system 
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dominated by state-owned banks. The state would provide investment, rather 
than the stock exchange or international finance markets. There was a 
consensus in the post-war period, between the state and (social) stake holders, 
that socioeconomic change could be induced via intervention. In the 1970s 
Zysman noted:  
―the anti-market tradition in France has its origins in the very process 
of industrialisation, which was initiated by a strong and centralised 
state...Closed borders, active entrepreneurial intervention by the 
state, and negotiation rather than competition between businesses 
within France have all served to insulate the economy from the 
market‖ (1977:51).   
Control over nationalised enterprises in coal, steel, energy and automobiles 
allowed the state to coerce other firms to comply with national objectives. In 
some cases, if the state‘s medium-term goals were being fulfilled, such as 
maintaining employment or increasing production in strategic areas, the state 
would forego any return on investment. By the 1960s the government was 
providing significant subsidies to firms designated ‗national champions‘ (Zsyman 
1977; Hall 1986; Cohen 1995). Consequently, large French firms modernised 
rapidly, but became dependent on the state for access to capital, technology 
and skills. The policy created large state firms in key sectors, such as energy 
(GDF, EDF, CEA, and CDF), transport (Air France), industry (Renault) and banking 
and insurance. The result, as Cole notes, was that: ―the state was thus 
simultaneously a gatekeeper, a mobiliser and an agent of economic 
development‖ (2005:218).  
A cohesive set of social networks, formed within the grandes écoles, linked 
senior executives closely to industrial policy makers. It was routine for public 
officials to enter the private sector where, as executives and senior managers, 
they joined a cohesive elite linking French corporation closely to the state, 
thereby facilitating the coordinated pursuit of national objectives (Suleiman 
1978). Among larger firms, there was a significant degree of strategic 
coordination steered by the state.  Relations at a micro level were less 
progressive. There was often a social divide between middle management 
recruited from the ranks of the firm in question and senior managers often 
transplanted from the outside world of public affairs. In addition, a fractious 
labour movement compelled firms to maintain rigid job classifications and foster 
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steep managerial hierarchies. This allowed firms to operate mass production 
successfully but restricted the autonomy of workers, limiting the scope for 
innovation in production processes (Maurice, Sellier, & Silvestre 1986).  
The modernisation strategy of dirigisme was a great success and for many years 
the economy was a source of pride for the French political elite. Thirty years of 
significant economic growth 1945-1974 (les trente glorieuses) meant France 
more than doubled its GDP per capita (Maddison 1996). This placed the French 
economy second behind Germany in Europe (and 4th in the world).  French 
competitiveness was somewhere between Germany and Britain. It benefited 
from monetary policies that created an unstable but favourable economic 
environment and from industrial policies that underwrote business investment 
and product innovation in strategic areas (Schmidt 1996). As such, France 
established a commanding presence in steel, armaments, aircraft, consumer 
goods and agricultural products. However, it suffered from business practices 
that, without state support, neglected or were unable to invest in new 
infrastructure, machinery, technology or human resources (Schmidt 1996; Hall 
1986). French policy makers and politicians were eager to accept credit for the 
successful modernisation, despite the influence of a number of contributing 
factors, and the growth in the economy was used to finance significant social 
and industrial subsidies to supplement declining sectors and those employed 
within them.  
2.2.4 Summary 
The UK, Germany and France each achieved significant economic reconstruction 
during the decades following WWII. However, the model of capitalism that each 
followed was distinctive and these differences, as will become evident later in 
the thesis, impacted on the path of deindustrialisation experienced by the 
regions of interest.  
2.3 Economic challenges since the 1970s 
This section will further discuss the capitalist political economies of Britain, 
Germany and France with a primary focus on: the impact of the liberalisation of 
international trade during the 1960s; the deceleration of growth post 1974; the 
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rising inflation and unemployment of the 1970s and, finally, the ‗economic 
liberalisation‘ of the 1980s, 1990s and beyond.  
2.3.1 The economic challenges of the 1970s 
Regardless of their political economy or relative competitive advantage, the 
economic decline and accompanying distributive conflict of the late 1960s 
through to the 1980s proved a serious challenge to the economies of the UK, 
Germany and France. The institutional path dependencies that ensued from 
divergences in the post-war models of capitalism and country-specific factors 
(vulnerability to exogenous economic pressure; capacity to negotiate and 
implement reform; legitimacy of national discourse)  best explain the 
differences in each country‘s policy responses and subsequent economic 
development (Schmidt 2003; Hall 2007).  
The exogenous pressure in the international economy, the collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the two OPEC73 crises in the 
mid-1970s, created a serious economic challenge resulting in mounting currency 
volatility, rising inflation and declining competitiveness. The political rhetoric of 
the time routinely cited such events when accounting for the economic problems 
of the era. However, although serious, these were not the only determining 
factors, as Hall notes:  
 ―the history of this period suggests that some of the most profound 
challenges facing political economies are endogenous by-products of 
existing institutions or the patterns of economic development they 
promote‖ (2007:52). 
Nonetheless, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods exchange-rate regime in 1970 
supported the analysis of those who had suggested the effectiveness of domestic 
institutions depends on the character of international regimes (Eichengreen 
1996). Its ‗pegged‘ exchange rate limited wage demands and inflationary 
pressures and enabled countries to use the exchange rate as a lever. In 
Germany, the continuation of undervalued exchange rates improved export-led 
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growth. In France, where the failure of domestic institutions to resolve industrial 
conflicts had led to inflation, state coordinated devaluation offset the impact of 
wage increases on the country‘s international competitiveness.  The Bretton 
Woods system provided a lever by which domestic institutions could regulate 
distributive conflict. The transition to a system of floating rates would remove 
that lever – thus, diminishing the state‘s ability to control inflation (Hall 2007). 
Post-war structural economic developments had increased distributive pressures. 
By the 1970s the rapid increases in growth and productivity that resulted from 
the shift of labour from agriculture to industry could no longer be sustained 
(Blanchard & Wolfers 2000). The following shift of employment from industry to 
services that began on a large scale during the 1960s reduced the rate of growth 
of productivity further, because the capacity for productivity gains in services 
were typically less than those available in industry. The question for each 
political economy was, therefore: ‗are the institutional arrangements 
established fit for purpose when it comes to resolving new distributional 
conflicts and encouraging continued economic development‘? 
The institutional arrangements and paths to economic development European 
nations fostered to aid economic development now seemed prohibitive.  Trade 
union movements, empowered by collective bargaining institutions and high 
levels of employment, had the weight to negotiate settlements that increased 
the share of value-added74 going to labour relative to the share going to capital, 
leading in some cases to disinvestment (Armstrong, Glyn, & Harrison 1991).  
The late 1960s and 1970s saw increasing rates of inflation and unemployment 
leading to ‗stagflation‘: stagflation was a combination of inflation and reduced 
growth. Theories based on the Phillips curve had suggested that this could not 
happen75. The increased influence of the trade union movement and the threat 
of industrial conflict had resulted in inflationary wage settlements that could no 
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per unit. 
75
 In economics, the Phillips curve is a historical inverse relationship between the rate of 
unemployment and the rate of inflation in an economy. It indicated that lower unemployment 
in an economy is correlated with a higher rate of inflation.  
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longer be offset by a ‗pegged‘ exchange-rate anchor (Crafts & Toniolo1996; Hall 
2007). 
Unemployment levels grew as an increasing number of people sought work in an 
economic climate that reduced capital and discouraged investment. The OPEC 
crises of 1973-1974 (Arab oil embargo) and 1979-1980 (Iranian revolution) 
aggravated a deteriorating situation, driving inflation up and rates of growth 
down (Judt 2005). In response, governments in Britain, Germany and France all 
pursued reform in order to increase economic growth and competitiveness. This 
generally meant: deindustrialisation, liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation 
and decentralisation.  
The socioeconomic challenges of the 1970s and 1980s intensified existing and 
awakened latent distributive conflicts. Each government‘s response came in two 
waves. Initially, during the 1970s, administrations responded to the challenges 
by established means. To counter the increase in unemployment, a Keynesian 
stimulus was introduced. In France and Britain, where the formulae was tried 
and tested, this could be expected. However, it was something of a departure 
for Germany. Instead of cutting public expenditure, the economic downturn led 
governments to increase spending and introduce social policies designed to 
protect the populous against the effects of recession (Tanzi & Schuknecht 2000). 
As a proportion of GDP, the increase in social spending in the 1970s was 
unprecedented (Pierson 2006). To some extent this was a result of new 
initiatives but it was also due to a deceleration in GDP growth (OECD 1996). 
Many of the social benefits facing scrutiny in the 1990s and 2000s were 
instigated during the 1970s. The reality is that many policy makers viewed the 
economic downturn as a temporary recession rather than the structural 
adjustment it proved to be.  
The second wave of policy making grew out of dissatisfaction with the real and 
perceived effectiveness of increased state intervention. To varying degrees and 
with different ideological commitments, each government implemented more 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies and a supply-side view of employment 
that led to cuts in industrial subsidies in favour of manpower policies. This 
ideological shift was eventually embodied in The Single European Act of 1986. 
This institutionalised a ‗move to the market‘ that was a response to the 
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economic decline and activist state intervention associated with the 1970s and 
1980s (Hall 1986).  
In Britain, crisis came early and its model of market capitalism was therefore 
first to respond. The crisis provided the Thatcher government with an 
opportunity to progress an approach that saw market forces widen and deepen 
as many of the post-war policy legacies were withdrawn. By the late 1970s the 
UK was experiencing the full force of economic restructuring and the associated 
unemployment and social discord. France and Germany, by contrast, were still 
experiencing post-war prosperity, with relatively low levels of unemployment 
and high levels of GDP per capita.  
Whilst the UK pursued a strident neoliberal strategy, France and Germany, who 
became vulnerable during the 1980s, were more inclined to pursue solutions 
within established structures of local governance and economic relations (Crouch 
et al. 2011). In Germany, strategic coordination remained a central feature of its 
model of managed capitalism, although its real crisis would come in the 1990s, a 
consequence of reunification and increased international competition. France, 
like Britain, was in some difficulties by the early 1980s. Although initially 
seeking to increase competitiveness through dirigiste intervention, it soon 
exhibited a more neoliberal tendency via, at least to a degree, privatisation, 
financial market liberalisation, business deregulation and labour market 
flexibility (Schmidt 2003). However, relative to the UK, these changes were 
more socially inclusive and not implemented to the same extent.  
2.4 Post-industrial challenges of the 1990s and 2000s 
Those socioeconomic challenges most typically associated with ‗globalisation‘ 
seem to form the biggest problem for political economies today. However, 
rather than the import of cheap foreign goods, something each economy is used 
to, it is the expansion of emerging economies and the internationalisation of 
finance that seems to pose the greatest challenge (Hall 2007). This has led to 
the expansion of flexible labour markets which as Whiteside notes:  
―Has been associated with the collapse of full employment, the 
breakdown of post-war settlements and the development of 
unsustainable levels of social security expenditure. Economic 
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recession, job insecurity, growing social disparities...reflect a crisis of 
previous faith in the benefits of state action‖ (2000:2).  
The expansion of emerging economies since the collapse of communism and on-
going economic growth in China, Brazil and India has led to a shift in investment. 
Particularly affected are those enterprises that use low-skilled labour, something 
the emerging economies can provide more cheaply and copiously (Wood 1994). 
As a consequence, all European political economies are seeking to increase skill 
levels and create jobs in high value-added manufacturing and services. This is 
probably most explicitly articulated in the EU Lisbon strategy which calls for: 
"The most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion" (E.U. 2000). 
The increased internationalisation of finance has seen levels of foreign 
investment, in recent years, rise exponentially. Foreign capital is now the 
prevailing source of investment for many large enterprises and the large 
European banks have eased their commitments to domestic interests in order to 
secure global market share (Schmidt 2003). As a result, firms are no longer able 
to rely on the ‗domestic funders‘ that provided investment on terms that 
permitted them to pursue strategies of long-term growth rather than immediate 
profitability. In addition, it facilitates investors to intensify lobbying for 
increased deregulation and liberalisation (Hall & Soskice 2001).  
In addition to the exogenous forces associated with globalisation, there are also 
endogenous challenges most importantly: the influence of the EU and the 
structural changes each country is experiencing. The establishment of the single 
market heralded a shift in trade and monetary regimes. It forced enterprises to 
restructure in light of increased European competition and also forced 
governments to create policies that facilitated the redeployment of workers 
displaced by economic change.  The influence and direction of the EU is also 
significant: it now pursues and expects market liberalisation. Members are 
expected to: 
―Deregulate protected markets, eliminate industrial subsidies and 
promote free flows of capital. Across its member states, the European 
Union imparts a liberal bias to initiatives for institutional reform‖ 
(Hall 2007:65).  
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In the case of France and Germany, membership of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) limited the macroeconomic levers available to governments when faced 
with economic crises.  This limited the use of fiscal stimulus and removed the 
lever of devaluation, used in the past to alleviate the impact of wage inflation 
on national competitiveness.  
Structural and demographic changes exacerbate the problems each country 
faces. Although the expansion of the service sector continues, it has failed to 
replace the jobs lost as a consequence of deindustrialisation or deploy all those 
with industrial skills. At the same time, these structural changes in the economy 
have led to increases in part-time and temporary employment. Such factors gave 
rise to what Iversen and Wren term ‗the trilemma of the service economy‘ that 
is: 
“The declining capacity of the manufacturing sector to generate 
employment in most OECD countries...presents governments with a 
trilemma, or three-way choice, between the goals of earnings 
equality, budgetary restraint, and employment growth. Employment 
growth can be achieved only in the private services sector, at a cost 
of higher levels of wage inequality; or in the public services sector, at 
a cost either of higher taxes or of higher deficits. Strict adherence to 
the goals of budgetary restraint and wage equality simultaneously will 
therefore result in an inferior employment performance‖ (1998:554). 
In addition, falling birth rates and welfare retrenchment have increased the 
pressure governments face to secure high levels of employment, particularly 
now a smaller workforce will have to support an increasing proportion of the 
population in retirement76 (Pierson 2001). 
2.4.1 UK 
During this period which effectively covers the New Labour years, Britain, 
relative to France and Germany, performed well in terms of employment and 
domestic product. The introduction of the single market and liberalising 
tendencies of the EU suited a Britain used to the market as a coordinating force. 
By the 1990s Britain‘s share of European market had increased. Thatcherism, 
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population will grow from 13.8  per cent in 2005 to 20  per cent by 2030 and 25.2  per cent by 
2050. 
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consolidated under Blair, radically altered the reign of British firms: union 
presence was just about absent and wage structures and work practices could be 
transformed liberally. This was exhibited in the widening of pay differentials, 
relative to France and Germany (and most other European countries) (Bailey & 
Funk-Kirkegaard 2004).  
In terms of industrial employment, Britain was well equipped to redeploy 
workers into services, which constituted 75 per cent of the workforce in 2003 
(OECD 2004). The low-skill equilibrium of the UK favours general skills, 
facilitating labour mobility. In addition, UK governments have been able to 
supplement the level of general skills by extending general education (Hayward 
& James 2004). The welfare state also meets the demand of this service based 
economy. Low levels of employment protection led to increases in part-time and 
temporary employment.  Social policy such as New Labours ‗new deal‘ were 
intended to discourage long-term unemployment, as the receipt of benefit is 
based on so-called ‗activation‘ polices, in this instance, seeking work or 
participating in training schemes (Deakin & Reed 2000).  
In terms of labour relations, Thatcherism decimated the capacity of the British 
labour movement. Between 1979 and 1992, union membership fell from 50 to 30 
per cent of the workforce and the proportion of firms in employers‘ associations 
fell from 25 to 13 per cent (Rhodes 2001). This eased some of the pressures of 
wage inflation. In addition, the British government‘s decision to remain outside 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) afforded them the macroeconomic levers 
required to maintain domestic demand at high levels. This is reflected in the 
size of the current account deficit, which averaged $25 billion from 1995 to 2005 
compared with an average of $15 billion in Germany and France (Hall 2007:84).  
In Britain, business continued to be more financial market-led than in Germany 
or France. The levels of market capitalisation, mergers and acquisitions, access 
to venture capital, and foreign direct investment in the UK exceeded those in 
Germany of France (Schmidt 2003). This exposure to financial markets and 
capital movements resulted in the British economy being labelled as 
‗globalisation in one country‘ and an ‗over-internationalised economy in an 
under-globalised world‘ (Hirst & Thompson 2000). This reliance on the financial 
markets means the primary focus was on profitability, rather than firm value, 
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strategic business interests or employee concerns. Notably, in the UK, the 
mainstream political consensus continues to reflect: 
―the interests of capital in seeking to extend more variable forms of 
employment, to raise productivity, to reduce company overheads, to 
shore up defences against a rising tide of unemployment and social 
dependency‖ (Whiteside 2000:11). 
2.4.2 Germany 
Germany‘s model of coordinated capitalism managed well during the economic 
crises of the 1970s and the deindustrialisation of the 1980s because its 
institutional arrangements were able to secure strategic wage coordination. 
However, in the 1990s, when faced with the costs of reunification and increasing 
pressures of international competition, Germany‘s institutional arrangements 
meant reform had to be more gradual (Schmidt 2003; Hall 2007). In order to 
reorganise production regimes and introduce reforms, negotiations had to take 
place between government, German firms, powerful work councils and trade 
unions. These structures were hesitant to agree layoffs, wage differentials and 
changes to work conditions. However, concessions were made and the reform 
process was generally successful. There was liberalisation of the financial 
markets and small numbers of (West German) enterprises were privatised. In 
addition, there was deregulation of public utilities including telecommunications 
and electricity. However, the government lacked the political institutional 
capacity to secure reform of the labour markets and pension system (Thelen 
2001). As Schmidt explains: 
―...it was stymied not only by entrenched union interests but also by 
its own inability to come up with a discourse able to reframe the 
terms of the debate about the social market economy (2003:533).  
Labour market reforms would have been sought by the government as 
reunification had greatly exacerbated the work problem (Streeck 1997). High 
unemployment became a significant challenge, largely due to the poor state of 
the East German economy. The command economy of state-socialism meant 
authorities rather than entrepreneurs had been the decision makers. As a result, 
firms had too many workers and too little capital (Burda 1991). The inability of 
firms to compete in the open market saw many East German workers become 
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unemployed. The ‗Solidarity Pact‘, a political decision to equalise wages, 
exacerbated an already grave situation such that, by 2000, unemployment was 
around 20 per cent in the East (compared with approximately 7 per cent in the 
West). The situation in East Germany significantly increased the fiscal demands 
on government. 
Membership of the EMU created some additional problems for Germany and its 
institutional arrangements because the government was no longer in full control 
of monetary and fiscal policy. Nonetheless, the institutional arrangements of 
Germany enabled strategic wage coordination in light of competition from the 
single market and the east which restored competitiveness. However, the 
restriction of wage inflation depressed domestic demand and contributed to a 
macroeconomic environment that was not propitious for the type of growth 
other governments depended on, that is, consumer led expansion of the 
economy. In addition, as nominal interest rates were set by the European 
Central Bank in response to EMU inflation, Germany, due to its coordinating 
mechanisms, payed more in real terms than those countries less able to 
coordinate wage bargaining and effectively control inflation (Hall 2007).  
Germany‘s high skill equilibrium also affected its ability to manage high levels of 
unemployment and low levels of demand. When faced with high levels of 
unemployment, a labour force equipped with industry specific skills found it 
more difficult to secure jobs at similar wage rates than those equipped with 
general skills.  This in turn affected domestic demand as the workers‘ response 
in times of unemployment is to increase their level of savings (Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen & Soskice 2001). In the past, the solution would have been reflationary 
fiscal or monetary policy  however, membership of the EMU removed this option 
for Germany.  
Many German firms depended on the stability the established institutions of 
strategic coordination provided. Accordingly, in response to the challenges 
faced, Germany loosened rather than liberalised its institutional arrangements 
and, as a consequence, residual capacities for coordination remained (Thelen 
2000). For example, wage rates in the east settled at rates significantly lower on 
average than those in the west. In the prevailing economic conditions, unions 
and associations made concessions (Thelen & van Wijnbergen 2003). Although 
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the institutions of coordination demonstrated a degree of flexibility, their 
capacities remained fully functional such that they could be employed should 
labour-market conditions contract.  As Hall notes: 
―Wages and working conditions continue to be bargained with work 
councils and unions. Sixty per cent of the German workforce is still 
covered by a collective bargain, compared to 20 per cent in Britain, 
and industry and labour continue to operate collaborative training 
schemes conferring high levels of industry specific skills‖ (2007:69). 
Reform in the financial sector followed a similar tendency. The large German 
banks retrenched their commitment to domestic industry in order to invest and 
therefore compete in the global economy. Although the need to secure 
‗shareholder value‘ led to some restructuring, most firms still used earned 
income and bank finance for investment. In addition, the government continued 
to take preventative measures designed to limit hostile takeovers (Callaghan & 
Höpner 2005).  
A significant institutional transformation in the German political economy was 
the ‗development of a dual labour market‘. In order to encourage labour market 
flexibility there part-time work and marginal employment (so-called ‗mini jobs‘) 
increased. However, long-term unemployment persisted, as did the low 
employment levels of the elderly and the slow increase of female labour force 
participation. Germany‘s institutional arrangements, therefore, maintained 
security at the core of the labour market while gradually increasing flexibility at 
the margin (Ebbinghaus & Eichhorst 2009:119-20).  
2.4.3 France 
France was a strong advocate of the single market and EMU. In thrall to the 
German Bundesbank as they were in the 1980s, they believed the new 
arrangements would provide them with more monetary stability and restrain 
German monetary independence. Instead, they experienced a relatively austere 
macroeconomic environment and consistently high levels of unemployment. The 
government, in response, encouraged the role of markets in the allocation of 
resources, whilst at the same time increasing public spending.  
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In 1993 the state resumed the privatisation programme that had stalled since the 
late 1980s. However, the approach, relative to the UK, was dirigiste in practice. 
Instead of a ‗big bang‘ the government selected a ‗hard core‘ of investors, 
making available around 10 per cent of shares to employees and up to 20 per 
cent for foreign investors (except for firms related to national security). This, as 
Schmidt explains: 
―...intended to provide privatised firms with stable leadership akin to 
that of German managed capitalism as well as with protection against 
hostile takeovers and foreign acquirers‖ (2003:534).  
In France, some of the best performing enterprises continued to be nationalised 
in full or in part and many others retained ‗auto-control‘ through high levels of 
self-investment: for example, LMVH and Cap Gemini. Where mergers and 
acquisitions did take place, the primary driver continued to be a firm‘s strategy 
with regard to products, rather than the financial markets (Hancké 2001).  
Although deregulation was to be introduced, it would not be on the scale 
experienced in the UK or even Germany which, having resisted deregulation (like 
France), in the face of EU pressure, deregulated to a degree beyond that 
advocated by the EU. In France, public utilities and infrastructural services have 
a symbolic importance as ‗national champions‘. Therefore, in practice, 
deregulation would be the minimum required by EU directives and only in 
telecommunications were wide-scale deregulatory reforms accepted (Schmidt 
2003).  
In terms of industrial relations there was some decentralisation, with 
government initiatives encouraging bargaining at the firm, rather than the 
sector, level (Howell 1992). However this, as Schmidt concludes: 
―may be less a necessary consequence of the reform of former state-
led capitalist systems than of the particular circumstances of French 
industrial relations, namely, the weakness of employers‘ associations 
and unions77‖ (2003:535) 
                                         
77
 In European countries such as Italy and Spain where there are stronger employers‘ associations 
and unions there has been a tendency to recentralise wage bargaining in a more corporatist 
direction.  
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To protect against the unemployment created as French firms were being 
‗rationalised‘, the government increased public spending, effectively subsidising 
jobs for, most notably, the young and unemployed (Smith 2004). The initiatives 
of the Jospin government, elected in 1997, were, unlike those of the previous 
Juppe government, widely accepted. The reason was the Jospin government 
consulted extensively with labour and business, created new positions in the 
public sector and made few cuts to the generous benefits available to those in 
the most privileged positions of France‘s welfare state. As a consequence, public 
spending rose faster in France than elsewhere in Europe, reaching Nordic levels 
at 51 per cent of GDP in 2004 (Hall 2007). Reforms were made to social security 
such as the introduction of private pensions and industrial relations: for 
example, the introduction of the 35 hour working week. The government 
legitimated its path with a ―discourse that claimed to balance equity with 
efficiency in polices that mixed progressive and neoliberal elements‖ (Schmidt 
2003:535).  
France had to some degree converged with Britain by intensifying market forces 
and diverged from Germany by reforming its continental welfare state to a 
greater extent. France, like Germany, continued to operate a social policy 
regime that funded benefits from social charges on labour and which 
discouraged the creation of low-wage jobs (Scharpf 1999). However, like 
Germany, France had begun to facilitate the expansion of a dual labour market. 
The established link between work contract and benefits rights began to be 
undermined. An increase in the general social contribution (CSG) has shifted 
some of the costs of social protection to general taxation. In addition, the 
introduction of a national minimum income (RMI) had encouraged the 
unemployed to take low-wage jobs (Caroli, Gautié & Askenazy 2008). As 
Whiteside notes: 
―Far from flexibility parading as a solution to labour market problems, 
as in Britain, in France a deregulated labour market still embodies a 
threat-to personal security and to republican principle. So it is 
introduced through the back door‖ (2000:21). 
The outcome was the expansion of a secondary labour market where part-time 
and temporary employees work with fewer benefits and lower job security.  
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2.4.4 Summary 
By the 1970s the era of sustained growth was coming to a halt as the exogenous 
economic shocks associated with rising oil prices gave rise to recession. In the 
West, economic growth was no longer assured and the social costs of capitalism 
were becoming apparent once again. Unemployment and industrial decline 
increased as firms pursued improved productivity or were shut down due to a 
lack of competitiveness (Couch, Fraser & Percy 2003). It is within this context 
that countries restructured their economies. By the 1970s in the UK, and by the 
mid-1980s in France and Germany, the traditional industrial structure was 
transforming rapidly. Unemployment and deprivation became critical political 
issues. The UK, Germany and France each took a different path in response to 
the forces that created economic liberalisation during the 1980s, 1990s and 
beyond. Again, as will become evident later in the thesis, these strategies had 
an impact on the regions that will be examined.   
2.5 Policy responses to deindustrialisation in the UK, 
Germany and France  
This section will briefly discuss policy responses to deindustrialisation in the UK, 
Germany and France. Of course, deindustrialisation was more problematical in 
regions that had previously been heavily dependent on heavy industry. In these 
Old Industrial Regions (OIRs), a significant and increasing proportion of the 
population experienced poverty and became increasingly socially excluded from 
the formal economy (Fothergill 2001). This thesis will soon focus on these 
regions in some detail but, for the moment, the discussion will remain at the 
level of national policy. 
2.5.1 The UK 
Although there was some reprieve in the early post-war period, 
deindustrialisation had been a feature of the UK since the interwar period.  
Manufacturing was being overtaken by foreign competitors: mainly as a result of 
the UK‘s forms of ownership; low levels of capital investment and poor industrial 
relations (Lane 1989; Maddison 1991; Craft 1998). Deindustrialisation, when it 
came, occurred quickly. As MacInnes notes:  
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―the shift from manufacturing to services in terms of both output and 
employment has resulted from the British state's failure to appreciate 
the strategic role of industry in generating wealth and the strength of 
the legacy of 'laissez faire' in a country which embarked on the 
industrialisation with hardly any state involvement of the kind found 
in countries which industrialised at a later stage‖ (1995:2). 
By the 1970s, the economic stagnation and the declining competitiveness of key 
industrial sectors in international markets had led to increased industrial action 
and class-based conflict. The British model of market capitalism lacked the 
institutional arrangements for effective wage bargaining and, regardless of 
increasing unemployment, was unable to offset rising inflation (inflation peaked 
at 23 per cent in the spring of 1975)(Crouch 1979:103). To control inflation 
governments developed institutions for wage bargaining, albeit each attempt at 
this policy was unsuccessful.   
The Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970-1974) was unable to 
reform the political economy or moderate the distributional conflict78 that 
resulted from stagflation. Heath‘s government met opposition from both 
traditional business allies and an animated trade union leadership (Bogdanor 
1996).  The Labour governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (1974-
1979) had intended to pursue what was, in UK terms, a strong interventionist 
industrial policy in order to stem the decline in manufacturing employment. 
Their chosen tool was a new National Enterprise Board (NEB), created in 1975. 
However, participation by industry was voluntary rather than compulsory (as had 
been intended). In addition, plans for a ‗social contract‘ designed to mitigate 
distributional conflicts via wage coordination also proved unsuccessful. The 
Labour Government was initially successful in negotiating a ‗social contract‘ that 
united the parliamentary and industrial wings of the Labour movement and 
reduced inflation by means of wage coordination. However, the trade unions 
became increasingly aggravated by wage increases that came in well below the 
rate of inflation. The result was a split from the government in 1978 (Woodward 
2004).   
                                         
78 Unions were intent on recouping through wage-bargaining income they had lost through 
taxation. By the mid-1970s (after the abolishment of the lower rate of tax in 1969) union 
leaders would cite taxation to legitimate pay increases (Crouch 1977:98).  
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As the distributional conflict intensified, the country became beleaguered by 
strikes throughout the winter of 1978-1979 - the ‗Winter of Discontent‘. Labour‘s 
inability to control its own constituency, the trade unions, led to its demise at 
the general election in May 1979.  
By the time of the oil crises in the 1970s and the election of the Thatcher 
government in 1979, deindustrialisation had a political salience and was 
regarded, within many political circles, as inevitable. This was a marked change.  
The Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 on a platform 
that promised to roll back state intervention in the economy. Thatcher 
reoriented the state. Monetarism would replace Keynesianism as the new 
economic doctrine and the state would encourage overall economic growth and 
productivity by reducing social expenditure and the size of the public sector. 
This policy was achieved by trimming its work force and privatising nationalised 
industries. Monetarism was a radical departure from the post-war consensus on 
economic management. Not only was state intervention deemed redundant, it 
was also considered disadvantageous and destabilising. Thatcher would respond 
to the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s by augmenting Britain‘s historical 
model of market capitalism (Hall 1986; Pierson 1996; Harvey 2005).  
The electoral arithmetic of the UK parliament and a divided opposition provided 
the Thatcher administration with the capacity to impose reform. From the early 
1980s, the Thatcher administration deregulated the financial markets 
culminating with the ‗big bang‘ of 1986. Nationalised monopolies were privatised 
which meant that they now had to survive within the context of market 
competition. Deregulation meant that voluntary self-regulating regimes and 
formal government–industry relationships were replaced with independent 
regulatory agencies (Schmidt 1996).  Labour markets were made more flexible 
through deregulatory labour policies that restricted unions‘ organising and strike 
powers while increasing employers‘ capacity to hire and fire as required. 
Resistance to these changes by the institutions of organised labour were 
restricted by the effects of mass unemployment and the defeat of the coal 
miners‘ strike (Howell 1999). Under Thatcher, Britain became even more 
market-orientated, providing a legislative framework that located decision-
making power in companies and restricted trade union powers (Wood 2001). 
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The 1970s and 1980s, under Thatcher, would mark the peak of 
deindustrialisation. What happened can be seen as a form of ‗shock therapy‘: 
blunt rationalisation of formerly dominant manufacturing industries and an 
accelerated shift to a more service-oriented economy. The Thatcher government 
advanced the idea that the process of deindustrialisation was inevitable - the 
consequence of economic maturity and development. To mitigate the process 
via state intervention, as attempted by Wilson and Heath, would only hinder 
‗natural‘ structural economic change (Lloyd-Jones & Lewis 1998). This discourse 
of inevitably reframed deindustrialisation as an opportunity for businesses to 
become more competitive by rationalising in accordance with market logic, 
rather than, as a crisis of employment created by a lack of public and private 
investment and antagonistic industrial relations.  In this context, advocates 
argued, state intervention would be futile and counter-productive, delaying an 
inexorable outcome. The removal of restrictions on capital export and 
denationalisation advanced the overseas location of manufacturing increasing 
the deindustrialisation of industrial regions such as WCS. As a result, 
interregional inequalities were exacerbated as market forces increasingly shaped 
the geography of manufacturing (Hudson & Williams 1995). 
 
In the period that followed, any expansion of employment in the UK was 
generally the result of service sector employment secured via low wages and 
cuts to social protection: relative to Germany and France, the UK fostered lower 
quality and less stable forms of employment. Employers adjusted their systems 
of organisation and production to make few demands on the workforce, other 
than to accept low wages and atypical employment. Institutional support for 
expanding the workforce through low-wage employment discouraged firms from 
high quality production (Finegold & Soskice 1988). What this meant was that 
growth in economic activity was increasingly being secured through the 
expansion of employment rather than technological upgrading. One outcome of 
this complex set of changes was growing consumer expenditure and debt 
(Wilkinson 2007). A second outcome was the development of a highly polarised 
skill distribution within the UK workforce made worse by the inadequacies of the 
vocational training system at post-compulsory secondary education level which 
left many with no or weakly developed skills.  
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By the 1990s Thatcher‘s inevitability thesis and associated fiscal and industrial 
policies had achieved a degree of hegemony forming as it did the mainstream 
political consensus (only recently challenged in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis).  New Labour, under both Blair and Brown, maintained the same 
economic priorities as their Tory predecessors, concentrating on keeping 
inflation as low as possible. That said, supporters of New Labour will likely cite 
the increased investment in education as a policy designed to recover Britain‘s 
manufacturing base.  However, in reality, this investment was intended to meet 
the needs of British employers, the majority of which are not involved in 
manufacturing. As Coutts et al. conclude: 
 
―The decline in the importance of tradeable goods production in 
providing employment has continued in the past decade; distribution, 
public services and business and financial services all provide more 
jobs than tradeable goods‖ (2007:1).  
Market-capitalist Britain has become, if anything, more driven by financial 
market in business relations, more liberal in state relations with business and 
labour and more market-reliant and decentralised in industrial relations.  
Financial markets and autonomous firms, without any real input from labour and 
little state intervention, drive and demand economic or political change. This 
reflects an approach to policy making in the UK that privileged the interests of 
finance above those of industry. Conservative and Labour governments both 
strongly believed that the future development of the UK economy could be 
ensured through specialising in the provision of financial services (Harvey 2005; 
Clark et al. 2011). 
2.5.2 West Germany 
West Germany experienced significant declines in manufacturing during the 
1970s and 1980s, particularly around coal and steel. However, 
deindustrialisation in the German national context is often considered a feature 
of the 1990s, starting in the period that followed reunification during the final 
years of the Kohl government (Webber 1994; Hall 2007).  Deindustrialisation 
extended throughout the 2000s through the Agenda 2010 reforms of the Social 
Democratic (SPD) and Green coalition led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. These 
reforms were designed to facilitate increased labour market flexibility in the 
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face of a structural economic crisis characterised by high unemployment.  
Although there was some service job replacement, the country was (and 
continues to be) considered a service employment laggard (Smith 2003).  
Importantly, the dominant thinking during the 1970s and 1980s, which continues 
today, was that deindustrialisation was and is not inevitable (in all industries at 
least). This belief is bolstered by Germany‘s comparatively high levels of 
manufacturing employment.  
 
The German model of ‗managed capitalism‘ had become well established by the 
1970s and had many admirers (Paterson & Smith 1981). However, by the 1970s, 
Germany faced a number of challenges that would continue into the 1980s, when 
the country emerged from the period of economic uncertainty, characterised by 
some as Eurosclerosis79 (Olson 1982). West Germany‘s industrial relations 
system, linking wages to productivity, had hitherto been successful. However, it 
came under increased pressure during the 1970s: profits fluctuated unexpectedly 
as industrial conflict led to an increase in labour costs (56 per cent between 
1972 and 1975) (Hall 2007). Inflationary wage settlements led the independent 
Bundesbank to introduce a more restrictive monetary policy which put it at odds 
with a government that preferred to adhere to a more Keynesian approach to 
economic management. Nonetheless, the German system of wage bargaining was 
able to withstand the exogenous shocks of the 1970s and negotiated wage 
increases moderate enough to restrain inflation throughout the 1980s (Hassel 
2006). 
The economic miracle that continued into the 1960s created a work problem of 
labour scarcity. The result was that, between 1959 and 1971, over two million 
gastarbeiter (guest workers) entered Germany. However, by the 1970s, as 
employment began to shift out of industry into services, one of the most severe 
issues confronting the German administration was increasing unemployment and 
the costs associated with supporting the long-term unemployed.   
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system undermined one of the key levers used 
to maintain high levels of productivity, namely, the undervalued exchange rate 
that had made the cost of German goods competitive internationally. The loss of 
                                         
79 High unemployment and slow job creation in spite of overall economic growth. 
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a low exchange rate resulted in inflation and increased competitive pressures on 
German firms. Because the institutional arrangements for wage-bargaining had 
empowered the works councils and unions, firms could not easily pursue a 
strategy of wage reduction and restraint. Instead, strategies were adopted that 
would increase the productivity of labour. In order to increase productivity, 
firms pursued two main strategies: first, to promote labour flexibility and 
second, to increase productivity. Major unions became proactive on issues such 
as flexible work organisation. For example, IG Metall developed the principle of 
group work which came to characterise the West German auto industry (Thelen 
1991; Streeck 1992). Increased flexibility helped raise productivity and cut costs. 
Between 1970 and 1985, the capital intensity of German industry escalated 
considerably and the percentage of employees who were male decreased from 
93 to 82 per cent (Hall 2007). Investment in plant equipment continued as union 
‗sacred cows‘, such as prohibitions against night and weekend shifts, were 
replaced with flexible working hours and practices (Turner 1991).  
Germany weathered the crises of the 1970s comparatively well and the 
institutional arrangements of its political economy remained intact. In the area 
of industrial relations, these mediated the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment effectively. In terms of production, these maintained high-quality 
production and were able to fine tune and diversify it.  Germany‘s economic 
performance in the 1980s, relative to France and Britain, was good.  
In the 1990s, to encourage job creation and growth in the service sector, 
deregulatory measures in the labour market and new rules regarding the 
issuance of fixed-term contracts to workers were made under Kohl.   
Today, the inevitability of deindustrialisation is still refuted by many German 
policy makers who regard Germany‘s manufacturing decline as an outcome of 
failure to increase specialisation in niche and high quality areas of production 
and to adapt to the pressures of global competition. To combat this, Germany, 
although it maintains its institutions of strategic coordination, has facilitated 
flexibility in its labour markets and wage moderation, opened itself to foreign 
investment and reasserting its commitment to high-quality production (Baldi 
2011).  
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2.5.3  France 
Despite the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, the dirigiste role of the 
French state was, by the end of this period, under threat. The arbitrary mode of 
decision making and lack of consultation had provoked a momentous reaction: in 
May 1968 a wave of strikes and demonstrations brought the country to a halt. 
The interventionist autocratic manner of the state, in universities, workplaces 
and political institutions had bred resentment and led to the mobilisation of 
diverse groups of students, workers, artists, and professionals. What followed 
was years of intense labour militancy such that, by the early 1970s, strikes were 
common place.  
As the economy stagnated and discontent increased, French policy makers were 
forced to address a changing economic environment that undermined the state 
capitalist model of development. Dirigiste planning had been successful at 
building basic infrastructure in sectors that required investment such as steel 
and transport. However, it lacked the capacity to reform the French economy: 
to decentralise decision making and make changes that would allow France to 
compete successfully in the global economy. The initial response of French 
policy makers, like those in Britain, was to regard the economic downturn as a 
temporary recession, rather than a structural change, and, therefore, to address 
it with established policy responses. A series of right wing administrations under 
President Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing increased state support to industry and 
expanded social programmes for the unemployed (Hall 2007). However, the 
competitiveness of industry was severely compromised under d‘Estaing whose 
policy of rescuing companies on the verge of bankruptcy essentially turned 
Gaulle‘s policy of support for ‗national champions‘ into one of support for ‗lame 
ducks‘ (Hayward 1995). Growing discontent over economic performance brought 
the Left into power for the first time during the Fifth Republic.  
By the early 1980s, deindustrialisation became a critical concern for France. The 
dirigiste approach had, it seemed, reached its capacity as France, without the 
policy levers of inflation and currency devaluation, struggled to adjust to the 
demands of the global economy and experienced increasing unemployment. The 
Socialist government elected in 1981 under President François Mitterrand 
initially deepened the dirigiste response. Despite the austerity of the times, the 
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government of 1981 extended subsidies and loans and nationalised industries: 
between 1981 and 1985, the 16 largest French firms received 64 billion Francs in 
subsidies and the newly nationalised firms the equivalent of $5 billion (Schmidt 
1996: 108). The total investment to industry far outweighed what private 
industry had committed in the preceding years. Amable and Hancké conclude 
that this allowed ―these companies not only to accelerate investment, but also 
to increase R&D expenditure by over 20 per cent between 1982 and 1985‖ 
(2001:124).  
 
Mitterrand‘s strategy of dirigiste modernisation reformed the economy, society 
and state in the long-term. Social benefits were expanded, mechanisms were 
established to increase participation in economic decision making by workers 
and unions and areas of industry were improved due to public investment. 
However, in the short-term, it failed to restore rates of growth or investment.  
The short-term result was increased budget and trade deficits which resulted in 
a devaluation of the franc.  In March 1983 Mitterrand was forced to choose 
between his dirigiste strategy and his commitment to the European Monetary 
System (established in 1979 to stabilise exchange rate in Europe). Mitterrand 
abandoned the strategy in an effort to revive the economy by advocating more 
open European markets, a goal codified in the Single Europe Act of 1986 (Levy 
2008).  
The French political elite now faced a problem - how to restructure the 
institutions and regulatory regimes of France‘s political economy to ensure it 
prospered in new more competitive international markets. Some advocated the 
German model of managed capitalism (Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre 1996). Its 
egalitarianism and success in high-value added sectors were appealing to many 
in France. However, the effectiveness of the German model was contingent on 
the existence of strong employers‘ associations and trade unions. Conditions in 
France meant it would have been difficult to implement such a model because 
the labour movement was fragmented and some within the political elite were 
wary of fortifying a labour movement that had disrupted many governments and 
in which a communist trade union was important. Consequently, measures to 
afford the unions a greater hand in bargaining (the Aroux laws of 1982) and to 
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enhance regional cooperation between business and labour were less effective 
(Culpepper 2006).  
From 1983, a succession of administrations, left and right alike, pursued a 
neoliberal modernisation strategy which included regulatory changes that would 
increase competition between firms and enhance the extent to which they 
depended on markets to coordinate their endeavours (Goyer 2006). In a shift 
away from the post-war period of active state intervention, by the 1980s the 
state had exposed firms to reform from below, driving modernisation by 
exposing them to the demands of market competition. State assets in banking 
and industry were privatised and companies were encouraged to seek capital on 
the international markets.  The Paris Bourse was expanded, foreign investment 
was actively encouraged and a competitive market was fostered for corporate 
control. As a result, industrial subsidies diminished, markets were deregulated 
and French firms were required to compete in the new single European market 
(initially under a high exchange rate that reduced their competitive advantage).  
However, the state continued to set minimum wages and impose wage 
agreements across sectors, although it used these powers cautiously to 
encourage firm-level bargaining instead (Lallement 2006).  
The net outcome was a transformation in corporate governance. By the end of 
the 1990s almost 40 per cent of shares in France‘s leading firms of the CAC4080 
were held by foreign investors (Culpepper 2005:191). It is worth noting that the 
alliances forged at the elite educational institutions continue to provide French 
companies with the capacity to coordinate their endeavours. This was much less 
the case in the UK where market mechanisms shaped the coordination of 
business activities. However, in many respects, the French model was shifting 
towards the model of market capitalism. Typically, one might expect increases 
in market competition to lead to a reduction in social spending. France, 
however, made its markets more competitive and increased its levels of social 
protection at the same time. Moreover, the role of the state had undergone a 
significant transformation. As Hall concludes: 
                                         
80
 Bench mark for French stock market index. 
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―In 1960, the French state provided minimal social benefits but 
lavished subsidies on protected industrial firms. By 1990, it had given 
up on industrial protection in favour of social protection‖ (2007:56). 
2.5.4 Summary  
Deindustrialisation has been and continues to be a source of concern for a 
variety of reasons. A particular concern of the 1970s and 1980s (and post 1990s 
in CEE) was the fall in demand for labour, a consequence of the defensive 
restructuring of capital associated with maintaining profitability (Massey & 
Meegan 1982). In pursuit of greater profits, production in many industries shifted 
from more to less developed countries where labour costs were lower. It is this 
restructuring by relocation which creates and sustains spatially uneven 
development as places ‗rise and fall‘ (Castree et al. 2004:69; Hudson, 2001:261).  
 
Rodwin & Sazanani refer to a ―hollowing‖ of economies (1988: viii) - a ‗moving 
up‘ and ‗moving out‘ of manufacturing industry. By ‗moving up' the 
manufacturing industry in the mature industrial economies adopted advanced 
technologies which lead to capital intensification and higher value-added and, as 
a result, higher profits. By ‗moving out' manufacturing relocates to lower wage 
economies. As a result, the more immediate concerns in the short and long-term 
were: the redeployment of manual workers when the only growth is in the 
service/white collar sectors and the long-term viability of a service-based or 
tertiary economy.  
 
As a consequence of deindustrialisation, there have been both losers and 
winners, and significant socioeconomic and human costs:  
 
―blighted communities and regions, loss of infrastructure, 
disappearance of jobs, erosion of skills, increasing inequality of 
income and sheer human misery. Fear, hostility and concern have 
been aroused in many quarters and many persons are convinced that a 
better way to handle the incidence of costs and benefits must be 
found‖ (Rodwin & Sazanami, 1991:4).  
In order to encourage economic growth and competitiveness, each country, to 
varying degrees and intensity, pursued: deindustrialisation, liberalisation, 
privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation. In this regard the UK went 
furthest, pursuing a forceful neoliberal strategy. France and Germany were able 
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to mitigate many of the social costs associated with deindustrialisation by 
pursuing a more gradual and socially inclusive path toward economic 
restructuring and future economic development. That said, all the countries 
covered here have, to various extents, privatised national enterprises and public 
services, introduced austerity measures, and increased the role of the market.  
Currently, the socioeconomic challenges commonly associated with globalisation 
and increasingly austerity have led to the abandonment of full employment, 
post-war settlements and increases in social expenditure and provision. 
Consequently, and to varying degrees and intensity, governments have pursued 
policies of labour market flexibility and austerity in a context of economic 
recession, job insecurity and widening social inequalities. 
2.6 Social protection during deindustrialisation  
This section focuses on the policy context and levels of social protection offered 
to the population of the UK, Germany and France during and after 
deindustrialisation.  
From the conclusion of WWII till the 1970s and 1980s politicians throughout 
Western Europe, mindful of the mass unemployment faced during the inter-war 
era and (perhaps) conscious of the sacrifices many made during the war, 
established a consensus that poverty and unemployment were not the product of 
individual inadequacies.  Rather, they were structural and systemic (Bowles & 
Gintis 1982). The political imperative during this period was full employment. 
Governments, to varying degrees, increased interventions in the distribution of 
resources, implemented activist industrial policies and, on the back of economic 
growth, legislated for progressively munificent social benefits. During this golden 
age of welfare capitalism in West Europe the key concerns were protecting 
(predominantly) the income of the male breadwinner against unemployment, 
sickness and retirement (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 2001).  
However, deindustrialisation placed these arrangements under intense pressures 
and the associated socioeconomic changes commonly characterised as post-
industrial presented new social risks (NSRs) (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2006; 
Pintelon et al. 2011). 
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Between 1945 and 1973, the so-called ‗Golden Age‘, the welfare states of 
Britain, Germany and France developed rapidly, outpacing even the (often) 
significant growth in real GDP. This was an era of expansion in welfare state 
provision (see Table 4.1).  Countries established policies of social protection and 
labour market regulation in order to cover the traditional social risks associated 
with industrialisation such as poverty due to retirement from work, 
unemployment and illness. In Western Europe, the number of eligible recipients 
increased over time as did the benefits provided by pensions, disability 
payments and unemployment insurance programmes. In the 1930s roughly half 
the labour force was covered by some form of social protection: approximately a 
fifth was insured against unemployment. By the 1970s more than 90 per cent of 
the labour force was protected during old age, invalidity and sickness; more than 
80 per cent were covered by accident insurance; and 60 per cent had 
unemployment coverage (Pierson 2006:131). However, as Table 3.9.1 shows, if 
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used as a measure, levels of 
commitment varied. France and Germany, like most major OECD economies, 
were, by 1975, allocating in excess of 25 per cent of GDP to social expenditure. 
Of the seven major OECD economies, only the UK (19.6 per cent) along with the 
United States and Japan allocated less than a fifth of GDP (OECD 1988:11).  
Table A.1: Social expenditure, 1960-1975, as percentage of GDP in the UK, West Germany 
and France. 
Country 1960 1975 
UK 12.4 19.6 
West Germany  17.1 27.8 
France 14.4 26.3 
 
Source: OECD 1988:10 
The political and socioeconomic order of the post-war period was founded upon 
several mutually supporting policies. These were: Keynesian economic policies 
to secure full employment and sustain domestic economic growth within what 
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Pierson describes as ―the agreed parameters of an essentially liberal capitalist 
international market‖ (2006:131); creation and expansion of the welfare state to 
deal with the social costs of an industrial market economy; a (very) broad based 
consensus across the political spectrum, and between capital and labour, 
concerning the social institutions of a market economy and welfare state and the 
accommodation of their competing interests through institutionalised 
negotiation (Bowles & Gintis 1982; Pierson 2006:131-132). As a result, advanced 
industrial states experienced some success in tackling both horizontal and 
vertical income inequalities81 (Atkinson 1998; Berthoud 2004; Taylor-Gooby 
2004). 
Economic growth was the glue that held the consensus together and was the 
foundation of welfare state development. It was the purpose of Keynesian 
polices to encourage capital investment which was the stimulus to support 
economic growth, in order to secure full employment and finance health, 
education, welfare and social services. As Pierson concludes: 
―It was economic growth that made a reconciliation of the opposing 
interests of capital and labour viable and sustainable. Fittingly, what 
has been described as the ‗the Golden Age of the welfare state‘ was 
also a period of unprecedented and unparalleled growth in the 
international capitalist economy‖ (2006:133). 
In the case of the UK, France and Germany, up until the periods of 
deindustrialisation, quite different means were utilised to achieve greater 
equality. The UK limited state intervention to redistribution whilst France, via 
legislation and Germany, via collectively negotiated agreements, intervened in 
the functioning of the labour market to achieve social policy objectives 
(Whiteside & Salais 1998; Bonoli 2006). The socioeconomic change associated 
with deindustrialisation, and the shift from industrial to post-industrial 
economies and societies, led to the emergence of new risk groups that did not 
fit the traditional clientele of the post-war welfare state and, as such, 
experienced major welfare losses (Bonoli 2005).  
                                         
81 Vertical inequality refers to inequality among individuals or households, while horizontal 
inequality is defined as inequality among groups, typically culturally defined, for example, by 
ethnicity, religion or race.  
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2.6.1 UK 
We have already seen that the UK struggled for competitiveness in the 
immediate post-war era compared to Germany and France. As a result, work 
conditions and practices, particularly in heavy industry and manufacturing, were 
typically inferior. By the 1970s, the UK was in decline economically and, it 
appeared, socially. Britain was the first major West European country to be in 
the grip of deindustrialisation: plunged into manufacturing decline, stagflation, 
social conflict and the practice of restructuring a post-industrial society (Iversen 
& Cusack 2000). 
By the end of the decade unemployment was significantly greater and GDP per 
capita significantly lower than in either Germany or France (Smith 2003). As has 
been discussed, the UK augmented its low-skill, low-value added areas of 
production and market-led economy with neoliberal policies (Finegold & Soskice 
1988; Lane 1989; Rubery 1994). Neoliberal policies of deregulation, privatisation 
and lower taxes, appealing to individual self-reliance, were regarded as a 
remedy to the increasing burden of welfare capitalism and would also facilitate 
the emergence of a global open-market economy. The Thatcher government 
eradicated institutions for protecting wages and working conditions and 
statutory constraints were placed on industrial action (Howell 2005). 
Although for a short time (1965-1982), public unemployment insurance provided 
improved replacement rates, in contrast to Germany and France, income 
replacement rates in unemployment and retirement were low. Moreover, apart 
from a few core labour market ‗insiders‘ with occupational schemes,  
unemployed workers had to rely on what were, comparatively, very low benefits 
(Fleckenstein et al. 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011). Typically, there was no 
earnings-related link and benefits were means-tested and provided at a flat 
rate. At the end of the 1960s, only 53 per cent of the workforce could, with 40 
years employment, expect a replacement rate of 70 per cent of the standard 
wage in retirement (Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011; Blake 2003). Moreover, there 
were significant differences according to gender, skill, industry and sector. 
Reforms in the 1980s led to a significant decline in what were already 
comparatively meagre pension benefits. 
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Redundancy payments were also problematical. For example, in 1981, a year 
when unemployment in the UK exceeded 2.5 million, only 36 per cent of the 
unemployed received redundancy pay (traditionally dominant industries such as 
coal and steel were more likely to provide redundancy payments) (Seeleib-Kaiser 
et al. 2011). 
 
In the UK while the majority entered into a period of long-term unemployment 
with meagre benefits, many of their counterparts in France and Germany 
entered early retirement or a period of unemployment with more generous 
benefits and perhaps a greater chance of finding a job similar to the one they 
had lost (i.e. skilled and possibly in industry or manufacturing).  
In the UK, the process of deindustrialisation itself led to a loss of social 
protection. The manufacturing sector provided workers with a reasonable level 
of occupational social protection. Therefore, the decline of this sector and the 
limited re-employment opportunities for many of its former workers in the low-
general skills service sector jobs significantly reduced overall coverage and 
security (Fleckenstein et al. 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011). After the 
economic crisis of the 1970s and associated deindustrialisation, the question of 
how to best finance the welfare state became a political issue. Insurance 
benefits were not paid at a high enough level to prevent many senior citizens 
from becoming poor and full employment no longer seemed like an achievable 
goal. The latter was a result of the secular decline in manufacturing jobs which 
was itself a product of deindustrialisation. 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a sequence of radical welfare reforms, 
usually motivated by the desire to re-establish Britain‘s economic 
competitiveness. Conservative governments, in particular, have advocated a 
reduction in the size of the state which in their later terms in office targeted 
the welfare state specifically. Their position was ideological, rather than 
pragmatic, because the question of whether or not welfare spending actually 
curtailed competitiveness and encouraged a ‗benefit culture‘ was moot. The 
government alleged it did and acted accordingly to reduce the welfare state 
(Clarke & Newman 1997).  
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Both conservative governments (Thatcher (1979-1990) and Major (1990-1997) 
advocated and encouraged private sector involvement in welfare provision 
(Mitton 2009). The ‗marketisation‘ of welfare involved two processes: first, 
encouraging individuals to finance their own welfare, either by establishing their 
own pension or by taking out private health insurance and second, ‗sub-
contracting‘ the provision of publicly financed welfare services to commercial or 
voluntary not-for-profit suppliers (Mitton 2009) - for example back to work 
programmes for those on Jobseekers Allowance.   
New social policies were established that would consolidate this shift, via the 
integration of the public and private spheres in welfare provision. This would 
require new types of welfare state administration: markets for public services, 
decentralised system, networks of multiple welfare providers and new roles for 
commercial and voluntary providers (Timmins 1996:475). Quasi markets, 
particularly for health, were introduced and welfare provision became 
increasingly residual in character. The government wanted to cut public 
expenditure even if that meant increased inequality. Critics accused the 
conservatives of ‗selling off‘ the welfare state (Le Grand 1990).  
When New Labour came to power in 1997, they augmented many of the 
conservative welfare reforms via public finance initiatives (PFI), regulation of 
the public sector (where it was argued free markets do not serve the public 
interest), and through what some may deem as populist measures: that is, by 
‗empowering‘ service users and conducting public consultation on planning and 
policy. Although Prime Minister Blair stressed the need to implement policies 
that targeted the poor and the most vulnerable, the Labour party rejected their 
introduction on the grounds that such policies would be both ineffective and 
unfair. As Taylor-Gooby concludes: ―both main parties now endorse cost-
constraint, the expansion of private provision and workfare‖ (2001:192), thus 
leading to the establishment of a new, implicit (neo) liberal consensus in the UK. 
 
In Germany and France, government eschewed neoliberalism and pursued a 
more gradual and socially inclusive path toward economic restructuring and 
future economic development (Couch et al. 2011).  
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2.6.2 Germany 
The post-war (West) German settlement was founded upon the notion of a 'social 
state', typically referred to as a 'social market economy'. The central tenet of 
the system was that coordinated economic development was the best way to 
achieve social welfare. Rather than pursue a policy of full or maximum 
employment, the system provided subsidies to so-called ‗outsiders‘, who were 
compensated for leaving or not entering the labour market making space for 
those who were more productive. Therefore, in the post-war period until the 
1980s labour market and employment pressures were mitigated by the so-called 
‗male breadwinner‘82 model of welfare that limited female entrants (Lewis 1992; 
Ostner & Lewis 1995). 
When faced with the pressures of deindustrialisation, particularly 
unemployment, the government response was to advocate a more instrumental 
approach to macroeconomic management: restrictions on immigration were 
introduced while time spent in education for the younger population was 
expanded. One of the more noteworthy initiatives was the policy to reduce the 
size of the workforce. An ambiguous definition of disability increased the 
eligibility of older workers for munificent benefits and those who had been 
unemployed for a year could claim full pension entitlements at age 60, thereby 
making it possible for firms to compel workers into early retirement at the age 
of 59. Further legislation in 1972 increased pension benefits for the low paid and 
mandated early retirement at age 63. By 1985, the proportion of German men 
between the ages of 55 and 64 in paid employment had fallen to 60 from 80 per 
cent in 1970. Concerned about the fiscal legacy of these policies, the Kohl 
government adjusted the replacement rate for unemployment insurance from 68 
per cent to 63 per cent of previous wages and the social assistance rate down 
two per cent to 56 per cent in 1983–4. However, these measures did not 
substantially alter a strategy designed to limit the size of the labour force 
(Mirkin 1987; Hall 2007).  
                                         
82
 The state in corporatist countries such as Germany and a lesser extent France have, unlike the 
UK, been disinclined to encourage growth in the service sector. Considering it a threat to the 
‗breadwinner‘ model in which fathers earn the wages and mothers oversee the household. 
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Meanwhile, large industrial enterprises pursued a policy of consolidation in order 
to remain competitive and increase their scale and productivity (Hassink 1993; 
Hospers 2004). In those sectors most vulnerable to the prevailing economic 
circumstances, such as the heavy industries, government policy was able to limit 
the rapid decline in employment. Klodt (1990) and Giersch et al. (1992) note 
protectionist policies, such as increased subsidies, limited the loss of 
employment. For example, in the coal industry between 1980 and 1992 
employment in the UK fell from 294,000 to 44,000. In Germany the numbers fell 
from 187,000 to 115,000 (Cited in Carlin 1998). 
The cost of unemployment was not the only problem: there were also significant 
structural concerns. Could Germany‘s system of vocational education and 
apprenticeships continue to absorb new entrants into the labour market as a 
central foundation of the German model was the continued supply of skilled 
workers? In a coordinated effort, the Federal and State (Lander) governments, 
employers‘ associations, trade unions and work councils employed a range of 
formal and informal institutional mechanisms to develop this central feature of 
the labour market. Policies were formulated to satisfy regionally specific needs. 
Automobile and machine tools were targeted in the Stuttgart area, industrial 
electronics in Munich and the declining steel industry in the Ruhr valley.  The 
existing institutions of codetermination and works councils allowed stake holders 
(employers, unions and governments) to design a curriculum to fulfil the specific 
requirements of each region (Allen 2009).  
Generally, after first a period of state investment and increased subsidies, and 
then consolidation of the major industries, the process of deindustrialisation or 
rationalisation occurred. However, unlike the UK, the restructuring of industry 
would be comparatively gradual and mitigation would be the result of 
considered creation of working places, training schemes and compensation 
packages. In the UK, by contrast, the main emphasis was on the market to 
create working opportunities for newly redundant or unemployed workers (Kilper 
& Wood 1995; Hospers 2004).  
 
The mechanisms introduced to mediate unemployment (the work problem), the 
cap on the size of the labour force and reduced working hours, had, in the short-
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term at least, been successful. Those who had work were well paid and those 
who did not enjoyed generous social benefits.  
The reunification of Germany exacerbated existing concerns and raised the 
possibility of further reform and even retrenchment. The Kohl administration 
had underestimated the costs and institutional resources required to integrate 
the East German Länder. Since reunification, four per cent of GDP a year has 
been spent on social transfers to the East and, to finance these transfers, the 
government had to implement considerable tax increases (Hall 2007). Germany‘s 
deteriorating fiscal situation, in addition to anxieties over industrial 
competitiveness, engendered growing criticism of the welfare state. The 1990s 
were a period of fiscal consolidation which saw first cuts in unemployment 
benefits then a series of improvised, yet significant, reforms in almost all fields 
of social policy, including pensions, health care, social assistance and labour 
market policy. The reforms were inspired by the neoliberal discourse on the 
eroding competitiveness and viability of the German economy (Aust & Bönker 
2005). 
The Schroder government of the late 1990s and 2000s reduced social benefits 
and introduced  ‗activation‘ style policies, where benefits require individuals to 
actively seek work or commit to training (Clasen & Clegg 2004). However, the 
established structures of the welfare state remained in place: benefits 
continued to be financed via social charges and early retirement programmes 
still facilitated efforts to take labour out of the market (Streeck & Trampusch 
2005). 
2.6.3  France  
Like Germany, the French welfare system is founded upon social insurance: 
entitlement is conditional upon a contribution record; most benefits are 
earnings-related; financing is provided mainly by employers‘ and employees‘ 
contributions and the social partners are substantially involved in the 
management of the system. This system is divided into different sectors 
(branches): health care, old age, family and unemployment insurance and highly 
fragmented into different schemes (régimes) covering different occupational 
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groups. Schemes are made up of different funds (caisses) and are organised at 
the national, regional and local level (Mandin & Palier 2002:3).  
The socioeconomic changes associated with deindustrialisation put the French 
system of social protection under great pressure. By the 1980s, unemployment 
had become a key concern. In 1981 Mitterand was elected and France had its 
first left-wing government in 23 years. In order to mitigate the social costs that 
resulted from firms restructuring their workforces, the state funded many of the 
social plans designed to mitigate the increase in unemployment such as 
retraining. According to Freyssenet (1998), Renault reduced its workforce by 
approximately 20 per cent - a reduction wholly mitigated by government-
financed social plans.  
 
With regards to the work problem, rather than reduce unemployment protection 
and entitlement to counteract unemployment as had happened in the UK, the 
French administration of the 1980s, like Germany, reduced the numbers seeking 
work by expanding early retirement programmes, thus restricting the size of the 
working population. This reduction was achieved despite the ever increasing 
number of women now entering the workforce.   As a result the proportion of 
the male workforce aged over 50 years fell significantly. For example, the 
proportion of those aged 55 to 59 years who were in work fell from 83 per cent 
in 1976 to 68 per cent in 1984 (Mirkin 1987). French social benefits became 
increasingly munificent: whereas once the state had heavily subsidised industry 
it now provided similar sums to subsidize training schemes and the social charges 
of employers who took on young or unemployed workers. By 1986, the French 
state was spending four per cent of GDP on such schemes (Hall 2007:56). 
In addition, Mitterrand adopted a policy of redistributive Keynesianism. This 
involved: increasing the minimum wage to reflate the economy; creating 
100,000 public sector jobs; reducing the working week from 40 to 39 hours; 
increasing funding for manpower training and early retirement to reduce 
unemployment; nationalisation of firms critical to French banking and industry 
and increasing subsidies to industry (35 billion francs in 1981 to 86 billion in 
1985) on the premise that public investment could be used to replace private 
investment, which had been stagnant since 1974. All these changes were 
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financed through increases in social insurance and corporate taxes and 
expanding the budget deficit (Machin & Wright 1985). 
The Socialist government under Mitterrand was, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
committed to protecting workers rights. As a result retirement was set at 60 
years, a new shorter working week and fifth week of paid holiday were 
introduced while union rights were guaranteed and state-funded work and 
schemes of social protection (pensions, family allowances, and unemployment 
benefits) were extended (Whiteside 1999).    
 
In addition, during the 1980s, political powers were decentralised and 
Métropoles d‘Equilibre were established to correct geographical inequalities and 
encourage economic development around regional centres. The intention of the 
policy was not purely to redistribute growth away from Paris.  It also sought to 
counter the costs of deindustrialisation such as unemployment and draw inward 
investment to the blighted regions, such as Nord-Pas-de-Calais (NPdC). The 
decentralisation of 1982 was also important in strengthening the role of the 
regions in planning their own future economic development and infrastructure 
(Balchin et al. 1999; Hall & Tewder-Jones 2002). 
 
Although, in 1986, the new right-wing government of Chirac facilitated a 
programme of deregulation and privatisation, France, in light of the new terms 
of employment associated with increased flexibility, continued as Whiteside 
notes:  
 
―to codify the new terms of employment resulting from extensions in 
labour market flexibilities, to reinforce mutual obligation by 
mediating the possible consequences by sustaining the marriage 
between work contract and social protection. This objective also 
underpins wider social policies which have been introduced to shore 
up employment: the programmes of social insertion for the 
disadvantaged, the extension of subsidies to employers creating 
jobs…‖ (2000:21) 
Since the 1990s, reforms have been effectively neoliberal in their challenge to 
the established social protection system. However, the French social welfare 
system is often considered to be one of the most ―immovable objects‖ in French 
political life (Pierson 1998:558). In 1995, Prime Minister Juppé attempted to 
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introduce the Juppé plan: austerity measures which proposed an extensive 
program of welfare cutbacks, intended to reduce the budget deficit as required 
by the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. It provoked the biggest social conflict since May 
1968.  On 23rd November of that year, public sector employees (of SNCF, RATP 
etc.) decided to go on strike, and the strikes continued until 22nd December, 
1995. Although the Juppé plan was effectively abandoned it was, in Palier‘s 
words: ―a pivotal phase or moment in the changes in government in intervention 
in the area of social protection‖ (2006:13).  
2.7 Conclusion 
In Germany and France, the vast majority of (male) workers were better 
protected than in the UK during periods of deindustrialisation. For example, in 
Germany in the mid-1970s income replacement rates were 70 per cent for the 
standard pensioner: as such, few had to rely on social assistance. Seventy per 
cent of unemployed workers received insurance benefits equal to 68 per cent of 
prior net earnings. Moreover, there was less pressure to accept a job with a 
lower income or in a different field (Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2011).  In France, net 
replacement rates were roughly 80 per cent for pensioners while unemployment 
insurance could offer a 72 per cent replacement rate for minimum wage workers 
and a 90 per cent replacement rate for laid-off workers (Daniel & Tuchszirer 
1999). The stagflation and slow rates of growth associated with the era of 
deindustrialisation led to an increase in the neoliberal tendency in all three 
countries but this trend was much more marked in the UK. Broadly speaking, a 
new emphasis in welfare state policy emerged. Whereas the traditional welfare 
state ostensibly sought to protect people from the market, the ‗new‘ welfare 
state sought to integrate people into the market. Post-industrialism created new 
social risks for the welfare state: long-term unemployment; low skills; 
feminisation of labour market; reduced social security; reconciling work and 
family life. These changes occurred first in the UK. In light of increasing 
pressures such as fiscal instability, political uncontrollability and diminished 
social solidarity, governments are, to varying degrees of commitment and 
success, realigning welfare states to the new risk structures. 
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3. Appendix B: Notes, definitions and sources for data presented in the thesis 
Figure Description Definition Sources and notes 
Figure 1.1 Map showing location of WCS region.  Map produced using boundaries provided with 
ESRI ArcGIS 9 software. 
Figure 1.2 Male life expectancy at birth, WCS and ten 
post-industrial regions. 
Male life expectancy at birth using Chiang (II) 
methodology. 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (CépiDc, Institut National de 
la Santé et de la Recherche 
Médicale(INSERM).Data made available for 
individual years: 1983; 1987; 1991; 1995; 1999; 
and 2003. Data imputed for years where no 
data was available). 
Katowice (Department of Cancer Epidemiology 
and Prevention, Cancer Centre and Institute of 
Oncology, Warsaw: 1975-2005). 
N. Moravia (Institute of Health Information and 
Statistics of the Czech Republic, 1991-2005). 
Limburg (CBS Statsline; GGD Nederland, 
Utrecht, 1996-2005). 
Merseyside (ONS, 1988-2005). 
Swansea & S. Wales Coalfields (ONS, 1988-
2005). 
WCS (GROS, 1982-2005). 
N. Ireland (NISRA, 1979-2005). 
Ruhr area (North Rhine-Westphalia Institute for 
Health and Work (LIGA), 1990-2005). 
Saxony (Statistical Office of Free State of 
Saxony, 1983-2005). 
Saxony-Anhalt (Statistical Office Saxony Anhalt, 
1995-2005). 
Wallonia (Scientific Institute of Public Health, 
Centre of Operational Research of Public 
Health, Brussels, 1987-1997) 
Figure 1.3 All-cause mortality: EASRs (3 year rolling 
averages) 1980-2005, working-age 15-44, 
males; WCS in context of maximum, 
minimum and mean rates for selected 
European regions. 
Male European age-standardised mortality rates per 
100,000 people aged 15-44. 
See above 
Figure 1.4 Chronic liver disease & cirrhosis mortality: Male European age-standardised mortality rates per See above 
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EASRs (3 year rolling averages) 1980-2005, 
working-age 15-44, males; WCS in context 
of maximum, minimum and mean rates for 
selected European regions. 
100,000 people. Causes of death included in the 
chronic liver disease & cirrhosis were: 571 (ICD 9) 
and K70, K73, K74, K76 (ICD 10). 
Figure 1.5 Evans & Stoddart (1990) Model of the 
Determinants of Health. 
 Evans, R. & Stoddart, G.  (1990) Producing 
health, consuming health care. Social Science 
and Medicine, 31(12):1347-63. 
Figure 2.1 % industrial employment lost, ‗base year‘ to 
2005. 
 
Absolute change in the number of industrial 
employees for each region, between the base year 
and 2005, expressed a percentage. 
Base year data: Eurostat Regional Statistics 
Yearbook, 1971 (all Western European regions 
except: the Ruhr (Regionalverband Ruhr); 
Northern Ireland (Department of Manpower 
Services9); and UK regions (Linking Censuses 
through Time 
(http://cdu.mimas.ac.uk//software/lct/). 
Other sources: Eurostat (Saxony); Czech 
Statistical Office (Northern Moravia) and Polish 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) Regional 
Statistics Yearbook 198110 (Katowice). 2005 
data: Eurostat On-line Database; Annual 
Population Survey (UK regions); Czech 
Statistical Office (Northern Moravia); and the 
Polish CSO Regional Data Bank. 
Figure 3.1  Industrial employment as percentage of 
civilian labour force: UK, France, Germany, 
Poland and Czech Republic  
Level of industrial employment  OECD statistical database  
Figure 3.2 Unemployment as percentage of civilian 
labour force: UK, France, Germany, Poland 
and Czech Republic. 
Level of unemployment  See above 
Figure 3.3 Unemployed as a percentage of 
economically active population in selected 
host countries for years: 2008 and 2011.  
ILO unemployed as a percentage of economically 
active population aged 15+ (16+ for UK areas). 
WCS (Annual Population Survey). German 
regions (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der 
Länder) N. Moravia (Czech Statistical Office). 
All other regions (Eurostat). 
Figure 3.4  Percentage of men aged 25-49 not in 
employment: 2001. 
Calculated as: (Total men aged 25-49 resident in 
region - Total men aged 25-49 in employment)/Total 
men aged 25-49 resident in region. 
All regions except Silesia: Eurostat Regional 
Statistics, Census: Regional level census 2001 
round. Total residents figure from population 
structure folder, residents in employment 
figure from active population folder. Silesia 
data from the Central Statistical Office of 
Poland (GUS). 
Figure 3.5 At risk of poverty rates for working age Calculated as 60% of median equivalised income Eurostat database 2011 
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 adults not in employment in selected host 
countries: 1995-210. 
after social transfers 
Figure 3.6 Income inequality over time in Scotland and 
selected host countries: 1984-2004. 
 
Gini Coefficient (from 0-1), with 0 indicating 
maximum equality of income distribution and 1 
maximum inequality. LIS method uses the ‗square 
root scale‘ 
method: household disposable income was 
divided by the square root of the number of people 
in each household and this new set of income figures 
was then used to produce Gini Coefficient estimates. 
Luxemburg Income Study for all countries: 2004 
data except France (2005) 
Figure 3.7 Percentage of adults aged 25-64 with ISCED 
tertiary level qualifications. 
Percentage of adults aged 25-64 with tertiary level 
qualifications. (Level 5-6: Degree/NVQ level 4/5 
level qualifications and above).  
Eurostat database 2008 
Proxy geographies used: South Western 
Scotland (WCS), North-Rhine Westphalia (Ruhr 
area), West Wales & the Valleys (Swansea & S. 
Wales Valleys). 
Figure 3.8 Percentage of adults aged 25-64 with 
<ISCED Level 3 qualifications. 
Percentage of adults aged 25-64 with qualifications 
at levels 0-2 (Level 0-2: No qualifications to NVQ 
Level1). 
See above 
Figure 3.9 Percentage of households with children 
headed by a lone parent. 
Lone parent households as a percentage of all 
households with children, regardless of 
age/dependent status of children, except for Nord-
pas-de-Calais, Northern Moravia and Ruhr area. 
For Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Northern Moravia, figure 
shown is lone parent households with dependent 
children (< 25 years of age) as a percentage of all 
households with dependent children (< 25 years of 
age). For Ruhr, Urban Audit figure for 2001 (which 
excludes households with children aged 18+) was 
adjusted using published data on North-Rhine 
Westphalia on percentage of lone parent families as 
percentage of all families (19.9%) and lone parent 
families with children < 18 as percentage of all 
families with dependent children < 18 (16.6%) in 
2006. 
Silesia (Central Statistical Office of Poland 
(GUS) Census of Population and Housing 2002). 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Recensement de la 
Population 1999). 
N. Moravia (CSO Population and Housing Census 
2001). 
WCS (GROS Census of Population 2001). 
Ruhr area (Urban Audit 2001). 
Figure 3.10 Percentage of households with dependent 
children headed by a lone parent 1990-91 to 
1999-01, selected European regions. 
Lone parent households with dependent children as a 
percentage of all households with dependent 
children. Note this uses the dependent children 
definition to allow time series comparisons. 
Dependent children are defined as: Age 0-25 and 
economically inactive (N. Moravia); Unmarried 
N. Moravia (CSO Population and Housing Census 
1991 and 2001).  
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (INSEE Recensement de la 
Population 1990 and 1999). 
Ruhr area (Urban Audit, 1991 and 2001). 
WCS (GROS Census of Population 1991 and 
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children living with their parents and under 25 years 
old (Nord-Pas-de-Calais); Aged 0-15 or aged 16-18 if 
in full-time education (WCS). Aged 0-18 and living 
with their parents (Ruhr area). 
2001). 
Figure 3.11 Percentage of single person households, 
1999-2002. 
Single person households as a percentage of all 
households.  
Silesia (Central Statistical Office of Poland 
(GUS) Census of Population and Housing 2002). 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Recensement de la 
Population 1999). 
N. Moravia (CSO Population and Housing Census 
2001). 
WCS (GROS Census of Population 2001) 
Ruhr area (Urban Audit 2001). 
Figure 3.12 Percentage of single person households 
1990-91 to 1999-01, selected European 
regions. 
See above N. Moravia (CSO Population and Housing Census 
1991 and 2001). 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (INSEE Recensement de la 
Population 1990 and 1999). 
Ruhr area (Urban Audit, 1991 and 2001). 
WCS (GROS Census of Population 1991 and 
2001). 
Figure 3.13 Percentage of adults aged 25-64 who were 
married: c. 2001. 
Calculated as: (Adults aged 25-64 married or 
separated/Total adults aged 25-64)*100. 
Eurostat. Note that the GROS/ONS published 
data excludes those legally separated from 
marriage data. 
Figure 3.14 Religious participation. Percentage of adults aged 15+ who never attend 
religious ceremonies apart from special occasions. 
(For WCS, percentage of adults aged 18+ who never 
or practically never attend church apart from special 
occasions, varies too much to say, refused or not 
answered excluded from base). 
 
WCS (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2007). All 
other regions (European Social Survey Rounds 1 
– 4 combined). *Excluding those unable to 
attend. 
Proxy geographies used: North-Rhine 
Westphalia (Ruhr area). 
Figure 3.15 Political participation. Voter turnout at national parliamentary elections, c. 
2005-07.  
North-Rhine-Westphalia (Federal Returning 
Officer, 2005). 
N. Moravia (Czech Statistical Office, 2006). 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (French Ministry of the 
Interior, 2007). 
WCS (UK Electoral Commission, 2005). 
Slaskie (National Electoral Commission, 2007). 
Proxy geographies used: North-Rhine 
Westphalia (Ruhr area). 
Figure 3.16 Political participation. Voter turnout at national parliamentary elections, 
selected European regions: 1990-93 to 2005-07. 
North-Rhine-Westphalia (Federal Returning 
Officer). 
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Nord-Pas-de-Calais (French Ministry of the 
Interior; lefigaro.fr). 
WCS (UK Electoral Commission). 
N. Moravia (Czech Statistical Office) 
Parliamentary Election data years used were: 
1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005 for UK. 1993, 1998, 
2002 and 2007 for France. 1990, 1998, 2002 and 
2005 for Germany. 1992, 1998, 2002 and 2006 
for the Czech Republic. 
Figure 3.17 Male smoking rates. Percentage of adult males smoking at least one 
cigarette daily. Age bands were as follows: 
North-Rhine-Westphalia, 15+ 
WCS, 16+ 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 15-75 
South Poland, 15+ 
WCS, 16+ 
 
North-Rhine-Westphalia (German Microcensus, 
2005). 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Insee, Conseil régional, 
Drass, ORS, Cresge - Enquête Santé, 2002-03). 
WCS (Scottish Household Survey 2003-04). 
S. Poland (GATS Poland, 2009-2010). 
Proxy geographies used: S. Poland (Silesia), 
North-Rhine Westphalia (Ruhr area). 
Figure 3.18 Female smoking rates. Percentage of adult females smoking at least one 
cigarette daily. Age bands were same as for males 
(see above). 
See above 
Figure 3.19 % adult population not drinking during last 
year. 
Special Eurobarometer: Attitudes towards Alcohol, 
2006; and Scottish Health Survey (SheS) 2003. 
SHeS 2003 defines adults as aged 16+, while 
Eurobarometer defines adults as aged 15+. 
Figure 3.20 % adult population drinking alcohol daily. See above NB (and as noted in main report) Scottish data 
are based on a much shorter time period than 
that reported in the Special Eurobarometer – 
consumption over a week compared to 
consumption over a month – which may impact 
on figures presented. SHeS 2003 defines adults 
as aged 16+, while Eurobarometer defines 
adults as aged 
15+. 
Figure 3.21 Percentage of births to mothers under the 
age of 20.  
(All live births where mother aged <20/All live 
births) * 100. 
N. Moravia (CSO Regional Yearbooks 2005-06). 
WCS (GROS 2005-06). 
All other regions (Eurostat 2005-06). 
Note: Figure for Ruhr area is an estimate based 
on data for Dusseldorf, Munster & Arnsberg. 
Figure 3.22 Occupations of employed population 
selected countries: 2007. 
 Eurostat database 2008 
Figure 4.1 Unemployment rates WCS and Ruhr. Standardised Overman and Puga (S.W Scotland, 1986-
96) trends in unemployment rates (as percentage of 
South West Scotland used as proxy for WCS 
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economically active adults), South Western Scotland 
and the Ruhr area. 
Figure 4.2 Male employment rates WCS and Ruhr. Crude male employment rate=All males in 
employment/all males aged 15-64, except for 1986-
1991 WCS when rates directly calculated from 
Labour Force Survey 
WCS Population data Mid- year population 
estimates, GROS. Employment data 1995-2003: 
total in employment (Labour Force Survey); 
2005 (Annual Population Survey) Ruhr area 
Population data 
1980-2005: North-Rhine Westphalia Institute for 
Work and Health (LIGA) 
Employment data 1979-2005: employees in 
employment (Regionalverband Ruhr). 
Figure 4.3 Female employment rates WCS and Ruhr. Crude female employment rate=All See above 
females in employment/all males aged 15-64. 
See above 
Figure 4.4 Percentage of working-age adults by highest 
banded ISCED education attainment level 
achieved. WCS and Ruhr. 
ISCED 0-2, 3-4 and 5-6. Annual Population Survey 
January-December 2005 (WCS). Scottish data 
mapped to ISCED as follows: No qualifications & NVQ 
1: ISCED Level 0-2 NVQ Level 2, 3 & Trade 
apprenticeships: ISCED 3-4. NVQ 4+ and other: ISCED 
5-6. 
Urban Audit 2003-06 for the Ruhrgebeit LUZ, 
via Eurostat (Ruhr area). Annual Population 
Survey January-December 2005 (WCS).  
Age bands 16-64. 
Figure 4.5 Frequency of adult drinking WCS and Ruhr. Percentage of adults aged 45-74 exceeding 21/14 
units of alcohol a week, by gender, Mulheim, 
Bochum & Essen (2000-03) and Greater Glasgow 
(2003). 
Heinz Nixdorf Recall Study (Mulheim, 
Bochum & Essen) and Scottish Health 
Survey 2003 (Greater Glasgow). 
Figure 4.6 Percentage of population living in relative 
poverty WCS and Ruhr. 
Relative poverty (< 60% of median national income). 
Lemmi et al. Regional Indicators to reflect social 
exclusion and poverty VT/2003/43. Original source is 
the European Community Household Panel, pooled 
data from 1994-01 inclusive.  
South Western Scotland used as proxy for WCS. 
NUTS II Relative poverty rates calculated by 
national figure 
Figure 4.7 Income inequality WCS and North-Rhine-
Westphalia. 
Gini coefficient for household incomes.  
 
Luxemburg Income Study 2004 (North-Rhine-
Westphalia). Scottish Household Survey 2003-04 
(WCS). 
Figure 5.1 Unemployment rates WCS and Nord-Pas-de-
Calais.  
Unemployment rates as percentage of economically 
active adults. Age bands for WCS are 16+ for 1981, 
1991 and 2006, 16-74 in 2001. 
Age bands for NPdC adults aged 15+ for all time 
points 
GRO (S) Census of Population 1981, 1991 and 
2001, Annual Population Survey 2006 (WCS). 
INSEE recensement (Census of Population) 
1982, 1990, 1999 and 2006 (NPdC). 
Figure 5.2 Male employment rates WCS and Nord-Pas-
de-Calais. 
All males in employment/all males aged 15- 64, 
except for 1986-91 WCS when rates directly 
calculated from Labour Force Survey. 
WCS: 1981, 1986-1991: directly calculated 
employment rates for 15-64 year olds (Labour 
Force Survey) Population data 1981-2005: Mid- 
year population estimates, GROS. Employment 
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data 1993-2003: total in employment (Labour 
Force Survey); 2005 (Annual Population 
Survey). 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais: Population data 
1981, 1983-2005: Eurostat INSEE recensement 
(Census of Population) 1982. Employment data 
1982: working (Census of Population) 1981, 
1983-2005: total in employment, including self-
employed and armed forces (Eurostat). 
 
Note: Central Clydeside Conurbation used as 
proxy for WCS for 1986- 
1991. 1993-2005: LGF definition. 
Figure 5.3 Female employment rates WCS and Nord-
Pas-de-Calais. 
All females in employment/all males aged 15-64, 
except for 1986-1991 WCS when rates directly 
calculated from Labour Force Survey. 
See above 
Figure 5.4 NEET % of WCS and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Percentage of young men and women (aged 16-24) 
not in education, employment or training (NEET) in 
WCS and 
NPdC, 1999-01. 
Census of Population 2001 (WCS). INSEE 
recensement (Census of Population) 1999 
(NPdC). 
NEET categories included all those 
unemployed, retired or other inactive 
(excluding economically inactive students). 
 
Figure 5.5 Frequency of alcohol consumption, adult 
males Greater Glasgow and Nord-Pas-de-
Calais. 
Greater Glasgow Health and Wellbeing Survey 2005 
(WCS). Insee, Conseil régional, Drass, ORS, Cresge - 
Enquête Santé 2002-2003 (NPdC). 
Greater Glasgow used as proxy for WCS: adults 
aged 15+ for NPdC and adults aged 16+ for 
Greater Glasgow. 
Figure 5.6 Frequency of alcohol consumption, adult 
females Greater Glasgow and Nord-Pas-de-
Calais. 
See above See above 
Figure 5.7 Percentage of population living in relative 
poverty WCS and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
Relative poverty (< 60% of median national income). 
Lemmi et al. Regional Indicators to reflect social 
exclusion and poverty VT/2003/43. Final Report. 
Household Panel, pooled data from 1994-01 
inclusive. 
South Western Scotland used as proxy for WCS. 
NUTS II Relative poverty rates calculated by 
national figure.  
Figure 5.8 Income inequality WCS and Nord-Pas-de-
Calais 
Gini coefficient for household incomes. Luxemburg Income Study (2005). Scottish 
Household Survey 2003-04 (WCS). 
Figure 6.1 Unemployment rates WCS and Silesia.  South Western Scotland and Silesia between 1995-
1997 and 2006-2008. 
Age bands are 16-74 for WCS, 15-64 for Silesia. 
Unemployment rate = unemployed as percentage of 
Eurostat (South Western Scotland) and Central 
Statistical Office for Poland (GUS) (Silesia). 
 
Note: South Western Scotland as proxy for WCS 
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economically active population. 
Figure 6.2 Male employment rates WCS and Silesia.  All males in employment/all males aged 15-64, 
except for 1986-1991 WCS when rates directly 
calculated from Labour Force Survey. 
WCS: Population data Mid- year population 
estimates, GROS. Employment data 1995-2003: 
total in employment (Labour Force Survey); 
2005 (Annual Population Survey). 
Silesia All data from Central Statistical Office 
for Poland (GUS). 
Figure 6.3  Female employment rates WCS and Silesia.  See above See above 
Figure 6.4  Percentage of adults aged 18-59 living in 
households where no-one worked- WCS and 
Silesia.  
Silesia and Strathclyde region, 1995-1997 to 2003-
2005. 
UK Labour Force Survey Household Datasets 
(Spring datasets). GUS Census of Housing and 
Population 2002 (Silesia). 
Note: Age bands are adults aged 18-59 for both 
regions. Strathclyde used as proxy for WCS. 
Workless includes households where all 
unemployed, all inactive or mixed 
inactive/unemployed. ‗All student‘ households 
excluded from UK data. 
Figure 6.5 Percentage of households with dependent 
children. WCS and Silesia.  
Headed by a lone parent for WCS and Silesia 2001-
2002. 
GRO (S) Census of Population 2001 (WCS). GUS 
Census of Housing and Population 2002 
(Silesia). 
Note: Scottish definition=all lone parents with 
dependent children/all families with dependent 
children. In WCS, a dependent child is a person 
aged 0-15 in a household (whether or not in a 
family) or aged 16-18, in full-time education 
and living in a family with his or her parent(s). 
Polish definition= (single mothers with children 
+ single fathers with children)/all families with 
children. In Silesia, a dependent child is a 
person aged 0-24 years in the family household 
/institutional household. 
Figure 6.6 
  
Percentage of Adult WCS and Silesia. Population aged 15+/16+ who were regular daily 
smokers, Silesia and WCS. 
I2ZARE (original source: Polish Health Interview 
Survey 2004) (Silesia). 
Scottish Household Survey 2003-2004 for WCS. 
Figure 6.7 Frequency of alcohol consumption in 
Scotland and South Poland.   
Distribution of adults aged 15+ by frequency of 
alcohol consumption in last 30 days.  
Eurobarometer 66.2 and 72.3 (pooled data), 
extracted from ZACAT database. 
Figure 6.8  Degree of alcohol consumption in Scotland 
and South Poland.   
Distribution of adults aged 15+ by average number of 
drinks consumed at a single sitting.  
See above 
Figure 6.9 Religious participation WCS and Silesia.  Percentage of adults aged 15+/16+ reporting their 
religion as none, by gender, WCS (2005-2006) and 
European Social Survey Rounds 1-4 (2002/03 to 
2008/09) for Silesia. Scottish Household Survey 
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Silesia region (2002-2008 average). 2005-2006 for WCS. 
Figure 6.10 Percentage of population living in relative 
poverty WCS and Silesia.  
Relative poverty (< 60% of median national income). 
Lemmi et al. Regional Indicators to reflect social 
exclusion and poverty VT/2003/43. Final Report.  
Household Panel, pooled data from 1994-2001 
inclusive. 
South Western Scotland used as proxy for WCS. 
NUTS II Relative poverty rates calculated by 
national figure 
Figure 6.11 Income inequality WCS and Silesia. Gini coefficient for household incomes, Luxemburg Income Study 2004 (Silesia). 
Scottish Household Survey 2003-2004 (WCS).  
Figure 7.1 Unemployment rates WCS and Northern 
Moravia.  
Data show total numbers of unemployed adults 
(based on ILO definition) as percentage of the 
economically active adult population aged 15+ in 
each period. 
Data are shown as three year rolling averages. 
Data for 1997-2008 from Eurostat. Data for 
earlier period from: Overman HG, Puga D. 
Unemployment clusters across Europe's regions 
and countries, published in Economic Policy 34, 
April 2002: 115-147. 
South Western Scotland used as proxy for WCS. 
Figure 7.2  Male employment rates WCS and Northern 
Moravia. 
Crude employment rates, WCS and NM, 1993-2005, 
ages 15-64. Total number of employed adults aged 
15-64, expressed as a percentage of the total 
population of same age group. 
Calculated from data from: Labour Force 
Survey and GRO(S) for WCS; CSSR Yearbooks 
and Czech Labour Force Survey for NM. 
Figure 7.3 Female employment rates WCS and 
Northern Moravia.  
See above See above 
Figure 7.4 Economically active population WCS and 
Northern Moravia.  
Total number of economically active adults, 
expressed as a percentage of total population of 
same age group. For NM, adults are defined as 15+ in 
all periods; for WCS, numerator and denominator in 
1981 and 1991 were adults aged 16+, but in 2001 the 
16-74 age group was used. However, comparative 
analyses show this to have no impact on difference 
in rates. 
GRO(S) and Czech Statistical Office (Scottish 
and Czech census data).  
Note: there are a number of other differences 
in the definitions of ‗economically active‘ in 
the two countries: for example in the Czech 
Republic the category includes those in prison, 
and those undertaking military service. 
However, such differences are unlikely to 
impact on the data presented to any great 
degree. 
Figure 7.5 Rate of smoking WCS and Northern Moravia.  Smoking prevalence among 45-69 year-olds, Havirov 
and Karviná (NM) (2002-05) and Glasgow (2005-06). 
HAPIEE study; Scottish Household Survey. 
Figure 7.6 Degree of alcohol consumption in WCS and 
Northern Moravia. 
Problem drinking among 45-69 year-olds, Havirov and 
Karviná (NM) (2002-05) and greater Glasgow (2003). 
HAPIEE study; Scottish Health Survey. 
 
Note: Problem drinking defined as a score of 2+ 
on the CAGE survey questionnaire tool. The 
four ‗CAGE‘ questions are: 1) Have you ever 
felt you needed to Cut down on your drinking?; 
2) Have people Annoyed you by criticizing your 
drinking?; 3) Have you ever felt Guilty about 
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drinking?; 4) Have you ever felt you needed a 
drink first thing in the morning (Eye-opener) to 
steady your nerves or to get rid of a hangover? 
Figure 7.7 Social Capital WCS and Northern Moravia. Social capital: % of 45-69 year-olds who are members 
of clubs, organisation etc., 
Havirov and Karviná (NM) and Glasgow, 2002/05 and 
2001.  
HAPIEE study; NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde 
Health & Wellbeing Survey.  
 
Note: slight differences in the two survey 
questions: the HAPIEE questionnaire asks, ‗Are 
you a member of club or organisation (sports 
club, church, political party)?‘, while the 
Scottish survey asks, ‗Do you belong to any 
social clubs, associations, church groups or 
anything similar? 
Figure 7.8 Percentage of population living in relative 
poverty WCS and Northern Moravia. 
Relative poverty (< 60% of median national income). 
Lemmi et al. Regional Indicators to reflect social 
exclusion and poverty VT/2003/43. Final Report. 
Household Panel, pooled data from 1994-01 
inclusive. 
Moravskoslezský region used as proxy for N. 
Moravia. South Western Scotland used as a 
proxy for WCS. 
Appendix B 
 
Figure A.1 
 
Male life expectancy at birth: Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia, Bulgaria 
 World Databank 2012 
Figure A.2 Female life expectancy at birth: Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia, Bulgaria. 
 
 See above 
Figure A.3 Life expectancy 1950-2005: Scotland, 
France, West Germany, Poland and Czech 
Republic. 
 
 Human Mortality Database. University of 
California, Berkeley (USA), and 
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 
(Germany). 
www.mortality.org  www.humanmortality.de 
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